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This report is dedicated to the people of the greater New Orleans region; 
to those that perished, to those that lost friends and loved ones, 
and to those that lost their homes, their businesses, their place of work, 
and their community. 
 
New Orleans has now been flooded by hurricanes six times 
over the past century; in 1915, 1940, 1947, 1965, 1969 and 2005. 
 
It must be our goal that it not be allowed to happen again. 
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Appendix A:  Terrestrial LIDAR Imagery of New Orleans Levees Affected by 
Hurricane Katrina 
 
A.1 Introduction 
Preservation of information regarding the magnitude and geometry of structural and 
geotechnical deformations is paramount for the analysis of levee failure modes.  This chapter 
describes the areas of focus and methodology used in laser mapping of surface evidence of 
levee deformation and distress at eleven areas within the greater New Orleans area.  The area 
of focus extends from the 17th Street Canal in the Orleans East Bank area, to the Entergy 
power plant in the New Orleans East area. The NSF-sponsored investigation team included 
two researchers from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), who brought to the field 
area a terrestrial laser mapping tool to perform laser scanning or LIDAR (LIght Detection 
And Ranging) data collection. The laser mapping effort was conducted over 5 days from 
October 9-14, 2005.  An additional day of data collection was performed on March 15, 2006 
at the Orleans Canal Pump Station during a follow-up survey effort to collect high-accuracy 
control point data via differential GPS surveying.  The objective of the laser scanning effort 
was to obtain precise measurements of the ground surface to map soil displacements at each 
levee site, the non-uniformity of levee height freeboard, depth of erosion where scour 
occurred, and distress in structures at incipient failure. Toward that end, eleven sites were 
visited for LIDAR scanning (Figure A-1).  The sites, along with their global position 
coordinates (WGS84 Datum) and the number of individual scans collected at each site are 
outlined in Table A-1.  Because several of the sites are less than one kilometer apart (i.e. Sites 
2 & 3, Sites 4 & 5, and Sites 6 & 7), individual scans from each of these site pairs were 
collected and developed as a single LIDAR model and are listed jointly. 
 
 
A.2 Methodology 
The terrestrial LIDAR method, a 3D laser scanning technique, consists of sending and 
collecting laser pulses from surface objects to build a point file of three-dimensional 
coordinates.  The time of travel for a single pulse return from a surface is measured along a 
known trajectory such that the distance from the laser and consequently the exact location can 
be computed.  In addition, visual data on points located within and outside of the laser range 
can be obtained through the use of a CCD color sensor.  A unique aspect of the LIDAR 
method is the rapid rate of data collection.  The USGS laser scanning system can measure the 
location of up to 8,000 surface points in one second.  Thus within a few minutes, an entire 
surface, be it a structure or levee, can be imaged efficiently with a point file that contains 
several million position points.  The point files from collected scans are typically transformed 
into three-dimensional surfaces so that cross-sections can be generated and volumetric 
calculations can be performed between consecutively scanned surfaces. 
 
The LIDAR technique has been successfully utilized by members of the reconnaissance 
team in a wide range of environments, most recently, for studies involving coastal bluff 
change along the California coast (Collins and Sitar; 2004, 2005), and in earthquake 
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reconnaissance studies (Kayen et al., 2004; Kayen et al., in press).  Complete details of the 
laser scanning process can be found in these references. 
 
In the study of damage to the levee systems protecting the New Orleans area, the USGS 
scanning laser, a Riegl Z210 scanner (Riegl, 2005), was utilized as a tripod mounted survey 
instrument (Figure A-2).  To improve the imagery and increase the efficient transportation of 
the sensor between scans, the tripod was elevated to a fixed platform on the roof of the field 
vehicle.  Elevating the scanner to approximately 4 meters above the ground reduced shadow 
zones and extended coverage of each scan.  Each laser scan collected approximately 2.3 
million data points, scanning an azimuthal range up to 336 degrees and an elevation range of 
positive 40 degrees to negative 40 degrees measured from the horizontal.  The laser was set 
up over existing survey benchmarks where available, to tie the data into georeferenced 
coordinates.  However, for the most part, a separate, local coordinate system was utilized for 
each site for initial data processing.  An additional site visit was made to New Orleans in 
March 2006 to collect high-accuracy survey data to process and georeference all of the 
acquired data sets.  Details on these procedures are provided in this report. 
 
Multiple scans were collected to fill in “shadow zones” of locations not directly in the 
line of sight of the laser and to expand the range and density of the point data.  Processing of 
the data was performed using the I-SiTE software program (I-SiTE, 2005) specifically 
designed to handle laser data.  Specific details of the processing procedures used at each site 
are provided with each location’s summary. 
 
The range of radial target distances for natural targets is approximately 2 m - 400 m and 
at these distances the point measurement accuracy is 0.8-1.5 cm, depending on specific laser 
settings.  Time required for scanning at fine-scale density of points (e.g., 2.3 million targeted 
points) is 4 minutes.  In New Orleans, the fine-scale resolution was used to scan the levee 
sections in most cases.  At the highest resolution, the angular separation of the vertical line 
scans is 0.01°.  Thus, the near-field point separation is less than 1 mm and the separation of 
the farthest data at 400 m can be about 7 cm.  
 
The angular position of the laser-pulse leaving the scanner is controlled by precise 
stepper-motors within the unit. The scanner makes millions of individual x, y, z position 
measurements that together form a “point cloud” data set of information about the solid 
objects that return reflected pulses. The USGS scanner has an optical sensor that records 
reflective color and intensity. With the addition of a color channel, the natural appearance of 
the surface can be draped on to the three dimensional surface model.  Several useful 
applications of the color and intensity channels are to (1) extract non-topographic textural 
information about the target; (2) identify color-based lithologic changes in the target; and (3) 
enhance and identify georeference reflectors that send back the strongest reflected signal.  On 
some occasions (less than 10 scans) during the team’s reconnaissance mission, schedules 
necessitated night-time data collection such that real-color scans were not collected.  This 
only affected the color imagery of the data, not the positional accuracy or resolution of the 
point files. 
 
In most cases, after arriving at a site, the scanner was mounted on a tripod on the roof of 
the field vehicle.  In other configurations, the laser was placed on a tripod on the ground, or 
on its side, for example on the top of an I-wall section to scan downwards into toe scour 
Independent  Levee 
Investigation Team 
 A - 3  
New Orleans Levee Systems 
Hurricane Katrina 
July 31, 2006 
(Figure A-3).  Typically, the scanner is set upright and leveled, with the unit rotating 
horizontally. 
 
3-D laser scanners cannot see behind objects, therefore the first surface encountered casts 
a shadow over areas blocked from the view of the scanner.  For example, it can be seen in a 
scan of the levee at the east side, north breach of the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal 
(“IHNC”, locally referred to as the “Industrial Canal”) (Figure A-4) that shadows are cast by 
near-field objects like the exhumed sheet pile foundation over the debris behind it.  As the 
incident-angle of the laser point decreases, proportionally larger shadows are cast on the 
ground behind the target.  Therefore, to minimize shadow zones and get full coverage of the 
target surface using terrestrial LIDAR, the scanner is moved to a number of locations 
surrounding the target zone (Figure A-5). The levee scans involved 7 to 29 scanner set-ups to 
cover the entire feature and surrounding area and to minimize the number of shadow areas.  
Using multiple setups provided both a convenient way to limit the number of shadow zones 
while also increasing the resolution of the data collected and the boundaries of the scanned 
area. 
 
 
A.3 Georeferencing of LIDAR survey data 
Due to the difficult logistics of the initial data collection reconnaissance, each LiDAR 
data set was collected and processed using a local coordinate system, centered on the origin of 
the first scan collected at each site.  This provided a basis for understanding each site’s 
morphology and for making relative measurements within a single site.  However, this also 
limited the ability to make absolute measurements in terms of other georeferenced data sets, 
including elevation measurements relative to sea-level datums.  A dedicated survey effort was 
therefore conducted from March 13-17, 2006 to collect high-accuracy survey data on local 
control points identified within each sites LiDAR data set.  Survey data was collected at eight 
of the data sets (Site 1: 17th Street Canal, Site 2 and 3: London Ave. Canal, Site 4 and 5: 
IHNC Breaches, Site 6: Lakeside Airport Levee, and Site 11: Orleans Canal Pump Station and 
Spillway).  Georeferencing data was not collected at Sites 8, 9, and 10, and these sites remain 
as locally referenced data sets. 
 
Data was collected on cultural features clearly visible with the scans sets (house roof 
corners, fence posts, concrete foundation corners, etc.) using the USGS’ in-house GPS survey 
capabilities.  Using a network of base stations throughout the New Orleans area, 
approximately 15 local control points were collected at each site with centimeter-level 
accuracy.  A registration procedure was then performed for each data set to transform the 
locally referenced data to real-world coordinates, referenced to NAD83, UTM Zone 15 for the 
horizontal projection, and NAVD88 for the vertical datum.  The georeferencing procedures 
resulted in a registered fit of local to GPS survey points on the order of 10 centimeters, with 
the exception of Sites 4 and 5 (IHNC Breaches).  The georeferenced status for each site 
investigated in this study is presented in Table 1 for reference. 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent  Levee 
Investigation Team 
 A - 4  
New Orleans Levee Systems 
Hurricane Katrina 
July 31, 2006 
A.4 Processing of LIDAR Imagery  
At each levee site, the topographical surroundings were imaged on seven or more 
individual scans, together consisting of many millions of data points. The investigation team 
utilized the I-SiTE surface modeling software package, to both collect the scan point-cloud 
data and allow for post processing of multiple scans into geo-referenced solid surfaces. 
 
After data are acquired, there are a suite of standard processing steps needed to produce a 
surface model.  First, the multiple scans are either locally or absolutely geo-referenced to one-
another.  A least squares “best-fit” match is made between scans, augmented by precise 
survey measurements made with a total station or differential global positioning satellite (e.g., 
real time kinematic RTK-GPS, or Omnistar HP-differential GPS).  Filters are then used to 
eliminate unwanted data.  For example, typically filters are applied to remove vegetation-
related data points so as to observe the “bare” earth. Finally, the filtered data serves as the 
working digital terrain model (DTM) that is used to render a solid surface of the object 
(ground). Again, different surface modeling schemes can be used to fuse and render a surface 
from multiple scans.  The surface model represents a highly accurate virtual representation of 
the ground that can be used for documentation and change detection of volumes, areas, and 
distances. 
 
 
A.5 Data Coverage:  LIDAR scan sites at Levee Breaks within the New Orleans Area 
Figures A-6 through A-13 define the approximate bounds of highly detailed continuous 
LIDAR data.  Considerable data exist outside of these bounds, though they are not continuous 
and may have shadow effects.  In general, point to point spacing of individual LIDAR data 
points within the outlined areas is on the order of 25 mm providing an extremely dense 
coverage of all objects within each site.  However, typical surfaces generated from the data 
are typically filtered to a minimum point separation of 10 to 50 cm when greater accuracy is 
not required. 
 
 
A.6 Analysis Examples of Levee Deformation Using LIDAR Data 
Laser mapping allows for highly accurate computation of rotation, length, area, and 
volume.  Rotational displacement was common at areas of levee I-wall distress.  For example, 
the east side of the London Avenue Canal immediately south of Robert E. Lee Boulevard 
suffered distress and lateral deformation associated with incipient failure of the levee.  This 
movement is along a section of wall diagonally northeast of the west side breach across the 
canal.  In Figure A-14, an oblique image of the distressed wall can be seen from the south. 
The wall, preserved in incipient failure, leans toward the levee maintenance road and landside 
portion of the levee. In the right-hand background, is the bridge abutment on Robert E. Lee 
Blvd for reference. 
 
Considerable vegetation grows along the banks of the canal sides of the levees that are 
less maintained for growth than the landside neighborhood-side of the levee wall.  Thin slices 
of the point-cloud data orthogonal to the alignment of the levee wall (Figure A-15) display 
highly accurate cross sections of the distressed I-wall at London Canal.  Segment (a) is toward 
the south (left) of Figure A-14 and has a modest 1.9 degree rotational deformation.  Near the 
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position of maximum distress, the I-wall has 5.0 degrees of rotational deformation toward the 
landside of the levee. 
 
The London Canal levee failure (west side) and distressed wall (east side) are both 
immediately south of the bridge crossing at Robert E. Lee Boulevard.  A significant gap in 
height between the lower un-walled bridge abutment and the I-wall prevents water from 
overtopping these I-walls.  The height gap differs slightly between the walls located north and 
south of the bridge, due either to differing design heights or differential settlement following 
construction.  At the distressed I-wall section on the southeast corner of the bridge, LIDAR 
surveys and visual inspection indicated the gap at this location was approximately 1.7 meters 
(5.6 feet).  Therefore, water rising in the canal would overtop the bridge abutment and begin 
to flood the surrounding community when the water level was 1.7 meters (5.6 feet) below the 
top of the I-wall.  Figure A-16 shows this considerable wall gap, as well as moderate scour at 
the southeast edge of the bridge abutment (Figure A-16a).  On the northeast corner of the 
bridge abutment near the north levee wall, LIDAR surveys indicate the gap at this location to 
be approximately 1.51 meters (5.0 feet).  Figure A-17 and A-18 show this gap, as well as a 
scour trench at the base of the northeast abutment (Figure A-18a). 
 
There was no evidence of overtopping of the levee walls or erosion scour anywhere 
along this section of the canal except at the gap at the bridge.  The LIDAR and scour evidence 
therefore indicate that the floodwalls along the London Canal section, south of the Robert E. 
Lee Boulevard Bridge were not overtopped prior to failure of the levee wall. 
 
Measurement of displacement along the 17th Street Canal breach can be made by 
identifying the blocks of ground formerly within the intact levee that slid eastward toward the 
landside of the levee.  Figure A-19 is an overview image of a portion of the 17th Street point 
cloud data set consisting of 11 individual scans.  In this image, the bridge crossing over the 
canal at Robert E. Lee Blvd. (also called the Hammond Highway) is toward the upper left 
(north).  A dense cluster of points is visible at the levee breach in the center of the image as 
are the houses in the affected area.  Close in to the levee breach in Figure A-20, the remaining 
I-wall can be seen in alignment with the crest of the replacement structure.  Here, a total 
breach repair width of 142 meters (466 ft) as measured between intact I-wall sections has 
been calculated directly from the LIDAR data set.  A cross section taken through this area is 
shown in Figure A-21.  A multi-section view is shown, consisting of a section of the intact 
southern I-wall overlain over the failed section of the levee.  The geometry of the emergency 
repair embankment is clearly visible.  The sections also show the magnitude of the 
displacement of several earth blocks that moved away from the levee break during failure.  
The LIDAR data shows that blocks translated approximately 14 meters (46 ft) as measured 
from the existing alignment of the cyclone fence line to its new position within the displaced 
blocks.  From the perspective shown in Figure A-21, it can also be seen that the width of the 
17th St. Canal has been reduced about 6 meters (20 ft) by the placement of the earthen 
embankment. 
 
A final example of the use of the LIDAR data is shown in Figure A-22.  Here, the 
dimensions of the scour trench in the vicinity of the east side IHNC – south breach are 
outlined.  This view shows the depth of scour adjacent to the I-wall and into the embankment 
so that a direct comparison of the scour depth to sheet pile embedment can be made. 
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A.7 Summary 
The LIDAR data presented herein present the scope of available data coverage of the 
failed sections of the New Orleans levee system following Hurricane Katrina.  The 
methodology for processing the data has been outlined to provide important background 
information for maps, section views and calculations developed from the data and presented 
elsewhere in this report.  Examples of specific applications of the utility of the data have also 
been presented to provide information on how the data sets may be utilized in ongoing and 
future investigations of the performance of the levee systems. 
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Table A-1  LIDAR Site Description Summary 
 
LIDAR 
Site 
Number 
Location Latitude Longitude 
Number 
of LIDAR 
scans 
Data 
Georefer
-enced? 
1 17th Street Canal N30.0172° W90.1214° 20 Yes 
2 London Ave. Canal, North on east side N30.0210° W90.0704° 
29 with 
Site 3 Yes 
3 London Ave. Canal, North on west side N30.0206° W90.0708° 
29 with 
Site 2 Yes 
4 IHNC East Side, South Breach 9th Ward N29.97243° W90.02194° 13 Yes 
5 IHNC East Side, North Breach 9th Ward N29.97873° W90.02042° 14 Yes 
6 Lakefront Airport Levee Transition Breach N30.03367° W90.02622°
14 with 
Site 7 Yes 
7 Lakefront Airport Levee I-Wall N30.03436° W90.02641°
14 with 
Site 6 Yes 
8 Structural Distressed I-Wall at Container Wharf N29.98614° W90.0272° 20 No 
9 Erosionally Distressed Earth Levee N30.00200° W89.97500° 14 No 
10 Entergy Plant I-Wall Scour N30.00900° W89.93171° 20 No 
11 Orleans Canal Pump Station and Spillway N29.99476° W90.10070° 7 Yes 
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Source:  Delorme TopoUSA 
 
Figure A-1:  The eleven sites investigated by the laser mapping method reside within 
the boundary of Orleans Parish. 
Photograph by Robert Kayen 10/13/2005 
 
Figure A-2:  Entergy Plant I-Wall scanned using the USGS Coastal and Marine 
Geology Team terrestrial LIDAR unit and tripod mounted to the roof of 
our field vehicle.  The fixed roof base allowed for the leveling of the 
tripod and LIDAR instrument on sloping ground. 
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Photograph by Robert Kayen 10/10/2005 
 
Figure A-3:  LIDAR scan system on top of the east I-wall at the 
London Avenue Canal.  Scans of the canal side 
translational gap were made by placing the LIDAR 
on its side so the axis of rotation was horizontal. 
Overturned and 
deformed sheet pile 
Emergency repair 
embankment 
IHNC 
Intact levee wall 
Photograph by Brian Collins 10/12/2005 
 
Figure A-4.  For complete coverage of the IHNC-North levee breach the laser was 
moved around objects that cast shadows.  The sheet pile foundation and 
levee were imaged from both sides to complete the 3-D model. 
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Photograph by Robert Kayen 10/11/2005 
 
Figure A-5:  From another perspective, four separate LIDAR scans can be seen in the 
merged data file, each colored separately to differentiate them (red; white, 
purple, green).  At the IHNC - North Site, 14 scans were merged into a single 
composite file. 
Overturned and deformed sheet pile 
Intact levee wall 
DIRECTION OF WATER FLOW 
Source:  Modified from http://ngs.woc.noa7.gov/storms/katrina/24425575.jpg 
 
Figure A-6: Site 1, 17th Street Canal:  (N30.0172° W90.1214°) 
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Source:  modified from Google maps 
 
Figure A-7: Sites 2 & 3, London Ave. Canal, North 
on east side: (N30.0210° W90.0704°) 
and west side: (N30.0206° W90.0708°). 
Source: modified from http://www.digitalglobe.com/images/katrina/new_orleans_surekote_levee_aug31_2005_dg.jpg 
 
Figure A-8: Sites 4 & 5,  IHNC – South Breach: N29.97243° W90.02194°  IHNC 
North Breach:  N29.97873° W90.02042°. 
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Source: Modified from http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/storms/katrina/ 
 
Figure A-9: Sites 6 & 7, Lakefront Airport Levee Transition Breach: 
(N30.03367° W90.02622°) and Airport Levee I-Wall: (N30.03436° 
Source: Modified from http://ngs.woc.noa7.gov/storms/katrina/ 
 
Figure A-10: Site 8, Structural Distressed I-Wall at Container Wharf:  (N29.98614° 
W90.0272°) 
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Source: Modified from http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/storms/katrina/ 
 
Figure A-11: Site 9, Earthen Levee Section Distressed by Overtopping Erosion at 
N30.00200°, W89.97500° 
 
 
Source: Modified from http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/storms/katrina/ 
 
Figure A-12: Site 10, Entergy Plant I-Wall Scour at N30.00900°, W89.93171° 
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Source: Modified from http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/storms/katrina/ 
 
Figure A-13: Site 11, Orleans Canal Pump Station Spillway at N29.99476°, W90.10070° 
 
 
 
 
Orleans Canal Pump 
Station Spillway: 
N29.99476°, 
W90.10070° 
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Photograph by Robert Kayen 10/10/2005 
 
Figure A-14:  Leaning I-wall of a distressed portion of the London  
Avenue Canal.  The wall leans toward the levee 
maintenance road and landside portion of the levee. In 
the right-most background is the abutment of the 
bridge on Robert E. Lee Blvd. along with vegetation 
on the canal side of the levee. 
Distressed levee 
wall showing 
signs of outward 
rotation 
Photograph by Robert Kayen 10/10/2005 
 
Figure A-15:  Cross sections through two segments of distressed I-wall at London  
Avenue Canal.  Segment (a) is toward the south (left) of Figure A-14 
and has a modest 1.9 degree rotational deformation toward the landside 
of the levee.  Near a position of maximum distress, the I-wall has 5.0 
degrees of rotational deformation.
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Photograph by Brian Collins 10/11/2005 
 
Figure A-16:  Photograph of the southeast abutment of the London Avenue Canal bridge 
at Robert E. Lee Blvd (a), and LIDAR scan of the same location (b).  New 
soil and rock apparently fills scour and sink hole erosion beneath the 
abutment.  The relative height gap between the bridge abutment and the 
flood wall is 1.72 meters (5.6 feet).  Local coordinates are shown. 
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Photograph by Brian Collins 10/11/2005 
 
Figure A-17:  The northeast abutment of the London Avenue Canal bridge on Robert 
E. Lee Blvd. in photograph taken from the lower portion of the bridge 
approach-fill embankment (a), and corresponding LIDAR scan (b).  The 
wall gap here is 1.51 meters (5.0 feet).  Local coordinates are shown. 
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Photograph by Lee Wooten 
 
Figure A-18  Photograph taken directly south and adjacent to the northeast 
abutment of the Robert E. Lee Bridge (a), and corresponding 
LIDAR scan of the same location (b).  A scour trench is 
clearly visible beneath the abutment.  The wall gap here is 
1.51 meters (5.0 feet).  Local coordinates are shown. 
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Photograph by Robert Kayen 10/9/2005 
 
Figure A-19:  Overview oblique image of the 17th Street Canal area in the vicinity of 
the breach. The Robert E. Lee Blvd. Bridge is to the north (upper left) 
and the breach area is to the upper right (east).  Houses within the 
neighborhood breach area and the scour pond were imaged from the 
new levee and Bellaire Drive. 
Robert E. 
Lee Bridge 
17th Street Canal 
Area of levee failure 
Bellaire 
Drive 
NORTH 
Cross-sections in Figure A-21 
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Photograph by Brian Collins 10/10/2005 
 
Figure A-20.  An oblique close-in image of the as built replacement levee at the 17th 
Street Canal breach from the south. The remaining I-wall is visible on either 
side of the earthen embankment. 
Photograph by Brian Collins 10/10/2005 
 
Figure A-21  Cross-section of the 17th Street Canal breach looking northward.  
Measurement of the lateral translation of the landside soil levee from its 
original position is approximately 14 meters (46 ft).  The I-wall in this 
image is offset (out of the page) from the slide block. 
17th Street 
Canal 
Emergency repair embankment 
142 m  
(466 ft) 
NORTH 
Emergency repair 
embankment 
Displaced 
earth blocks 
with fence 
Intact 
existing 
I-wall 
Vegetation 
14 m (46 ft) 5 m (16 ft) 
Original position 
of fence 
6 m (20 ft) 
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Photograph by Brian Collins 10/11/2005 
 
Figure A-22:  Measurement of scour trench dimensions at the IHNC – South site. 
Intact I-wall 
Emergency repair 
embankment 
Scour trench 
1.4 m 
1.2 m 
Existing levee embankment 
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APPENDIX B: BORING LOGS 
 
As part of the field investigation 39 borings were performed at the sites of interest, as listed 
in Table B.1. The borings were performed by Soil Testing Engineers Inc. between 1/30/06 and 
2/22/06, and 4/7/06 and 4/13/06. All fieldwork activities were conducted by members of ILIT under 
the direct supervision of senior members of the team. 
Two drilling rigs were used for the geotechnical exploration: an F-350 truck-mounted rig 
with a 15ft tower (CME-75) and an “ARDACO” bogey rig for sites where access was difficult. 
Both rigs used 4” mud-rotary wash with a side discharge bit. Shallow borings were initially 
advanced using a 4-inch diameter auger.  A small geoprobe was used to auger down to target depths 
for Field Vane Shear Testing in sites that were inaccessible by the other two rigs. 
Three different types of borings were performed: (a) borings for continuous sampling for 
geologic characterization, (b) conventional geotechnical borings selectively sampled for laboratory 
tests of engineering properties and (c) borings for providing access for Field Vane Shear Testing.  
Within the boreholes three types of sampling methods were used: (a) continuous sampling 
with 3” thin-walled Shelby Tubes (ASTM D1587-00) and extruded on site for geologic 
characterization, (b) “undisturbed” sampling at selected depths with 3” thin-walled, fixed-piston 
Shelby Tubes (ASTM D1587-00), where the tube mouth was modified to eliminate over-cutting and 
thus reduce sample disturbance due to rebound (Lunne and Lacasse 1994), and (c) disturbed 
sampling by performing the Standard Penetration Test (ASTM D1586-99), where cohesionless 
material was present. 
The progression of the fieldwork program was based on an iterative process between the 
initial program and the new data as it was being collected from the field. The sampling process 
initiated with the continuous borings and continuous sampling to obtain a detailed description of the 
stratigraphy by extruding all samples on-site.  
Upon completion of each day of fieldwork all boreholes were grouted using cement grout 
and bentonite pellets.   
The pages that follow show plan views of the sites at which our investigation team 
performed borings, showing the locations of each boring.  These are followed by the logs of these 
borings.  Each boring log also has local GPS coordinates (x, y, and z) to help to further locate these 
borings. 
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17th STREET CANAL 
BORING NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
17-CON-1 30.01739 90.12071 -6.5 
17-CON-2 30.01718 90.12112 -2 
17-CON-3 30.0172 90.12118 -2 
17-CON-4 30.01709 90.12109 -1.8 
17-CON-4 A 30.01708 90.12107 -1.8 
17-CON-5 30.01731 90.12199 4.31 
17-CON-6 30.01827 90.12056 -7 
17-CON-7 30.01799 90.12126 3.8 
17-CON-8 30.01826 90.1206 -7 
17-CON-9 30.01705 90.12076 -6 
17-CON-10 30.0172 90.12117 -2 
17-CON-11 30.01654 90.12002 -6 
17-BOR-1 30.0174 90.12069 -6.5 
17-BOR-2 30.01619 90.12143 4 
17-BOR-3 30.01636 90.12075 -6.6 
17-BOR-4 30.01728 90.12197 4.3 
17-BOR-5 30.01639 90.12212 4.3 
17-BOR-6 30.01829 90.12059 -7 
17-BOR-6 A 30.01828 90.12059 -7 
LONDON AVENUE CANAL NORTH, EAST BANK 
BORING NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LAC-CON-1 30.02097 90.0703 -7.7 
LAC-BOR-1 30.02095 90.07031 -7.7 
LAC-BOR-1 A 30.02094 90.06992 -8 
LAC-BOR-2 30.02064 90.07024 -8 
LAC-BOR-3 30.02135 90.07025 -8.2 
LAC-BOR-4 30.01998 90.07014 -8.5 
Note:  Geographic coordinates are based on WGS84 datum.
 B - 2  
     New Orleans Levee Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 
 
 
LONDON AVENUE CANAL NORTH, WEST BANK 
BORING NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LACW-CON-1 30.02044 90.07138 -5.6 
LACW-BOR-1 30.02049 90.07135 -5.6 
LACW-BOR-2 30.02049 90.07106 2.8 
LACW-BOR-3 30.02129 90.07094 3.1 
LACW-BOR-4 30.01951 90.07813 2.6 
LONDON AVENUE CANAL SOUTH, EAST BANK 
BORING NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LACS-CON-1 30.00915 90.06941 -0.15 
LACS-CON-3 30.00851 90.06908 -2.3 
LACS-BOR-1 30.00912 90.0694 -0.15 
LACS-BOR-2 30.07985 90.06931 4.6 
LACS-BOR-3 30.00849 90.06908 -2.3 
INNER HARBOR NAVIGATION CANAL, EAST BANK 
BORING NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
IHNC-N-CON-1 29.97865 90.02022 -3.4 
IHNC-N-BOR-1 29.9786 90.0202 -3.4 
IHNC-S-CON-1 29.97038 90.02313 0.93 
IHNC-S-CON-2 29.97118 90.0227 -2.7 
IHNC-S-CON-3 29.97246 90.0225 -2.3 
IHNC-S-BOR-1 29.97039 90.02315 0.93 
IHNC-S-BOR-2 29.97116 90.0227 -2.7 
IHNC-S-BOR-3 29.97244 90.02251 -2.3 
LONDON AVENUE CANAL NORTH, EAST BANK 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LAC-CPT-1 30.02097 90.07027 -7.7 
LAC-CPT-2 30.02062 90.07026 -8 
LAC-CPT-3 30.02135 90.07053 -8.2 
LAC-CPT-4 30.01998 90.07032 -8.5 
Note:  Geographic coordinates are based on WGS84 datum.
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LONDON AVENUE CANAL NORTH, WEST BANK 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LACW-CPT-1 30.02044 90.07136 -5.6 
LACW-CPT-2 30.02048 90.07104 2.8 
LACW-CPT-3 30.02131 90.07094 3.1 
LACW-CPT-4 30.01953 90.07082 2.6 
LONDON AVENUE CANAL SOUTH, EAST BANK 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LACS-CPT-1 30.00908 90.0694 -0.15 
LACS-CPT-2 30.00797 90.06931 4.6 
LACS-CPT-3 30.0085 90.06907 -2.3 
INNER HARBOR NAVIGATION CANAL, EAST BANK 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
IHNC-N-CPT-1 29.9787 90.02049 -3.38 
IHNC-S-CPT-1 29.97035 90.02314 0.93 
IHNC-S-CPT-2 29.97126 90.02292 -2.7 
IHNC-S-CPT-3 29.97248 90.02257 -2.3 
Note:  Geographic coordinates are based on WGS84 datum. 
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PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER 17-BOR-3
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PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
0.11
AFTER DRILLING ---
0.14
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
GROUND ELEVATION -6.45 ft N.A.V.D.
0.12
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
0.11
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
HOLE SIZE 4"
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
LL
0.11
NOTES
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    FINES CONTENT (%)    
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    SPT N VALUE    
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AT END OF DRILLING ---
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
0
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)
COMPLETED 2/6/06DATE STARTED 2/6/06
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
ST
8
ST
7
ST
6
ST
5
ST
4
ST
3
ST
1
ST
2
OH: Medium, dark gray organic clay with peat.
OH: Soft, dark gray organic clay with peat.
CH: Soft, gray and brown clay with peat and organics.
CH: Medium, gray clay with silt seams and wood.
CL-ML: Medium, gray clay with silt and fine sand, alternating layers and traces of organic
matter.
FILL: Stiff, tan and brown clay with silt.
SM-SC: Soft gray silty sand to silty clay (alternate layers).
93
(100)
92
(100)
53
(100)
67
(100)
63
(100)
87
(100)
80
(100)
38
(100)
(roots)
CH: Very soft, gray clay.
Bottom of hole at 27.0 feet.
CH: Soft, gray clay with alternating layers of silty, fine sand.
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PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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PROJECT NUMBER
BORING NUMBER 17-BOR-4
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PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (West)
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GROUND WATER LEVELS:
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)
COMPLETED 2/7/06
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
0.1
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
HOLE SIZE 4"
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
0.29
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
0.19
NOTES
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
GROUND ELEVATION 4.31 ft N.A.V.D.
AFTER DRILLING ---
DATE STARTED 2/7/06
ST
7
ST
6
ST
5
ST
4
ST
3
ST
2
ST
1
OL: Wood, organic clay.
OL: Dark brown/black organic, half of area is wood.
WOOD: Wood and shells.
CL-ML: Brown silty clay.
FILL: Very stiff, tan and brown clay with silt.
CH: Very soft, gray clay with silt lenses and wood.
CH: Soft, gray clay with alternating seams of silty fine sand.
40
(100)
90
(100)
92
(100)
Wood, roots, organic matter.
67
(100)
35
(100)
Bottom of hole at 27.0 feet.
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PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (West)
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PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, LouisianaPROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER 17-BOR-5
PAGE  1  OF  1
LL
0.12
COMPLETED 2/7/06DATE STARTED 2/7/06
AFTER DRILLING ---
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
HOLE SIZE 4"
R
E
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Y
 %
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
S
u,
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(ts
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0.18
AT END OF DRILLING ---
NOTES at the last 2', drill rig deviated from vertical
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
GROUND ELEVATION 4.31 ft N.A.V.D.
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
1.66
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    FINES CONTENT (%)    
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0
10
20
GROUND ELEVATION -6.6 ft N.A.V.D.
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
COMPLETED 2/20/06
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
0
10
DATE STARTED 2/20/06
77
(100)
Sample# 17-BOR-6-1 was not retrieved so after 17-BOR-6 was completed,moved ~3'
and sampled 5' to 7' with 20.5"/30". Sample# 17-BOR-6A-1.
CH: Gray clay, traces of organic matter, shells.
CH: Gray clay, silt lenses.
Bottom of hole at 12.0 feet.
NOTES
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68
(100)
0
(100)
30
(100)
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(100)
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(100)
ST
ST
80
(100)
100
(100)
100
(100)
93
(100)
93
(100)
85
(100)
95
(100)
FILL: Very loose, dark brown, silty fine sand, moist, with fine pea-sized gravel.
CH: Gray clay, trace of organic matter and decreasing shell content, silt lenses closely
spaced.
98
(100)
Bottom of hole at 30.0 feet.
3" diameter Shelby tubes used. Extruded and logged onsite. At 4' depth, changed to
rotarty mud drill (4"). 5 bulk samples taken.
SM: Loose, gray silty sand with clay, moist, trace amounts of shells. decreasing fines
content with depth.
CH: Gray clay, occasional lens of medium subrounded gray and white sand. Transition
layer of soft gray plastic clay (CH),  moist. increasing trace of sand and shell fragments.
CH: Gray clay, grading to stiffer 25.3' to 26.0'.
CH: Gray clay. Very soft zone at 23.6'.
CH: Very soft, gray clay, trace of silt, very moist.
CH: Gray clay, with trace of organic matter.
CH: Soft grading to firm, gray clay, with trace of organic matter. 2" silt pocket at 14.3'.
SM: Loose, dark brown, silty fine sand, moist, with occasional root mass, and organic
matter.
CH: Gray clay, with shell fragments and silt lens at 13.5' and 13.75'.
CH: Soft, gray clay, moist, with occasional shells and fibrous material and trace organic
matter. medium to high plasticity silt lens at 11.3' and 11.5'.
CH: Soft, gray clay, thin silt lenses, decreasing fine gravel content.
CH: Gray clay, trace amounts of organic material (fibrous peat), trace of fine angular
gravels.
FILL: Shell fill with pea gravel, 1" to 2" subangular gravel, and dark brown, very moist
silty clay (CH).
No Recovery, 2.5" diameter concrete block.
OL: Brown-black organics, moist, trace shells and sand. Changed to 4" mud rotary drill.
with trace amount of 1"-1.5" subrounded gravel
SM: Brown, silty fine sand, moist, with shell fragments.
ST
CH: Soft to firm, gray clay, with trace organic matter.
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
BORING NUMBER 17-CON-1
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
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PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
COMPLETED 1/31/06
0
10
20
30
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
DATE STARTED 1/31/06
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
NOTES 6' East of driveway  of 6914 Bellaire Drive
GROUND ELEVATION -6.5 ft N.A.V.D.
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary AT TIME OF DRILLING 4.0 ft / Elev -10.5 ft
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
100
(100)
95
(100)
100
(100)
75
(100)
95
(100)
95
(100)
85
(100)
75
(100)
75
(100)
55
(100)
95
(100)
40
(100)
ST
4
ST
3
ST
2
ST
1
90
(100)
CLS: Firm, gray sandy clay, fine uniform sand pocket from 34'-34.4'. 100
(100)
CH: Very soft, gray clay, trace of organic matter and  roots.
ST
5
Bottom of hole at 36.0 feet.
95
(100)
SP: Loose, gray, fine, uniform sand, very moist, with trace of shells.
Firm, gray clay, with silt lenses 1" thick. transitions to sand, grading stiffer.
Firm, gray clay, with fine uniform sand lenses 1.5"-2" thick. trace of fresh water (oyster)
shells from 31'-32'.
High moisture content with partially decomposed wood, strong organic odor.
Soft, gray clay, moist, with trace wood and organic matter.
Firm, light gray to gray clay,  moist, with trace organic matter and thin silt lenses.
Very soft, clay, with 1"-1.5" silt lenses, trace thin wood fragments and roots. grading to
stiffer.
ML: Gray, medium plasticity silt. 1"-2" very fine uniform, moist sand lenses.
ML: Medium plasticity, gray clayey silt, grading to stiffer, very moist.
Very soft clay, grading to firmer from about 14.8', trace of fine roots.
Very moist, clearly increasing plasticity and decreasing organic content and fibrous
material.
CH: Soft, gray clay, moist, with organic matter and partially decomposed wood. strong
organic odor.
OL: Dark brown, organic silt, with partially decomposed organic material, thin to 3/8"
diameter wood fragments. Very strong organic odor. Rapidly loosing fluid in borehole.
Water rising from hole or CPT-1 drilled close by. Bentonite added to boring fluid.
WOOD: Damaged tube between 6' and 8'. Changed to 4" diameter mud rotary drill.
grading stiffer and sandier as root mass increases
ML: Moderately stiff, brown sandy silt with clay,  moist, with 1.5"-2" thick fine and uniform
sand lenses and fine root mass.
MH: Firm, brown silt, moist, with fine sand, organic matter and wood.
CH: Soft, gray silty clay, high water content. transitions to clayey silt (ML), grading to
more firm from 18.5'.
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
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COMPLETED 2/1/06DATE STARTED 2/1/06
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
GROUND WATER LEVELS:DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
ST
8
GROUND ELEVATION -2 ft N.A.V.D.
NOTES
HOLE SIZE 4"
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DATE STARTED 2/1/06 COMPLETED 2/1/06
D
E
P
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(ft
)
GROUND ELEVATION -1.7 ft N.A.V.D.
0
10
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
70
(100)
WOOD
OL: Dark brown, organic silt, with organic matter, roots, and fibrous material.
Root-induced diagonal crack zone at 9.5'.
CH: Very soft, gray clay intermixed with black organic silt, saturated, strong organic odor.
Transition to gray high plasticity clay, grading to stiffer, moist, with organic matter, roots,
and wood.
Bottom of hole at 14.0 feet.
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
70
(100)
ST
1
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2
NOTES
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
    SPT N VALUE    
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
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GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
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Drilled to 9.5' with mud rotary.
OH: Intermixing of dark brown, organic silt with fibrous material and organic matter, with
gray high plasticity clay (CH).
Bottom of hole at 11.5 feet.
70
(100)
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
HOLE SIZE 4"
NOTES
GROUND ELEVATION -1.8 ft N.A.V.D.
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DATE STARTED 2/3/06 COMPLETED 2/3/06
D
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GROUND ELEVATION -1.7 ft N.A.V.D.
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OL: Dark brown, organic silt, very high moisture content, with organic matter and roots,
with some gray clays down to 6.8'.
OH: Very soft, gray clay mixed with dark brown and black silt (OH), and tan clay (CH),
very high moisture content.
CH: Grades to stiffer clay, decrease in water content.
End of intermixing zone. Gray clay, with trace of organic matter.
Bottom of hole at 10.0 feet.
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
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PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
    SPT N VALUE    
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3" chunk of wood
Dirty gray, medium grained sand throughout, contains shell fragments.
Gray, softer clay, 1" sized gravel at 30.1'. Very soft 1/2" inclusion of plastic clay with high
water content in filled root track from 30.3' to 30.6'. Silt lens at 30.7', firm, silty clay to the
end of the sample.
CL-ML: Silty clay with organics and roots throughout. Very soft up 18.8'.
Becomes stiffer silty clay.
OL: Organics with wood and odor.
CL-ML: Gray, silty clay. Clay is firm until 1.3' where it becomes softer.
CH: Gray, high plasticity clay with silt lens at 1.1', becomes more silty after 1.1', traces of
black organic throughout and roots at the base of the sample.
Gray silty high plasticity clay with silt lenses every few inches. Large silt lens at 24.6'.
Stiff, clean plastic clay from 25.3' to end. Silt lenses absent in this layer.
Bottom of hole at 42.0 feet.
Firm, gray, silty plastic clay.
Soft, gray plastic clay with even softer zones surrounding roots. Many shells and filled
roots. Shells at 32.5' that is 1 5/8" across. This material is very soft, plastic, and has high
water content until a silt lens at 32.8'. Firm clay from 32.8' to the end.
Roots in very soft clay through to 34.25'. Secondary intersitial clay in root tracks, very soft
high water content very plastic clay.
Stiff clay.
Soft root track through clay until 37', highly plastic, high water content in soft filling.
Silt lens.
SP: Dirty gray sand containing shell particles for last 1".
Clay with wood at 26.3' to 26.4'. Stiffer, gray silty clay with silt lenses. Appears to be fine
sand mixed into the silt lenses from 27.45' to the end of the sample.
55
(100)
CH: Gray clay with wood.
65
(100)
85
(100)
75
(100)
80
(100)
90
(100)
43
(100)
98
(100)
Shells, roots, and organics, strong odor.
CH: Gray clay with black organic clay.
Brown, medium stiff clay with reddish traces and lower silt content.
Gray clay with shells.
OH: Organic layer with wood and black organic matter.
CH: Medium stiff clay becomes softer before becoming more organic.
SHELL: Shell layer followed by black organic traces.
WOOD
Clay, contains mostly crushed shells.
OH: Firm, black clay with wood, silt, strong odor.
Dark gray clay with roots, organics wood and roots for the 1st 3", strong odor.
3" to 6" contains plastic organic clay, shells, and gravel up to 2" in diameter.
Wood at 15.4'
OH: Black organic matter.
FILL: Dark brown clay, thin layer of crushed rock, with shells.
CH: Firm, gray silty clay with silt lenses, grades stiffer with more silt at 9.4'.
First 1' sheared by wood. Large amount of organics and roots throughout.
Wood, concrete followed by stiff, dark brown clay with fine sand.
CL-ML: Firm to stiff, gray-brown silty clay with shells. Red-brown, fill material consisting
of silty clay.
Stiff, gray silty clay, less silty fines.
Silty clay, clay includes reddish brown traces.
Gray silty clay.
CH: Firm to stiff, gray brown clay with reddish traces and shells.
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HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
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PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (West)
PROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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AT END OF DRILLING ---
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13
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1
NOTES
ST
20
GROUND ELEVATION 4.31 ft N.A.V.D.
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
ST
21
ST
3
ST
6
ST
4
ST
2
ST
1
HOLE SIZE 4"
ST
5
AFTER DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AT TIME OF DRILLING N/ADRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
GROUND ELEVATION -6.6 ft N.A.V.D.
ST
7
NOTES 6946 Bellaire Drive
Grading to organic clay, roots, traces of red organic matter, strong odor.
OL: Organic silty matter with tan sand in the middle of cross section, roots.
Topsoil and sediments.
Brownish yellow sand, topsoil and sediments.
TOPSOIL: Organic matter with roots (moist), topsoil and sediments, tan-brownish yellow
sand.
Soft, gray clay, silt lens at 11.4' (~1" thick).
35
(100)
90
(100)
95
(100)
43
(100)
43
(100)
CH: Soft, gray clay with traces of organic matter grading to high PI gray clay with roots
and shell fragments.
40
(100)
Soft, gray clay, shell fragments.
Bottom of hole at 14.0 feet.
Soft, gray clay.
73
(100)
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BORING NUMBER 17-CON-6
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
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DATE STARTED 2/20/06
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)
COMPLETED 2/20/06
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
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MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
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Bottom of hole at 19.0 feet.
CH: Medium firm, gray clay, trace of shells and organic matter. 1" to 2" thick silt pockets.
OH: Very soft, black-dark brown fibrous organic silt with trace amount of roots and strong
organic odor, transitions to gray clays (CH).
CH: Very soft, dark gray and brown, high plasticity clay with fine sand lenses, organic
matter and roots.
ST
1
100
(100)
95
(100)
75
(100)
90
(100)
78
(100)
70
(100)
88
(100)
fragments and roots.
CH: Dark brown and gray clay with lenses of fine gray sand.
100
(100)
WOOD (single core of wood in tube)
OH: Black organic silt, with decomposed organic matter, saturated.
WOOD
OH: Very soft, dark brown, fibrous organic silt, very moist, low density , with significant
amount of wood and strong organic odor.
ML: Very soft, gray, medium plasticity clayey silt, very moist.
CH: Intermixing zone. Very soft, dark brown-black organic silt (OH),  moisture content
increases with depth, mixed with gray clay (CH), and very fine silty sand (SM). Sand lens
@11.5', horizontal crack on interface. Trace of wood and roots.
CL: Soft, gray silty clay, moist, trace amount of roots and organic matter.
Intermixig zone. Dark brown organic silt mixed with very fine gray silty sand (SM), and
gray clay (CH), very low density organics (OH).
Dark brown-black very soft organic silt, with trace of fine sand, organic matter, roots and
organic odor.
OH: Dark brown and black, soft organic silt, moist, with roots and organic matter, trace
amount of reddish-brown stains.
ML: Light gray, soft clayey silt, moist, with organic matter and roots.
Tan and gray clay with silt (CH) and small brick fragments.
FILL: Medium Firm, tan-brown, sandy clay with silt (CL) and trace amount of roots.
Auger first 2'.
ST
2
OH: Very soft, black organic silt, low density, moist, with some gray clay, roots, and
organic odor.
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
AT TIME OF DRILLING 13.5 ft / Elev -9.7 ft
20 40 60 80
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
B
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C
O
U
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(N
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)
GROUND ELEVATION 3.8 ft N.A.V.D.
NOTES
AT END OF DRILLING ---
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
ST
8
ST
7
ST
6
ST
5
ST
4
    SPT N VALUE    
G
R
A
P
H
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G
0
10
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
.25hrs AFTER DRILLING 12.2 ft / Elev -8.4 ft
COMPLETED 2/20/06 HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DATE STARTED 2/20/06
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
HOLE SIZE 4"
becomes firmer, silt content increases
NOTES
GROUND ELEVATION -2.0 ft N.A.V.D.
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
AT END OF DRILLING ---
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
Bottom of hole at 20.0 feet.
GP: Stiff, gravel fill, light brown, silty-sandy clay, dark brown clay, traces of black organic.
CLS: Interchanging of medium stiff clay, silt, fine sand in gray, brown, orange, red colors.
CH: Brown, gray clay with shells.
CH: Gray clay with silt lenses.
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
clay with roots
gray clay with fine sand
CH: Mixing gray clay with black organic matter.
SM: Silty fine sand.
CL-ML: Gray-brown clayey silt, interchanging with gray-brown silty clay, layered with
brown, red lenses.
OL: Black organic matter, roots and wood, strong odor (Marsh).
clayey silt with fine sand, trace roots
OL: Black organic matter with roots.
drilled through wood
WOOD
OL: Organic matter, fibrous (Marsh).
OL: Black organic matter, fibrous, with roots.
SP: Very fine sand or silt lens.
OH: Contact with clay happens vertically (Marsh).
PL LL
DATE STARTED 2/20/06
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AFTER DRILLING ---
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PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
    FINES CONTENT (%)    D
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ST
1
ST
3
ST
4
NOTES
GROUND ELEVATION -6.6 ft N.A.V.D.
AT TIME OF DRILLING 0.0 ft / Elev -6.6 ftDRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
COMPLETED 2/20/06DATE STARTED 2/20/06
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
CHECKED BY A. AthanasopoulosLOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
Very soft, gray clay with fine sand lenses (1" to 2" thick) with trace amount of organic
matter.
FILL: Loose, tan, fine, uniform sand (SP), with brick fragments and trace of organic
matter.
SM: Loose, brown, silty sand, saturated, with organic matter and roots.
OH: Dark brown-black organic silt, saturated, with strong organic odor and light brown
stains.
Extremely soft, black-dark brown organic silt, low density, very high water content,
vertically aligned roots and wood fragments, strong organic odor.
ST
2
Intermixing zone. Very soft, gray clay mixed with black, soft organic silt (OH), very high
water content.
Bottom of hole at 8.0 feet.
90
(100)
40
(100)
78
(100)
58
(100)
CH: Transition to very soft, gray clay, high water content, with  organic matter and trace
of roots.
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
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GROUND WATER LEVELS:
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BORING NUMBER 17-CON-9
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
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LOGGED BY C. Cheung
GROUND ELEVATION -2 ft N.A.V.D.COMPLETED 2/20/06
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
NOTES
SM/SC to CL: Light brown, silty, clayey sand.
FILL: Stiff, brown silty clay.
SC: Light brown to brown, clayey silty sand.
DATE STARTED 2/20/06
CH: Dark brown clay fill.
CL-ML: Firm, dark gray silty clay. Silt to fine sand lens.
CH: Gray clay, silty fine sand lens, mixing with above.
OH: Gray clay mixing with organics.
CH: Mixing gray clay with silt and fine sand, 7'4" cleaner gray clay.
OL: Dark brown organics, roots, fibrous.
CH: Soft, light gray clay.
OH: Mixing of gray clay with black, fibrous organic matter.
OL: Dark brown, fibrous organics.
ML: Wood with silt.
Bottom of hole at 11.0 feet.
FILL: Gray, gravelly fill.
PL LLMC
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
AT TIME OF DRILLING 0.0 ft / Elev -6.0 ft
NOTES
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
GROUND ELEVATION -6 ft N.A.V.D.
AT END OF DRILLING ---
ST
3
HOLE SIZE 4"
ST
2
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DATE STARTED 2/20/06
AFTER DRILLING ---
No Recovery. Recently deposited sediment.
OH: Very soft, black-dark brown organic silt, saturated, with organic matter, roots, wood,
strong organic odor. Bottom is mixed with gray clay (CH).
OH: Intermixing zone. Black organic silt, mixed with gray clay (CH). Extrememly soft, very
high water content with organic matter and wood.
CH: Very soft, gray clay, high water content, trace of organic matter and roots. 1" thick
silt lenses.
CH: Very soft, gray clay with organic matter, wood and roots. Trace of black organic silt,
very moist.
ST
4
COMPLETED 2/20/06
0
(100)
55
(100)
100
(100)
84
(100)
ST
1
Bottom of hole at 8.0 feet.
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
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BORING NUMBER 17-CON-11
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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(12)
4-4-4
(8)
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(3)
SS
SS
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Top- CH: Gray clay.
Auger to 4'.
SP: Very loose, gray sand, saturated. 33
(100)
61
(100)
Bottom- SM: silty sand
80
(100)
SP: Very loose, gray sand, saturated.
Bottom of hole at 25.5 feet.
                                                 *Bottom of hole at 60.0 feet.
Loose, fine, gray sand with shell fragments, strong organic odor.
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PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal - North (West)
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PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, LouisianaPROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LACW-BOR-1
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COMPLETED 2/13/06
.25hrs AFTER DRILLING 5'
CHECKED BY A. AthanasopoulosLOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
HOLE SIZE 4"
R
E
C
O
V
E
R
Y
 %
DATE STARTED 2/13/06
LL
AT END OF DRILLING ---
NOTES Frontyard of 6109 Pratt Dr. (West-outside breach).
AT TIME OF DRILLING 6'
GROUND ELEVATION -5.6 ft N.A.V.D.
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger
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(13)
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(100)
33
(100)
63
(100)
67
(100)
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43
(100)
44
(100)
Bottom of hole at 40.0 feet.
SP: Light gray sand.
Attempted to sample 16' to 18', no recovery, so cleaned 6" and performed SPT at 16.5'.
SM: Gray silty fine sand.
Bottom- CL-ML: Gray, sandy, silty clay.
OH: Soft, dark organic clay with peat.
Bottom- OL: Organic matter, roots, wood.
GP: Gravel fill (emergency repair). Augered to 5' using a hollow-stem auger.
20 40 60 80
COMPLETED 2/14/06
4-5-6
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PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal - North (West)
PROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
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DATE STARTED 2/14/06
SS
SS
SS
SS
SS
SS
SS
SS
AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
0.12
NOTES
GROUND ELEVATION 2.8 ft N.A.V.D.
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger
0.13
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-RoaLOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
67
(100)
67
(100)
67
(100)
78
(100)
83
(100)
80
(100)
43
(100)
68
(100)
40
(100)
47
(100)
1-0-0
(0)
ST
3
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2
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1
1-2-2
(4)
2-1-1
(2)
5-10-17
(27)
OL: Organic matter, fibrous, roots, black to 5", continuous organics but not as much
fibrous mixing with gray clay.
ST
4
Bottom of hole at 35.5 feet.
SP: Light gray, gray sand.
SP: Gray, light gray sand.
SM: Gray silty sand.
SM: Gray silty sand.
OL: Organic matter.
no roots, no fiber. peat and clay. increase in gray clay content with depth.
OH: Dark organic clay, alternate layers of sand, silt, and clay.
MLS: Silt content increases, very fine sand with traces of organics. Increasing organic
traces with depth, sandy silt matrix.
becoming cleaner light gray sand (sugar sands)
CLS to SC: Dark gray, sandy clay to clayey sand, light-brown oxidation root tracks.
FILL: Stiff, brown clay.
FILL: Brown clay.
Augered through 2' of emergency repair gravel.
OH: Dark gray clay, wood, organic. Sample extruded because low recovery.
ST
5
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PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal - North (West)CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LACW-BOR-3
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COMPLETED 2/14/06
AT END OF DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
AT TIME OF DRILLING 6'-6.5'
DATE STARTED 2/14/06
N/Ahrs AFTER DRILLING N/A
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
0
10
20
30
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
0.28
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
GROUND ELEVATION 4.47 ft N.A.V.D.
3.0
NOTES
1.25
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger
1.25
.5
83
(100)
56
(100)
72
(100)
56
(100)
87
(100)
47
(100)
70
(100)
43
(100)
40
(100)
36-41-52
(93)
83
(100)
2-2-1
(3)
2-2-3
(5)
3-3-2
(5)
11-16-21
(37)
4-7-10
(17)
Changed to split-spoon. Used older split-spoon with oxide on inner walls.
Bottom of hole at 41.5 feet.
OH: Black, dark brown organic clay.
Gray, very dense, fine, uniform sand, subangular particles, trace shell fragments.
SP: Light gray, dense, fine uniform sand, subangular particles with shell fragmens and
trace amount of roots.
Auger to 35' depth.
SP: Gray, loose, fine, uniform sand with shell fragments and trace silt, grading denser.
Auger 28.5' depth.
SP: Gray, loose, fine uniform sand with shell fragments and trace silt.
With shell fragments.
SM: Gray, loose, silty sand, saturated.
No recovery. Change to SPT.
SC: Clayey sand.
WOOD: wood or big root.
CH: Soft, gray clay with peat and wood.
OH: Medium, gray organic clay with wood and peat.
SP: Light brown (tan), fine sand. 2" from bottom, trace of organics (?).
FILL: Stiff, brown clay.
OH: Stiff, organic clay with roots.
FILL: Tan clay.
Auger to 2.5'.
OL: Marsh.
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PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal - North (West)
PROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
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CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
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4
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
0.54
0.25
0.17
GROUND ELEVATION 2.6 ft N.A.V.D.
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
AT END OF DRILLING ---
N/Ahrs AFTER DRILLING N/A
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
NOTES 30ft. South of south end of Breach, Levee Crest.
30
(100)
70
(100)
65
(100)
ST
6
ST
5
ST
4
ST
3
ST
2
80
(100)
90
(100)
35
(100)
ST
1
SM: Dark brown, deposited sediment.
ML: Dark brown, sandy silt with organic matter, trace clay, wood and brick fragments
(FILL).
Loose, gray, very fine uniform sand with trace organic matter, roots, and wood
fragments, saturated.
Bottom of hole at 46.0 feet.
CH: Gray clay with trace of sand and shells. Sample not extruded.
Auguered down to 44'.
No sample recovered.
Augered down to 35'.
Auger down to 25'. Drilling fluid added.
SP: Very loose, gray, very fine sand, trace silt, shells and organic matter. Brown stiff clay
lenses.
CL: Very soft, gray sandy clay, with trace wood and organic matter. High water content.
SC: Extremely loose, gray clayey sand, fine, subangular, saturated zone from 6.7' to 6.9'.
SP: Loose, gray sand.
SM: Medium dense, gray silty sand, saturated, fine-subrounded.
Gray clay with trace of organic matter, wood and fine sand.
CH: Transitions to gray clay.
SM: Very loose, dark gray and brown silty sand with organic matter and roots, moist.
Dropped sample. Re-pushed samples and obtained 1.8' recovery.
SP: Gray, medium dense, fine to medium sand, subangular, with shell fragments and
trace organic matter, strong organic odor.
MC LLPL
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PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal - North (West)
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, LouisianaPROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LACW-CON-1
PAGE  1  OF  1
S
u,
 S
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ng
th
(ts
f)
GROUND ELEVATION -5.6 ft N.A.V.D.
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos AT END OF DRILLING ---
COMPLETED 2/13/06DATE STARTED 2/13/06
R
E
C
O
V
E
R
Y
 %
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
AT TIME OF DRILLING 6'
HOLE SIZE 4"
.25hrs AFTER DRILLING 5'NOTES Frontyard of 6109 Pratt Dr.
D
ry
 U
ni
t W
ei
gh
t
(ts
f)MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
20 40 60 80
    SPT N VALUE    
G
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IC
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G
D
E
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(ft
)
0
10
20
30
40
AT END OF DRILLING ---
0.13
AT TIME OF DRILLING 1.8 ft / Elev -9.5 ftDRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
NOTES
0.07
0.06
0.06
Bottom of hole at 10.5 feet.
SP: Firm, gray fine sand with 2" clayey sand layer.
CLS: Very soft, gray sandy clay with wood and clay pockets.
CH: Very soft, clay with 1/2" sand layer at bottom.
CH: Soft, gray clay with fine sand.
TOPSOIL: Topsoil sediments. Sample extruded because of low recovery. Very soft
organic clay.
ST
4
ST
3
ST
2
ST
1
80
(100)
90
(100)
85
(100)
20
(100)
GROUND ELEVATION -7.7 ft N.A.V.D.
.25hrs AFTER DRILLING 1.3 ft / Elev -9.0 ft
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BORING NUMBER LAC-BOR-1
60 120 180 240
0.15
PROJECT LOCATION London Ave. Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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PROJECT NAME London Ave. Canal - North (East)
PROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PL
DATE STARTED 2/10/06
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)
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MC
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
GROUND WATER LEVELS:DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
HOLE SIZE N/ACOMPLETED 2/10/06
R
E
C
O
V
E
R
Y
 %
B
LO
W
C
O
U
N
TS
(N
 V
A
LU
E
)
D
ry
 U
ni
t W
ei
gh
t
(ts
f)MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
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    FINES CONTENT (%)    
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    SPT N VALUE    
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4-4-5
(9)
1-3-2
(5)SS
6-6-5
(11)
ST
2
ST
1
SS
OL: Gray, black and dark brown organic silty sand with organic matter, roots.
No Recovery. Osterberg sampler damaged.
0
(100)
27
(100)
92
(100)
Bottom- OL: Black organics.
SS
Bottom of hole at 22.5 feet.
SP: Gray, saturated, clean, uniform sand, with shell fragments.
Augered to 21ft.
SP: Gray, saturated, clean, uniform sand, with shell fragments, grading denser.
SP: Very loose, gray, saturated, clean, uniform sand, with shell fragments.
Augered to 12ft. Started Standard Penetration Test.
ST
3
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f) LL
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PROJECT LOCATION London Ave. Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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PROJECT NAME London Ave. Canal - North (East)
PROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LAC-BOR-1A
MC
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
COMPLETED 2/16/06
NOTES Front yard of 6076 Warrington Dr. (East of distressed section)
DATE STARTED 2/16/06 GROUND ELEVATION -7.7 ft N.A.V.D.
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
B
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    SPT N VALUE    
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
0
10
20
0.3
ST
1
5-5-8
(13)
7-7-7
(14)
4-4-5
(9)
3-3-4
(7)
ST
3 2-3-4
(7)
ST
4
1-2-1
(3)
ST
2
92
(100)
Drilled the first 4'.
trace amounts of shells
93
(100)
Stopped @3:30pm 02/10/06
Started @10:40am 02/11/06
SP: Light gray sand, organic odor.
Bottom of hole at 46.0 feet.
The night of 02/10/06 rained so rope for SPT on 02/11/06 was wet.
CH: Medium, gray clay with silt seams and shell fragments.
CH: Medium, gray clay with some silt.
Tried to get a sample of clay below sand but sample was sand with clay lens.
light gray, clean sand
gray sand
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PROJECT LOCATION London Ave. Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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PROJECT NAME London Ave. Canal - North (East)
PROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LAC-BOR-2
PAGE  1  OF  1
HOLE SIZE N/ACOMPLETED 2/11/06DATE STARTED 2/10/06
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
.17hrs AFTER DRILLING 1.2 ft / Elev -7.6 ft
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AT TIME OF DRILLING 1.3 ft / Elev -7.7 ftDRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
GROUND ELEVATION -6.4 ft N.A.V.D.
NOTES
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
R
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Y
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) MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
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    FINES CONTENT (%)    
    SPT N VALUE    
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G
0
10
20
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40
4-4-8
(12)
3-3-4
(7)
ST
2
1-2-2
(4)
ST
1
SS
SS
SS
ST
4
ST
3
SM: Gray silty sand with some dark brown organics. From top 2" to 3", transitions with
gray clay with a lot (~50%) of shells about 7" to 9".
TOPSOIL: Augered through first 2' of fill.
CLS: Medium, gray sandy clay to sand.
60
(100)
(100)
(100)
(100)
68
(100)
signs of organic matter and roots at ~13". increasing organic content and roots with
depth.
40
(100)
OL: Organic matter, fibrous.
Bottom of hole at 22.5 feet.
SC: Firm, gray sand with clay.
60
(100)
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PROJECT NAME London Ave. Canal - North (East)
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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PROJECT LOCATION London Ave. Canal, New Orleans, LouisianaPROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LAC-BOR-3
PAGE  1  OF  1
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
HOLE SIZE 4"
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AT TIME OF DRILLING 9.0 ft / Elev -16.5 ft
D
ry
 U
ni
t W
ei
gh
t
(ts
f) LL
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
0.27
GROUND ELEVATION -7.5 ft N.A.V.D.
NOTES
0.37
G
R
A
P
H
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G MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
20 40 60 80
    SPT N VALUE    
AFTER DRILLING N/A
DATE STARTED 2/11/06
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
COMPLETED 2/11/06
0
10
20
1-3-2
(5)
1-2-2
(4)
89
(100)
3-6-7
(13)SS
SS
SS
SS
SS
ST
2
2-2-2
(4)
4-5-5
(10)
ST
1
Did not recover soil, too weak perhaps due to rain of previous night.
83
(100)
67
(100)
44
(100)
44
(100)
0
(100)
82
(100)
Bottom of hole at 19.5 feet.
SP: Clean, gray sand.
SP: Almost clean sand, strong organic odor.
SC: Soft, clayey sand to cleaner sand.
SP: Gray sand with fines.
SP: Gray sand with fines.
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PROJECT NUMBER
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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PROJECT NAME London Ave. Canal - North (East)CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LAC-BOR-4
PAGE  1  OF  1
PROJECT LOCATION London Ave. Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
HOLE SIZE N/A
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos AT END OF DRILLING ---
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
.25hrs AFTER DRILLING 1.5 ft / Elev -8.5 ft
PL
GROUND ELEVATION -7.0 ft N.A.V.D.
NOTES
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
20 40 60 80
    SPT N VALUE    
G
R
A
P
H
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G
AT TIME OF DRILLING 1.5 ft / Elev -8.5 ft
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DATE STARTED 2/11/06 COMPLETED 2/11/06
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
0
10
63
(100)
100
(100)
67
(100)
67
(100)
100
(100)
80
(100)
35
(100)
0
(100)
4-6-10
(16)
ST
3
ST
2
ST
1
0-0-1
(1)
5-4-3
(7)
ST
4No recovery
3-2-3
(5)
Bottom of hole at 17.5 feet.
SP: Light gray, clean sand, strong organic odor, shells seen half way through split spoon.
SM: Gray silty sand.
SM: Gray sand.
SC-SM: Gray silty, clayey sand.
CL-ML: Gray silty clay.
OH: Organic clay, roots.
SC: Gray, fine (sugar) sand with some silt.
CL-ML:  Gray silty clay, trace organics, transitions to gray silty clay.
OH: Black organic clay, roots (fibrous), strong organic odor.
TOPSOIL: Dark brown silty clay, roots.
No recovery.
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Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
G
E
O
TE
C
H
 B
H
 P
LO
TS
  L
O
N
D
O
N
 N
O
R
TH
 (E
A
S
T)
.G
P
J 
 G
IN
T 
U
S
 L
A
B
.G
D
T 
 4
/2
0/
06
MC
PROJECT NAME London Ave. Canal - North (East)CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LAC-CON-1
PAGE  1  OF  1
PROJECT LOCATION London Ave. Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
20 40 60 80
SS
6
NOTES
SS
7
SS
8
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
GROUND ELEVATION -7.7 ft N.A.V.D.
AT TIME OF DRILLING 2.8 ft / Elev -10.5 ftDRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
LL
    SPT N VALUE    
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
0
10
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
AT END OF DRILLING ---
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
.25hrs AFTER DRILLING 1.7 ft / Elev -9.4 ft
DATE STARTED 2/8/06
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
COMPLETED 2/8/06 HOLE SIZE N/A
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE

AT TIME OF DRILLING 8.5 ft / Elev -8.7 ftDRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
AT END OF DRILLING ---
GROUND ELEVATION -.15 ft N.A.V.D.
NOTES ~40ft (?) north of breach on protected side.
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
.25hrs AFTER DRILLING 8.1 ft / Elev -8.3 ft
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
ST
3
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
COMPLETED 2/16/06 HOLE SIZE 4"
Bottom-FILL: Tan clay.
CH: Soft, gray clay with organics.
Auger to 8.5'.
SC: Interface of clays and sands sampled.
Bottom-Loose sand, 3" gap between sample and bottom of tube.
48
(100)
62
(100)
70
(100)
ST
1
ST
2
Bottom of hole at 10.5 feet.
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PL LLMC
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DATE STARTED 2/16/06
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BORING NUMBER LACS-BOR-1
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal -South
PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
G
E
O
TE
C
H
 B
H
 P
LO
TS
  L
O
N
D
O
N
 S
O
U
TH
.G
P
J 
 G
IN
T 
U
S
 L
A
B
.G
D
T 
 4
/2
0/
06
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
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Bottom of hole at 32.5 feet.
GP: Emergency fill.
Augered through first 5'.
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PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal -South
PROJECT NUMBER
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
BORING NUMBER LACS-BOR-2
PAGE  1  OF  1
S
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COMPLETED 2/16/06
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
HOLE SIZE 5"DATE STARTED 2/16/06
AFTER DRILLING ---NOTES ~20ft south of breach
AT END OF DRILLING ---
GROUND ELEVATION 4.6 ft N.A.V.D.
AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
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f)MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
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GROUND WATER LEVELS:
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    SPT N VALUE    
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30
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
NOTES 100ft east from old sheetpile wall
GROUND ELEVATION -2.3 ft N.A.V.D.
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
AFTER DRILLING ---
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
AT END OF DRILLING ---LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
HOLE SIZE 6"
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
SS
DATE STARTED 2/15/06 COMPLETED 2/15/06
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
0
10
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
Hollow-stem auger to 5'.
Interface sampled.
SP: Loose, saturated sands.
Bottom of hole at 11.5 feet.
57
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67
(100)
2-6-9
(15)
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1
ST
2
PROJECT NUMBER
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BORING NUMBER LACS-BOR-3
LL
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team) PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal -South
PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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(100)
110
(100)
55
(100)
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(100)
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(100)
43
(100)
21-35-50
(85)
20-36-50
(86)
11-16-22
(38)
6-6-12
(18)
67
(100)
73
(100)
Bottom of hole at 25.5 feet.
CH: Medium firm, gray clay, grading to stiffer with depth, very moist, with roots and wood
fragments, and root induced channels of small diameters (diameter<1mm).
SP: Dense, light gray and white, fine to medium coarse sand, subangular particles.
Augered 6'.
SP: Dense, light gray-white, clean, uniform sand, fine and grading to medium coarse
subangular particles, moist, organic odor.
Clean hole- auger 0.5'.
SP: Medium dense, light gray, fine uniform sand, with organic odor.
Boring stopped 02/14/06 @14', 17:15. Restarted 02/15/06 @09:25. 0.5' cleaned with 4"
diameter auger.
SP: Medium dense, light gray and tan, very fine sand, very moist with shell fragments.
Boring stopped 02/14/06 @14', 17:15. Restarted 02/15/06, 09:25.
Change to Split-spoon sampler.
CL: Firm, gray sandy clay, saturated, transition zone.
SC: Clayey sand lens.
CH: Very soft, tan and gray clay with trace organic matter and very fine sand lenses, very
high water content.
CH: Stiff, dark brown-black and gray clay, very moist, with organic matter, roots, and 1"
thick sand lens.
SC: Loose, very fine, uniform clayey sand lens, very moist.
FILL: Tan-brown medium plasticity clay, moist, grading stiffer.
FILL: Stiff, tan-brown, medium plasticity clay (CL) with sand and traces of wood and
roots. Reddish-brown stains (oxide) and fine sand lenses.
SP: Light gray, very fine sand with shell fragments, recently deposited sediment. Auger
to 2'.
SP: Gray, clean fine, uniform sand, subangular to subrounded particles, saturated, traces
of wood and strong organic odor.
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PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
PL
PROJECT NUMBER
BORING NUMBER LACS-CON-1
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PROJECT NAME London Avenue Outfall Canal -South
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CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
0
10
20
D
E
P
TH
(ft
)
COMPLETED 2/15/06DATE STARTED 2/14/06
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
AT TIME OF DRILLING 8.5 ft / Elev -8.7 ft
NOTES North of breach, inboard slope of levee, 5ft north of LACS-BOR-1.
GROUND ELEVATION -.15 ft N.A.V.D. HOLE SIZE 4"
.25hrs AFTER DRILLING 8.0 ft / Elev -8.2 ft
AT END OF DRILLING ---LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
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SS
SS 3-8-14(22)
13-15-19
(34)
70
(100)
ST
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CH: Soft, gray clay with 3/8" wood fragments, traces of organic matter, very moist.
CH: Gray clay, grading to firmer, high water content, with root channels and
reddish-brown (oxide?) stains surrounding the channels. These elements appear to be
opened and connected.
Bottom of hole at 21.5 feet.
ST
2
GP: Gravel-repair fill. Hollow-stem auger to 5'. water velocity determined on toe of repair
fill, approximately 30' West.
88
(100)
SP: Medium dense sand. Same material as 13.5' to 15'.
Clean hole- auger 5'.
Clean hole- auger 0.5'.
SP: Loose, light gray-white fine, uniform sand, grading to denser with depth, subangular
to subrounded particles, slight organic odor.
SP: Light gray, uniform sand, very moist, subangular to subrounded particles.
SP: Loose, gray, fine sand with organic matter and roots, grading to denser with depth.
SC: Very soft,  gray fine, uniform clayey sand, subangular, very high water content, trace
wood and roots.
CH: Soft, light gray clay with abundant shell gragments and wood, very high moister
conent, reddish-brown oxide stained root channels.
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DATE STARTED 2/15/06 HOLE SIZE 6"
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
DRILLING METHOD Mud Rotary
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
COMPLETED 2/15/06
R
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 %
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
AFTER DRILLING ---NOTES East bank. Backyard of house on Warrington & Wilton Dr.
AT END OF DRILLING ---
GROUND ELEVATION -2.3 ft N.A.V.D.
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
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COMPLETED 2/21/06
ST
3
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4
0.09
NOTES Middle of North breach (Florida Ave.)
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DATE STARTED 2/21/06
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
AT END OF DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
GROUND ELEVATION -3.38 ft N.A.V.D.
Had to drill on the street because of concrete blocks found ~2' to 3' deep where initial
location of borehole was selected. Augered through asphalt.
OL: Black, organic matter, roots, gray clay.
CL: Dark brown, silty clay, roots, silty fines.
CH: Very soft, gray and dark gray clay with peat.
CL-ML: Gray, silty clay, some very fine sand, roots.
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Bottom of hole at 15.0 feet.
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DATE STARTED 2/17/06
0.42
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
0.19
NOTES South end of South breach (Claiborne)
GROUND ELEVATION .93 ft N.A.V.D.
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
0.13
37
(100)
FILL: Augered through the first 6' to go through placed fill by USACE (fill came from old
levee and was dumped).
CH: Medium, gray clay.
WOOD
CH: Soft, gray clay with organics and wood.
Bottom of hole at 14.0 feet.
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DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
AT TIME OF DRILLING N/A
NOTES Middle of South breach (Claiborne)
GROUND ELEVATION -2.7 ft N.A.V.D.
AT END OF DRILLING ---
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HOLE SIZE 4"
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DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
COMPLETED 2/17/06
D
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AFTER DRILLING ---
Augered through first 4' to get below fill.
roots
CH: Gray clay.
Bottom of hole at 13.0 feet.
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NOTES
GROUND ELEVATION -2.3 ft N.A.V.D.
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa AT END OF DRILLING ---
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
COMPLETED 2/21/06
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger
53
(100)
Dry auger down to 7'.
Top- CH: Gray clay.
Bottom- CH: Gray clay and brown OH, roots.
CH: Very soft, gray clay with peat.
Bottom- Gray clay.
Bottom of hole at 15.5 feet.
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COMPLETED 2/17/06
ST
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NOTES South side of South breach, on emergency fill east of sheet pile.
CHECKED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DATE STARTED 2/17/06
LOGGED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DRILLING METHOD Hollow Stem Auger AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE 4"
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
GROUND ELEVATION .93 ft N.A.V.D.
High moisture content with trace organic matter, wood, and significant amount of roots.
Grading to firmer with depth. Unable to perform vane due to large amount of roots and
wood in sample.
Augered down to 40' on emergency repair fill.
CH: Firm, light brown gray clay with trace of roots and some root-channels with oxide
stains.
Transition to gray clay, moderately firm, moist, with increasing amount of wood and roots.
OH: Very soft, dark brown-black organic clay with roots and wood, increasing water
content. Bottom 0.4ft is wood.
WOOD: Bottom 0.3' tube is mixed with soft, gray clay, very moist. Wood recovered from
5.6' to 8.3'.
DRILLING CONTRACTOR STE
78
(100)
90
(100)
30
(100)
WOOD
CH: Very soft, gray clay, saturated, with large amount of wood fragments and roots.
Bottom of hole at 12.0 feet.
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APPENDIX C: CPT LOGS 
 
As part of the field investigations, 26 Piezo-Cone Penetrometer Tests (CPTU) were 
performed at the sites of interest, as listed in Table C.1. These CPT probes were performed by 
Soil Testing Engineers Inc. between 1/30/06 and 2/22/06. All fieldwork activities were 
conducted by members of the Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT) under the direct 
supervision of senior members of the team. 
The CPTs were performed according to the ASTM D 5778, using an electric piezo-cone 
conforming to the ASTM standards. The pore pressure measurements were obtained at the base 
of the cone sleeve, immediately above the conical cone “tip”, as illustrated in Figure C-1.  The 
sleeve friction was re-zeroed at the start of each probe, and the porous stone was saturated before 
each test. 
The Figures that follow present a series of plan views showing the locations of the CPTU 
probes performed by our investigation team, followed by the logs of these CPTU probes.  Each 
CPTU log also has local GPS coordinates (x, y, and z) to help to locate these. 
 
 
Figure C-1: Typical piezo-cone used by STE Inc. showing the location of the porous filter  
                      element 
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Appendix G:   
17th STREET CANAL 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
17-CPT-1 30.01716 90.12109 -1.9 
17-CPT-2 30.01793 90.1207 -6.5 
17-CPT-3 30.01804 90.12125 3.8 
17-CPT-3 A 30.01805 90.12125 3.8 
17-CPT-4 30.01626 90.1215 4 
17-CPT-4 A 30.0162 90.12155 4 
17-CPT-5 30.01718 90.12108 -2 
17-CPT-6 30.01711 90.12109 -1.8 
17-CPT-7 30.01736 90.12116 0.5 
17-CPT-9 A 30.01636 90.12077 -6.6 
17-CPT-10 30.01731 90.12202 4.31 
17-CPT-11 30.01641 90.12212 4.31 
17-CPT-12 30.01824 90.12057 -6.6 
LONDON AVENUE CANAL NORTH, EAST BANK 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LAC-CPT-1 30.02097 90.07027 -7.7 
LAC-CPT-2 30.02062 90.07026 -8 
LAC-CPT-3 30.02135 90.07053 -8.2 
LAC-CPT-4 30.01998 90.07032 -8.5 
LONDON AVENUE CANAL NORTH, WEST BANK 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LACW-CPT-1 30.02044 90.07136 -5.6 
LACW-CPT-2 30.02048 90.07104 2.8 
LACW-CPT-3 30.02131 90.07094 3.1 
LACW-CPT-4 30.01953 90.07082 2.6 
Note:  Geographic coordinates are based on WGS84 datum.
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LONDON AVENUE CANAL SOUTH, EAST BANK 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
LACS-CPT-1 30.00908 90.0694 -0.15 
LACS-CPT-2 30.00797 90.06931 4.6 
LACS-CPT-3 30.0085 90.06907 -2.3 
INNER HARBOR NAVIGATION CANAL, EAST BANK 
CPT NUMBER Latitude (N) Longitude (W) Elevation (MSL) 
IHNC-N-CPT-1 29.9787 90.02049 -3.38 
IHNC-S-CPT-1 29.97035 90.02314 0.93 
IHNC-S-CPT-2 29.97126 90.02292 -2.7 
IHNC-S-CPT-3 29.97248 90.02257 -2.3 
Note:  Geographic coordinates are based on WGS84 datum. 
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APPENDIX D: STE Laboratory Testing 
 
Soil Testing Engineers Inc. performed a series of laboratory tests on the samples retrieved 
during the field investigation by ILIT. Tests performed included 
 
a) Atterberg Limits, ASTM D 4318 
b) Triaxial Unconfined Compression Test, ASTM D 2166 
c) Triaxial Unconsolidated Undrained Compression Test, ASTM D 2850 
d) Laboratory Vane Shear Test 
e) Consolidation Test, ASTM D 2435 
 
Results of these tests are summarized in the Figures and Tables that follow.  
 
 
  
Appendix F:  Looking Back 
                                                                             D - 1 
Table D.1: Laboratory Testing Results
Project: New Orleans Levee Study 06-1004
3/22/2006
Client: Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT)
Boring No. Depth        (ft.) Test Type Decription 
Compressive    
Strength        
(tons/sq.ft.)
Lateral         
Pressure       
(psi.)
Vane Shear     
(tons./sq.ft.)
Type of Failure  
strain at   Failure
Moisture    
Content     
(%)
Dry Density  
(lbs./cu.ft.)
17-2-1 1-3 U,1pt Att Stiff brown slightly silty clay w/stone and gravel 1.46 - - Multi @ 8% 21.7 100.9 43 18 25 - - -
17-2-2 4-6  top U,3pt Att Stiff dark gray organic clay to gray and tan clay w/ 1/2"-1" silt layer 1.31 - - Yield @ 10% 40.9 75 - - - 72 29 43
4-6 bott. U,3pt Att Medium gray clay with silt seams and layers 1/2"-1" 0.59 - - Multi @ 6.5% 27.1 88.7 - - - 70 26 44
17-2-3 8-10 top
uu,consol, 1 &3 pt 
Att, vane Soft dark gray clay with silt seams and organics 0.26 4.13 .145/.005 Yield @ 10% 47.8 62.8 - - - 74 28 46
8-10 bott
uu,consol, 1 &3 pt 
Att, vane Soft dark gray clay with silt seams and organics 0.88 4.13 .45/.08 Yield @ 10% 47.8 70.7 65 29 36 65 26 39
17-2-6 17-19 bott
uu,consol, 1 pt 
Att, vane Medium dark gray organic clay w/ peat 0.75 10.63 .47/.05 Yield @ 10% 227.2 21.7 405 171 234 - - -
17-19 top Vane Medium dark gray organic clay w/ peat - - .45/.04 - - - - - - - - -
17-2-7 19.5-21.5
uu,consol,          3 
pt Att, vane Soft gray slightly silty clay 0.41 11.5 .28/.01 Yield @ 10% 38.3 82 - - - 38 20 18
17-2-8 24-26
UU 1pt ATT   
consol , vane Soft gray clay w/ alt. Layers of fine sand and    silt 0.41 14 .33/.02 Yield @ 10% 58.4 62.5 86 26 60 - - -
17-2-9 30-32
UU, consol    
Vane Soft gray clay with silt seams 0.35 18.2 .23/.01 Yield @ 10% 63.1 58.9 - - - - - -
17-6A-1 5-6
UU,1pt Att,    
Vane Very soft dark gray to brown peat 0.15 3 .15/.03 Yield@ 10% 199.3 22.4 493 165 328 - - -
6-7
UU,1pt ATT,  
Vane Very soft gray clay 0.13 3.83 .03/.005 Yield @ 10% 99.9 46.5 80 24 56 - - -
17-1-1 14.5-15.0 UU, 1 pt Att Very soft gray clay 0.11 8.85 - Yield @ 10% 67 53.2 78 23 55 - - -
15.5-16
UU,1pt ATT    
consol,vane Very soft gray clay with peat 0.15 8.85 .075/.03 Yield @ 10% 67.9 54 89 26 63 - - -
17-1-2 17-19
U,Cu,1 pt Att,   
3pt Att Very soft gray clay with organics 0.09 10.6 - Yield @ 10% 73.7 54.6 88 28 60 88 28 60
17-1-3 22.5-24.5
UU,consol ,      
1pt Att,vane Very soft gray clay 0.24 13.6 0.14/.025 Yield @ 10% 92.4 46.9 106 31 75 - - -
17-1-4 26.5-28.5 UU,consol,Gss Firm gray fine sand with clay streaks 2.63 15.94 - Yield @ 10% 30.2 86.7 - - - - - -
17-3-3 9-10 UU,vane Very soft gray silty clay w/wood & shell frags. 0.19 5.9 .065/.035 Yield @ 10% 38.1 81.2 - - - - - -
10-11 UU,Vane
Very soft dark gray clay w/ wood & shell        fragments
0.22 5.9 .025/.015 Yield @ 10% 41.8 77.1 - - - - - -
17-3-4 14-16 UU,consol Very soft gray clay with silty clay layers 0.23 8.85 - - 50.9 68.4 - - - - - -
17-3-5 20-22
UU,consol       
3pt Att Very soft gray clay 0.22 12.4 - Yield @ 10 % 67.8 57 - - - 78 27 51
17-3-6 26-28 UU,1 pt Att Very soft gray very sandy clay with shell 0.28 15.94 - Yield @ 10 % 26.9 83.3 43 13 30 - - -
17-4-1 3-5 U,1&3pt Att Stiff tan and brown clay with silt 1.29 - - Vertical @  7.1% 22.3 102.1 33 18 15 34 18 16
17-4-2 9-10 top UU,1 pt Att
Medium gray clay with silt and fine sand      alternating 
layers and traces of organic matter 0.65 5.9 - Bulge @ 9% 35.2 81.5 42 19 23 - - -
10-11 bott UU, 1pt Att Medium gray clay with silt seams and wood 0.62 5.9 - Yield @ 10% 34.1 84.3 39 20 19 - - -
17-4-3 11.5-13.5
UU ,hydro      1 pt 
Att Soft gray and brown clay with peat and organics 0.49 7.5 - Yield @ 10% 128.4 38.6 122 41 81 - - -
17-4-4 14-15 top
UU,1pt Att    
Vane Soft dark gray organic clay with peat 0.38 8.85 .085/.04 - 261.8 22.9 174 66 108 - - -
15-16 bott
UU,1pt Att    
Vane Medium dark gray organic clay with peat 0.54 8.85 .335/.04 - 80.3 40.7 334 125 209 - - -
17-4-7 21.5-23.5 top
UU,1pt ATT,  
Vane Very soft gray clay 0.19 14.4 0.11/0.02 Yield @ 10% 78 53.4 115 25 90 - - -
Legend: U = Unconfined compressive strength ASTM D2166  UU = Triaxial unconsolidated undrained compressive strength ASTM D2850
               Att = Atterberg Limit determination ASTM D4318    Consol = Consolidation Astm D2435     vane = Minature vane shear
Other Data
Sample Identification Strength Test Data
File No.:
Date:
1 point             
LL      PL        PI
3 point           
LL      PL      PI
Atterberg Limits
Classification Data
Table D.1: Laboratory Testing Results (cont'd)
Project: New Orleans Levee Study 06-1004
3/22/2006
Client: Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT)
Boring No.
Depth        
(ft.) Test Type Decription 
Compressive    
Strength        
(tons/sq.ft.)
Lateral         
Pressure       
(psi.)
Vane Shear     
(tsf.)
Type of Failure  
strain at   Failure
Moisture    
Content     
(%)
Dry Density 
(lbs./cu.ft.)
17-4-7 22.5-23.5 UU,1pt Att ,   consol Soft gray silty sandy to silty clay (alt. Layers) 0.57 14.4 - Yield @ 10% 46.6 77.9 34 24 10 - - -
17-4-8 25-27
UU, 1pt Att,   
Vane
Soft gray clay with alternating layers of silty    fin
sand 0.38 15.9 .10/.05 Yield @ 10% 65.8 59.7 72 24 48 - - -
17-5-1 3-5 U,1pt Att Very stiff tan and brown clay with silt 3.32 - Vertical @ 7.4% 17.6 107.4 38 17 21 - - -
17-5-6 22-24
UU,1pt Att,   
Vane Very soft gray clay with siltlenses and wood 0.24 14.41 .125/.01 Yield @ 10% 77.7 54.2 95 27 68 - - -
17-5-7 25-27
UU, consol ,  
1 pt Att,Vane
Soft gray clay w/ alternating seams of silty     fine 
sand 0.36 16.71 .215/.04 Yield @ 10% 42.7 70.7 71 25 46 - - -
LAC-1-1 3-4 UU,3pt Att,   Very soft gorganic clay 0.13 2.95 - Yield @ 10% 123.8 38.7 - - - 97 26 71
5-6
UU,Hydro,    1pt 
Att,consol Soft gray clay with fine sand 0.25 2.95 .22/.03 Yield @ 10% 47.7 78.2 37 15 22 - - -
LAC-1-2 6-8
UU,1pt Att    
Vane Very soft clay w/ 1/2" sand layer @ bottom 0.14 4.13 0.06/.005 Yield @ 10% 51.7 74.1 47 17 30 - - -
LAC-1-3 8.5-9.5
UU,1pt Att    
consol,vane Very soft gray sandy clay w/ wood & clay      pockets 0.11 5.6 .005/0.0 Yield @10% 32.6 72.3 82 25 57 - - -
9.5-10   UU,Hydro     Firm gray fine sand with 2" clayey sand layer 0.29 5.6 - Bulge @4% 30.2 90.2 - - - - - -
LAC-2-4 44-45 UU,1pt. Att Medium gray clay with some silt 0.59 26.6 - Yield @ 10% 86.5 54.5 84 24 60 - - -
45-46
UU,consol,    1 pt 
Att Medium gray clay w/silt seams& shell frags. 0.65 26.6 - Yield @10% 57.8 66.6 74 21 53 - - -
LAC-3-3 7.5-8.5
UU,consol,    1 
pt Att Medium gray sandy clay to sand 0.53 4.3 - Vertical @ 4% 21.8 103.3 19 18 1 - - -
LAC-3-4 9-11
UU,3 pt Att,   
consol Firm gray sand with clay 0.73 5.9 - Bulge @7% 26.6 96.6 - - - 13 13 NP
LACW-2-2 8.5-9.5
UU,1pt Att,    
Vane  Soft Dark gray organic clay with peat 0.26 4.3 0.08/0.01 Yield @ 10% 187 26.7 251 67 184 - - -
9.5-10.5
UU,1pt Att,   
Vane Very  Soft Dark gray organic clay with peat 0.23 4.3 0.07/0.01 Yield @ 10% 158 29.9 236 59 177 - - -
LACW-2-4 13.5-15.5 Hydro Frim gray silty fine sand - - .055/.02 - 27.7 - 22 17 5 - - -
LACW-3-4 10-12
UU,1pt Att,      
vane
Medium dark gray organic clay alternate layers   of 
sand,silt and clay 0.56 6.49 0.26/.03 Yield @ 10% 48.1 76.4 40 16 24 - - -
LACW-4-1 3.5-4.5 U, 1 pt Att Stiff dark gray organic clay w/ roots 1.05 - - Vertical @ 9% 52.3 66.7 90 32 58 - - -
LACW-4-3 7.5-8.5 U,1 pt Att Medium gray organic clay w/ wood & peat 0.5 - - Vertical @ 7% 109.9 41.3 125 49 76 - - -
8.5-9.5 U,1 pt Att Soft gray clay with peat & wood 0.34 - - Vertical @ 8% 125.1 37.5 92 46 46 - - -
Legend: U = Unconfined compressive strength ASTM D2166  UU = Triaxial unconsolidated undrained compressive strength ASTM D2850
             Att = Atterberg limit determination ASTM D4318    Consol = Consolidationtest ASTM D2435  vane = Minature vane shear   
Other Data
Sample Identification Strength Test Data
File No.:
Date:
1 point            
LL      Pl        PI
3 point           
LL      PL      PI
Atterberg Limits
Classification Data
Table D.1: Laboratory Testing Results (cont'd)
Project: New Orleans Levee Study 06-1004
4/8/2006
Client: Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT)
Boring No. Depth         
(ft.)
Test Type Decription 
Compressive    
Strength        
(tons/sq.ft.)
Lateral         
Pressure       
(kips./sq.ft.)
Vane Shear     
(kips./sq.ft.)
Type of Failure  
strain at   Failure
Moisture    
Content     
(%)
Dry Density 
(lbs./cu.ft.)
LACS-1-2 5-7 1pt Att, vane Soft gray clay with organics - - 0.45/.09 - 79.1 - 156 50 106 - - -
LACS-1-3 8.5-10.5 UU,gss,Vane Medium gray clay w/ fine sand @ bottom 0.62 4.2 .29/.03 Yield @ 10% 32.5 78.5 - - - - - -
LACS-3-1 5-7
UU,1pt Att    
Vane Stiff gray clay 1.07 3.54 .49/.15 yield@10% 28.1 91.4 56 19 37 - - -
LACS-3-2 7.5-9.5
UU,3pt Att,    
Vane Soft gray clay 0.47 5 .28/.05 Bukgr @ 8% 50.3 66.2 - - - 116 29 87
IHNCS-1-1 8-9 Vane Medium gray clay - - 0.52/.03 - - -
7.5-9.5
UU,1pt Att    
Vane Medium gray clay 0.85 4 0.35/.01 Yield @ 10% 62.8 62.7 101 31 70 - - -
IHNCS-1-3 12-13 UU,1pt Att Soft gray clay with wood 0.25 7.38 - Yield @ 10% 94.9 46.2 129 29 100 - - -
13-14
UU,3pt Att    
vane,1pt Att Soft gray clay with wood 0.27 7.96 0.15/.005 Yield @ 10% 94.5 44.1 138 34 104 139 35 104
IHNCS-3-2 11.5-12.5
UU,1pt Att    
Vane Very soft gray clay with peat 0.16 7.08 .025/0.0 Yield @ 10% 78.3 53.9 98 31 67 - - -
12.5-13.5 UU Very soft gray clay 0.22 7.67 - Yield @10% 57.2 64.5
IHNCN-1-3 10-12 UU Very soft gray & dark gray clay with peat 0.18 6.49 - Yield @ 10% 67.9 58.1
Legend: U = Unconfined compressive strength ASTM D2166   UU = Triaxial unconsolidated undrained compressive strength ASTM D2850
             Att = Atterberg Limit determination ASTM D4318  Consol = Consolidation ASTM D2435   Vane = Minature vane shear  gss = Grain size sieve ASTM D422
Sample ravialed while extruding
Other Data
Sample Identification Strength Test Data
File No.:
Date:
1 point             
LL      Pl        PI
3 point           
LL      PL      PI
Atterberg Limits
Classification Data
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Stiff brown slightly silty clay w/stone and gravel Type of Failure: Multi @ 8%
Boring No.: 17-2-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 173.86 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 1-3 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 148.06 Cell Pressure (psi) = 0.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 21.66% Can wt. 28.96 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1212.8 Wet Density (pcf) = 122.7 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain Dial Strength Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 100.9 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729025
0.020 32  0.345 0.119 
0.040 36  0.690 0.134 
0.060 40  1.034 0.148 
0.080 46  1.379 0.170 
0.100 69  1.724 0.253 
0.120 96  2.069 0.351 
0.140 118  2.414 0.430 
0.160 158  2.759 0.574 
0.180 163  3.103 0.590 
0.200 183  3.448 0.660 
0.220 208  3.793 0.748 
0.240 227  4.138 0.813 
0.260 248  4.483 0.885 
0.280 274  4.828 0.975 
0.300 290  5.172 1.028 
0.320 308  5.517 1.088 
0.340 327  5.862 1.150 
0.360 348  6.207 1.220 
0.380 362  6.552 1.264 
0.400 378  6.897 1.315 
0.420 393  7.241 1.362 
0.440 406  7.586 1.402 
0.460 416  7.931 1.431 
0.480 423  8.276 1.450 
0.500 428  8.621 1.462 
0.520 428  8.966 1.456 
0.540 
0.560 
0.580 
0.600 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Still dark gray organic clay to gray & tan clay w/1/2-1" silt layer Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-2-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 130.16 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 4-6 top Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 98.84 Cell Pressure (psi) = 0.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 40.88% Can wt. 22.22 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1046.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 105.7 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 75.0 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 10  0.344 0.037 
0.040 35  0.688 0.130 
0.060 59  1.032 0.218 
0.080 80  1.376 0.295 
0.100 105  1.720 0.386 
0.120 128  2.064 0.469 
0.140 158  2.408 0.576 
0.160 171  2.752 0.622 
0.180 191  3.096 0.692 
0.200 210  3.440 0.758 
0.220 229  3.784 0.824 
0.240 243  4.128 0.871 
0.260 259  4.472 0.925 
0.280 284  4.816 1.010 
0.300 290  5.160 1.028 
0.320 300  5.504 1.060 
0.340 312  5.848 1.098 
0.360 324  6.192 1.136 
0.380 333  6.536 1.163 
0.400 343  6.880 1.194 
0.420 351  7.224 1.217 
0.440 359  7.568 1.240 
0.460 365  7.912 1.256 
0.480 372  8.256 1.276 
0.500 378  8.600 1.291 
0.520 382  8.944 1.300 
0.540 384  9.288 1.302 
0.560 388  9.632 1.311 
0.580 390  9.976 1.312 
0.600 390  10.320 1.307 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay w/ silt seams and layers 1/2-1" Type of Failure: Multi @ 6.5%
Boring No.: 17-2-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 196.48 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 4-6 bot Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 160.31 Cell Pressure (psi) = 0.0 
Height (in) = 4.0 Moisture Content (%) = 27.14% Can wt. 27.02 Height Correction = 0.957 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 768.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 112.8 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 88.7 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 20  0.500 0.071 
0.040 43  1.000 0.152 
0.060 67  1.500 0.236 
0.080 90  2.000 0.316 
0.100 120  2.500 0.419 
0.120 145  3.000 0.503 
0.140 155  3.500 0.535 
0.160 160  4.000 0.550 
0.180 167  4.500 0.571 
0.200 172  5.000 0.585 
0.220 175  5.500 0.592 
0.240 170  6.000 0.572 
0.260 165  6.500 0.552 
0.280 161  7.000 0.536 
0.300 
0.320 
0.340 
0.360 
0.380 
0.400 
0.420 
0.440 
0.460 
0.480 
0.500 
0.520 
0.540 
0.560 
0.580 
0.600 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft dark gray clay with silt seams and organics Type of Failure: Yeild @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-2-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 111.12 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8-10 top Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 83.88 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.1 
Height (in) = 4.5 Moisture Content (%) = 47.75% Can wt. 26.83 Height Correction = 0.976 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 711.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 92.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 62.8 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.5  0.444 0.070 
0.040 10.2  0.889 0.109 
0.060 12.0  1.333 0.128 
0.080 13.6  1.778 0.145 
0.100 14.7  2.222 0.156 
0.120 16.2  2.667 0.171 
0.140 17.2  3.111 0.180 
0.160 18.0  3.556 0.188 
0.180 19.0  4.000 0.197 
0.200 19.7  4.444 0.204 
0.220 20.2  4.889 0.208 
0.240 20.9  5.333 0.214 
0.260 21.0  5.778 0.214 
0.280 22.2  6.222 0.225 
0.300 22.7  6.667 0.229 
0.320 23.0  7.111 0.231 
0.340 23.6  7.556 0.236 
0.360 23.9  8.000 0.238 
0.380 24.4  8.444 0.242 
0.400 24.7  8.889 0.244 
0.420 25.0  9.333 0.245 
0.440 25.4  9.778 0.248 
0.460 25.7  10.222 0.250 
0.480 26.0  10.667 0.251 
0.500 26.5  11.111 0.255 
0.520 26.7  11.556 0.256 
0.540 27.0  12.000 0.257 
0.560 27.2  12.444 0.258 
0.580 27.8  12.889 0.262 
0.600 28.0  13.333 0.263 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft dark gray clay with silt seams and organics Type of Failure: Yeild @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-2-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 134.9 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8-10 bot Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 98.05 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.1 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 47.75% Can wt. 20.87 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1034.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 104.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 70.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 19.0  0.344 0.210 
0.040 26.0  0.688 0.286 
0.060 30.1  1.032 0.330 
0.080 39.3  1.376 0.430 
0.100 38.2  1.720 0.416 
0.120 41.1  2.064 0.446 
0.140 45.2  2.408 0.489 
0.160 48.5  2.752 0.523 
0.180 51.8  3.096 0.557 
0.200 59.8  3.440 0.640 
0.220 58.2  3.784 0.621 
0.240 60.8  4.128 0.646 
0.260 69.0  4.472 0.731 
0.280 66.1  4.816 0.698 
0.300 69.3  5.160 0.729 
0.320 72.2  5.504 0.757 
0.340 74.5  5.848 0.778 
0.360 76.0  6.192 0.791 
0.380 78.7  6.536 0.816 
0.400 80.8  6.880 0.834 
0.420 82.2  7.224 0.846 
0.440 83.3  7.568 0.854 
0.460 84.8  7.912 0.866 
0.480 85.8  8.256 0.873 
0.500 86.5  8.600 0.877 
0.520 86.8  8.944 0.877 
0.540 86.8  9.288 0.873 
0.560 86.7  9.632 0.869 
0.580 86.3  9.976 0.862 
0.600 85.5  10.320 0.850 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium dark gray organic clay w/peat Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-2-6 Sample Data: Wet wt. 89.54 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 17-19 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 41.86 Cell Pressure (psi) = 10.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 227.16% Can wt. 20.87 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 702.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 70.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 21.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 10.3  0.344 0.114 
0.040 16.1  0.688 0.177 
0.060 22.0  1.032 0.241 
0.080 26.5  1.376 0.290 
0.100 30.8  1.720 0.336 
0.120 35.8  2.064 0.389 
0.140 39.3  2.408 0.425 
0.160 43.1  2.752 0.465 
0.180 47.8  3.096 0.514 
0.200 50.3  3.440 0.539 
0.220 54.5  3.784 0.582 
0.240 57.8  4.128 0.615 
0.260 60.7  4.472 0.643 
0.280 63.0  4.816 0.665 
0.300 65.3  5.160 0.687 
0.320 66.8  5.504 0.700 
0.340 68.3  5.848 0.713 
0.360 69.8  6.192 0.726 
0.380 71.3  6.536 0.739 
0.400 72.0  6.880 0.744 
0.420 72.8  7.224 0.749 
0.440 73.3  7.568 0.751 
0.460 73.2  7.912 0.748 
0.480 71.7  8.256 0.730 
0.500 64.8  8.600 0.657 
0.520 63.2  8.944 0.638 
0.540 62.5  9.288 0.629 
0.560 61.8  9.632 0.619 
0.580 60.8  9.976 0.607 
0.600 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray slightly silty clay Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-2-7 Sample Data: Wet wt. 139.84 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 19.5-21.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 108.02 Cell Pressure (psi) = 11.5 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 38.34% Can wt. 25.02 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1123.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 113.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 82.0 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.8  0.344 0.053 
0.040 7.7  0.688 0.085 
0.060 10.0  1.032 0.110 
0.080 12.2  1.376 0.133 
0.100 13.8  1.720 0.150 
0.120 15.2  2.064 0.165 
0.140 17.8  2.408 0.193 
0.160 19.8  2.752 0.214 
0.180 22.0  3.096 0.236 
0.200 23.1  3.440 0.247 
0.220 25.3  3.784 0.270 
0.240 26.8  4.128 0.285 
0.260 28.7  4.472 0.304 
0.280 30.0  4.816 0.317 
0.300 31.6  5.160 0.332 
0.320 32.7  5.504 0.343 
0.340 33.7  5.848 0.352 
0.360 34.7  6.192 0.361 
0.380 35.8  6.536 0.371 
0.400 36.5  6.880 0.377 
0.420 37.2  7.224 0.383 
0.440 37.7  7.568 0.386 
0.460 38.3  7.912 0.391 
0.480 38.8  8.256 0.395 
0.500 39.3  8.600 0.398 
0.520 39.7  8.944 0.401 
0.540 40.2  9.288 0.404 
0.560 40.5  9.632 0.406 
0.580 41.0  9.976 0.409 
0.600 41.3  10.320 0.411 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/alt. Layers of fine sand & silt Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-2-8 Sample Data: Wet wt. 183.45 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 24-26 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 123.96 Cell Pressure (psi) = 14.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 58.43% Can wt. 22.14 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 980.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 98.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 62.5 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.2  0.344 0.035 
0.040 11.7  0.688 0.129 
0.060 16.0  1.032 0.176 
0.080 19.8  1.376 0.217 
0.100 22.2  1.720 0.242 
0.120 23.3  2.064 0.253 
0.140 25.2  2.408 0.273 
0.160 27.2  2.752 0.293 
0.180 29.0  3.096 0.312 
0.200 30.3  3.440 0.324 
0.220 31.7  3.784 0.338 
0.240 32.8  4.128 0.349 
0.260 34.2  4.472 0.362 
0.280 35.2  4.816 0.372 
0.300 36.0  5.160 0.379 
0.320 36.8  5.504 0.386 
0.340 37.5  5.848 0.392 
0.360 38.2  6.192 0.397 
0.380 38.8  6.536 0.402 
0.400 39.2  6.880 0.405 
0.420 39.7  7.224 0.409 
0.440 39.8  7.568 0.408 
0.460 40.2  7.912 0.411 
0.480 40.3  8.256 0.410 
0.500 40.5  8.600 0.411 
0.520 40.7  8.944 0.411 
0.540 40.8  9.288 0.410 
0.560 40.8  9.632 0.409 
0.580 40.9  9.976 0.408 
0.600 40.9  10.320 0.407 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay with silt seams Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-2-9 Sample Data: Wet wt. 165.18 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 30-32 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 112.45 Cell Pressure (psi) = 18.2 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 63.12% Can wt. 28.91 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 952.2 Wet Density (pcf) = 96.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 58.9 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.2  0.344 0.035 
0.040 12.8  0.688 0.141 
0.060 17.3  1.032 0.190 
0.080 19.8  1.376 0.217 
0.100 22.2  1.720 0.242 
0.120 23.8  2.064 0.259 
0.140 25.0  2.408 0.271 
0.160 26.2  2.752 0.283 
0.180 27.2  3.096 0.292 
0.200 28.2  3.440 0.302 
0.220 29.0  3.784 0.309 
0.240 29.7  4.128 0.316 
0.260 30.3  4.472 0.321 
0.280 30.8  4.816 0.325 
0.300 31.3  5.160 0.329 
0.320 31.8  5.504 0.333 
0.340 32.3  5.848 0.337 
0.360 32.8  6.192 0.341 
0.380 33.2  6.536 0.344 
0.400 33.5  6.880 0.346 
0.420 33.7  7.224 0.347 
0.440 34.0  7.568 0.349 
0.460 34.3  7.912 0.350 
0.480 34.3  8.256 0.349 
0.500 34.5  8.600 0.350 
0.520 34.8  8.944 0.351 
0.540 35.0  9.288 0.352 
0.560 35.2  9.632 0.353 
0.580 35.2  9.976 0.351 
0.600 35.3  10.320 0.351 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft dark gray to brown peat Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-6A-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 141.12 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 5-6 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 65.16 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 199.32% Can wt. 27.05 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 662.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 66.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 22.4 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 2.3  0.344 0.025 
0.040 4.0  0.688 0.044 
0.060 5.1  1.032 0.056 
0.080 6.0  1.376 0.066 
0.100 7.0  1.720 0.076 
0.120 8.0  2.064 0.087 
0.140 8.6  2.408 0.093 
0.160 8.8  2.752 0.095 
0.180 9.8  3.096 0.105 
0.200 10.0  3.440 0.107 
0.220 10.6  3.784 0.113 
0.240 11.3  4.128 0.120 
0.260 11.6  4.472 0.123 
0.280 12.0  4.816 0.127 
0.300 12.3  5.160 0.129 
0.320 12.6  5.504 0.132 
0.340 13.0  5.848 0.136 
0.360 13.6  6.192 0.141 
0.380 13.6  6.536 0.141 
0.400 14.0  6.880 0.145 
0.420 14.2  7.224 0.146 
0.440 14.3  7.568 0.147 
0.460 14.5  7.912 0.148 
0.480 14.8  8.256 0.151 
0.500 15.0  8.600 0.152 
0.520 15.1  8.944 0.152 
0.540 15.1  9.288 0.152 
0.560 15.1  9.632 0.151 
0.580 15.3  9.976 0.153 
0.600 15.5  10.320 0.154 
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0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
0.080
0.100
0.120
0.140
0.160
0.180
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Strain (%)
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
t
s
f
)
uu17-6A-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-6A-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 193.2 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 6-7 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 110.91 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.8 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 99.88% Can wt. 28.52 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 920.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 92.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 46.5 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.5  0.344 0.039 
0.040 4.3  0.688 0.047 
0.060 5.1  1.032 0.056 
0.080 5.6  1.376 0.061 
0.100 6.3  1.720 0.069 
0.120 6.8  2.064 0.074 
0.140 7.3  2.408 0.079 
0.160 7.6  2.752 0.082 
0.180 7.8  3.096 0.084 
0.200 8.3  3.440 0.089 
0.220 8.5  3.784 0.091 
0.240 8.6  4.128 0.091 
0.260 9.1  4.472 0.096 
0.280 10.3  4.816 0.109 
0.300 10.5  5.160 0.110 
0.320 10.6  5.504 0.111 
0.340 10.7  5.848 0.112 
0.360 11.0  6.192 0.114 
0.380 11.1  6.536 0.115 
0.400 11.3  6.880 0.117 
0.420 11.5  7.224 0.118 
0.440 11.6  7.568 0.119 
0.460 11.8  7.912 0.121 
0.480 12.0  8.256 0.122 
0.500 12.1  8.600 0.123 
0.520 12.3  8.944 0.124 
0.540 12.3  9.288 0.124 
0.560 12.5  9.632 0.125 
0.580 12.5  9.976 0.125 
0.600 12.6  10.320 0.125 
Stress Strain Curve
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uu17-6A-1(2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 212.49 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 14.5-15 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 136.12 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 66.96% Can wt. 22.07 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 880.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 88.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 53.2 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.1  0.344 0.034 
0.040 4.3  0.688 0.047 
0.060 5.0  1.032 0.055 
0.080 5.5  1.376 0.060 
0.100 6.2  1.720 0.068 
0.120 6.5  2.064 0.071 
0.140 7.0  2.408 0.076 
0.160 7.3  2.752 0.079 
0.180 7.8  3.096 0.084 
0.200 8.2  3.440 0.088 
0.220 8.5  3.784 0.091 
0.240 8.8  4.128 0.094 
0.260 9.0  4.472 0.095 
0.280 9.2  4.816 0.097 
0.300 9.2  5.160 0.097 
0.320 9.5  5.504 0.100 
0.340 9.7  5.848 0.101 
0.360 9.8  6.192 0.102 
0.380 9.9  6.536 0.103 
0.400 10.0  6.880 0.103 
0.420 10.1  7.224 0.104 
0.440 10.2  7.568 0.105 
0.460 10.3  7.912 0.105 
0.480 10.5  8.256 0.107 
0.500 10.6  8.600 0.107 
0.520 10.6  8.944 0.107 
0.540 10.7  9.288 0.108 
0.560 10.7  9.632 0.107 
0.580 10.8  9.976 0.108 
0.600 10.9  10.320 0.108 
Stress Strain Curve
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uu17-1-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay with peat Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 240.13 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 15 .5-16 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 154.52 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 67.91% Can wt. 28.46 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 899.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 90.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 54.0 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 5.5  0.344 0.061 
0.040 7.2  0.688 0.079 
0.060 8.2  1.032 0.090 
0.080 9.0  1.376 0.098 
0.100 9.7  1.720 0.106 
0.120 10.2  2.064 0.111 
0.140 10.8  2.408 0.117 
0.160 11.2  2.752 0.121 
0.180 11.7  3.096 0.126 
0.200 12.0  3.440 0.129 
0.220 12.3  3.784 0.131 
0.240 12.7  4.128 0.135 
0.260 13.0  4.472 0.138 
0.280 13.2  4.816 0.139 
0.300 13.5  5.160 0.142 
0.320 13.6  5.504 0.143 
0.340 13.7  5.848 0.143 
0.360 14.0  6.192 0.146 
0.380 14.2  6.536 0.147 
0.400 14.3  6.880 0.148 
0.420 14.5  7.224 0.149 
0.440 14.5  7.568 0.149 
0.460 14.7  7.912 0.150 
0.480 14.7  8.256 0.150 
0.500 15.0  8.600 0.152 
0.520 15.2  8.944 0.154 
0.540 15.3  9.288 0.154 
0.560 15.3  9.632 0.153 
0.580 15.4  9.976 0.154 
0.600 15.5  10.320 0.154 
Stress Strain Curve
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uu17-1-1 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay with organics Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-1-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 116.16 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 17-19 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 77.49 Cell Pressure (psi) = 10.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 73.71% Can wt. 25.03 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 940.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 94.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 54.6 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 2.7  0.344 0.030 
0.040 3.5  0.688 0.039 
0.060 4.0  1.032 0.044 
0.080 4.3  1.376 0.047 
0.100 4.7  1.720 0.051 
0.120 5.0  2.064 0.054 
0.140 5.4  2.408 0.058 
0.160 5.7  2.752 0.061 
0.180 5.9  3.096 0.063 
0.200 6.0  3.440 0.064 
0.220 6.2  3.784 0.066 
0.240 6.5  4.128 0.069 
0.260 6.9  4.472 0.073 
0.280 7.0  4.816 0.074 
0.300 7.2  5.160 0.076 
0.320 7.2  5.504 0.075 
0.340 7.4  5.848 0.077 
0.360 7.5  6.192 0.078 
0.380 7.9  6.536 0.082 
0.400 8.0  6.880 0.083 
0.420 8.2  7.224 0.084 
0.440 8.2  7.568 0.084 
0.460 8.2  7.912 0.084 
0.480 8.4  8.256 0.085 
0.500 8.5  8.600 0.086 
0.520 8.7  8.944 0.088 
0.540 8.7  9.288 0.088 
0.560 8.7  9.632 0.087 
0.580 8.7  9.976 0.087 
0.600 8.7  10.320 0.087 
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uu17-1-2 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 104.96 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 22.5-24.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 66.58 Cell Pressure (psi) = 13.6 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 92.37% Can wt. 25.03 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 906.2 Wet Density (pcf) = 90.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 46.9 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.6  0.340 0.040 
0.040 8.5  0.679 0.094 
0.060 11.6  1.019 0.127 
0.080 12.8  1.358 0.140 
0.100 14.0  1.698 0.153 
0.120 15.1  2.037 0.164 
0.140 16.0  2.377 0.173 
0.160 16.8  2.716 0.181 
0.180 17.5  3.056 0.188 
0.200 17.8  3.396 0.191 
0.220 18.5  3.735 0.198 
0.240 19.0  4.075 0.202 
0.260 19.5  4.414 0.207 
0.280 19.8  4.754 0.209 
0.300 20.3  5.093 0.214 
0.320 20.6  5.433 0.216 
0.340 21.0  5.772 0.220 
0.360 21.3  6.112 0.222 
0.380 21.5  6.452 0.223 
0.400 22.0  6.791 0.228 
0.420 22.1  7.131 0.228 
0.440 22.5  7.470 0.231 
0.460 22.6  7.810 0.231 
0.480 22.8  8.149 0.232 
0.500 22.8  8.489 0.231 
0.520 23.1  8.829 0.234 
0.540 23.1  9.168 0.233 
0.560 23.3  9.508 0.234 
0.580 23.5  9.847 0.235 
0.600 23.3  10.187 0.232 
Stress Strain Curve
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uu17-1-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Firm gray fine sand with clay streaks Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-1-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 200.08 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 26.5-28.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 160.4 Cell Pressure (psi) = 15.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 30.20% Can wt. 28.99 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1132.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 112.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 86.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 9.6  0.340 0.106 
0.040 55.7  0.679 0.614 
0.060 71.5  1.019 0.785 
0.080 84.0  1.358 0.919 
0.100 103.4  1.698 1.128 
0.120 118.4  2.037 1.287 
0.140 123.5  2.377 1.338 
0.160 132.4  2.716 1.429 
0.180 141.0  3.056 1.517 
0.200 149.9  3.396 1.607 
0.220 158.7  3.735 1.695 
0.240 167.9  4.075 1.787 
0.260 176.2  4.414 1.869 
0.280 183.7  4.754 1.941 
0.300 193.4  5.093 2.036 
0.320 207.5  5.433 2.177 
0.340 215.2  5.772 2.250 
0.360 221.9  6.112 2.312 
0.380 228.9  6.452 2.376 
0.400 235.7  6.791 2.438 
0.420 242.9  7.131 2.503 
0.440 248.9  7.470 2.555 
0.460 253.7  7.810 2.595 
0.480 254.5  8.149 2.594 
0.500 257.8  8.489 2.617 
0.520 258.4  8.829 2.614 
0.540 259.3  9.168 2.613 
0.560 260.1  9.508 2.611 
0.580 262.6  9.847 2.627 
0.600 263.9  10.187 2.630 
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uu17-1-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray silty clay w/wood & shell fragments Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-3-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 178.58 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9-10 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 134.4 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 38.06% Can wt. 18.32 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1111.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 112.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 81.2 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.5  0.344 0.039 
0.040 5.0  0.688 0.055 
0.060 6.0  1.032 0.066 
0.080 6.8  1.376 0.074 
0.100 7.6  1.720 0.083 
0.120 8.5  2.064 0.092 
0.140 9.1  2.408 0.098 
0.160 10.0  2.752 0.108 
0.180 10.6  3.096 0.114 
0.200 11.3  3.440 0.121 
0.220 11.6  3.784 0.124 
0.240 12.3  4.128 0.131 
0.260 12.8  4.472 0.136 
0.280 13.5  4.816 0.143 
0.300 13.8  5.160 0.145 
0.320 14.5  5.504 0.152 
0.340 15.0  5.848 0.157 
0.360 15.3  6.192 0.159 
0.380 15.6  6.536 0.162 
0.400 16.3  6.880 0.168 
0.420 16.6  7.224 0.171 
0.440 17.0  7.568 0.174 
0.460 17.3  7.912 0.177 
0.480 17.6  8.256 0.179 
0.500 18.0  8.600 0.182 
0.520 18.3  8.944 0.185 
0.540 18.5  9.288 0.186 
0.560 18.9  9.632 0.189 
0.580 19.0  9.976 0.190 
0.600 19.3  10.320 0.192 
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uu17-3-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft dark gray silty clay w/wood & shell fragments Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-3-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 191.49 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 10-11 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 141.25 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 41.80% Can wt. 21.06 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1083.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 109.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 77.1 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.1  0.344 0.045 
0.040 6.0  0.688 0.066 
0.060 6.8  1.032 0.075 
0.080 8.1  1.376 0.089 
0.100 9.5  1.720 0.104 
0.120 10.6  2.064 0.115 
0.140 11.6  2.408 0.126 
0.160 12.6  2.752 0.136 
0.180 13.6  3.096 0.146 
0.200 14.6  3.440 0.156 
0.220 15.3  3.784 0.163 
0.240 15.8  4.128 0.168 
0.260 16.6  4.472 0.176 
0.280 17.1  4.816 0.181 
0.300 17.9  5.160 0.188 
0.320 18.3  5.504 0.192 
0.340 18.6  5.848 0.194 
0.360 19.1  6.192 0.199 
0.380 19.5  6.536 0.202 
0.400 19.8  6.880 0.204 
0.420 20.1  7.224 0.207 
0.440 20.3  7.568 0.208 
0.460 20.6  7.912 0.210 
0.480 20.8  8.256 0.212 
0.500 21.0  8.600 0.213 
0.520 21.1  8.944 0.213 
0.540 21.3  9.288 0.214 
0.560 21.6  9.632 0.216 
0.580 21.8  9.976 0.218 
0.600 22.1  10.320 0.220 
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uu17-3-3 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay with silty clay layers Type of Failure:
Boring No.: 17-3-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 112.6 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 14-16 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 81.68 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 50.88% Can wt. 20.91 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1036.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 103.2 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 68.4 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.0  0.340 0.066 
0.040 8.1  0.679 0.089 
0.060 9.0  1.019 0.099 
0.080 10.1  1.358 0.111 
0.100 11.3  1.698 0.123 
0.120 12.5  2.037 0.136 
0.140 13.8  2.377 0.149 
0.160 14.8  2.716 0.160 
0.180 15.6  3.056 0.168 
0.200 16.5  3.396 0.177 
0.220 17.1  3.735 0.183 
0.240 17.8  4.075 0.189 
0.260 18.3  4.414 0.194 
0.280 18.8  4.754 0.199 
0.300 19.3  5.093 0.203 
0.320 19.8  5.433 0.208 
0.340 20.4  5.772 0.213 
0.360 21.1  6.112 0.220 
0.380 21.9  6.452 0.227 
0.400 22.3  6.791 0.231 
0.420 20.1  7.131 0.207 
0.440 20.3  7.470 0.208 
0.460 21.3  7.810 0.218 
0.480 21.5  8.149 0.219 
0.500 21.8  8.489 0.221 
0.520 22.5  8.829 0.228 
0.540 21.0  9.168 0.212 
0.560 21.8  9.508 0.219 
0.580 21.7  9.847 0.217 
0.600 21.9  10.187 0.218 
Stress Strain Curve
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Strain (%)
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
t
s
f
)
uu17-3-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-3-5 Sample Data: Wet wt. 146.08 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 20-22 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 96.04 Cell Pressure (psi) = 12.4 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 67.79% Can wt. 22.22 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 960.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 95.7 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 57.0 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.0  0.340 0.033 
0.040 6.0  0.679 0.066 
0.060 8.5  1.019 0.093 
0.080 10.3  1.358 0.113 
0.100 11.7  1.698 0.128 
0.120 13.3  2.037 0.145 
0.140 14.3  2.377 0.155 
0.160 15.3  2.716 0.165 
0.180 16.2  3.056 0.174 
0.200 16.8  3.396 0.180 
0.220 17.3  3.735 0.185 
0.240 18.0  4.075 0.192 
0.260 18.7  4.414 0.198 
0.280 19.2  4.754 0.203 
0.300 19.7  5.093 0.207 
0.320 20.2  5.433 0.212 
0.340 20.7  5.772 0.216 
0.360 21.0  6.112 0.219 
0.380 21.3  6.452 0.221 
0.400 21.5  6.791 0.222 
0.420 21.5  7.131 0.222 
0.440 21.7  7.470 0.223 
0.460 21.7  7.810 0.222 
0.480 21.8  8.149 0.222 
0.500 21.8  8.489 0.221 
0.520 21.6  8.829 0.218 
0.540 21.8  9.168 0.220 
0.560 21.7  9.508 0.218 
0.580 21.9  9.847 0.219 
0.600 22.3  10.187 0.222 
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uu17-3-5 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray very sandy clay with shell Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-3-6 Sample Data: Wet wt. 153.77 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 26-28 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 126.81 Cell Pressure (psi) = 15.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 26.88% Can wt. 26.52 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1060.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 105.6 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 83.3 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.1  0.340 0.034 
0.040 6.8  0.679 0.075 
0.060 9.5  1.019 0.104 
0.080 11.8  1.358 0.129 
0.100 13.3  1.698 0.145 
0.120 15.2  2.037 0.165 
0.140 16.5  2.377 0.179 
0.160 17.8  2.716 0.192 
0.180 19.2  3.056 0.207 
0.200 20.2  3.396 0.217 
0.220 21.2  3.735 0.226 
0.240 22.2  4.075 0.236 
0.260 23.0  4.414 0.244 
0.280 23.7  4.754 0.250 
0.300 24.3  5.093 0.256 
0.320 24.8  5.433 0.260 
0.340 25.5  5.772 0.267 
0.360 26.0  6.112 0.271 
0.380 26.3  6.452 0.273 
0.400 26.7  6.791 0.276 
0.420 27.0  7.131 0.278 
0.440 27.3  7.470 0.280 
0.460 27.6  7.810 0.282 
0.480 27.9  8.149 0.284 
0.500 28.0  8.489 0.284 
0.520 27.8  8.829 0.281 
0.540 27.5  9.168 0.277 
0.560 27.8  9.508 0.279 
0.580 28.0  9.847 0.280 
0.600 28.0  10.187 0.279 
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uu17-3-6 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Stiff tan and brown clay with silt Type of Failure: Vertical @ 7.1%
Boring No.: 17-4-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 194.78 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 3-5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 164.15 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 22.25% Can wt. 26.47 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1253.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 124.8 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 102.1 0.337
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 15  0.340 0.056 
0.040 42  0.679 0.156 
0.060 61  1.019 0.226 
0.080 82  1.358 0.302 
0.100 102  1.698 0.375 
0.120 121  2.037 0.443 
0.140 142  2.377 0.518 
0.160 162  2.716 0.589 
0.180 182  3.056 0.660 
0.200 202  3.396 0.730 
0.220 222  3.735 0.799 
0.240 242  4.075 0.868 
0.260 256  4.414 0.915 
0.280 275  4.754 0.979 
0.300 295  5.093 1.047 
0.320 310  5.433 1.096 
0.340 325  5.772 1.145 
0.360 340  6.112 1.194 
0.380 354  6.452 1.238 
0.400 364  6.791 1.269 
0.420 372  7.131 1.292 
0.440 372  7.470 1.287 
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uu17-4-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Med gray clay w/silt & fine sand alt layers & traces of organic matter Type of Failure: Bulge @ 9%
Boring No.: 17-4-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 147.97 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9-10 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 115.26 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 35.17% Can wt. 22.25 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1091.2 Wet Density (pcf) = 110.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 81.5 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 17.6  0.344 0.195 
0.040 22.8  0.688 0.251 
0.060 27.1  1.032 0.297 
0.080 31.1  1.376 0.340 
0.100 35.0  1.720 0.382 
0.120 38.6  2.064 0.419 
0.140 41.8  2.408 0.452 
0.160 45.1  2.752 0.486 
0.180 47.8  3.096 0.514 
0.200 50.5  3.440 0.541 
0.220 52.6  3.784 0.561 
0.240 54.6  4.128 0.581 
0.260 57.1  4.472 0.605 
0.280 58.1  4.816 0.613 
0.300 59.3  5.160 0.624 
0.320 60.3  5.504 0.632 
0.340 61.1  5.848 0.638 
0.360 61.8  6.192 0.643 
0.380 62.3  6.536 0.646 
0.400 62.5  6.880 0.645 
0.420 62.5  7.224 0.643 
0.440 62.0  7.568 0.636 
0.460 61.0  7.912 0.623 
0.480 60.3  8.256 0.614 
0.500 59.5  8.600 0.603 
0.520 
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0.560 
0.580 
0.600 
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uu17-4-2 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay with silt seams and wood Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 182.31 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 10-11 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 141.25 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 34.12% Can wt. 20.9 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1120.7 Wet Density (pcf) = 113.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 84.3 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 9.8  0.344 0.108 
0.040 13.6  0.688 0.150 
0.060 17.1  1.032 0.188 
0.080 19.8  1.376 0.217 
0.100 22.3  1.720 0.243 
0.120 25.1  2.064 0.273 
0.140 27.3  2.408 0.295 
0.160 30.0  2.752 0.324 
0.180 32.1  3.096 0.345 
0.200 34.1  3.440 0.365 
0.220 36.5  3.784 0.389 
0.240 38.5  4.128 0.409 
0.260 40.5  4.472 0.429 
0.280 42.3  4.816 0.447 
0.300 44.1  5.160 0.464 
0.320 45.6  5.504 0.478 
0.340 47.1  5.848 0.492 
0.360 48.6  6.192 0.506 
0.380 50.6  6.536 0.525 
0.400 51.6  6.880 0.533 
0.420 52.8  7.224 0.543 
0.440 54.1  7.568 0.555 
0.460 55.3  7.912 0.565 
0.480 56.3  8.256 0.573 
0.500 57.6  8.600 0.584 
0.520 58.6  8.944 0.592 
0.540 59.6  9.288 0.600 
0.560 60.6  9.632 0.607 
0.580 61.5  9.976 0.614 
0.600 62.3  10.320 0.620 
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uu17-4-2 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray and brown clay with peat and organics Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 162.94 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 11.5-13.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 83.74 Cell Pressure (psi) = 7.5 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 128.43% Can wt. 22.07 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 885.7 Wet Density (pcf) = 88.2 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 38.6 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 9.2  0.340 0.102 
0.040 14.6  0.679 0.161 
0.060 19.1  1.019 0.210 
0.080 23.2  1.358 0.254 
0.100 26.3  1.698 0.287 
0.120 29.0  2.037 0.315 
0.140 30.8  2.377 0.334 
0.160 32.8  2.716 0.354 
0.180 34.5  3.056 0.371 
0.200 36.0  3.396 0.386 
0.220 37.2  3.735 0.397 
0.240 38.5  4.075 0.410 
0.260 39.5  4.414 0.419 
0.280 40.5  4.754 0.428 
0.300 41.5  5.093 0.437 
0.320 42.2  5.433 0.443 
0.340 42.8  5.772 0.447 
0.360 43.7  6.112 0.455 
0.380 44.3  6.452 0.460 
0.400 45.0  6.791 0.465 
0.420 45.6  7.131 0.470 
0.440 46.2  7.470 0.474 
0.460 46.7  7.810 0.478 
0.480 47.2  8.149 0.481 
0.500 47.5  8.489 0.482 
0.520 48.0  8.829 0.486 
0.540 48.3  9.168 0.487 
0.560 48.8  9.508 0.490 
0.580 49.2  9.847 0.492 
0.600 49.5  10.187 0.493 
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uu17-4-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft dark gray organic clay with peat Type of Failure:
Boring No.: 17-4-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 126.99 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 14-15 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 54.52 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 261.81% Can wt. 26.84 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 830.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 82.7 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 22.9 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 5.3  0.340 0.059 
0.040 10.5  0.679 0.116 
0.060 14.8  1.019 0.163 
0.080 18.5  1.358 0.202 
0.100 21.1  1.698 0.230 
0.120 23.5  2.037 0.255 
0.140 25.8  2.377 0.279 
0.160 27.3  2.716 0.295 
0.180 28.8  3.056 0.310 
0.200 30.0  3.396 0.322 
0.220 31.3  3.735 0.334 
0.240 32.5  4.075 0.346 
0.260 33.1  4.414 0.351 
0.280 34.0  4.754 0.359 
0.300 34.6  5.093 0.364 
0.320 35.3  5.433 0.370 
0.340 35.8  5.772 0.374 
0.360 36.3  6.112 0.378 
0.380 36.5  6.452 0.379 
0.400 36.6  6.791 0.379 
0.420 36.5  7.131 0.376 
0.440 36.5  7.470 0.375 
0.460 36.5  7.810 0.373 
0.480 36.5  8.149 0.372 
0.500 36.4  8.489 0.370 
0.520 36.6  8.829 0.370 
0.540 36.8  9.168 0.371 
0.560 36.6  9.508 0.367 
0.580 36.6  9.847 0.366 
0.600 36.6  10.187 0.365 
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uu17-4-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium dark gray organic clay with peat Type of Failure:
Boring No.: 17-4-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 147.46 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 15-16 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 91.67 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 80.25% Can wt. 22.15 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 736.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 73.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 40.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.5  0.340 0.072 
0.040 11.0  0.679 0.121 
0.060 14.3  1.019 0.157 
0.080 17.8  1.358 0.195 
0.100 21.3  1.698 0.232 
0.120 24.5  2.037 0.266 
0.140 28.0  2.377 0.303 
0.160 31.0  2.716 0.335 
0.180 34.3  3.056 0.369 
0.200 37.0  3.396 0.397 
0.220 39.6  3.735 0.423 
0.240 41.8  4.075 0.445 
0.260 44.1  4.414 0.468 
0.280 45.8  4.754 0.484 
0.300 47.5  5.093 0.500 
0.320 49.0  5.433 0.514 
0.340 50.0  5.772 0.523 
0.360 51.0  6.112 0.531 
0.380 51.8  6.452 0.538 
0.400 52.5  6.791 0.543 
0.420 52.8  7.131 0.544 
0.440 53.0  7.470 0.544 
0.460 53.1  7.810 0.543 
0.480 53.1  8.149 0.541 
0.500 53.0  8.489 0.538 
0.520 52.5  8.829 0.531 
0.540 52.0  9.168 0.524 
0.560 51.6  9.508 0.518 
0.580 51.5  9.847 0.515 
0.600 51.0  10.187 0.508 
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uu17-4-4 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-7 Sample Data: Wet wt. 146.82 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 21.5-22.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 92.09 Cell Pressure (psi) = 14.4 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 77.95% Can wt. 21.88 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 942.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 95.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 53.4 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.3  0.344 0.048 
0.040 6.8  0.688 0.075 
0.060 8.8  1.032 0.097 
0.080 10.2  1.376 0.112 
0.100 11.2  1.720 0.122 
0.120 12.0  2.064 0.130 
0.140 12.7  2.408 0.137 
0.160 13.3  2.752 0.143 
0.180 14.3  3.096 0.154 
0.200 14.5  3.440 0.155 
0.220 15.2  3.784 0.162 
0.240 15.7  4.128 0.167 
0.260 16.0  4.472 0.170 
0.280 16.3  4.816 0.172 
0.300 16.7  5.160 0.176 
0.320 16.8  5.504 0.176 
0.340 17.2  5.848 0.180 
0.360 17.3  6.192 0.180 
0.380 17.5  6.536 0.181 
0.400 17.7  6.880 0.183 
0.420 17.8  7.224 0.183 
0.440 18.0  7.568 0.185 
0.460 18.1  7.912 0.185 
0.480 18.2  8.256 0.185 
0.500 18.3  8.600 0.186 
0.520 18.3  8.944 0.185 
0.540 18.5  9.288 0.186 
0.560 18.5  9.632 0.185 
0.580 18.6  9.976 0.186 
0.600 18.6  10.320 0.185 
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uu17-4-7 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray silty sandy clay (alt. Layers) Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-7 Sample Data: Wet wt. 204.42 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 22.5-23.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 146.12 Cell Pressure (psi) = 14.4 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 46.61% Can wt. 21.05 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1131.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 114.2 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 77.9 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.5  0.344 0.039 
0.040 7.9  0.688 0.087 
0.060 10.9  1.032 0.120 
0.080 13.7  1.376 0.150 
0.100 16.5  1.720 0.180 
0.120 19.2  2.064 0.209 
0.140 21.5  2.408 0.233 
0.160 24.0  2.752 0.259 
0.180 26.4  3.096 0.284 
0.200 28.7  3.440 0.307 
0.220 30.7  3.784 0.328 
0.240 32.7  4.128 0.348 
0.260 34.8  4.472 0.369 
0.280 36.9  4.816 0.390 
0.300 38.5  5.160 0.405 
0.320 40.5  5.504 0.424 
0.340 42.4  5.848 0.443 
0.360 44.2  6.192 0.460 
0.380 45.9  6.536 0.476 
0.400 47.4  6.880 0.490 
0.420 48.1  7.224 0.495 
0.440 49.9  7.568 0.512 
0.460 51.0  7.912 0.521 
0.480 52.0  8.256 0.529 
0.500 53.0  8.600 0.537 
0.520 54.0  8.944 0.545 
0.540 54.9  9.288 0.552 
0.560 55.9  9.632 0.560 
0.580 56.5  9.976 0.564 
0.600 57.4  10.320 0.571 
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uu17-4-7 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/alt. Layers of silty fine sand Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-8 Sample Data: Wet wt. 159.49 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 25-27 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 104.48 Cell Pressure (psi) = 15.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 65.80% Can wt. 20.88 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 981.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 99.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 59.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 5.7  0.344 0.063 
0.040 12.5  0.688 0.138 
0.060 15.8  1.032 0.173 
0.080 18.3  1.376 0.200 
0.100 20.3  1.720 0.221 
0.120 22.3  2.064 0.242 
0.140 24.2  2.408 0.262 
0.160 25.7  2.752 0.277 
0.180 27.3  3.096 0.293 
0.200 28.5  3.440 0.305 
0.220 29.6  3.784 0.316 
0.240 30.8  4.128 0.327 
0.260 31.8  4.472 0.337 
0.280 32.7  4.816 0.345 
0.300 33.7  5.160 0.354 
0.320 34.0  5.504 0.356 
0.340 34.8  5.848 0.363 
0.360 35.5  6.192 0.369 
0.380 35.8  6.536 0.371 
0.400 36.3  6.880 0.375 
0.420 36.7  7.224 0.378 
0.440 37.0  7.568 0.379 
0.460 37.2  7.912 0.380 
0.480 37.5  8.256 0.382 
0.500 37.7  8.600 0.382 
0.520 37.8  8.944 0.382 
0.540 37.8  9.288 0.380 
0.560 37.8  9.632 0.379 
0.580 37.9  9.976 0.378 
0.600 37.9  10.320 0.377 
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uu17-4-8 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very stiff tan and brown clay with silt Type of Failure: Vertical @ 7.4%
Boring No.: 17-5-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 162.22 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 3-5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 142.28 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 17.59% Can wt. 28.9 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1267.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 126.3 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 107.4 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 18  0.340 0.067 
0.040 41  0.679 0.152 
0.060 75  1.019 0.278 
0.080 115  1.358 0.424 
0.100 152  1.698 0.559 
0.120 194  2.037 0.711 
0.140 230  2.377 0.840 
0.160 270  2.716 0.982 
0.180 313  3.056 1.135 
0.200 358  3.396 1.293 
0.220 405  3.735 1.458 
0.240 445  4.075 1.596 
0.260 490  4.414 1.751 
0.280 538  4.754 1.916 
0.300 578  5.093 2.051 
0.320 620  5.433 2.353 
0.340 660  5.772 2.686 
0.360 692  6.112 2.948 
0.380 712  6.452 3.107 
0.400 725  6.791 3.205 
0.420 736  7.131 3.286 
0.440 742  7.470 3.324 
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uu17-5-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay with siltlenses and wood Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-5-6 Sample Data: Wet wt. 136.11 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 22-24 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 85.72 Cell Pressure (psi) = 14.4 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 77.69% Can wt. 20.86 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 954.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 96.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 54.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.0  0.344 0.066 
0.040 8.0  0.688 0.088 
0.060 9.7  1.032 0.106 
0.080 10.8  1.376 0.118 
0.100 12.0  1.720 0.131 
0.120 12.8  2.064 0.139 
0.140 13.8  2.408 0.149 
0.160 14.5  2.752 0.156 
0.180 15.5  3.096 0.167 
0.200 16.0  3.440 0.171 
0.220 16.7  3.784 0.178 
0.240 17.3  4.128 0.184 
0.260 17.8  4.472 0.189 
0.280 18.3  4.816 0.193 
0.300 18.7  5.160 0.197 
0.320 19.2  5.504 0.201 
0.340 19.7  5.848 0.206 
0.360 20.2  6.192 0.210 
0.380 20.3  6.536 0.210 
0.400 20.7  6.880 0.214 
0.420 21.0  7.224 0.216 
0.440 21.3  7.568 0.218 
0.460 21.8  7.912 0.223 
0.480 22.2  8.256 0.226 
0.500 22.5  8.600 0.228 
0.520 22.7  8.944 0.229 
0.540 22.8  9.288 0.229 
0.560 23.0  9.632 0.231 
0.580 23.7  9.976 0.237 
0.600 23.9  10.320 0.238 
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uu17-5-6 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/alt. Seams of silty fine sand Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-5-7 Sample Data: Wet wt. 143.77 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 25-27 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 107.04 Cell Pressure (psi) = 16.7 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 42.65% Can wt. 20.92 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 999.2 Wet Density (pcf) = 100.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 70.7 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 1.2  0.344 0.013 
0.040 9.0  0.688 0.099 
0.060 12.5  1.032 0.137 
0.080 15.3  1.376 0.167 
0.100 17.2  1.720 0.187 
0.120 18.8  2.064 0.204 
0.140 20.5  2.408 0.222 
0.160 22.2  2.752 0.239 
0.180 23.5  3.096 0.253 
0.200 24.8  3.440 0.266 
0.220 25.4  3.784 0.271 
0.240 26.8  4.128 0.285 
0.260 27.7  4.472 0.293 
0.280 29.0  4.816 0.306 
0.300 30.9  5.160 0.325 
0.320 30.5  5.504 0.320 
0.340 31.2  5.848 0.326 
0.360 31.8  6.192 0.331 
0.380 32.5  6.536 0.337 
0.400 33.0  6.880 0.341 
0.420 33.5  7.224 0.345 
0.440 33.8  7.568 0.347 
0.460 34.1  7.912 0.348 
0.480 34.0  8.256 0.346 
0.500 35.0  8.600 0.355 
0.520 35.5  8.944 0.359 
0.540 35.8  9.288 0.360 
0.560 36.2  9.632 0.363 
0.580 36.3  9.976 0.362 
0.600 36.5  10.320 0.363 
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uu17-5-7 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft organic clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 142.26 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 3-4 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 75.15 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 123.75% Can wt. 20.92 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 852.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 86.5 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 38.7 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.8  0.346 0.042 
0.040 4.7  0.691 0.052 
0.060 5.2  1.037 0.057 
0.080 5.8  1.383 0.063 
0.100 6.3  1.729 0.069 
0.120 7.0  2.074 0.076 
0.140 7.3  2.420 0.079 
0.160 7.5  2.766 0.081 
0.180 7.8  3.111 0.084 
0.200 8.2  3.457 0.088 
0.220 8.7  3.803 0.093 
0.240 9.0  4.149 0.096 
0.260 9.2  4.494 0.097 
0.280 9.3  4.840 0.098 
0.300 9.8  5.186 0.103 
0.320 10.2  5.532 0.107 
0.340 10.5  5.877 0.110 
0.360 10.7  6.223 0.111 
0.380 10.8  6.569 0.112 
0.400 11.0  6.914 0.114 
0.420 12.2  7.260 0.125 
0.440 11.3  7.606 0.116 
0.460 11.7  7.952 0.119 
0.480 11.8  8.297 0.120 
0.500 12.0  8.643 0.122 
0.520 12.1  8.989 0.122 
0.540 12.2  9.334 0.123 
0.560 12.2  9.680 0.122 
0.580 12.3  10.026 0.123 
0.600 12.3  10.372 0.122 
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uuLAC-1-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay with fine sand Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 198.4 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 5-6 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 143.55 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 47.68% Can wt. 28.51 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1143.7 Wet Density (pcf) = 115.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 78.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.3  0.344 0.048 
0.040 6.0  0.688 0.066 
0.060 7.2  1.032 0.079 
0.080 8.5  1.376 0.093 
0.100 9.8  1.720 0.107 
0.120 10.8  2.064 0.117 
0.140 11.8  2.408 0.128 
0.160 12.5  2.752 0.135 
0.180 13.3  3.096 0.143 
0.200 14.5  3.440 0.155 
0.220 15.3  3.784 0.163 
0.240 16.3  4.128 0.173 
0.260 17.0  4.472 0.180 
0.280 17.7  4.816 0.187 
0.300 18.2  5.160 0.191 
0.320 19.0  5.504 0.199 
0.340 19.5  5.848 0.204 
0.360 20.0  6.192 0.208 
0.380 20.5  6.536 0.213 
0.400 20.8  6.880 0.215 
0.420 21.3  7.224 0.219 
0.440 21.7  7.568 0.222 
0.460 22.3  7.912 0.228 
0.480 22.7  8.256 0.231 
0.500 23.2  8.600 0.235 
0.520 23.7  8.944 0.239 
0.540 24.0  9.288 0.241 
0.560 24.3  9.632 0.244 
0.580 25.0  9.976 0.250 
0.600 25.5  10.320 0.254 
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uuLAC-1-1 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft clay w/ 1/2" sand layer at bottom Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-1-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 151.2 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 6-8 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 108.24 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.1 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 51.65% Can wt. 25.06 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1111.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 112.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 74.1 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.0  0.345 0.044 
0.040 5.2  0.690 0.057 
0.060 6.0  1.034 0.066 
0.080 6.7  1.379 0.073 
0.100 7.2  1.724 0.078 
0.120 7.8  2.069 0.085 
0.140 8.3  2.414 0.090 
0.160 8.8  2.759 0.095 
0.180 9.0  3.103 0.097 
0.200 9.7  3.448 0.104 
0.220 10.0  3.793 0.107 
0.240 10.2  4.138 0.108 
0.260 10.3  4.483 0.109 
0.280 11.2  4.828 0.118 
0.300 11.7  5.172 0.123 
0.320 12.0  5.517 0.126 
0.340 12.0  5.862 0.125 
0.360 12.2  6.207 0.127 
0.380 12.3  6.552 0.127 
0.400 12.5  6.897 0.129 
0.420 12.8  7.241 0.132 
0.440 13.0  7.586 0.133 
0.460 13.3  7.931 0.136 
0.480 13.5  8.276 0.137 
0.500 13.5  8.621 0.137 
0.520 13.7  8.966 0.138 
0.540 13.8  9.310 0.139 
0.560 14.0  9.655 0.140 
0.580 14.0  10.000 0.140 
0.600 14.3  10.345 0.142 
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uuLAC-1-2 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray sandy clay w/wood & clay pockets Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 185.35 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 145.26 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 32.58% Can wt. 22.22 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 947.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 95.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 72.3 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.5  0.345 0.039 
0.040 4.8  0.690 0.053 
0.060 5.7  1.034 0.063 
0.080 6.2  1.379 0.068 
0.100 6.7  1.724 0.073 
0.120 7.3  2.069 0.079 
0.140 7.7  2.414 0.083 
0.160 8.0  2.759 0.086 
0.180 8.2  3.103 0.088 
0.200 8.5  3.448 0.091 
0.220 8.7  3.793 0.093 
0.240 9.0  4.138 0.096 
0.260 9.3  4.483 0.099 
0.280 9.7  4.828 0.102 
0.300 9.8  5.172 0.103 
0.320 10.0  5.517 0.105 
0.340 10.2  5.862 0.106 
0.360 10.2  6.207 0.106 
0.380 10.3  6.552 0.107 
0.400 10.7  6.897 0.110 
0.420 10.7  7.241 0.110 
0.440 10.8  7.586 0.111 
0.460 10.8  7.931 0.110 
0.480 11.0  8.276 0.112 
0.500 11.0  8.621 0.111 
0.520 11.2  8.966 0.113 
0.540 11.2  9.310 0.113 
0.560 11.3  9.655 0.113 
0.580 11.3  10.000 0.113 
0.600 11.5  10.345 0.114 
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uuLAC-1-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Firm gray fine sand with 2" clayey sand layer Type of Failure: Bulge @ 4%
Boring No.: LAC-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 197.24 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9.5-10.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 158.25 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 30.18% Can wt. 29.07 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1160.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 117.5 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 90.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 19.4  0.345 0.214 
0.040 24.0  0.690 0.264 
0.060 25.2  1.034 0.277 
0.080 25.9  1.379 0.283 
0.100 26.2  1.724 0.286 
0.120 26.2  2.069 0.285 
0.140 25.9  2.414 0.280 
0.160 25.2  2.759 0.272 
0.180 24.0  3.103 0.258 
0.200 21.0  3.448 0.225 
0.220 16.7  3.793 0.178 
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uuLAC-1-3 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay with some silt Type of Failure: Yeild @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-2-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 207.31 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 44-45 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 124.65 Cell Pressure (psi) = 26.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 86.46% Can wt. 29.05 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1006.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 101.6 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 54.5 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 21.6  0.344 0.239 
0.040 33.3  0.688 0.367 
0.060 39.6  1.032 0.435 
0.080 33.3  1.376 0.364 
0.100 35.8  1.720 0.390 
0.120 47.8  2.064 0.519 
0.140 49.1  2.408 0.531 
0.160 50.3  2.752 0.543 
0.180 51.6  3.096 0.555 
0.200 52.5  3.440 0.562 
0.220 53.3  3.784 0.569 
0.240 54.0  4.128 0.574 
0.260 54.6  4.472 0.578 
0.280 55.0  4.816 0.581 
0.300 55.5  5.160 0.584 
0.320 56.0  5.504 0.587 
0.340 56.4  5.848 0.589 
0.360 56.8  6.192 0.591 
0.380 57.0  6.536 0.591 
0.400 57.1  6.880 0.590 
0.420 57.3  7.224 0.590 
0.440 57.6  7.568 0.590 
0.460 57.8  7.912 0.590 
0.480 58.0  8.256 0.590 
0.500 58.1  8.600 0.589 
0.520 58.1  8.944 0.587 
0.540 58.3  9.288 0.587 
0.560 58.3  9.632 0.584 
0.580 58.1  9.976 0.580 
0.600 57.8  10.320 0.575 
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uuLAC-2-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay w/silt seams & shell fragments Type of Failure: Yeild @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-2-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 195.39 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 45-46 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 131.96 Cell Pressure (psi) = 26.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 57.75% Can wt. 22.12 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1041.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 105.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 66.6 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 12.8  0.344 0.141 
0.040 28.4  0.688 0.313 
0.060 36.4  1.032 0.400 
0.080 40.7  1.376 0.445 
0.100 44.5  1.720 0.485 
0.120 47.4  2.064 0.515 
0.140 49.7  2.408 0.538 
0.160 51.9  2.752 0.560 
0.180 53.4  3.096 0.574 
0.200 54.7  3.440 0.586 
0.220 55.9  3.784 0.597 
0.240 56.9  4.128 0.605 
0.260 58.0  4.472 0.615 
0.280 58.9  4.816 0.622 
0.300 59.5  5.160 0.626 
0.320 60.4  5.504 0.633 
0.340 60.9  5.848 0.636 
0.360 61.4  6.192 0.639 
0.380 61.7  6.536 0.640 
0.400 62.8  6.880 0.649 
0.420 62.4  7.224 0.642 
0.440 62.5  7.568 0.641 
0.460 62.7  7.912 0.640 
0.480 62.9  8.256 0.640 
0.500 63.0  8.600 0.639 
0.520 63.2  8.944 0.638 
0.540 63.2  9.288 0.636 
0.560 63.2  9.632 0.633 
0.580 63.4  9.976 0.633 
0.600 63.6  10.320 0.633 
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uuLAC-2-4 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray sandy clay to sand Type of Failure: Vertical @ 4%
Boring No.: LAC-3-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 193.85 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 7.5-8.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 164.29 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.3 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 21.80% Can wt. 28.69 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1246.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 125.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 103.3 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 10.0  0.344 0.111 
0.040 19.5  0.688 0.215 
0.060 26.4  1.032 0.290 
0.080 32.9  1.376 0.360 
0.100 38.2  1.720 0.416 
0.120 42.5  2.064 0.462 
0.140 45.5  2.408 0.492 
0.160 47.7  2.752 0.514 
0.180 49.0  3.096 0.527 
0.200 49.7  3.440 0.532 
0.220 49.7  3.784 0.530 
0.240 48.5  4.128 0.516 
0.260 45.9  4.472 0.486 
0.280 43.8  4.816 0.462 
0.300 39.8  5.160 0.419 
0.320 35.8  5.504 0.375 
0.340 32.4  5.848 0.338 
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uuLAC-3-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Firm gray sand with clay Type of Failure: Bulge @ 7%
Boring No.: LAC-3-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 151.05 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9-11 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 123.97 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 26.58% Can wt. 22.08 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1208.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 122.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 96.6 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 17.8  0.345 0.197 
0.040 25.2  0.690 0.278 
0.060 30.0  1.034 0.329 
0.080 36.2  1.379 0.396 
0.100 41.8  1.724 0.456 
0.120 46.8  2.069 0.508 
0.140 51.7  2.414 0.560 
0.160 55.3  2.759 0.596 
0.180 58.7  3.103 0.631 
0.200 61.8  3.448 0.662 
0.220 64.2  3.793 0.685 
0.240 67.2  4.138 0.714 
0.260 68.5  4.483 0.726 
0.280 67.5  4.828 0.712 
0.300 66.7  5.172 0.701 
0.320 66.7  5.517 0.699 
0.340 66.2  5.862 0.691 
0.360 65.0  6.207 0.676 
0.380 64.3  6.552 0.666 
0.400 63.7  6.897 0.658 
0.420 62.8  7.241 0.646 
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uuLAC-3-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft dark gray organic clay with peat Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACW-2-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 133.17 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 64.01 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.3 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 186.97% Can wt. 27.02 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 759.7 Wet Density (pcf) = 76.7 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 26.7 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.8  0.344 0.042 
0.040 6.5  0.688 0.072 
0.060 8.7  1.032 0.095 
0.080 10.3  1.376 0.113 
0.100 11.8  1.720 0.129 
0.120 13.2  2.064 0.143 
0.140 14.5  2.408 0.157 
0.160 15.7  2.752 0.169 
0.180 16.7  3.096 0.179 
0.200 17.5  3.440 0.187 
0.220 18.3  3.784 0.195 
0.240 19.0  4.128 0.202 
0.260 19.7  4.472 0.209 
0.280 20.3  4.816 0.214 
0.300 20.8  5.160 0.219 
0.320 21.5  5.504 0.225 
0.340 22.2  5.848 0.232 
0.360 22.5  6.192 0.234 
0.380 23.0  6.536 0.238 
0.400 23.5  6.880 0.243 
0.420 23.7  7.224 0.244 
0.440 24.2  7.568 0.248 
0.460 24.3  7.912 0.248 
0.480 24.7  8.256 0.251 
0.500 25.0  8.600 0.253 
0.520 25.0  8.944 0.252 
0.540 25.2  9.288 0.254 
0.560 25.3  9.632 0.254 
0.580 25.5  9.976 0.255 
0.600 25.7  10.320 0.256 
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uuLACW-2-2 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very Soft dark gray organic clay with peat Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACW-2-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 135 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9.5-10.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 70.05 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.3 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 157.95% Can wt. 28.93 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 764.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 77.2 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 29.9 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.9  0.344 0.043 
0.040 6.3  0.688 0.069 
0.060 8.3  1.032 0.091 
0.080 9.8  1.376 0.107 
0.100 11.3  1.720 0.123 
0.120 12.7  2.064 0.138 
0.140 13.7  2.408 0.148 
0.160 14.8  2.752 0.160 
0.180 15.8  3.096 0.170 
0.200 16.5  3.440 0.177 
0.220 17.3  3.784 0.185 
0.240 18.0  4.128 0.191 
0.260 18.5  4.472 0.196 
0.280 19.2  4.816 0.203 
0.300 19.7  5.160 0.207 
0.320 20.2  5.504 0.212 
0.340 20.5  5.848 0.214 
0.360 20.8  6.192 0.216 
0.380 21.0  6.536 0.218 
0.400 21.3  6.880 0.220 
0.420 21.7  7.224 0.223 
0.440 21.8  7.568 0.223 
0.460 22.0  7.912 0.225 
0.480 22.2  8.256 0.226 
0.500 22.3  8.600 0.226 
0.520 22.5  8.944 0.227 
0.540 22.7  9.288 0.228 
0.560 22.7  9.632 0.228 
0.580 22.8  9.976 0.228 
0.600 23.0  10.320 0.229 
Stress Strain Curve
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uuLACW-2-2 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium dark gray organic clay alt. Layers of sand silt & clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACW-3-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 205 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 10-12 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 145.69 Cell Pressure (psi) = 6.5 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 48.11% Can wt. 22.42 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1120.8 Wet Density (pcf) = 113.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 76.4 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 12.7  0.344 0.140 
0.040 19.9  0.688 0.219 
0.060 25.5  1.032 0.280 
0.080 27.9  1.376 0.305 
0.100 30.7  1.720 0.335 
0.120 32.5  2.064 0.353 
0.140 35.4  2.408 0.383 
0.160 37.7  2.752 0.407 
0.180 39.4  3.096 0.423 
0.200 40.9  3.440 0.438 
0.220 42.4  3.784 0.452 
0.240 43.9  4.128 0.467 
0.260 45.0  4.472 0.477 
0.280 45.9  4.816 0.485 
0.300 47.0  5.160 0.494 
0.320 47.9  5.504 0.502 
0.340 48.9  5.848 0.511 
0.360 49.5  6.192 0.515 
0.380 50.7  6.536 0.526 
0.400 50.9  6.880 0.526 
0.420 51.7  7.224 0.532 
0.440 52.0  7.568 0.533 
0.460 52.9  7.912 0.540 
0.480 53.2  8.256 0.541 
0.500 53.9  8.600 0.546 
0.520 54.4  8.944 0.549 
0.540 55.2  9.288 0.555 
0.560 55.7  9.632 0.558 
0.580 55.7  9.976 0.556 
0.600 55.9  10.320 0.556 
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uuLACW-3-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Stiff dark gray organic w/roots Type of Failure: Vertical @ 9%
Boring No.: LACW-4-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 145.27 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 3.5-4.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 105.17 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 4.6 Moisture Content (%) = 52.32% Can wt. 28.52 Height Correction = 0.978 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 790.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 101.7 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 66.7 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 8  0.439 0.029 
0.040 18  0.877 0.065 
0.060 36  1.316 0.130 
0.080 60  1.754 0.215 
0.100 80  2.193 0.286 
0.120 101  2.632 0.359 
0.140 122  3.070 0.432 
0.160 145  3.509 0.511 
0.180 165  3.947 0.579 
0.200 188  4.386 0.657 
0.220 208  4.825 0.724 
0.240 225  5.263 0.779 
0.260 243  5.702 0.838 
0.280 257  6.140 0.882 
0.300 272  6.579 0.929 
0.320 287  7.018 0.975 
0.340 298  7.456 1.008 
0.360 305  7.895 1.027 
0.380 310  8.333 1.039 
0.400 314  8.772 1.047 
0.420 314  9.211 1.042 
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uuLACW-4-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray organic clay w/wood & peat Type of Failure: Vertical @ 7%
Boring No.: LACW-4-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 134.15 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 7.5-8.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 78.49 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 109.93% Can wt. 27.86 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 858.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 86.7 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 41.3 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 15  0.344 0.056 
0.040 31  0.688 0.115 
0.060 44  1.032 0.163 
0.080 54  1.376 0.199 
0.100 64  1.720 0.235 
0.120 71  2.064 0.260 
0.140 79  2.408 0.288 
0.160 88  2.752 0.320 
0.180 95  3.096 0.344 
0.200 100  3.440 0.361 
0.220 106  3.784 0.381 
0.240 112  4.128 0.401 
0.260 118  4.472 0.421 
0.280 122  4.816 0.434 
0.300 128  5.160 0.454 
0.320 132  5.504 0.466 
0.340 135  5.848 0.475 
0.360 138  6.192 0.484 
0.380 143  6.536 0.500 
0.400 143  6.880 0.498 
0.420 143  7.224 0.496 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay with peat & wood Type of Failure: Vertical @ 8%
Boring No.: LACW-4-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 105.4 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 59.13 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 125.09% Can wt. 22.14 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 836.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 84.4 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 37.5 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 8  0.344 0.030 
0.040 15  0.688 0.056 
0.060 23  1.032 0.085 
0.080 31  1.376 0.114 
0.100 38  1.720 0.140 
0.120 42  2.064 0.154 
0.140 49  2.408 0.179 
0.160 54  2.752 0.196 
0.180 58  3.096 0.210 
0.200 63  3.440 0.227 
0.220 68  3.784 0.245 
0.240 72  4.128 0.258 
0.260 76  4.472 0.271 
0.280 81  4.816 0.288 
0.300 84  5.160 0.298 
0.320 88  5.504 0.311 
0.340 90  5.848 0.317 
0.360 92  6.192 0.323 
0.380 95  6.536 0.332 
0.400 96  6.880 0.334 
0.420 97  7.224 0.336 
0.440 98  7.568 0.339 
0.460 98  7.912 0.337 
0.480 98  8.256 0.336 
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0.520 
0.540 
0.560 
0.580 
0.600 
Stress Strain Curve
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
0.400
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Strain (%)
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
t
s
f
)
uuLACW-4-3 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay w/fine sand at bottom Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACS-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 223.35 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8.5-10.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 174.08 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.2 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 32.46% Can wt. 22.3 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1030.8 Wet Density (pcf) = 104.0 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 78.5 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 13.7  0.344 0.151 
0.040 24.7  0.688 0.272 
0.060 31.8  1.032 0.349 
0.080 36.8  1.376 0.403 
0.100 40.2  1.720 0.438 
0.120 43.2  2.064 0.469 
0.140 45.7  2.408 0.495 
0.160 49.2  2.752 0.531 
0.180 50.3  3.096 0.541 
0.200 52.5  3.440 0.562 
0.220 53.8  3.784 0.574 
0.240 54.5  4.128 0.580 
0.260 55.5  4.472 0.588 
0.280 56.0  4.816 0.591 
0.300 56.5  5.160 0.594 
0.320 57.2  5.504 0.599 
0.340 57.3  5.848 0.598 
0.360 57.8  6.192 0.601 
0.380 58.3  6.536 0.604 
0.400 58.7  6.880 0.606 
0.420 59.0  7.224 0.607 
0.440 59.3  7.568 0.608 
0.460 59.5  7.912 0.608 
0.480 59.8  8.256 0.608 
0.500 60.5  8.600 0.613 
0.520 61.0  8.944 0.616 
0.540 61.5  9.288 0.619 
0.560 61.8  9.632 0.619 
0.580 62.0  9.976 0.619 
0.600 62.3  10.320 0.620 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Stiff gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACS-3-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 218.55 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 5-7 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 177.01 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.5 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 28.06% Can wt. 28.96 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1160.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 117.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 91.4 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 25.2  0.344 0.279 
0.040 37.2  0.688 0.410 
0.060 47.5  1.032 0.521 
0.080 54.3  1.376 0.594 
0.100 61.7  1.720 0.673 
0.120 67.3  2.064 0.731 
0.140 71.3  2.408 0.772 
0.160 76.7  2.752 0.827 
0.180 80.5  3.096 0.865 
0.200 84.5  3.440 0.905 
0.220 87.5  3.784 0.934 
0.240 91.2  4.128 0.970 
0.260 94.2  4.472 0.998 
0.280 96.7  4.816 1.021 
0.300 98.8  5.160 1.039 
0.320 100.2  5.504 1.050 
0.340 101.3  5.848 1.058 
0.360 101.7  6.192 1.058 
0.380 102.3  6.536 1.060 
0.400 102.7  6.880 1.061 
0.420 103.0  7.224 1.060 
0.440 103.8  7.568 1.064 
0.460 104.2  7.912 1.064 
0.480 104.8  8.256 1.066 
0.500 105.7  8.600 1.071 
0.520 106.0  8.944 1.070 
0.540 106.5  9.288 1.071 
0.560 106.8  9.632 1.070 
0.580 107.2  9.976 1.070 
0.600 107.3  10.320 1.067 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray caly Type of Failure: Bulge @ 8%
Boring No.: LACS-3-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 224.64 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 7.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 158.43 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 50.25% Can wt. 26.67 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 984.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 99.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 66.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 15.9  0.344 0.176 
0.040 23.0  0.688 0.253 
0.060 27.4  1.032 0.301 
0.080 30.2  1.376 0.330 
0.100 32.7  1.720 0.356 
0.120 35.0  2.064 0.380 
0.140 36.5  2.408 0.395 
0.160 38.0  2.752 0.410 
0.180 39.2  3.096 0.421 
0.200 40.2  3.440 0.431 
0.220 41.2  3.784 0.440 
0.240 42.2  4.128 0.449 
0.260 42.7  4.472 0.452 
0.280 43.5  4.816 0.459 
0.300 44.2  5.160 0.465 
0.320 44.4  5.504 0.465 
0.340 44.5  5.848 0.465 
0.360 44.4  6.192 0.462 
0.380 44.4  6.536 0.460 
0.400 44.4  6.880 0.459 
0.420 44.4  7.224 0.457 
0.440 44.0  7.568 0.451 
0.460 43.5  7.912 0.444 
0.480 43.2  8.256 0.440 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 98.15 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 7.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 70.36 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 62.77% Can wt. 26.09 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1009.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 102.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 62.7 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 27.3  0.345 0.302 
0.040 41.3  0.690 0.455 
0.060 49.3  1.034 0.541 
0.080 55.3  1.379 0.605 
0.100 59.7  1.724 0.651 
0.120 63.5  2.069 0.690 
0.140 66.3  2.414 0.718 
0.160 69.0  2.759 0.744 
0.180 71.3  3.103 0.766 
0.200 73.2  3.448 0.784 
0.220 74.8  3.793 0.798 
0.240 76.2  4.138 0.810 
0.260 77.7  4.483 0.823 
0.280 78.8  4.828 0.832 
0.300 79.7  5.172 0.838 
0.320 80.3  5.517 0.841 
0.340 81.2  5.862 0.848 
0.360 81.3  6.207 0.846 
0.380 81.7  6.552 0.847 
0.400 82.2  6.897 0.849 
0.420 82.5  7.241 0.849 
0.440 82.3  7.586 0.843 
0.460 82.0  7.931 0.837 
0.480 81.8  8.276 0.832 
0.500 82.0  8.621 0.831 
0.520 82.0  8.966 0.828 
0.540 82.2  9.310 0.827 
0.560 82.2  9.655 0.824 
0.580 82.0  10.000 0.818 
0.600 82.0  10.345 0.815 
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uuIHNCS-1-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/wood Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 124.85 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 12-13 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 74.21 Cell Pressure (psi) = 7.4 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 94.94% Can wt. 20.87 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 890.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 90.0 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 46.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 7.5  0.345 0.083 
0.040 11.0  0.690 0.121 
0.060 13.3  1.034 0.146 
0.080 15.0  1.379 0.164 
0.100 17.0  1.724 0.185 
0.120 18.1  2.069 0.197 
0.140 18.7  2.414 0.202 
0.160 19.5  2.759 0.210 
0.180 19.8  3.103 0.213 
0.200 20.3  3.448 0.217 
0.220 21.0  3.793 0.224 
0.240 21.3  4.138 0.226 
0.260 21.8  4.483 0.231 
0.280 22.2  4.828 0.234 
0.300 22.5  5.172 0.237 
0.320 22.7  5.517 0.238 
0.340 23.2  5.862 0.242 
0.360 23.0  6.207 0.239 
0.380 23.5  6.552 0.244 
0.400 23.8  6.897 0.246 
0.420 24.0  7.241 0.247 
0.440 23.8  7.586 0.244 
0.460 24.0  7.931 0.245 
0.480 24.2  8.276 0.246 
0.500 24.5  8.621 0.248 
0.520 24.5  8.966 0.247 
0.540 24.7  9.310 0.248 
0.560 24.7  9.655 0.247 
0.580 24.8  10.000 0.248 
0.600 24.8  10.345 0.247 
Stress Strain Curve
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uuIHNCS-1-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/wood Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 130.39 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 13-14 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 77.82 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 94.48% Can wt. 22.18 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 847.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 85.7 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 44.1 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 8.5  0.345 0.094 
0.040 12.0  0.690 0.132 
0.060 14.2  1.034 0.156 
0.080 15.7  1.379 0.172 
0.100 17.0  1.724 0.185 
0.120 18.2  2.069 0.198 
0.140 19.2  2.414 0.208 
0.160 20.0  2.759 0.216 
0.180 20.7  3.103 0.222 
0.200 21.2  3.448 0.227 
0.220 21.8  3.793 0.233 
0.240 22.2  4.138 0.236 
0.260 22.7  4.483 0.240 
0.280 23.3  4.828 0.246 
0.300 23.7  5.172 0.249 
0.320 24.0  5.517 0.251 
0.340 24.2  5.862 0.253 
0.360 24.5  6.207 0.255 
0.380 24.7  6.552 0.256 
0.400 25.0  6.897 0.258 
0.420 25.3  7.241 0.260 
0.440 25.7  7.586 0.263 
0.460 25.7  7.931 0.262 
0.480 25.8  8.276 0.262 
0.500 25.8  8.621 0.261 
0.520 26.0  8.966 0.262 
0.540 26.2  9.310 0.264 
0.560 26.5  9.655 0.266 
0.580 26.5  10.000 0.264 
0.600 26.7  10.345 0.265 
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uuIHNCS-1-3 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay w/peat Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-3-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 136.01 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 11.5-12.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 85.46 Cell Pressure (psi) = 7.1 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 78.30% Can wt. 20.9 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 950.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 96.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 53.9 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.1  0.345 0.067 
0.040 7.8  0.690 0.086 
0.060 9.3  1.034 0.102 
0.080 10.1  1.379 0.110 
0.100 11.1  1.724 0.121 
0.120 11.6  2.069 0.126 
0.140 12.3  2.414 0.133 
0.160 12.5  2.759 0.135 
0.180 13.0  3.103 0.140 
0.200 13.1  3.448 0.140 
0.220 13.5  3.793 0.144 
0.240 14.0  4.138 0.149 
0.260 14.1  4.483 0.149 
0.280 14.3  4.828 0.151 
0.300 14.3  5.172 0.150 
0.320 14.5  5.517 0.152 
0.340 14.8  5.862 0.155 
0.360 15.0  6.207 0.156 
0.380 15.1  6.552 0.156 
0.400 15.3  6.897 0.158 
0.420 15.3  7.241 0.157 
0.440 15.5  7.586 0.159 
0.460 15.6  7.931 0.159 
0.480 15.8  8.276 0.161 
0.500 16.0  8.621 0.162 
0.520 16.0  8.966 0.162 
0.540 16.1  9.310 0.162 
0.560 16.1  9.655 0.161 
0.580 16.3  10.000 0.163 
0.600 16.5  10.345 0.164 
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uuIHNCS-3-2 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-3-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 133.27 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 12.5-13.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 95.32 Cell Pressure (psi) = 7.7 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 57.18% Can wt. 28.95 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1001.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 101.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 64.5 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 7.1  0.345 0.078 
0.040 9.5  0.690 0.105 
0.060 10.8  1.034 0.119 
0.080 12.1  1.379 0.132 
0.100 12.8  1.724 0.140 
0.120 14.0  2.069 0.152 
0.140 14.6  2.414 0.158 
0.160 15.1  2.759 0.163 
0.180 15.8  3.103 0.170 
0.200 16.3  3.448 0.175 
0.220 17.0  3.793 0.181 
0.240 17.6  4.138 0.187 
0.260 18.0  4.483 0.191 
0.280 19.3  4.828 0.204 
0.300 18.5  5.172 0.195 
0.320 18.8  5.517 0.197 
0.340 19.3  5.862 0.201 
0.360 19.8  6.207 0.206 
0.380 20.0  6.552 0.207 
0.400 20.3  6.897 0.210 
0.420 20.5  7.241 0.211 
0.440 20.6  7.586 0.211 
0.460 21.0  7.931 0.214 
0.480 21.1  8.276 0.215 
0.500 21.3  8.621 0.216 
0.520 21.8  8.966 0.220 
0.540 22.0  9.310 0.221 
0.560 22.1  9.655 0.221 
0.580 22.3  10.000 0.223 
0.600 22.5  10.345 0.224 
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uuIHNCS-3-2 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray & dark gray clay w/peat Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCN-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 182.11 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 10-12 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 119.39 Cell Pressure (psi) = 6.5 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 67.92% Can wt. 27.05 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 962.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 97.6 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 58.1 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 5.7  0.346 0.063 
0.040 7.5  0.691 0.083 
0.060 8.9  1.037 0.098 
0.080 9.7  1.383 0.106 
0.100 10.2  1.729 0.111 
0.120 11.0  2.074 0.119 
0.140 11.9  2.420 0.129 
0.160 12.0  2.766 0.129 
0.180 12.2  3.111 0.131 
0.200 12.7  3.457 0.136 
0.220 13.0  3.803 0.139 
0.240 13.4  4.149 0.142 
0.260 13.7  4.494 0.145 
0.280 13.9  4.840 0.147 
0.300 14.2  5.186 0.149 
0.320 14.4  5.532 0.151 
0.340 14.7  5.877 0.153 
0.360 14.9  6.223 0.155 
0.380 15.2  6.569 0.157 
0.400 15.4  6.914 0.159 
0.420 15.7  7.260 0.161 
0.440 15.9  7.606 0.163 
0.460 16.2  7.952 0.165 
0.480 16.4  8.297 0.167 
0.500 16.5  8.643 0.167 
0.520 16.7  8.989 0.169 
0.540 17.0  9.334 0.171 
0.560 17.2  9.680 0.172 
0.580 17.4  10.026 0.174 
0.600 17.6  10.372 0.175 
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uuIHNCN1-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Stiff brown slightly silty clay w/stone and gravel Type of Failure: Multi @ 8%
Boring No.: 17-2-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 173.86 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 1-3 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 148.06 Cell Pressure (psi) = 0.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 21.66% Can wt. 28.96 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1212.8 Wet Density (pcf) = 122.7 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain Dial Strength Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 100.9 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729025
0.020 32  0.345 0.119 
0.040 36  0.690 0.134 
0.060 40  1.034 0.148 
0.080 46  1.379 0.170 
0.100 69  1.724 0.253 
0.120 96  2.069 0.351 
0.140 118  2.414 0.430 
0.160 158  2.759 0.574 
0.180 163  3.103 0.590 
0.200 183  3.448 0.660 
0.220 208  3.793 0.748 
0.240 227  4.138 0.813 
0.260 248  4.483 0.885 
0.280 274  4.828 0.975 
0.300 290  5.172 1.028 
0.320 308  5.517 1.088 
0.340 327  5.862 1.150 
0.360 348  6.207 1.220 
0.380 362  6.552 1.264 
0.400 378  6.897 1.315 
0.420 393  7.241 1.362 
0.440 406  7.586 1.402 
0.460 416  7.931 1.431 
0.480 423  8.276 1.450 
0.500 428  8.621 1.462 
0.520 428  8.966 1.456 
0.540 
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0.600 
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uu17-2-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Still dark gray organic clay to gray & tan clay w/1/2-1" silt layer Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-2-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 130.16 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 4-6 top Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 98.84 Cell Pressure (psi) = 0.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 40.88% Can wt. 22.22 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1046.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 105.7 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 75.0 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 10  0.344 0.037 
0.040 35  0.688 0.130 
0.060 59  1.032 0.218 
0.080 80  1.376 0.295 
0.100 105  1.720 0.386 
0.120 128  2.064 0.469 
0.140 158  2.408 0.576 
0.160 171  2.752 0.622 
0.180 191  3.096 0.692 
0.200 210  3.440 0.758 
0.220 229  3.784 0.824 
0.240 243  4.128 0.871 
0.260 259  4.472 0.925 
0.280 284  4.816 1.010 
0.300 290  5.160 1.028 
0.320 300  5.504 1.060 
0.340 312  5.848 1.098 
0.360 324  6.192 1.136 
0.380 333  6.536 1.163 
0.400 343  6.880 1.194 
0.420 351  7.224 1.217 
0.440 359  7.568 1.240 
0.460 365  7.912 1.256 
0.480 372  8.256 1.276 
0.500 378  8.600 1.291 
0.520 382  8.944 1.300 
0.540 384  9.288 1.302 
0.560 388  9.632 1.311 
0.580 390  9.976 1.312 
0.600 390  10.320 1.307 
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uu17-2-2t STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay w/ silt seams and layers 1/2-1" Type of Failure: Multi @ 6.5%
Boring No.: 17-2-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 196.48 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 4-6 bot Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 160.31 Cell Pressure (psi) = 0.0 
Height (in) = 4.0 Moisture Content (%) = 27.14% Can wt. 27.02 Height Correction = 0.957 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 768.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 112.8 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 88.7 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 20  0.500 0.071 
0.040 43  1.000 0.152 
0.060 67  1.500 0.236 
0.080 90  2.000 0.316 
0.100 120  2.500 0.419 
0.120 145  3.000 0.503 
0.140 155  3.500 0.535 
0.160 160  4.000 0.550 
0.180 167  4.500 0.571 
0.200 172  5.000 0.585 
0.220 175  5.500 0.592 
0.240 170  6.000 0.572 
0.260 165  6.500 0.552 
0.280 161  7.000 0.536 
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uu17-2-2b STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft dark gray clay with silt seams and organics Type of Failure: Yeild @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-2-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 111.12 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8-10 top Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 83.88 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.1 
Height (in) = 4.5 Moisture Content (%) = 47.75% Can wt. 26.83 Height Correction = 0.976 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 711.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 92.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 62.8 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.5  0.444 0.070 
0.040 10.2  0.889 0.109 
0.060 12.0  1.333 0.128 
0.080 13.6  1.778 0.145 
0.100 14.7  2.222 0.156 
0.120 16.2  2.667 0.171 
0.140 17.2  3.111 0.180 
0.160 18.0  3.556 0.188 
0.180 19.0  4.000 0.197 
0.200 19.7  4.444 0.204 
0.220 20.2  4.889 0.208 
0.240 20.9  5.333 0.214 
0.260 21.0  5.778 0.214 
0.280 22.2  6.222 0.225 
0.300 22.7  6.667 0.229 
0.320 23.0  7.111 0.231 
0.340 23.6  7.556 0.236 
0.360 23.9  8.000 0.238 
0.380 24.4  8.444 0.242 
0.400 24.7  8.889 0.244 
0.420 25.0  9.333 0.245 
0.440 25.4  9.778 0.248 
0.460 25.7  10.222 0.250 
0.480 26.0  10.667 0.251 
0.500 26.5  11.111 0.255 
0.520 26.7  11.556 0.256 
0.540 27.0  12.000 0.257 
0.560 27.2  12.444 0.258 
0.580 27.8  12.889 0.262 
0.600 28.0  13.333 0.263 
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uu17-2-3t STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft dark gray clay with silt seams and organics Type of Failure: Yeild @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-2-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 134.9 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8-10 bot Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 98.05 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.1 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 47.75% Can wt. 20.87 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1034.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 104.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 70.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 19.0  0.344 0.210 
0.040 26.0  0.688 0.286 
0.060 30.1  1.032 0.330 
0.080 39.3  1.376 0.430 
0.100 38.2  1.720 0.416 
0.120 41.1  2.064 0.446 
0.140 45.2  2.408 0.489 
0.160 48.5  2.752 0.523 
0.180 51.8  3.096 0.557 
0.200 59.8  3.440 0.640 
0.220 58.2  3.784 0.621 
0.240 60.8  4.128 0.646 
0.260 69.0  4.472 0.731 
0.280 66.1  4.816 0.698 
0.300 69.3  5.160 0.729 
0.320 72.2  5.504 0.757 
0.340 74.5  5.848 0.778 
0.360 76.0  6.192 0.791 
0.380 78.7  6.536 0.816 
0.400 80.8  6.880 0.834 
0.420 82.2  7.224 0.846 
0.440 83.3  7.568 0.854 
0.460 84.8  7.912 0.866 
0.480 85.8  8.256 0.873 
0.500 86.5  8.600 0.877 
0.520 86.8  8.944 0.877 
0.540 86.8  9.288 0.873 
0.560 86.7  9.632 0.869 
0.580 86.3  9.976 0.862 
0.600 85.5  10.320 0.850 
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uu17-2-3b STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium dark gray organic clay w/peat Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-2-6 Sample Data: Wet wt. 89.54 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 17-19 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 41.86 Cell Pressure (psi) = 10.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 227.16% Can wt. 20.87 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 702.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 70.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 21.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 10.3  0.344 0.114 
0.040 16.1  0.688 0.177 
0.060 22.0  1.032 0.241 
0.080 26.5  1.376 0.290 
0.100 30.8  1.720 0.336 
0.120 35.8  2.064 0.389 
0.140 39.3  2.408 0.425 
0.160 43.1  2.752 0.465 
0.180 47.8  3.096 0.514 
0.200 50.3  3.440 0.539 
0.220 54.5  3.784 0.582 
0.240 57.8  4.128 0.615 
0.260 60.7  4.472 0.643 
0.280 63.0  4.816 0.665 
0.300 65.3  5.160 0.687 
0.320 66.8  5.504 0.700 
0.340 68.3  5.848 0.713 
0.360 69.8  6.192 0.726 
0.380 71.3  6.536 0.739 
0.400 72.0  6.880 0.744 
0.420 72.8  7.224 0.749 
0.440 73.3  7.568 0.751 
0.460 73.2  7.912 0.748 
0.480 71.7  8.256 0.730 
0.500 64.8  8.600 0.657 
0.520 63.2  8.944 0.638 
0.540 62.5  9.288 0.629 
0.560 61.8  9.632 0.619 
0.580 60.8  9.976 0.607 
0.600 
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uu17-2-6 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray slightly silty clay Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-2-7 Sample Data: Wet wt. 139.84 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 19.5-21.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 108.02 Cell Pressure (psi) = 11.5 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 38.34% Can wt. 25.02 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1123.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 113.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 82.0 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.8  0.344 0.053 
0.040 7.7  0.688 0.085 
0.060 10.0  1.032 0.110 
0.080 12.2  1.376 0.133 
0.100 13.8  1.720 0.150 
0.120 15.2  2.064 0.165 
0.140 17.8  2.408 0.193 
0.160 19.8  2.752 0.214 
0.180 22.0  3.096 0.236 
0.200 23.1  3.440 0.247 
0.220 25.3  3.784 0.270 
0.240 26.8  4.128 0.285 
0.260 28.7  4.472 0.304 
0.280 30.0  4.816 0.317 
0.300 31.6  5.160 0.332 
0.320 32.7  5.504 0.343 
0.340 33.7  5.848 0.352 
0.360 34.7  6.192 0.361 
0.380 35.8  6.536 0.371 
0.400 36.5  6.880 0.377 
0.420 37.2  7.224 0.383 
0.440 37.7  7.568 0.386 
0.460 38.3  7.912 0.391 
0.480 38.8  8.256 0.395 
0.500 39.3  8.600 0.398 
0.520 39.7  8.944 0.401 
0.540 40.2  9.288 0.404 
0.560 40.5  9.632 0.406 
0.580 41.0  9.976 0.409 
0.600 41.3  10.320 0.411 
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uu17-2-7 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/alt. Layers of fine sand & silt Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-2-8 Sample Data: Wet wt. 183.45 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 24-26 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 123.96 Cell Pressure (psi) = 14.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 58.43% Can wt. 22.14 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 980.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 98.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 62.5 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.2  0.344 0.035 
0.040 11.7  0.688 0.129 
0.060 16.0  1.032 0.176 
0.080 19.8  1.376 0.217 
0.100 22.2  1.720 0.242 
0.120 23.3  2.064 0.253 
0.140 25.2  2.408 0.273 
0.160 27.2  2.752 0.293 
0.180 29.0  3.096 0.312 
0.200 30.3  3.440 0.324 
0.220 31.7  3.784 0.338 
0.240 32.8  4.128 0.349 
0.260 34.2  4.472 0.362 
0.280 35.2  4.816 0.372 
0.300 36.0  5.160 0.379 
0.320 36.8  5.504 0.386 
0.340 37.5  5.848 0.392 
0.360 38.2  6.192 0.397 
0.380 38.8  6.536 0.402 
0.400 39.2  6.880 0.405 
0.420 39.7  7.224 0.409 
0.440 39.8  7.568 0.408 
0.460 40.2  7.912 0.411 
0.480 40.3  8.256 0.410 
0.500 40.5  8.600 0.411 
0.520 40.7  8.944 0.411 
0.540 40.8  9.288 0.410 
0.560 40.8  9.632 0.409 
0.580 40.9  9.976 0.408 
0.600 40.9  10.320 0.407 
Stress Strain Curve
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
0.400
0.450
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Strain (%)
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
t
s
f
)
uu17-2-8 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay with silt seams Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-2-9 Sample Data: Wet wt. 165.18 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 30-32 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 112.45 Cell Pressure (psi) = 18.2 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 63.12% Can wt. 28.91 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 952.2 Wet Density (pcf) = 96.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 58.9 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.2  0.344 0.035 
0.040 12.8  0.688 0.141 
0.060 17.3  1.032 0.190 
0.080 19.8  1.376 0.217 
0.100 22.2  1.720 0.242 
0.120 23.8  2.064 0.259 
0.140 25.0  2.408 0.271 
0.160 26.2  2.752 0.283 
0.180 27.2  3.096 0.292 
0.200 28.2  3.440 0.302 
0.220 29.0  3.784 0.309 
0.240 29.7  4.128 0.316 
0.260 30.3  4.472 0.321 
0.280 30.8  4.816 0.325 
0.300 31.3  5.160 0.329 
0.320 31.8  5.504 0.333 
0.340 32.3  5.848 0.337 
0.360 32.8  6.192 0.341 
0.380 33.2  6.536 0.344 
0.400 33.5  6.880 0.346 
0.420 33.7  7.224 0.347 
0.440 34.0  7.568 0.349 
0.460 34.3  7.912 0.350 
0.480 34.3  8.256 0.349 
0.500 34.5  8.600 0.350 
0.520 34.8  8.944 0.351 
0.540 35.0  9.288 0.352 
0.560 35.2  9.632 0.353 
0.580 35.2  9.976 0.351 
0.600 35.3  10.320 0.351 
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uu17-2-9 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft dark gray to brown peat Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-6A-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 141.12 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 5-6 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 65.16 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 199.32% Can wt. 27.05 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 662.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 66.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 22.4 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 2.3  0.344 0.025 
0.040 4.0  0.688 0.044 
0.060 5.1  1.032 0.056 
0.080 6.0  1.376 0.066 
0.100 7.0  1.720 0.076 
0.120 8.0  2.064 0.087 
0.140 8.6  2.408 0.093 
0.160 8.8  2.752 0.095 
0.180 9.8  3.096 0.105 
0.200 10.0  3.440 0.107 
0.220 10.6  3.784 0.113 
0.240 11.3  4.128 0.120 
0.260 11.6  4.472 0.123 
0.280 12.0  4.816 0.127 
0.300 12.3  5.160 0.129 
0.320 12.6  5.504 0.132 
0.340 13.0  5.848 0.136 
0.360 13.6  6.192 0.141 
0.380 13.6  6.536 0.141 
0.400 14.0  6.880 0.145 
0.420 14.2  7.224 0.146 
0.440 14.3  7.568 0.147 
0.460 14.5  7.912 0.148 
0.480 14.8  8.256 0.151 
0.500 15.0  8.600 0.152 
0.520 15.1  8.944 0.152 
0.540 15.1  9.288 0.152 
0.560 15.1  9.632 0.151 
0.580 15.3  9.976 0.153 
0.600 15.5  10.320 0.154 
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uu17-6A-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-6A-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 193.2 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 6-7 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 110.91 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.8 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 99.88% Can wt. 28.52 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 920.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 92.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 46.5 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.5  0.344 0.039 
0.040 4.3  0.688 0.047 
0.060 5.1  1.032 0.056 
0.080 5.6  1.376 0.061 
0.100 6.3  1.720 0.069 
0.120 6.8  2.064 0.074 
0.140 7.3  2.408 0.079 
0.160 7.6  2.752 0.082 
0.180 7.8  3.096 0.084 
0.200 8.3  3.440 0.089 
0.220 8.5  3.784 0.091 
0.240 8.6  4.128 0.091 
0.260 9.1  4.472 0.096 
0.280 10.3  4.816 0.109 
0.300 10.5  5.160 0.110 
0.320 10.6  5.504 0.111 
0.340 10.7  5.848 0.112 
0.360 11.0  6.192 0.114 
0.380 11.1  6.536 0.115 
0.400 11.3  6.880 0.117 
0.420 11.5  7.224 0.118 
0.440 11.6  7.568 0.119 
0.460 11.8  7.912 0.121 
0.480 12.0  8.256 0.122 
0.500 12.1  8.600 0.123 
0.520 12.3  8.944 0.124 
0.540 12.3  9.288 0.124 
0.560 12.5  9.632 0.125 
0.580 12.5  9.976 0.125 
0.600 12.6  10.320 0.125 
Stress Strain Curve
0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
0.080
0.100
0.120
0.140
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Strain (%)
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
t
s
f
)
uu17-6A-1(2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 212.49 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 14.5-15 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 136.12 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 66.96% Can wt. 22.07 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 880.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 88.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 53.2 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.1  0.344 0.034 
0.040 4.3  0.688 0.047 
0.060 5.0  1.032 0.055 
0.080 5.5  1.376 0.060 
0.100 6.2  1.720 0.068 
0.120 6.5  2.064 0.071 
0.140 7.0  2.408 0.076 
0.160 7.3  2.752 0.079 
0.180 7.8  3.096 0.084 
0.200 8.2  3.440 0.088 
0.220 8.5  3.784 0.091 
0.240 8.8  4.128 0.094 
0.260 9.0  4.472 0.095 
0.280 9.2  4.816 0.097 
0.300 9.2  5.160 0.097 
0.320 9.5  5.504 0.100 
0.340 9.7  5.848 0.101 
0.360 9.8  6.192 0.102 
0.380 9.9  6.536 0.103 
0.400 10.0  6.880 0.103 
0.420 10.1  7.224 0.104 
0.440 10.2  7.568 0.105 
0.460 10.3  7.912 0.105 
0.480 10.5  8.256 0.107 
0.500 10.6  8.600 0.107 
0.520 10.6  8.944 0.107 
0.540 10.7  9.288 0.108 
0.560 10.7  9.632 0.107 
0.580 10.8  9.976 0.108 
0.600 10.9  10.320 0.108 
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uu17-1-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay with peat Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 240.13 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 15 .5-16 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 154.52 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 67.91% Can wt. 28.46 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 899.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 90.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 54.0 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 5.5  0.344 0.061 
0.040 7.2  0.688 0.079 
0.060 8.2  1.032 0.090 
0.080 9.0  1.376 0.098 
0.100 9.7  1.720 0.106 
0.120 10.2  2.064 0.111 
0.140 10.8  2.408 0.117 
0.160 11.2  2.752 0.121 
0.180 11.7  3.096 0.126 
0.200 12.0  3.440 0.129 
0.220 12.3  3.784 0.131 
0.240 12.7  4.128 0.135 
0.260 13.0  4.472 0.138 
0.280 13.2  4.816 0.139 
0.300 13.5  5.160 0.142 
0.320 13.6  5.504 0.143 
0.340 13.7  5.848 0.143 
0.360 14.0  6.192 0.146 
0.380 14.2  6.536 0.147 
0.400 14.3  6.880 0.148 
0.420 14.5  7.224 0.149 
0.440 14.5  7.568 0.149 
0.460 14.7  7.912 0.150 
0.480 14.7  8.256 0.150 
0.500 15.0  8.600 0.152 
0.520 15.2  8.944 0.154 
0.540 15.3  9.288 0.154 
0.560 15.3  9.632 0.153 
0.580 15.4  9.976 0.154 
0.600 15.5  10.320 0.154 
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uu17-1-1 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay with organics Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-1-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 116.16 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 17-19 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 77.49 Cell Pressure (psi) = 10.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 73.71% Can wt. 25.03 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 940.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 94.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 54.6 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 2.7  0.344 0.030 
0.040 3.5  0.688 0.039 
0.060 4.0  1.032 0.044 
0.080 4.3  1.376 0.047 
0.100 4.7  1.720 0.051 
0.120 5.0  2.064 0.054 
0.140 5.4  2.408 0.058 
0.160 5.7  2.752 0.061 
0.180 5.9  3.096 0.063 
0.200 6.0  3.440 0.064 
0.220 6.2  3.784 0.066 
0.240 6.5  4.128 0.069 
0.260 6.9  4.472 0.073 
0.280 7.0  4.816 0.074 
0.300 7.2  5.160 0.076 
0.320 7.2  5.504 0.075 
0.340 7.4  5.848 0.077 
0.360 7.5  6.192 0.078 
0.380 7.9  6.536 0.082 
0.400 8.0  6.880 0.083 
0.420 8.2  7.224 0.084 
0.440 8.2  7.568 0.084 
0.460 8.2  7.912 0.084 
0.480 8.4  8.256 0.085 
0.500 8.5  8.600 0.086 
0.520 8.7  8.944 0.088 
0.540 8.7  9.288 0.088 
0.560 8.7  9.632 0.087 
0.580 8.7  9.976 0.087 
0.600 8.7  10.320 0.087 
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uu17-1-2 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 104.96 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 22.5-24.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 66.58 Cell Pressure (psi) = 13.6 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 92.37% Can wt. 25.03 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 906.2 Wet Density (pcf) = 90.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 46.9 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.6  0.340 0.040 
0.040 8.5  0.679 0.094 
0.060 11.6  1.019 0.127 
0.080 12.8  1.358 0.140 
0.100 14.0  1.698 0.153 
0.120 15.1  2.037 0.164 
0.140 16.0  2.377 0.173 
0.160 16.8  2.716 0.181 
0.180 17.5  3.056 0.188 
0.200 17.8  3.396 0.191 
0.220 18.5  3.735 0.198 
0.240 19.0  4.075 0.202 
0.260 19.5  4.414 0.207 
0.280 19.8  4.754 0.209 
0.300 20.3  5.093 0.214 
0.320 20.6  5.433 0.216 
0.340 21.0  5.772 0.220 
0.360 21.3  6.112 0.222 
0.380 21.5  6.452 0.223 
0.400 22.0  6.791 0.228 
0.420 22.1  7.131 0.228 
0.440 22.5  7.470 0.231 
0.460 22.6  7.810 0.231 
0.480 22.8  8.149 0.232 
0.500 22.8  8.489 0.231 
0.520 23.1  8.829 0.234 
0.540 23.1  9.168 0.233 
0.560 23.3  9.508 0.234 
0.580 23.5  9.847 0.235 
0.600 23.3  10.187 0.232 
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uu17-1-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Firm gray fine sand with clay streaks Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-1-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 200.08 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 26.5-28.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 160.4 Cell Pressure (psi) = 15.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 30.20% Can wt. 28.99 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1132.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 112.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 86.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 9.6  0.340 0.106 
0.040 55.7  0.679 0.614 
0.060 71.5  1.019 0.785 
0.080 84.0  1.358 0.919 
0.100 103.4  1.698 1.128 
0.120 118.4  2.037 1.287 
0.140 123.5  2.377 1.338 
0.160 132.4  2.716 1.429 
0.180 141.0  3.056 1.517 
0.200 149.9  3.396 1.607 
0.220 158.7  3.735 1.695 
0.240 167.9  4.075 1.787 
0.260 176.2  4.414 1.869 
0.280 183.7  4.754 1.941 
0.300 193.4  5.093 2.036 
0.320 207.5  5.433 2.177 
0.340 215.2  5.772 2.250 
0.360 221.9  6.112 2.312 
0.380 228.9  6.452 2.376 
0.400 235.7  6.791 2.438 
0.420 242.9  7.131 2.503 
0.440 248.9  7.470 2.555 
0.460 253.7  7.810 2.595 
0.480 254.5  8.149 2.594 
0.500 257.8  8.489 2.617 
0.520 258.4  8.829 2.614 
0.540 259.3  9.168 2.613 
0.560 260.1  9.508 2.611 
0.580 262.6  9.847 2.627 
0.600 263.9  10.187 2.630 
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uu17-1-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray silty clay w/wood & shell fragments Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-3-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 178.58 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9-10 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 134.4 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 38.06% Can wt. 18.32 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1111.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 112.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 81.2 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.5  0.344 0.039 
0.040 5.0  0.688 0.055 
0.060 6.0  1.032 0.066 
0.080 6.8  1.376 0.074 
0.100 7.6  1.720 0.083 
0.120 8.5  2.064 0.092 
0.140 9.1  2.408 0.098 
0.160 10.0  2.752 0.108 
0.180 10.6  3.096 0.114 
0.200 11.3  3.440 0.121 
0.220 11.6  3.784 0.124 
0.240 12.3  4.128 0.131 
0.260 12.8  4.472 0.136 
0.280 13.5  4.816 0.143 
0.300 13.8  5.160 0.145 
0.320 14.5  5.504 0.152 
0.340 15.0  5.848 0.157 
0.360 15.3  6.192 0.159 
0.380 15.6  6.536 0.162 
0.400 16.3  6.880 0.168 
0.420 16.6  7.224 0.171 
0.440 17.0  7.568 0.174 
0.460 17.3  7.912 0.177 
0.480 17.6  8.256 0.179 
0.500 18.0  8.600 0.182 
0.520 18.3  8.944 0.185 
0.540 18.5  9.288 0.186 
0.560 18.9  9.632 0.189 
0.580 19.0  9.976 0.190 
0.600 19.3  10.320 0.192 
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uu17-3-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft dark gray silty clay w/wood & shell fragments Type of Failure: Yield @10%
Boring No.: 17-3-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 191.49 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 10-11 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 141.25 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 41.80% Can wt. 21.06 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1083.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 109.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 77.1 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.1  0.344 0.045 
0.040 6.0  0.688 0.066 
0.060 6.8  1.032 0.075 
0.080 8.1  1.376 0.089 
0.100 9.5  1.720 0.104 
0.120 10.6  2.064 0.115 
0.140 11.6  2.408 0.126 
0.160 12.6  2.752 0.136 
0.180 13.6  3.096 0.146 
0.200 14.6  3.440 0.156 
0.220 15.3  3.784 0.163 
0.240 15.8  4.128 0.168 
0.260 16.6  4.472 0.176 
0.280 17.1  4.816 0.181 
0.300 17.9  5.160 0.188 
0.320 18.3  5.504 0.192 
0.340 18.6  5.848 0.194 
0.360 19.1  6.192 0.199 
0.380 19.5  6.536 0.202 
0.400 19.8  6.880 0.204 
0.420 20.1  7.224 0.207 
0.440 20.3  7.568 0.208 
0.460 20.6  7.912 0.210 
0.480 20.8  8.256 0.212 
0.500 21.0  8.600 0.213 
0.520 21.1  8.944 0.213 
0.540 21.3  9.288 0.214 
0.560 21.6  9.632 0.216 
0.580 21.8  9.976 0.218 
0.600 22.1  10.320 0.220 
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uu17-3-3 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay with silty clay layers Type of Failure:
Boring No.: 17-3-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 112.6 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 14-16 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 81.68 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 50.88% Can wt. 20.91 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1036.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 103.2 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 68.4 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.0  0.340 0.066 
0.040 8.1  0.679 0.089 
0.060 9.0  1.019 0.099 
0.080 10.1  1.358 0.111 
0.100 11.3  1.698 0.123 
0.120 12.5  2.037 0.136 
0.140 13.8  2.377 0.149 
0.160 14.8  2.716 0.160 
0.180 15.6  3.056 0.168 
0.200 16.5  3.396 0.177 
0.220 17.1  3.735 0.183 
0.240 17.8  4.075 0.189 
0.260 18.3  4.414 0.194 
0.280 18.8  4.754 0.199 
0.300 19.3  5.093 0.203 
0.320 19.8  5.433 0.208 
0.340 20.4  5.772 0.213 
0.360 21.1  6.112 0.220 
0.380 21.9  6.452 0.227 
0.400 22.3  6.791 0.231 
0.420 20.1  7.131 0.207 
0.440 20.3  7.470 0.208 
0.460 21.3  7.810 0.218 
0.480 21.5  8.149 0.219 
0.500 21.8  8.489 0.221 
0.520 22.5  8.829 0.228 
0.540 21.0  9.168 0.212 
0.560 21.8  9.508 0.219 
0.580 21.7  9.847 0.217 
0.600 21.9  10.187 0.218 
Stress Strain Curve
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uu17-3-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-3-5 Sample Data: Wet wt. 146.08 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 20-22 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 96.04 Cell Pressure (psi) = 12.4 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 67.79% Can wt. 22.22 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 960.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 95.7 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 57.0 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.0  0.340 0.033 
0.040 6.0  0.679 0.066 
0.060 8.5  1.019 0.093 
0.080 10.3  1.358 0.113 
0.100 11.7  1.698 0.128 
0.120 13.3  2.037 0.145 
0.140 14.3  2.377 0.155 
0.160 15.3  2.716 0.165 
0.180 16.2  3.056 0.174 
0.200 16.8  3.396 0.180 
0.220 17.3  3.735 0.185 
0.240 18.0  4.075 0.192 
0.260 18.7  4.414 0.198 
0.280 19.2  4.754 0.203 
0.300 19.7  5.093 0.207 
0.320 20.2  5.433 0.212 
0.340 20.7  5.772 0.216 
0.360 21.0  6.112 0.219 
0.380 21.3  6.452 0.221 
0.400 21.5  6.791 0.222 
0.420 21.5  7.131 0.222 
0.440 21.7  7.470 0.223 
0.460 21.7  7.810 0.222 
0.480 21.8  8.149 0.222 
0.500 21.8  8.489 0.221 
0.520 21.6  8.829 0.218 
0.540 21.8  9.168 0.220 
0.560 21.7  9.508 0.218 
0.580 21.9  9.847 0.219 
0.600 22.3  10.187 0.222 
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uu17-3-5 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray very sandy clay with shell Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-3-6 Sample Data: Wet wt. 153.77 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 26-28 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 126.81 Cell Pressure (psi) = 15.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 26.88% Can wt. 26.52 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1060.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 105.6 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 83.3 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.1  0.340 0.034 
0.040 6.8  0.679 0.075 
0.060 9.5  1.019 0.104 
0.080 11.8  1.358 0.129 
0.100 13.3  1.698 0.145 
0.120 15.2  2.037 0.165 
0.140 16.5  2.377 0.179 
0.160 17.8  2.716 0.192 
0.180 19.2  3.056 0.207 
0.200 20.2  3.396 0.217 
0.220 21.2  3.735 0.226 
0.240 22.2  4.075 0.236 
0.260 23.0  4.414 0.244 
0.280 23.7  4.754 0.250 
0.300 24.3  5.093 0.256 
0.320 24.8  5.433 0.260 
0.340 25.5  5.772 0.267 
0.360 26.0  6.112 0.271 
0.380 26.3  6.452 0.273 
0.400 26.7  6.791 0.276 
0.420 27.0  7.131 0.278 
0.440 27.3  7.470 0.280 
0.460 27.6  7.810 0.282 
0.480 27.9  8.149 0.284 
0.500 28.0  8.489 0.284 
0.520 27.8  8.829 0.281 
0.540 27.5  9.168 0.277 
0.560 27.8  9.508 0.279 
0.580 28.0  9.847 0.280 
0.600 28.0  10.187 0.279 
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uu17-3-6 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Stiff tan and brown clay with silt Type of Failure: Vertical @ 7.1%
Boring No.: 17-4-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 194.78 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 3-5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 164.15 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 22.25% Can wt. 26.47 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1253.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 124.8 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 102.1 0.337
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 15  0.340 0.056 
0.040 42  0.679 0.156 
0.060 61  1.019 0.226 
0.080 82  1.358 0.302 
0.100 102  1.698 0.375 
0.120 121  2.037 0.443 
0.140 142  2.377 0.518 
0.160 162  2.716 0.589 
0.180 182  3.056 0.660 
0.200 202  3.396 0.730 
0.220 222  3.735 0.799 
0.240 242  4.075 0.868 
0.260 256  4.414 0.915 
0.280 275  4.754 0.979 
0.300 295  5.093 1.047 
0.320 310  5.433 1.096 
0.340 325  5.772 1.145 
0.360 340  6.112 1.194 
0.380 354  6.452 1.238 
0.400 364  6.791 1.269 
0.420 372  7.131 1.292 
0.440 372  7.470 1.287 
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uu17-4-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Med gray clay w/silt & fine sand alt layers & traces of organic matter Type of Failure: Bulge @ 9%
Boring No.: 17-4-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 147.97 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9-10 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 115.26 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 35.17% Can wt. 22.25 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1091.2 Wet Density (pcf) = 110.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 81.5 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 17.6  0.344 0.195 
0.040 22.8  0.688 0.251 
0.060 27.1  1.032 0.297 
0.080 31.1  1.376 0.340 
0.100 35.0  1.720 0.382 
0.120 38.6  2.064 0.419 
0.140 41.8  2.408 0.452 
0.160 45.1  2.752 0.486 
0.180 47.8  3.096 0.514 
0.200 50.5  3.440 0.541 
0.220 52.6  3.784 0.561 
0.240 54.6  4.128 0.581 
0.260 57.1  4.472 0.605 
0.280 58.1  4.816 0.613 
0.300 59.3  5.160 0.624 
0.320 60.3  5.504 0.632 
0.340 61.1  5.848 0.638 
0.360 61.8  6.192 0.643 
0.380 62.3  6.536 0.646 
0.400 62.5  6.880 0.645 
0.420 62.5  7.224 0.643 
0.440 62.0  7.568 0.636 
0.460 61.0  7.912 0.623 
0.480 60.3  8.256 0.614 
0.500 59.5  8.600 0.603 
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uu17-4-2 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay with silt seams and wood Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 182.31 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 10-11 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 141.25 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 34.12% Can wt. 20.9 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1120.7 Wet Density (pcf) = 113.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 84.3 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 9.8  0.344 0.108 
0.040 13.6  0.688 0.150 
0.060 17.1  1.032 0.188 
0.080 19.8  1.376 0.217 
0.100 22.3  1.720 0.243 
0.120 25.1  2.064 0.273 
0.140 27.3  2.408 0.295 
0.160 30.0  2.752 0.324 
0.180 32.1  3.096 0.345 
0.200 34.1  3.440 0.365 
0.220 36.5  3.784 0.389 
0.240 38.5  4.128 0.409 
0.260 40.5  4.472 0.429 
0.280 42.3  4.816 0.447 
0.300 44.1  5.160 0.464 
0.320 45.6  5.504 0.478 
0.340 47.1  5.848 0.492 
0.360 48.6  6.192 0.506 
0.380 50.6  6.536 0.525 
0.400 51.6  6.880 0.533 
0.420 52.8  7.224 0.543 
0.440 54.1  7.568 0.555 
0.460 55.3  7.912 0.565 
0.480 56.3  8.256 0.573 
0.500 57.6  8.600 0.584 
0.520 58.6  8.944 0.592 
0.540 59.6  9.288 0.600 
0.560 60.6  9.632 0.607 
0.580 61.5  9.976 0.614 
0.600 62.3  10.320 0.620 
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uu17-4-2 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray and brown clay with peat and organics Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 162.94 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 11.5-13.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 83.74 Cell Pressure (psi) = 7.5 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 128.43% Can wt. 22.07 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 885.7 Wet Density (pcf) = 88.2 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 38.6 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 9.2  0.340 0.102 
0.040 14.6  0.679 0.161 
0.060 19.1  1.019 0.210 
0.080 23.2  1.358 0.254 
0.100 26.3  1.698 0.287 
0.120 29.0  2.037 0.315 
0.140 30.8  2.377 0.334 
0.160 32.8  2.716 0.354 
0.180 34.5  3.056 0.371 
0.200 36.0  3.396 0.386 
0.220 37.2  3.735 0.397 
0.240 38.5  4.075 0.410 
0.260 39.5  4.414 0.419 
0.280 40.5  4.754 0.428 
0.300 41.5  5.093 0.437 
0.320 42.2  5.433 0.443 
0.340 42.8  5.772 0.447 
0.360 43.7  6.112 0.455 
0.380 44.3  6.452 0.460 
0.400 45.0  6.791 0.465 
0.420 45.6  7.131 0.470 
0.440 46.2  7.470 0.474 
0.460 46.7  7.810 0.478 
0.480 47.2  8.149 0.481 
0.500 47.5  8.489 0.482 
0.520 48.0  8.829 0.486 
0.540 48.3  9.168 0.487 
0.560 48.8  9.508 0.490 
0.580 49.2  9.847 0.492 
0.600 49.5  10.187 0.493 
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uu17-4-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft dark gray organic clay with peat Type of Failure:
Boring No.: 17-4-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 126.99 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 14-15 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 54.52 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 261.81% Can wt. 26.84 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 830.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 82.7 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 22.9 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 5.3  0.340 0.059 
0.040 10.5  0.679 0.116 
0.060 14.8  1.019 0.163 
0.080 18.5  1.358 0.202 
0.100 21.1  1.698 0.230 
0.120 23.5  2.037 0.255 
0.140 25.8  2.377 0.279 
0.160 27.3  2.716 0.295 
0.180 28.8  3.056 0.310 
0.200 30.0  3.396 0.322 
0.220 31.3  3.735 0.334 
0.240 32.5  4.075 0.346 
0.260 33.1  4.414 0.351 
0.280 34.0  4.754 0.359 
0.300 34.6  5.093 0.364 
0.320 35.3  5.433 0.370 
0.340 35.8  5.772 0.374 
0.360 36.3  6.112 0.378 
0.380 36.5  6.452 0.379 
0.400 36.6  6.791 0.379 
0.420 36.5  7.131 0.376 
0.440 36.5  7.470 0.375 
0.460 36.5  7.810 0.373 
0.480 36.5  8.149 0.372 
0.500 36.4  8.489 0.370 
0.520 36.6  8.829 0.370 
0.540 36.8  9.168 0.371 
0.560 36.6  9.508 0.367 
0.580 36.6  9.847 0.366 
0.600 36.6  10.187 0.365 
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uu17-4-4 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium dark gray organic clay with peat Type of Failure:
Boring No.: 17-4-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 147.46 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 15-16 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 91.67 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.9 
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 80.25% Can wt. 22.15 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 736.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 73.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 40.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.5  0.340 0.072 
0.040 11.0  0.679 0.121 
0.060 14.3  1.019 0.157 
0.080 17.8  1.358 0.195 
0.100 21.3  1.698 0.232 
0.120 24.5  2.037 0.266 
0.140 28.0  2.377 0.303 
0.160 31.0  2.716 0.335 
0.180 34.3  3.056 0.369 
0.200 37.0  3.396 0.397 
0.220 39.6  3.735 0.423 
0.240 41.8  4.075 0.445 
0.260 44.1  4.414 0.468 
0.280 45.8  4.754 0.484 
0.300 47.5  5.093 0.500 
0.320 49.0  5.433 0.514 
0.340 50.0  5.772 0.523 
0.360 51.0  6.112 0.531 
0.380 51.8  6.452 0.538 
0.400 52.5  6.791 0.543 
0.420 52.8  7.131 0.544 
0.440 53.0  7.470 0.544 
0.460 53.1  7.810 0.543 
0.480 53.1  8.149 0.541 
0.500 53.0  8.489 0.538 
0.520 52.5  8.829 0.531 
0.540 52.0  9.168 0.524 
0.560 51.6  9.508 0.518 
0.580 51.5  9.847 0.515 
0.600 51.0  10.187 0.508 
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uu17-4-4 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-7 Sample Data: Wet wt. 146.82 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 21.5-22.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 92.09 Cell Pressure (psi) = 14.4 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 77.95% Can wt. 21.88 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 942.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 95.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 53.4 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.3  0.344 0.048 
0.040 6.8  0.688 0.075 
0.060 8.8  1.032 0.097 
0.080 10.2  1.376 0.112 
0.100 11.2  1.720 0.122 
0.120 12.0  2.064 0.130 
0.140 12.7  2.408 0.137 
0.160 13.3  2.752 0.143 
0.180 14.3  3.096 0.154 
0.200 14.5  3.440 0.155 
0.220 15.2  3.784 0.162 
0.240 15.7  4.128 0.167 
0.260 16.0  4.472 0.170 
0.280 16.3  4.816 0.172 
0.300 16.7  5.160 0.176 
0.320 16.8  5.504 0.176 
0.340 17.2  5.848 0.180 
0.360 17.3  6.192 0.180 
0.380 17.5  6.536 0.181 
0.400 17.7  6.880 0.183 
0.420 17.8  7.224 0.183 
0.440 18.0  7.568 0.185 
0.460 18.1  7.912 0.185 
0.480 18.2  8.256 0.185 
0.500 18.3  8.600 0.186 
0.520 18.3  8.944 0.185 
0.540 18.5  9.288 0.186 
0.560 18.5  9.632 0.185 
0.580 18.6  9.976 0.186 
0.600 18.6  10.320 0.185 
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uu17-4-7 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray silty sandy clay (alt. Layers) Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-7 Sample Data: Wet wt. 204.42 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 22.5-23.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 146.12 Cell Pressure (psi) = 14.4 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 46.61% Can wt. 21.05 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1131.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 114.2 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 77.9 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.5  0.344 0.039 
0.040 7.9  0.688 0.087 
0.060 10.9  1.032 0.120 
0.080 13.7  1.376 0.150 
0.100 16.5  1.720 0.180 
0.120 19.2  2.064 0.209 
0.140 21.5  2.408 0.233 
0.160 24.0  2.752 0.259 
0.180 26.4  3.096 0.284 
0.200 28.7  3.440 0.307 
0.220 30.7  3.784 0.328 
0.240 32.7  4.128 0.348 
0.260 34.8  4.472 0.369 
0.280 36.9  4.816 0.390 
0.300 38.5  5.160 0.405 
0.320 40.5  5.504 0.424 
0.340 42.4  5.848 0.443 
0.360 44.2  6.192 0.460 
0.380 45.9  6.536 0.476 
0.400 47.4  6.880 0.490 
0.420 48.1  7.224 0.495 
0.440 49.9  7.568 0.512 
0.460 51.0  7.912 0.521 
0.480 52.0  8.256 0.529 
0.500 53.0  8.600 0.537 
0.520 54.0  8.944 0.545 
0.540 54.9  9.288 0.552 
0.560 55.9  9.632 0.560 
0.580 56.5  9.976 0.564 
0.600 57.4  10.320 0.571 
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uu17-4-7 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/alt. Layers of silty fine sand Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-4-8 Sample Data: Wet wt. 159.49 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 25-27 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 104.48 Cell Pressure (psi) = 15.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 65.80% Can wt. 20.88 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 981.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 99.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 59.7 1
0.000 0.0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 5.7  0.344 0.063 
0.040 12.5  0.688 0.138 
0.060 15.8  1.032 0.173 
0.080 18.3  1.376 0.200 
0.100 20.3  1.720 0.221 
0.120 22.3  2.064 0.242 
0.140 24.2  2.408 0.262 
0.160 25.7  2.752 0.277 
0.180 27.3  3.096 0.293 
0.200 28.5  3.440 0.305 
0.220 29.6  3.784 0.316 
0.240 30.8  4.128 0.327 
0.260 31.8  4.472 0.337 
0.280 32.7  4.816 0.345 
0.300 33.7  5.160 0.354 
0.320 34.0  5.504 0.356 
0.340 34.8  5.848 0.363 
0.360 35.5  6.192 0.369 
0.380 35.8  6.536 0.371 
0.400 36.3  6.880 0.375 
0.420 36.7  7.224 0.378 
0.440 37.0  7.568 0.379 
0.460 37.2  7.912 0.380 
0.480 37.5  8.256 0.382 
0.500 37.7  8.600 0.382 
0.520 37.8  8.944 0.382 
0.540 37.8  9.288 0.380 
0.560 37.8  9.632 0.379 
0.580 37.9  9.976 0.378 
0.600 37.9  10.320 0.377 
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uu17-4-8 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very stiff tan and brown clay with silt Type of Failure: Vertical @ 7.4%
Boring No.: 17-5-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 162.22 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 3-5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 142.28 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 5.9 Moisture Content (%) = 17.59% Can wt. 28.9 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1267.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 126.3 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 107.4 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 18  0.340 0.067 
0.040 41  0.679 0.152 
0.060 75  1.019 0.278 
0.080 115  1.358 0.424 
0.100 152  1.698 0.559 
0.120 194  2.037 0.711 
0.140 230  2.377 0.840 
0.160 270  2.716 0.982 
0.180 313  3.056 1.135 
0.200 358  3.396 1.293 
0.220 405  3.735 1.458 
0.240 445  4.075 1.596 
0.260 490  4.414 1.751 
0.280 538  4.754 1.916 
0.300 578  5.093 2.051 
0.320 620  5.433 2.353 
0.340 660  5.772 2.686 
0.360 692  6.112 2.948 
0.380 712  6.452 3.107 
0.400 725  6.791 3.205 
0.420 736  7.131 3.286 
0.440 742  7.470 3.324 
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uu17-5-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay with siltlenses and wood Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-5-6 Sample Data: Wet wt. 136.11 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 22-24 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 85.72 Cell Pressure (psi) = 14.4 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 77.69% Can wt. 20.86 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 954.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 96.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 54.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.0  0.344 0.066 
0.040 8.0  0.688 0.088 
0.060 9.7  1.032 0.106 
0.080 10.8  1.376 0.118 
0.100 12.0  1.720 0.131 
0.120 12.8  2.064 0.139 
0.140 13.8  2.408 0.149 
0.160 14.5  2.752 0.156 
0.180 15.5  3.096 0.167 
0.200 16.0  3.440 0.171 
0.220 16.7  3.784 0.178 
0.240 17.3  4.128 0.184 
0.260 17.8  4.472 0.189 
0.280 18.3  4.816 0.193 
0.300 18.7  5.160 0.197 
0.320 19.2  5.504 0.201 
0.340 19.7  5.848 0.206 
0.360 20.2  6.192 0.210 
0.380 20.3  6.536 0.210 
0.400 20.7  6.880 0.214 
0.420 21.0  7.224 0.216 
0.440 21.3  7.568 0.218 
0.460 21.8  7.912 0.223 
0.480 22.2  8.256 0.226 
0.500 22.5  8.600 0.228 
0.520 22.7  8.944 0.229 
0.540 22.8  9.288 0.229 
0.560 23.0  9.632 0.231 
0.580 23.7  9.976 0.237 
0.600 23.9  10.320 0.238 
Stress Strain Curve
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uu17-5-6 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/alt. Seams of silty fine sand Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: 17-5-7 Sample Data: Wet wt. 143.77 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 25-27 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 107.04 Cell Pressure (psi) = 16.7 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 42.65% Can wt. 20.92 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 999.2 Wet Density (pcf) = 100.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 70.7 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 1.2  0.344 0.013 
0.040 9.0  0.688 0.099 
0.060 12.5  1.032 0.137 
0.080 15.3  1.376 0.167 
0.100 17.2  1.720 0.187 
0.120 18.8  2.064 0.204 
0.140 20.5  2.408 0.222 
0.160 22.2  2.752 0.239 
0.180 23.5  3.096 0.253 
0.200 24.8  3.440 0.266 
0.220 25.4  3.784 0.271 
0.240 26.8  4.128 0.285 
0.260 27.7  4.472 0.293 
0.280 29.0  4.816 0.306 
0.300 30.9  5.160 0.325 
0.320 30.5  5.504 0.320 
0.340 31.2  5.848 0.326 
0.360 31.8  6.192 0.331 
0.380 32.5  6.536 0.337 
0.400 33.0  6.880 0.341 
0.420 33.5  7.224 0.345 
0.440 33.8  7.568 0.347 
0.460 34.1  7.912 0.348 
0.480 34.0  8.256 0.346 
0.500 35.0  8.600 0.355 
0.520 35.5  8.944 0.359 
0.540 35.8  9.288 0.360 
0.560 36.2  9.632 0.363 
0.580 36.3  9.976 0.362 
0.600 36.5  10.320 0.363 
Stress Strain Curve
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uu17-5-7 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft organic clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 142.26 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 3-4 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 75.15 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 123.75% Can wt. 20.92 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 852.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 86.5 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 38.7 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.8  0.346 0.042 
0.040 4.7  0.691 0.052 
0.060 5.2  1.037 0.057 
0.080 5.8  1.383 0.063 
0.100 6.3  1.729 0.069 
0.120 7.0  2.074 0.076 
0.140 7.3  2.420 0.079 
0.160 7.5  2.766 0.081 
0.180 7.8  3.111 0.084 
0.200 8.2  3.457 0.088 
0.220 8.7  3.803 0.093 
0.240 9.0  4.149 0.096 
0.260 9.2  4.494 0.097 
0.280 9.3  4.840 0.098 
0.300 9.8  5.186 0.103 
0.320 10.2  5.532 0.107 
0.340 10.5  5.877 0.110 
0.360 10.7  6.223 0.111 
0.380 10.8  6.569 0.112 
0.400 11.0  6.914 0.114 
0.420 12.2  7.260 0.125 
0.440 11.3  7.606 0.116 
0.460 11.7  7.952 0.119 
0.480 11.8  8.297 0.120 
0.500 12.0  8.643 0.122 
0.520 12.1  8.989 0.122 
0.540 12.2  9.334 0.123 
0.560 12.2  9.680 0.122 
0.580 12.3  10.026 0.123 
0.600 12.3  10.372 0.122 
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uuLAC-1-1 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay with fine sand Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 198.4 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 5-6 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 143.55 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 47.68% Can wt. 28.51 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1143.7 Wet Density (pcf) = 115.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 78.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.3  0.344 0.048 
0.040 6.0  0.688 0.066 
0.060 7.2  1.032 0.079 
0.080 8.5  1.376 0.093 
0.100 9.8  1.720 0.107 
0.120 10.8  2.064 0.117 
0.140 11.8  2.408 0.128 
0.160 12.5  2.752 0.135 
0.180 13.3  3.096 0.143 
0.200 14.5  3.440 0.155 
0.220 15.3  3.784 0.163 
0.240 16.3  4.128 0.173 
0.260 17.0  4.472 0.180 
0.280 17.7  4.816 0.187 
0.300 18.2  5.160 0.191 
0.320 19.0  5.504 0.199 
0.340 19.5  5.848 0.204 
0.360 20.0  6.192 0.208 
0.380 20.5  6.536 0.213 
0.400 20.8  6.880 0.215 
0.420 21.3  7.224 0.219 
0.440 21.7  7.568 0.222 
0.460 22.3  7.912 0.228 
0.480 22.7  8.256 0.231 
0.500 23.2  8.600 0.235 
0.520 23.7  8.944 0.239 
0.540 24.0  9.288 0.241 
0.560 24.3  9.632 0.244 
0.580 25.0  9.976 0.250 
0.600 25.5  10.320 0.254 
Stress Strain Curve
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uuLAC-1-1 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft clay w/ 1/2" sand layer at bottom Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-1-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 151.2 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 6-8 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 108.24 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.1 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 51.65% Can wt. 25.06 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1111.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 112.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 74.1 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 4.0  0.345 0.044 
0.040 5.2  0.690 0.057 
0.060 6.0  1.034 0.066 
0.080 6.7  1.379 0.073 
0.100 7.2  1.724 0.078 
0.120 7.8  2.069 0.085 
0.140 8.3  2.414 0.090 
0.160 8.8  2.759 0.095 
0.180 9.0  3.103 0.097 
0.200 9.7  3.448 0.104 
0.220 10.0  3.793 0.107 
0.240 10.2  4.138 0.108 
0.260 10.3  4.483 0.109 
0.280 11.2  4.828 0.118 
0.300 11.7  5.172 0.123 
0.320 12.0  5.517 0.126 
0.340 12.0  5.862 0.125 
0.360 12.2  6.207 0.127 
0.380 12.3  6.552 0.127 
0.400 12.5  6.897 0.129 
0.420 12.8  7.241 0.132 
0.440 13.0  7.586 0.133 
0.460 13.3  7.931 0.136 
0.480 13.5  8.276 0.137 
0.500 13.5  8.621 0.137 
0.520 13.7  8.966 0.138 
0.540 13.8  9.310 0.139 
0.560 14.0  9.655 0.140 
0.580 14.0  10.000 0.140 
0.600 14.3  10.345 0.142 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray sandy clay w/wood & clay pockets Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 185.35 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 145.26 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 32.58% Can wt. 22.22 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 947.4 Wet Density (pcf) = 95.9 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 72.3 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.5  0.345 0.039 
0.040 4.8  0.690 0.053 
0.060 5.7  1.034 0.063 
0.080 6.2  1.379 0.068 
0.100 6.7  1.724 0.073 
0.120 7.3  2.069 0.079 
0.140 7.7  2.414 0.083 
0.160 8.0  2.759 0.086 
0.180 8.2  3.103 0.088 
0.200 8.5  3.448 0.091 
0.220 8.7  3.793 0.093 
0.240 9.0  4.138 0.096 
0.260 9.3  4.483 0.099 
0.280 9.7  4.828 0.102 
0.300 9.8  5.172 0.103 
0.320 10.0  5.517 0.105 
0.340 10.2  5.862 0.106 
0.360 10.2  6.207 0.106 
0.380 10.3  6.552 0.107 
0.400 10.7  6.897 0.110 
0.420 10.7  7.241 0.110 
0.440 10.8  7.586 0.111 
0.460 10.8  7.931 0.110 
0.480 11.0  8.276 0.112 
0.500 11.0  8.621 0.111 
0.520 11.2  8.966 0.113 
0.540 11.2  9.310 0.113 
0.560 11.3  9.655 0.113 
0.580 11.3  10.000 0.113 
0.600 11.5  10.345 0.114 
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0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
0.080
0.100
0.120
0.140
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Strain (%)
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
t
s
f
)
uuLAC-1-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Firm gray fine sand with 2" clayey sand layer Type of Failure: Bulge @ 4%
Boring No.: LAC-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 197.24 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9.5-10.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 158.25 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 30.18% Can wt. 29.07 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1160.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 117.5 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 90.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 19.4  0.345 0.214 
0.040 24.0  0.690 0.264 
0.060 25.2  1.034 0.277 
0.080 25.9  1.379 0.283 
0.100 26.2  1.724 0.286 
0.120 26.2  2.069 0.285 
0.140 25.9  2.414 0.280 
0.160 25.2  2.759 0.272 
0.180 24.0  3.103 0.258 
0.200 21.0  3.448 0.225 
0.220 16.7  3.793 0.178 
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uuLAC-1-3 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay with some silt Type of Failure: Yeild @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-2-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 207.31 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 44-45 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 124.65 Cell Pressure (psi) = 26.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 86.46% Can wt. 29.05 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1006.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 101.6 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 54.5 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 21.6  0.344 0.239 
0.040 33.3  0.688 0.367 
0.060 39.6  1.032 0.435 
0.080 33.3  1.376 0.364 
0.100 35.8  1.720 0.390 
0.120 47.8  2.064 0.519 
0.140 49.1  2.408 0.531 
0.160 50.3  2.752 0.543 
0.180 51.6  3.096 0.555 
0.200 52.5  3.440 0.562 
0.220 53.3  3.784 0.569 
0.240 54.0  4.128 0.574 
0.260 54.6  4.472 0.578 
0.280 55.0  4.816 0.581 
0.300 55.5  5.160 0.584 
0.320 56.0  5.504 0.587 
0.340 56.4  5.848 0.589 
0.360 56.8  6.192 0.591 
0.380 57.0  6.536 0.591 
0.400 57.1  6.880 0.590 
0.420 57.3  7.224 0.590 
0.440 57.6  7.568 0.590 
0.460 57.8  7.912 0.590 
0.480 58.0  8.256 0.590 
0.500 58.1  8.600 0.589 
0.520 58.1  8.944 0.587 
0.540 58.3  9.288 0.587 
0.560 58.3  9.632 0.584 
0.580 58.1  9.976 0.580 
0.600 57.8  10.320 0.575 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay w/silt seams & shell fragments Type of Failure: Yeild @ 10%
Boring No.: LAC-2-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 195.39 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 45-46 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 131.96 Cell Pressure (psi) = 26.6 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 57.75% Can wt. 22.12 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1041.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 105.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 66.6 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 12.8  0.344 0.141 
0.040 28.4  0.688 0.313 
0.060 36.4  1.032 0.400 
0.080 40.7  1.376 0.445 
0.100 44.5  1.720 0.485 
0.120 47.4  2.064 0.515 
0.140 49.7  2.408 0.538 
0.160 51.9  2.752 0.560 
0.180 53.4  3.096 0.574 
0.200 54.7  3.440 0.586 
0.220 55.9  3.784 0.597 
0.240 56.9  4.128 0.605 
0.260 58.0  4.472 0.615 
0.280 58.9  4.816 0.622 
0.300 59.5  5.160 0.626 
0.320 60.4  5.504 0.633 
0.340 60.9  5.848 0.636 
0.360 61.4  6.192 0.639 
0.380 61.7  6.536 0.640 
0.400 62.8  6.880 0.649 
0.420 62.4  7.224 0.642 
0.440 62.5  7.568 0.641 
0.460 62.7  7.912 0.640 
0.480 62.9  8.256 0.640 
0.500 63.0  8.600 0.639 
0.520 63.2  8.944 0.638 
0.540 63.2  9.288 0.636 
0.560 63.2  9.632 0.633 
0.580 63.4  9.976 0.633 
0.600 63.6  10.320 0.633 
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uuLAC-2-4 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray sandy clay to sand Type of Failure: Vertical @ 4%
Boring No.: LAC-3-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 193.85 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 7.5-8.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 164.29 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.3 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 21.80% Can wt. 28.69 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1246.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 125.8 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 103.3 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 10.0  0.344 0.111 
0.040 19.5  0.688 0.215 
0.060 26.4  1.032 0.290 
0.080 32.9  1.376 0.360 
0.100 38.2  1.720 0.416 
0.120 42.5  2.064 0.462 
0.140 45.5  2.408 0.492 
0.160 47.7  2.752 0.514 
0.180 49.0  3.096 0.527 
0.200 49.7  3.440 0.532 
0.220 49.7  3.784 0.530 
0.240 48.5  4.128 0.516 
0.260 45.9  4.472 0.486 
0.280 43.8  4.816 0.462 
0.300 39.8  5.160 0.419 
0.320 35.8  5.504 0.375 
0.340 32.4  5.848 0.338 
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uuLAC-3-3 STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Firm gray sand with clay Type of Failure: Bulge @ 7%
Boring No.: LAC-3-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 151.05 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9-11 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 123.97 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.9 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 26.58% Can wt. 22.08 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1208.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 122.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 96.6 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 17.8  0.345 0.197 
0.040 25.2  0.690 0.278 
0.060 30.0  1.034 0.329 
0.080 36.2  1.379 0.396 
0.100 41.8  1.724 0.456 
0.120 46.8  2.069 0.508 
0.140 51.7  2.414 0.560 
0.160 55.3  2.759 0.596 
0.180 58.7  3.103 0.631 
0.200 61.8  3.448 0.662 
0.220 64.2  3.793 0.685 
0.240 67.2  4.138 0.714 
0.260 68.5  4.483 0.726 
0.280 67.5  4.828 0.712 
0.300 66.7  5.172 0.701 
0.320 66.7  5.517 0.699 
0.340 66.2  5.862 0.691 
0.360 65.0  6.207 0.676 
0.380 64.3  6.552 0.666 
0.400 63.7  6.897 0.658 
0.420 62.8  7.241 0.646 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft dark gray organic clay with peat Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACW-2-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 133.17 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 64.01 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.3 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 186.97% Can wt. 27.02 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 759.7 Wet Density (pcf) = 76.7 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 26.7 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.8  0.344 0.042 
0.040 6.5  0.688 0.072 
0.060 8.7  1.032 0.095 
0.080 10.3  1.376 0.113 
0.100 11.8  1.720 0.129 
0.120 13.2  2.064 0.143 
0.140 14.5  2.408 0.157 
0.160 15.7  2.752 0.169 
0.180 16.7  3.096 0.179 
0.200 17.5  3.440 0.187 
0.220 18.3  3.784 0.195 
0.240 19.0  4.128 0.202 
0.260 19.7  4.472 0.209 
0.280 20.3  4.816 0.214 
0.300 20.8  5.160 0.219 
0.320 21.5  5.504 0.225 
0.340 22.2  5.848 0.232 
0.360 22.5  6.192 0.234 
0.380 23.0  6.536 0.238 
0.400 23.5  6.880 0.243 
0.420 23.7  7.224 0.244 
0.440 24.2  7.568 0.248 
0.460 24.3  7.912 0.248 
0.480 24.7  8.256 0.251 
0.500 25.0  8.600 0.253 
0.520 25.0  8.944 0.252 
0.540 25.2  9.288 0.254 
0.560 25.3  9.632 0.254 
0.580 25.5  9.976 0.255 
0.600 25.7  10.320 0.256 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very Soft dark gray organic clay with peat Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACW-2-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 135 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 9.5-10.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 70.05 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.3 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 157.95% Can wt. 28.93 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 764.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 77.2 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 29.9 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 3.9  0.344 0.043 
0.040 6.3  0.688 0.069 
0.060 8.3  1.032 0.091 
0.080 9.8  1.376 0.107 
0.100 11.3  1.720 0.123 
0.120 12.7  2.064 0.138 
0.140 13.7  2.408 0.148 
0.160 14.8  2.752 0.160 
0.180 15.8  3.096 0.170 
0.200 16.5  3.440 0.177 
0.220 17.3  3.784 0.185 
0.240 18.0  4.128 0.191 
0.260 18.5  4.472 0.196 
0.280 19.2  4.816 0.203 
0.300 19.7  5.160 0.207 
0.320 20.2  5.504 0.212 
0.340 20.5  5.848 0.214 
0.360 20.8  6.192 0.216 
0.380 21.0  6.536 0.218 
0.400 21.3  6.880 0.220 
0.420 21.7  7.224 0.223 
0.440 21.8  7.568 0.223 
0.460 22.0  7.912 0.225 
0.480 22.2  8.256 0.226 
0.500 22.3  8.600 0.226 
0.520 22.5  8.944 0.227 
0.540 22.7  9.288 0.228 
0.560 22.7  9.632 0.228 
0.580 22.8  9.976 0.228 
0.600 23.0  10.320 0.229 
Stress Strain Curve
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Strain (%)
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
t
s
f
)
uuLACW-2-2 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium dark gray organic clay alt. Layers of sand silt & clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACW-3-4 Sample Data: Wet wt. 205 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 10-12 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 145.69 Cell Pressure (psi) = 6.5 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 48.11% Can wt. 22.42 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1120.8 Wet Density (pcf) = 113.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 76.4 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 12.7  0.344 0.140 
0.040 19.9  0.688 0.219 
0.060 25.5  1.032 0.280 
0.080 27.9  1.376 0.305 
0.100 30.7  1.720 0.335 
0.120 32.5  2.064 0.353 
0.140 35.4  2.408 0.383 
0.160 37.7  2.752 0.407 
0.180 39.4  3.096 0.423 
0.200 40.9  3.440 0.438 
0.220 42.4  3.784 0.452 
0.240 43.9  4.128 0.467 
0.260 45.0  4.472 0.477 
0.280 45.9  4.816 0.485 
0.300 47.0  5.160 0.494 
0.320 47.9  5.504 0.502 
0.340 48.9  5.848 0.511 
0.360 49.5  6.192 0.515 
0.380 50.7  6.536 0.526 
0.400 50.9  6.880 0.526 
0.420 51.7  7.224 0.532 
0.440 52.0  7.568 0.533 
0.460 52.9  7.912 0.540 
0.480 53.2  8.256 0.541 
0.500 53.9  8.600 0.546 
0.520 54.4  8.944 0.549 
0.540 55.2  9.288 0.555 
0.560 55.7  9.632 0.558 
0.580 55.7  9.976 0.556 
0.600 55.9  10.320 0.556 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Stiff dark gray organic w/roots Type of Failure: Vertical @ 9%
Boring No.: LACW-4-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 145.27 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 3.5-4.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 105.17 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 4.6 Moisture Content (%) = 52.32% Can wt. 28.52 Height Correction = 0.978 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 790.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 101.7 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 66.7 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 8  0.439 0.029 
0.040 18  0.877 0.065 
0.060 36  1.316 0.130 
0.080 60  1.754 0.215 
0.100 80  2.193 0.286 
0.120 101  2.632 0.359 
0.140 122  3.070 0.432 
0.160 145  3.509 0.511 
0.180 165  3.947 0.579 
0.200 188  4.386 0.657 
0.220 208  4.825 0.724 
0.240 225  5.263 0.779 
0.260 243  5.702 0.838 
0.280 257  6.140 0.882 
0.300 272  6.579 0.929 
0.320 287  7.018 0.975 
0.340 298  7.456 1.008 
0.360 305  7.895 1.027 
0.380 310  8.333 1.039 
0.400 314  8.772 1.047 
0.420 314  9.211 1.042 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray organic clay w/wood & peat Type of Failure: Vertical @ 7%
Boring No.: LACW-4-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 134.15 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 7.5-8.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 78.49 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 109.93% Can wt. 27.86 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 858.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 86.7 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 41.3 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 15  0.344 0.056 
0.040 31  0.688 0.115 
0.060 44  1.032 0.163 
0.080 54  1.376 0.199 
0.100 64  1.720 0.235 
0.120 71  2.064 0.260 
0.140 79  2.408 0.288 
0.160 88  2.752 0.320 
0.180 95  3.096 0.344 
0.200 100  3.440 0.361 
0.220 106  3.784 0.381 
0.240 112  4.128 0.401 
0.260 118  4.472 0.421 
0.280 122  4.816 0.434 
0.300 128  5.160 0.454 
0.320 132  5.504 0.466 
0.340 135  5.848 0.475 
0.360 138  6.192 0.484 
0.380 143  6.536 0.500 
0.400 143  6.880 0.498 
0.420 143  7.224 0.496 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay with peat & wood Type of Failure: Vertical @ 8%
Boring No.: LACW-4-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 105.4 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 59.13 Cell Pressure (psi) =
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 125.09% Can wt. 22.14 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 836.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 84.4 Proving Ring No.= 9839
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 37.5 0.337
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 2.197729
0.020 8  0.344 0.030 
0.040 15  0.688 0.056 
0.060 23  1.032 0.085 
0.080 31  1.376 0.114 
0.100 38  1.720 0.140 
0.120 42  2.064 0.154 
0.140 49  2.408 0.179 
0.160 54  2.752 0.196 
0.180 58  3.096 0.210 
0.200 63  3.440 0.227 
0.220 68  3.784 0.245 
0.240 72  4.128 0.258 
0.260 76  4.472 0.271 
0.280 81  4.816 0.288 
0.300 84  5.160 0.298 
0.320 88  5.504 0.311 
0.340 90  5.848 0.317 
0.360 92  6.192 0.323 
0.380 95  6.536 0.332 
0.400 96  6.880 0.334 
0.420 97  7.224 0.336 
0.440 98  7.568 0.339 
0.460 98  7.912 0.337 
0.480 98  8.256 0.336 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay w/fine sand at bottom Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACS-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 223.35 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 8.5-10.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 174.08 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.2 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 32.46% Can wt. 22.3 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1030.8 Wet Density (pcf) = 104.0 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 78.5 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 13.7  0.344 0.151 
0.040 24.7  0.688 0.272 
0.060 31.8  1.032 0.349 
0.080 36.8  1.376 0.403 
0.100 40.2  1.720 0.438 
0.120 43.2  2.064 0.469 
0.140 45.7  2.408 0.495 
0.160 49.2  2.752 0.531 
0.180 50.3  3.096 0.541 
0.200 52.5  3.440 0.562 
0.220 53.8  3.784 0.574 
0.240 54.5  4.128 0.580 
0.260 55.5  4.472 0.588 
0.280 56.0  4.816 0.591 
0.300 56.5  5.160 0.594 
0.320 57.2  5.504 0.599 
0.340 57.3  5.848 0.598 
0.360 57.8  6.192 0.601 
0.380 58.3  6.536 0.604 
0.400 58.7  6.880 0.606 
0.420 59.0  7.224 0.607 
0.440 59.3  7.568 0.608 
0.460 59.5  7.912 0.608 
0.480 59.8  8.256 0.608 
0.500 60.5  8.600 0.613 
0.520 61.0  8.944 0.616 
0.540 61.5  9.288 0.619 
0.560 61.8  9.632 0.619 
0.580 62.0  9.976 0.619 
0.600 62.3  10.320 0.620 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Stiff gray clay Type of Failure: Yield @ 10%
Boring No.: LACS-3-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 218.55 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 5-7 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 177.01 Cell Pressure (psi) = 3.5 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 28.06% Can wt. 28.96 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1160.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 117.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 91.4 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 25.2  0.344 0.279 
0.040 37.2  0.688 0.410 
0.060 47.5  1.032 0.521 
0.080 54.3  1.376 0.594 
0.100 61.7  1.720 0.673 
0.120 67.3  2.064 0.731 
0.140 71.3  2.408 0.772 
0.160 76.7  2.752 0.827 
0.180 80.5  3.096 0.865 
0.200 84.5  3.440 0.905 
0.220 87.5  3.784 0.934 
0.240 91.2  4.128 0.970 
0.260 94.2  4.472 0.998 
0.280 96.7  4.816 1.021 
0.300 98.8  5.160 1.039 
0.320 100.2  5.504 1.050 
0.340 101.3  5.848 1.058 
0.360 101.7  6.192 1.058 
0.380 102.3  6.536 1.060 
0.400 102.7  6.880 1.061 
0.420 103.0  7.224 1.060 
0.440 103.8  7.568 1.064 
0.460 104.2  7.912 1.064 
0.480 104.8  8.256 1.066 
0.500 105.7  8.600 1.071 
0.520 106.0  8.944 1.070 
0.540 106.5  9.288 1.071 
0.560 106.8  9.632 1.070 
0.580 107.2  9.976 1.070 
0.600 107.3  10.320 1.067 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray caly Type of Failure: Bulge @ 8%
Boring No.: LACS-3-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 224.64 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 7.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 158.43 Cell Pressure (psi) = 5.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 50.25% Can wt. 26.67 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 984.9 Wet Density (pcf) = 99.4 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 66.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 15.9  0.344 0.176 
0.040 23.0  0.688 0.253 
0.060 27.4  1.032 0.301 
0.080 30.2  1.376 0.330 
0.100 32.7  1.720 0.356 
0.120 35.0  2.064 0.380 
0.140 36.5  2.408 0.395 
0.160 38.0  2.752 0.410 
0.180 39.2  3.096 0.421 
0.200 40.2  3.440 0.431 
0.220 41.2  3.784 0.440 
0.240 42.2  4.128 0.449 
0.260 42.7  4.472 0.452 
0.280 43.5  4.816 0.459 
0.300 44.2  5.160 0.465 
0.320 44.4  5.504 0.465 
0.340 44.5  5.848 0.465 
0.360 44.4  6.192 0.462 
0.380 44.4  6.536 0.460 
0.400 44.4  6.880 0.459 
0.420 44.4  7.224 0.457 
0.440 44.0  7.568 0.451 
0.460 43.5  7.912 0.444 
0.480 43.2  8.256 0.440 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Medium gray clay Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-1-1 Sample Data: Wet wt. 98.15 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 7.5-9.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 70.36 Cell Pressure (psi) = 4.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 62.77% Can wt. 26.09 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1009.3 Wet Density (pcf) = 102.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 62.7 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 27.3  0.345 0.302 
0.040 41.3  0.690 0.455 
0.060 49.3  1.034 0.541 
0.080 55.3  1.379 0.605 
0.100 59.7  1.724 0.651 
0.120 63.5  2.069 0.690 
0.140 66.3  2.414 0.718 
0.160 69.0  2.759 0.744 
0.180 71.3  3.103 0.766 
0.200 73.2  3.448 0.784 
0.220 74.8  3.793 0.798 
0.240 76.2  4.138 0.810 
0.260 77.7  4.483 0.823 
0.280 78.8  4.828 0.832 
0.300 79.7  5.172 0.838 
0.320 80.3  5.517 0.841 
0.340 81.2  5.862 0.848 
0.360 81.3  6.207 0.846 
0.380 81.7  6.552 0.847 
0.400 82.2  6.897 0.849 
0.420 82.5  7.241 0.849 
0.440 82.3  7.586 0.843 
0.460 82.0  7.931 0.837 
0.480 81.8  8.276 0.832 
0.500 82.0  8.621 0.831 
0.520 82.0  8.966 0.828 
0.540 82.2  9.310 0.827 
0.560 82.2  9.655 0.824 
0.580 82.0  10.000 0.818 
0.600 82.0  10.345 0.815 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/wood Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 124.85 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 12-13 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 74.21 Cell Pressure (psi) = 7.4 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 94.94% Can wt. 20.87 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 890.0 Wet Density (pcf) = 90.0 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 46.2 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 7.5  0.345 0.083 
0.040 11.0  0.690 0.121 
0.060 13.3  1.034 0.146 
0.080 15.0  1.379 0.164 
0.100 17.0  1.724 0.185 
0.120 18.1  2.069 0.197 
0.140 18.7  2.414 0.202 
0.160 19.5  2.759 0.210 
0.180 19.8  3.103 0.213 
0.200 20.3  3.448 0.217 
0.220 21.0  3.793 0.224 
0.240 21.3  4.138 0.226 
0.260 21.8  4.483 0.231 
0.280 22.2  4.828 0.234 
0.300 22.5  5.172 0.237 
0.320 22.7  5.517 0.238 
0.340 23.2  5.862 0.242 
0.360 23.0  6.207 0.239 
0.380 23.5  6.552 0.244 
0.400 23.8  6.897 0.246 
0.420 24.0  7.241 0.247 
0.440 23.8  7.586 0.244 
0.460 24.0  7.931 0.245 
0.480 24.2  8.276 0.246 
0.500 24.5  8.621 0.248 
0.520 24.5  8.966 0.247 
0.540 24.7  9.310 0.248 
0.560 24.7  9.655 0.247 
0.580 24.8  10.000 0.248 
0.600 24.8  10.345 0.247 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Soft gray clay w/wood Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 130.39 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 13-14 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 77.82 Cell Pressure (psi) = 8.0 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 94.48% Can wt. 22.18 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 847.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 85.7 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 44.1 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 8.5  0.345 0.094 
0.040 12.0  0.690 0.132 
0.060 14.2  1.034 0.156 
0.080 15.7  1.379 0.172 
0.100 17.0  1.724 0.185 
0.120 18.2  2.069 0.198 
0.140 19.2  2.414 0.208 
0.160 20.0  2.759 0.216 
0.180 20.7  3.103 0.222 
0.200 21.2  3.448 0.227 
0.220 21.8  3.793 0.233 
0.240 22.2  4.138 0.236 
0.260 22.7  4.483 0.240 
0.280 23.3  4.828 0.246 
0.300 23.7  5.172 0.249 
0.320 24.0  5.517 0.251 
0.340 24.2  5.862 0.253 
0.360 24.5  6.207 0.255 
0.380 24.7  6.552 0.256 
0.400 25.0  6.897 0.258 
0.420 25.3  7.241 0.260 
0.440 25.7  7.586 0.263 
0.460 25.7  7.931 0.262 
0.480 25.8  8.276 0.262 
0.500 25.8  8.621 0.261 
0.520 26.0  8.966 0.262 
0.540 26.2  9.310 0.264 
0.560 26.5  9.655 0.266 
0.580 26.5  10.000 0.264 
0.600 26.7  10.345 0.265 
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0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Strain (%)
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
t
s
f
)
uuIHNCS-1-3 (2) STE
UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay w/peat Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-3-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 136.01 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 11.5-12.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 85.46 Cell Pressure (psi) = 7.1 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 78.30% Can wt. 20.9 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 950.1 Wet Density (pcf) = 96.1 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 53.9 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 6.1  0.345 0.067 
0.040 7.8  0.690 0.086 
0.060 9.3  1.034 0.102 
0.080 10.1  1.379 0.110 
0.100 11.1  1.724 0.121 
0.120 11.6  2.069 0.126 
0.140 12.3  2.414 0.133 
0.160 12.5  2.759 0.135 
0.180 13.0  3.103 0.140 
0.200 13.1  3.448 0.140 
0.220 13.5  3.793 0.144 
0.240 14.0  4.138 0.149 
0.260 14.1  4.483 0.149 
0.280 14.3  4.828 0.151 
0.300 14.3  5.172 0.150 
0.320 14.5  5.517 0.152 
0.340 14.8  5.862 0.155 
0.360 15.0  6.207 0.156 
0.380 15.1  6.552 0.156 
0.400 15.3  6.897 0.158 
0.420 15.3  7.241 0.157 
0.440 15.5  7.586 0.159 
0.460 15.6  7.931 0.159 
0.480 15.8  8.276 0.161 
0.500 16.0  8.621 0.162 
0.520 16.0  8.966 0.162 
0.540 16.1  9.310 0.162 
0.560 16.1  9.655 0.161 
0.580 16.3  10.000 0.163 
0.600 16.5  10.345 0.164 
Stress Strain Curve
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray clay Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCS-3-2 Sample Data: Wet wt. 133.27 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 12.5-13.5 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 95.32 Cell Pressure (psi) = 7.7 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 57.18% Can wt. 28.95 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 1001.6 Wet Density (pcf) = 101.3 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 64.5 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 7.1  0.345 0.078 
0.040 9.5  0.690 0.105 
0.060 10.8  1.034 0.119 
0.080 12.1  1.379 0.132 
0.100 12.8  1.724 0.140 
0.120 14.0  2.069 0.152 
0.140 14.6  2.414 0.158 
0.160 15.1  2.759 0.163 
0.180 15.8  3.103 0.170 
0.200 16.3  3.448 0.175 
0.220 17.0  3.793 0.181 
0.240 17.6  4.138 0.187 
0.260 18.0  4.483 0.191 
0.280 19.3  4.828 0.204 
0.300 18.5  5.172 0.195 
0.320 18.8  5.517 0.197 
0.340 19.3  5.862 0.201 
0.360 19.8  6.207 0.206 
0.380 20.0  6.552 0.207 
0.400 20.3  6.897 0.210 
0.420 20.5  7.241 0.211 
0.440 20.6  7.586 0.211 
0.460 21.0  7.931 0.214 
0.480 21.1  8.276 0.215 
0.500 21.3  8.621 0.216 
0.520 21.8  8.966 0.220 
0.540 22.0  9.310 0.221 
0.560 22.1  9.655 0.221 
0.580 22.3  10.000 0.223 
0.600 22.5  10.345 0.224 
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UNCONFINED COMPRESSION TEST/UNCONSOLIDATED UNDRAINED TRIAXIAL TEST
Project Name: Levee Study
File No.: 06-1004
Material : Very soft gray & dark gray clay w/peat Type of Failure: Yield  @ 10%
Boring No.: IHNCN-1-3 Sample Data: Wet wt. 182.11 Test Data:
Depth (ft): 10-12 Diameter (in.) = 2.875 Area (in2) = 6.492 Dry at. 119.39 Cell Pressure (psi) = 6.5 
Height (in) = 5.8 Moisture Content (%) = 67.92% Can wt. 27.05 Height Correction = 1.000 
TEST DATA Weight (gm) = 962.5 Wet Density (pcf) = 97.6 Proving Ring No.= 2011
Strain 
Dial
Strength 
Dial Strain (%)
Stress
(tsf) Dry Density (pcf) = 58.1 1
0.000 0  0.000 0.000 6.521451
0.020 5.7  0.346 0.063 
0.040 7.5  0.691 0.083 
0.060 8.9  1.037 0.098 
0.080 9.7  1.383 0.106 
0.100 10.2  1.729 0.111 
0.120 11.0  2.074 0.119 
0.140 11.9  2.420 0.129 
0.160 12.0  2.766 0.129 
0.180 12.2  3.111 0.131 
0.200 12.7  3.457 0.136 
0.220 13.0  3.803 0.139 
0.240 13.4  4.149 0.142 
0.260 13.7  4.494 0.145 
0.280 13.9  4.840 0.147 
0.300 14.2  5.186 0.149 
0.320 14.4  5.532 0.151 
0.340 14.7  5.877 0.153 
0.360 14.9  6.223 0.155 
0.380 15.2  6.569 0.157 
0.400 15.4  6.914 0.159 
0.420 15.7  7.260 0.161 
0.440 15.9  7.606 0.163 
0.460 16.2  7.952 0.165 
0.480 16.4  8.297 0.167 
0.500 16.5  8.643 0.167 
0.520 16.7  8.989 0.169 
0.540 17.0  9.334 0.171 
0.560 17.2  9.680 0.172 
0.580 17.4  10.026 0.174 
0.600 17.6  10.372 0.175 
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                                                                                                              New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 
APPENDIX E: UC Berkeley Laboratory Testing and  
ILIT In-Situ Field Vane Shear Testing 
 
A series of laboratory tests were performed at the GeoEngineering Laboratory at the 
University of California at Berkeley on selected “relatively undisturbed” samples that were 
retrieved during the field investigation in New Orleans.  Tests performed included 
a) Particle size sieve analysis, ASTM D 422 
b) Atterberg Limits, ASTM D 4318 
c) Permeability Test (Falling Head Method) 
d) Direct Shear Test  
e) Laboratory Vane Shear Test 
Results of these tests are presented in this Appendix. 
In addition, in-situ field vane shear tests (FVST; ASTM D2573) were performed at 
selected locations to evaluate peak and residual undrained soil shear strengths.  These results are 
also presented in this Appendix. 
Laboratory vane shear tests were performed to assess the undrained peak and residual 
shear strengths of cohesive materials serving as foundations for some of the levee embankments 
in New Orleans. A special set of procedures were developed for the sampling and laboratory 
vane shear testing of the sensitive organic clayey silt layer found at the 17th Street Canal breach 
site. This sensitive layer was very thin (typically 3/4” to 4”), it exhibited very low undrained 
shear strength and high sensitivity, and it was hidden under a layer of leaves and thin roots (and 
often intermixed, at least in part, with this obstructing overlying layer of organic detritus.)  
Filed samples were “targeted by performing borings and CPT, as necessary, to precisely 
determine the depth of this critical layer at any given location.  An additional boring was then 
performed adjacent to the previous boring(s) and/or CPT, and this “targeted sampling” borehole 
was drilled to within approximately 6-inches of the top of the targeted layer.  A three-foot long, 
specially modified Shelby tube was then used to “oversample” the targeted layer; this 
oversampling captured approximately 2 to 2.5 feet of more competent material from below the 
highly sensitive layer, effectively “plugging” the base of the sampler so that the overall sample 
could be recovered.  The 3-inch diameter Shelby tubes were modified by eliminating the 
“overcut” at the cutting lip, so that lateral expansion of the sample as it entered the tube would be 
eliminated. 
Once the samples had been carefully transported to the laboratory, in order to reach the 
desired depth the soil was carefully hand-excavated from the end of the tube in 2-inch stages 
using a spoon and sharp blade.  After each 2-inch layer had been slowly excavated, the tube was 
then cut with a rotary hand pipecutter (with stiffeners to reduce oval-disturbance.  The process 
was repeated until the characteristic layer of organic and wind blown detritus was encountered, 
at which point the detritus was carefully hand-picked from the tube as hand excavation 
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proceeded. The leaves and thin roots were carefully removed to expose the top of the targeted 
layer, so that the vane could be inserted. 
Since this layer was very thin, to avoid pushing the vane through the layer, once the layer 
was encountered in the Shelby Tube the vane was only inserted so that the metal blades were 
completely inside the soil, but not under it. That meant that the shear strength at the top of the 
rotating vane was not measured, and so a correction to the conventional (e.g.: ASTM) “vane 
factor” was required.  For the vane geometry used (see Figure E.2) the required vane correction 
factor was found to be 0.84 times the conventional vane factor if the vane had been adequately 
embedded as to register full “top of vane” shear resistance. The vane shear test was performed at 
a rotational rate of 2 degrees/sec; a rate selected to represent relative rate of shear displacement 
behavior of interest with regard to the field cases being investigated. 
As part of the field investigation, Field Vane Shear Tests were also performed at the 17th 
Street Canal breach site and at the London Avenue Canal distressed section. The results are 
presented in terms of peak and residual undrained shear strength. The dimensions of the vane 
used for these FVST tests are shown in Figure E-3.  Rates of vane rotation were 1º per minute 
until the peak shear strength had been well-exceeded.  The vane was then rotated five times, and 
then the residual strength measurement was again made at a rotational rate of  1º per minute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure E-1: Laboratory vane shear testing of the thin layer of sensitive organic silty clay 
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Figure E-2: Geometry and dimensions of laboratory vane 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure E-3: Geometry and dimensions of field vane. 
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/07/06
Project No. : Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/07/06
Boring No.: Checked By: Diego Cobos-Roa
Sample No.: Depth (ft.)
Soil Identification:
% Sand: 94.5 % Silt: NA % Clay: trace USCS: SP
New Orleans Levee Investigation
Particle-Size Analysis
ASTM D 422
LAC-BOR-1
LAC-BOR-1-2 9.5
Poorly Graded Sand (SP), Grey, with trace clay
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/07/06
Project No. : Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/07/06
Boring No.: Checked By: Diego Cobos-Roa
Sample No.: Depth (ft.)
Soil Identification:
% Sand: 95.1 % Silt: NA % Clay: trace USCS: (SP) Poorly Graded Sand
LAC-BOR-1
LAC-BOR-1-2 10.0
Poorly Graded Sand (SP) Grey, with trace Clay
New Orleans Levee Investigation
Particle-Size Analysis
ASTM D 422
Grain Size Distribution
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/13/06
Boring No.: 17-BOR-6 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Vane Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
42 27 15
37.30 36.80 35.00
31.40 30.70 29.20
15.90 16.20 16.10
38.06 42.07 44.27
41.6
PI at "A" - Line  =  0.73(LL-20)   =   
One - Point Liquid Limit Calculation
LL =Wn(N/25)
PROCEDURES USED
  Wet Preparation
   Multipoint  - Wet
  Dry Preparation
   Multipoint  - Dry 
   Procedure A
   Multipoint  Test
   Procedure B
   One-point  Test
Grey Silty Clay (CL) trace fine sand, with few shells.
TEST
NO.
ATTERBERG LIMITS
 ASTM D 4318
New Orleans Levee Investigation
17-BOR-6-2
NOVANE24 -15.3
Number of Blows        [N]
Wet Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
           LIQUID LIMIT      PLASTIC LIMIT
Dry Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
Wt. of Container         (g)
Moisture Content (%) [Wn]
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Plastic Limit
Plasticity Index
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/13/06
Boring No.: Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Vane Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
19 23 41 12
40.00 32.20 36.00 35.60
33.50 27.80 30.90 30.00
16.10 15.60 15.20 16.00
37.36 36.07 32.48 40.00
35.5
PI at "A" - Line  =  0.73(LL-20)   =   
One - Point Liquid Limit Calculation
LL =Wn(N/25)
PROCEDURES USED
  Wet Preparation
   Multipoint  - Wet
  Dry Preparation
   Multipoint  - Dry 
   Procedure A
   Multipoint  Test
   Procedure B
   One-point  Test
Grey Sandy Clay (CL) very Sandy
TEST
NO.
ATTERBERG LIMITS
 ASTM D 4318
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LAC-BOR-2
LAC-BOR-2-3
NOVANE30 -13.0
Number of Blows        [N]
Wet Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
           LIQUID LIMIT      PLASTIC LIMIT
Dry Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
Wt. of Container         (g)
Moisture Content (%) [Wn]
Liquid Limit
Plastic Limit
Plasticity Index
Classification
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grained soils and fine-grained 
fraction of coarse-grained soils
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CH or OH
CL- ML
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/13/06
Boring No.: 17-BOR-6 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Vane Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
38 21 15
33.60 32.60 33.70
25.80 25.20 25.40
16.10 16.10 15.70
80.41 81.32 85.57
81.7
PI at "A" - Line  =  0.73(LL-20)   =   
One - Point Liquid Limit Calculation
LL =Wn(N/25)
PROCEDURES USED
  Wet Preparation
   Multipoint  - Wet
  Dry Preparation
   Multipoint  - Dry 
   Procedure A
   Multipoint  Test
   Procedure B
   One-point  Test
Grey Clay with trace Silt (CH) Hight Plasticity, few shells.
TEST
NO.
ATTERBERG LIMITS
 ASTM D 4318
New Orleans Levee Investigation
17-BOR-6-3
NOVANE39 -18.0
Number of Blows        [N]
Wet Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
           LIQUID LIMIT      PLASTIC LIMIT
Dry Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
Wt. of Container         (g)
Moisture Content (%) [Wn]
Liquid Limit
Plastic Limit
Plasticity Index
Classification
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/13/06
Boring No.: 17-BOR-6 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Vane Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
39 27 14
32.30 32.70 31.80
25.50 25.50 24.80
15.90 15.30 15.60
70.83 70.59 76.09
72.5
PI at "A" - Line  =  0.73(LL-20)   =   
One - Point Liquid Limit Calculation
LL =Wn(N/25)
PROCEDURES USED
  Wet Preparation
   Multipoint  - Wet
  Dry Preparation
   Multipoint  - Dry 
   Procedure A
   Multipoint  Test
   Procedure B
   One-point  Test
Dry Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
Wt. of Container         (g)
Moisture Content (%) [Wn]
Liquid Limit
Plastic Limit
Plasticity Index
Classification
Number of Blows        [N]
Wet Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
           LIQUID LIMIT      PLASTIC LIMIT
Grey Clay (CH) High Plasticity.
TEST
NO.
ATTERBERG LIMITS
 ASTM D 4318
New Orleans Levee Investigation
17-BOR-6-3
NOVANE40 -18.3
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/15/06
Boring No.: 17-BOR-6 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Vane Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
48 22 15
34.30 32.60 34.30
28.20 26.50 27.70
16.10 15.60 16.00
50.41 55.96 56.41
54.2
PI at "A" - Line  =  0.73(LL-20)   =   
One - Point Liquid Limit Calculation
LL =Wn(N/25)
PROCEDURES USED
  Wet Preparation
   Multipoint  - Wet
  Dry Preparation
   Multipoint  - Dry 
   Procedure A
   Multipoint  Test
   Procedure B
   One-point  Test
Grey Silty Clay (CL) plastic.
TEST
NO.
ATTERBERG LIMITS
 ASTM D 4318
New Orleans Levee Investigation
17-BOR-6-3
NOVANE41 -18.5
Number of Blows        [N]
Wet Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
           LIQUID LIMIT      PLASTIC LIMIT
Dry Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
Wt. of Container         (g)
Moisture Content (%) [Wn]
Liquid Limit
Plastic Limit
Plasticity Index
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/15/06
Boring No.: 17-BOR-6 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Vane Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
44 31 17
33.10 32.40 31.00
26.00 25.70 24.40
15.60 15.90 15.70
68.27 68.37 75.86
72.0
PI at "A" - Line  =  0.73(LL-20)   =   
One - Point Liquid Limit Calculation
LL =Wn(N/25)
PROCEDURES USED
  Wet Preparation
   Multipoint  - Wet
  Dry Preparation
   Multipoint  - Dry 
   Procedure A
   Multipoint  Test
   Procedure B
   One-point  Test
Dry Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
Wt. of Container         (g)
Moisture Content (%) [Wn]
Liquid Limit
Plastic Limit
Plasticity Index
Classification
Number of Blows        [N]
Wet Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
           LIQUID LIMIT      PLASTIC LIMIT
Grey Silty Clay (CL) very plastic
TEST
NO.
ATTERBERG LIMITS
 ASTM D 4318
New Orleans Levee Investigation
17-BOR-6-3
NOVANE42 -18.9
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/15/06
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-1A Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Vane Test No.: Elevation (ft.)
Soil Identification:
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
36 32 23 15
26.70 29.00 26.10 30.10
18.90 20.10 19.00 20.30
15.40 16.00 15.90 16.00
222.86 217.07 229.03 227.91
222.5
PI at "A" - Line  =  0.73(LL-20)   147.825
One - Point Liquid Limit Calculation
LL =Wn(N/25)
PROCEDURES USED
  Wet Preparation
   Multipoint  - Wet
  Dry Preparation
   Multipoint  - Dry 
   Procedure A
   Multipoint  Test
   Procedure B
   One-point  Test
Dry Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
Wt. of Container         (g)
Moisture Content (%) [Wn]
Liquid Limit
Plastic Limit
Plasticity Index
Classification
Number of Blows        [N]
Wet Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
           LIQUID LIMIT      PLASTIC LIMIT
Black to Dark Grey Silty Clay (CL), with organics
TEST
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ATTERBERG LIMITS
 ASTM D 4318
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LAC-BOR-1A-1
NOVANE49 -10.7
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/13/06
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-1A Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Vane Test No.: Elevation (ft.)
Soil Identification:
1 2 3 1 2 3 4
27 22 15
33.80 36.50 38.60
28.10 30.40 31.40
15.60 15.90 16.10
45.60 42.07 47.06
43.3
PI at "A" - Line  =  0.73(LL-20)   =   
One - Point Liquid Limit Calculation
LL =Wn(N/25)
PROCEDURES USED
  Wet Preparation
   Multipoint  - Wet
  Dry Preparation
   Multipoint  - Dry 
   Procedure A
   Multipoint  Test
   Procedure B
   One-point  Test
Grey to Dark Grey, Sandy Clay (CL) Trace Organics
TEST
NO.
ATTERBERG LIMITS
 ASTM D 4318
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LAC-BOR-1A-1
NOVANE52 -11.2
Number of Blows        [N]
Wet Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
           LIQUID LIMIT      PLASTIC LIMIT
Dry Wt. of Soil + Cont. (g)
Wt. of Container         (g)
Moisture Content (%) [Wn]
Liquid Limit
Plastic Limit
Plasticity Index
Classification
0.12
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grained fraction of coarse-
grained soils
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/30/06
Boring No.: LACW-BOR-1 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
SHRP_Equipment_Corporation
Automatic_Testing_System_v.3.11
1
OVERBURDEN: 4.5 divs
248.1231 psf
SHEAR RATE: 4.1E-05 in/s
TOTAL DISP: 0.3065 in
MAX SHEAR STRESS: 0.804 psi
115.776 psf
Su,DS 57.888 psf
approx Su,TX 75.3 psf
Displacements
initial (in) final (in)
0.5635 0.87
Total Time (sec)
7476
1 -14.8
Grey Silty Sandy Clay (CL)
DIRECT  SHEAR  TEST
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LACW-BOR-1-2
DIRECT SHEAR TEST 1
LACW-BOR-1-2
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 04/30/06
Boring No.: LACW-BOR-1 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
SHRP_Equipment_Corporation
Automatic_Testing_System_v.3.11
1 2
OVERBURDEN: 0.9 18 divs
856.6892 1965.489 psf
SHEAR RATE: 3.17E-05 in/s
TOTAL DISP: 0.31 in
MAX SHEAR STRESS: 2.76 psi
397.44 psf
Φ 25 deg
Displacements
initial (in) final (in)
0.476 0.786
Total Time (sec)
9780
Grey Silty Sand (SM)
2 -15.4
DIRECT  SHEAR  TEST
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LACW-BOR-1-2
DIRECT SHEAR TEST 2
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vertical load 2
Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/01/06
Boring No.: LACW-BOR-1 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
SHRP_Equipment_Corporation
Automatic_Testing_System_v.3.11
1
OVERBURDEN: 0.9 divs
856.6892 psf
SHEAR RATE: 4.88E-05 in/s
TOTAL DISP: 0.527 in
MAX SHEAR STRESS: 3.631 psi
522.864 psf
Φ 31.3 deg
Displacements
initial (in) final (in)
0.33 0.857
Total Time (sec)
10800
3 -15.8
Grey Sand with Clay and Silt (SP)
DIRECT  SHEAR  TEST
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LACW-BOR-1-2
DIRECT SHEAR TEST 3
LACW-BOR-1-2
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/01/06
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-4 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
SHRP_Equipment_Corporation
Automatic_Testing_System_v.3.11
1
OVERBURDEN: 0.9 divs
856.6892 psf
SHEAR RATE: 0.000106 in/s
TOTAL DISP: 0.484 in
MAX SHEAR STRESS: 1.9992 psi
287.8848 psf
Su,DS 143.9424 psf
approx Su,TX 187.1 psf
Displacements
initial (in) final (in)
0.404 0.888
Total Time (sec)
4551
4 -19.9
Grey Silty Clay (CL)
DIRECT  SHEAR  TEST
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LAC-BOR-4-5
DIRECT SHEAR TEST 4
LAC-BOR-4-5
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/01/06
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-4 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
SHRP_Equipment_Corporation
Automatic_Testing_System_v.3.11
1
OVERBURDEN: 0.9 divs
856.6892 psf
SHEAR RATE: 6.05E-05 in/s
TOTAL DISP: 0.168 in
MAX SHEAR STRESS: 2.2512 psi
324.1728 psf
Su,DS 162.0864 psf
approx Su,TX 210.7 psf
Displacements
initial (in) final (in)
0.29 0.458
Total Time (sec)
2775
5 -20.5
Grey Silty Clay with trace Sand (CL)
DIRECT  SHEAR  TEST
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LAC-BOR-4-5
DIRECT SHEAR TEST 5
LAC-BOR-4-5
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/01/06
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-2 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
SHRP_Equipment_Corporation
Automatic_Testing_System_v.3.11
1
OVERBURDEN: 0.9 divs
856.6892 psf
SHEAR RATE: 5.22E-05 in/s
TOTAL DISP: 0.4975 in
MAX SHEAR STRESS: 4.1868 psi
602.8992 psf
Su,DS 301.4496 psf
approx Su,TX 391.9 psf
Displacements
initial (in) final (in)
0.4955 0.993
Total Time (sec)
9522
6 -15.4
Grey Sandy Clay / Clayey Sand (SC/CL),
DIRECT  SHEAR  TEST
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LAC-BOR-2-3
DIRECT SHEAR TEST 6
LAC-BOR-2-3
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Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/06/06
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-2 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
Sample Dimentions:
1 2
Beaker wt: 285.28 g Soil Height: 14.92 15.08 cm
wt Beaker + dry Soil: 534.99 g
wt Soil: 249.71 g avg height: 15 cm
Beaker Diam: 3.7846 cm
Beaker Area: 11.249 cm2
Sample Density: 1.480 g/cm3
Water Cylinder:
1 2
Volume: 775 1570 cc
Drop in water Level: 30 60 cm2
Cylinder Area: 25.833 26.17 cm2
Avg Area: 26 cm2
TEST DATA AND RESULTS:
Height
Test No.
ho h1 h2 ho to h1 h0 to h2 k(0-1) k(0-2)
cm cm cm s s cm/s cm/s
1 160 130 100 2625 6105 2.74E-03 2.67E-03
2 160 130 100 2435 5810 2.96E-03 2.80E-03
1 -15.1
Grey Silty Sand (SM)  Fine Sand.
PERMEABILITY  TEST (FALLING  HEAD  METHOD)
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LAC-BOR-2-3
HYDRAULIC
CONDUCTIVITY
Time
Project Name: Tested By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/06/06
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-2 Input By: Julien Cohen-Waeber Date: 05/14/06
Sample No.: Checked By: Adda Athanasopoulos
Lab Test No.: Elevation (ft.):
Soil Identification:
Sample Dimentions:
1 2
Beaker wt: 285.28 g Soil Height: 13.652 13.653 cm
wt Beaker + dry Soil: 534.99 g
wt Soil: 249.71 g avg height: 13.6525 cm
Beaker Diam: 3.7846 cm
Beaker Area: 11.249 cm2
Sample Density: 1.626 g/cm3
Water Cylinder:
1 2
Volume: 775 1570 cc
Drop in water Level: 30 60 cm2
Cylinder Area: 25.833 26.17 cm2
Avg Area: 26 cm2
TEST DATA AND RESULTS:
Height
Test No.
ho h1 h2 ho to h1 h0 to h2 k(0-1) k(0-2)
cm cm cm s s cm/s cm/s
1 160 130 100 7905 19515 8.29E-04 7.60E-04
HYDRAULIC
CONDUCTIVITY
Time
PERMEABILITY  TEST (FALLING  HEAD  METHOD)
New Orleans Levee Investigation
LAC-BOR-2-3
2 -15.9
Grey Silty Sand (SM)  Fine Sand.
Project Name: New Orleans Levee Investigation Tested By: Diego Cobos-Roa
Project No. : Adda Athanasopoulos
Boring No.: 17-BOR-2 Depth (ft): 12 to 16.5
Sample No.: 17-BOR-2-4  and  17-BOR-2-5 G.E. (ft): 3.8
W.T. (ft): -1
vane test # elevation (ft) peak (psf) residual (psf) peak (psf) residual (psf) material w (%) σ'vo (psf) Su/P
N.O. Vane1 -9 230 0 262.2 0 CH/OH 80.8 773 0.34
N.O. Vane2 -9.2 472 25 538.08 28.5 CH/OH 84.2 778 0.69
N.O. Vane3 -9.3 713 100 812.82 114 CH/OH 70.8 781 1.04
N.O. Vane4 -9.4 728 130 829.92 148.2 CH/OH 123.2 784 1.06
N.O. Vane5 -9.6 728 80 829.92 91.2 CH/OH 137.6 789 1.05
N.O. Vane6 -9.9 728 80 829.92 91.2 CH/OH 262.2 798 1.04
N.O. Vane7 -10.1 726 100 827.64 114 CH/OH 803 1.03
N.O. Vane31 -10.9 630 40 718.2 45.6 very fibrous marsh 202.4 825 0.87
N.O. Vane32 -11 728 40 829.92 45.6 very fibrous marsh 227.2 828 1.00
N.O. Vane33 -11.2 728 60 829.92 68.4
very fibrous marsh, 
roots, wood 268.7 834 1.00
N.O. Vane34 -11.5 727 190 828.78 216.6
very fibrous marsh, 
roots, wood 236.5 842 0.98
N.O. Vane35 -11.9 728 130 829.92 148.2
very fibrous marsh, 
roots, wood 159.1 853 0.97
N.O. Vane36 -12.4 728 100 829.92 114
very fibrous marsh, 
roots, wood 328.7 867 0.96
* See text, page E-1.
** italic indicates maximum reading for the laboratory vane device
measured corrected*
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Project Name: New Orleans Levee Investigation Tested By: Diego Cobos-Roa
Project No. : Adda Athanasopoulos
Boring No.: 17-BOR-3 Depth (ft): 6 to 8
Sample No.: 17-BOR-3-2 G.E. (ft): -6.6
W.T. (ft): -8
vane test # elevation (ft) peak (psf) residual (psf) peak (psf) residual (psf) soil description w (%) σ'vo (psf) Su/P
N.O. Vane8 -13.02 120 20 136.8 22.8 marsh 246 271.6 0.50
N.O. Vane9 -13.12 34 0 38.76 0 marsh 277.6 274.3 0.14
N.O. Vane10 -13.25 55 15 62.7 17.1 marsh 253.9 277.9 0.23
N.O. Vane11 -13.35 153 30 174.42 34.2 marsh 127.4 280.7 0.62
N.O. Vane12 -13.53 196 65 223.44 74.1 marsh, (+CH) 201.7 285.6 0.78
N.O. Vane13 -13.71 206 75 234.84 85.5 CH w/OH 248.6 290.6 0.81
N.O. Vane14 -14 200 60 228 68.4 CH w/OH 253.5 298.6 0.76
N.O. Vane15 -14.2 202 50 230.28 57 CH 56 304.1 0.76
N.O. Vane16 -14.4 308 70 351.12 79.8 CH 46.6 309.6 1.13
* See text, page E-1.
corrected*measured
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Project Name: New Orleans Levee Investigation Tested By: Diego Cobos-Roa
Project No. : Adda Athanasopoulos
Boring No.: 17-BOR-6 Depth (ft): 7.5 to 12
Sample No.: 17-BOR-6-2  and  17-BOR-6-3 G.E. (ft): -6.6
W.T. (ft): -8
vane test # elevation (ft) peak (psf) residual (psf) peak (psf) residual (psf) soil description w (%) σ'vo (psf) Su/P
N.O. Vane22 -14.6 175 50 199.5 57
grey CH, traces 
organic, shells 90.4 315.16 0.63
N.O. Vane23 -15 195 50 222.3 57
grey CH, traces 
organic, shells 60.9 326.2 0.68
N.O. Vane24 -15.3 270 55 307.8 62.7
grey CH (some silt), 
less shells 40.8 334.48 0.92
N.O. Vane25 -17.1 163 45 185.82 51.3
light grey CL/CH, 
some silt 73.4 384.16 0.48
N.O. Vane26 -17.5 307 115 349.98 131.1 grey CH 95.5 395.2 0.89
N.O. Vane27 -17.8 370 135 421.8 153.9 grey CH 84.7 403.48 1.05
N.O. Vane39 -18 370 150 421.8 171 grey CH 55.8 409 1.03
N.O. Vane40 -18.3 321 100 365.94 114 grey CH 83.5 417.28 0.88
N.O. Vane41 -18.5 390 100 444.6 114 grey CH 61.4 422.8 1.05
N.O. Vane42 -18.9 317 116 361.38 132.24 grey CH 88.9 433.84 0.83
*See text, page E-1.
measured corrected*
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Project Name: New Orleans Levee Investigation Tested By: Diego Cobos-Roa
Project No. : Adda Athanasopoulos
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-2 Depth (ft): 6 to 10
Sample No.: LAC-BOR-2-2  and  LAC-BOR-2-3 G.E. (ft): -6.4
W.T. (ft): -8
vane test # elevation (ft) peak (psf) residual (psf) peak (psf) residual (psf) soil description water content (%) σ'vo (psf) Su/P
N.O. Vane17 -10.3 136.8 51.3 155.952 58.482
gray-black CH, org. 
matter, wood, org. odor 132.8 215.48 0.72
N.O. Vane18 -10.47 205.2 51.3 233.928 58.482
gray-black CH, org. 
matter, wood, org. odor 122 220.172 1.06
N.O. Vane19 -10.6 242.82 72.96 276.8148 83.1744
gray-black CH, org. 
matter, wood, org. odor 93.3 223.76 1.24
N.O. Vane20 -10.7 307.8 94.62 350.892 107.8668
gray CH w/ traces black 
org. matter 50.2 226.52 1.55
N.O. Vane21 -10.93 332.88 85.5 379.4832 97.47 gray clayey silt 34.7 232.868 1.63
N.O. Vane28 -12.3 125.4 11.4 142.956 12.996
gray CH w/ traces black 
org. matter 63.5 270.68 0.53
N.O. Vane29 -12.6 171 39.9 194.94 45.486 grey CH 44.2 278.96 0.70
N.O. Vane30 -13 193.8 57 220.932 64.98 gray clayey silt 45.6 290 0.76
*See text, page E-1.
measured corrected*
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Project Name: New Orleans Levee Investigation Tested By: Diego Cobos-Roa
Project No. : Adda Athanasopoulos
Boring No.: LAC-BOR-1A Depth (ft): 2 to 4
Sample No.: LAC-BOR-1A-1 G.E. (ft): -7.7
W.T. (ft): -9
vane test # depth (ft) peak (psf) residual (psf) peak (psf) residual (psf) soil description water content (%) σ'vo (psf) Su/P
NO VANE 43 -9.7 340 35 387.6 39.9
matter, wood, org. 
odor 132.8 142.82 2.71
NO VANE 44 -9.9 306 50 348.84 57
g y , g
matter, wood, org. 
odor 122 148.34 2.35
NO VANE 45 -10.05 372 50 424.08 57
g y , g
matter, wood, org. 
odor 93.3 152.48 2.78
NO VANE 46 -10.2 280 34 319.2 38.76
gray CH w/ traces 
black org. matter 50.2 156.62 2.04
NO VANE 47 -10.4 243 52 277.02 59.28 gray clayey silt 34.7 162.14 1.71
NO VANE 48 -10.6 102 14 116.28 15.96
gray CH w/ traces 
black org. matter 63.5 167.66 0.69
NO VANE 49 -10.7 334 50 380.76 57 grey CH 44.2 170.42 2.23
NO VANE 50 -10.9 194 40 221.16 45.6 gray clayey silt 45.6 175.94 1.26
NO VANE 51 -11.1 217 50 247.38 57 gray clayey silt 147.4 181.46 1.36
NO VANE 52 -11.2 227 56 258.78 63.84 gray clayey silt 58.6 184.22 1.40
NO VANE 53 -11.4 528 10 601.92 11.4 gray clayey silt 189.74 3.17
*See text, page E-1.
corrected
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DATE STARTED 4/11/06 GROUND ELEVATION -6 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR
Bottom of hole at 10.7 feet.
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
CH: Gray CH, high PI.
COMPLETED 4/11/06
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
    SPT N VALUE    
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
1
70.5
82.2
82.2
94
94
176.2
152.7
199.7
164.4
NOTES South end of breach, East of emergency repair fill.
199.7
47
2
3
4
5
6
CH: Gray CH and black organic matter (mixing zone).
CH: Gray CH and black organic matter (mixing zone).
CH: Gray CH and black organic matter (mixing zone).
CH: Gray CH and black organic matter (mixing zone).
CH: Gray CH and black organic matter (mixing zone). 187.9
BORING NUMBER 17-VANE-1
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DATE STARTED 3/12/06 GROUND ELEVATION -6.44 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR
Bottom of hole at 8.4 feet.
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
CH: Soft, gray CH.
COMPLETED 3/12/06
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
    SPT N VALUE    
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
7
41.1
5.9
11.7
23.5
47.0
364.1
158.6
47.0
23.5
NOTES Center of breach, outside disturbed area (by school bus).
105.7
23.5
8
9
10
11
12
Fill
Marsh
Marsh
CH: Gray CH and black organic matter (mixing zone).
CH: Very soft, high PI, gray CH. 35.2
BORING NUMBER 17-VANE-2
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DATE STARTED 3/13/06 GROUND ELEVATION -1.78 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR
Bottom of hole at 12.5 feet.
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
CH: Soft, gray CH.
COMPLETED 3/13/06
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
    SPT N VALUE    
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
13
82.2
23.5
11.7
35.2
52.9
411.1
328.9
164.4
105.7
NOTES North-East of displaced block.
140.9
23.5
14
15
16
17
18
Fill
Fill mixing with fibrous organic clay.
Marsh
CH: Gray CH and black organic matter (mixing zone).
CH: Very soft, high PI, gray CH. 117.5
BORING NUMBER 17-VANE-3
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DATE STARTED 4/8/06 GROUND ELEVATION -6 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR
Bottom of hole at 9.3 feet.
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
Black organic matter mixing with gray clay.
COMPLETED 4/8/06
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
    SPT N VALUE    
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
19
23.5
7
37.6
18.8
51.7
117.5
305.4
82.2
115.1
NOTES South end of breach, levee toe.
187.9
23.5
20
21
22
23
24
Non-engineered CL fill.
Very fibrous marsh, wood.
Black organic matter.
Black organic matter, roots, wood.
Black organic matter. 124.5
BORING NUMBER 17-VANE-4
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DATE STARTED 4/8/06 GROUND ELEVATION -6 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR
Bottom of hole at 8.4 feet.
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
Gray CH, traces organic.
COMPLETED 4/8/06
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
    SPT N VALUE    
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
25
44.6
35.2
47
11.7
72.8
152.7
176.2
164.4
129.2
NOTES South end of breach, levee toe.
164.4
23.5
26
27
28
29
30
Organic matter.
CH/OH
CH/OH
CH/OH
Marsh, contact with gray CH. 52.9
BORING NUMBER 17-VANE-5
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
20 40 60 80
R
E
C
O
V
E
R
Y
 %
B
LO
W
C
O
U
N
TS
(N
 V
A
LU
E
)
60 120 180 240
P
ea
k 
S
tre
ng
th
(p
sf
)
G
E
O
TE
C
H
 B
H
 P
LO
TS
  I
LI
T,
 F
IE
LD
 V
A
N
E
S
, 1
7T
H
 S
TR
E
E
T.
G
P
J 
 G
IN
T 
U
S
 L
A
B
.G
D
T 
 5
/4
/0
6
PL LLMC
D
ep
th
(ft
)
0
5
DATE STARTED 4/9/06 GROUND ELEVATION -5 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR
Bottom of hole at 9.6 feet.
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
Intermixing of black organic with gray clay.
COMPLETED 4/9/06
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
    SPT N VALUE    
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
31
47
30.5
47
47
52.9
234.9
187.9
150.3
211.4
NOTES North end of breach, levee toe, 6949 Bellaire St.
129.2
70.5
32
33
34
35
36
Organic matter.
Organic matter, strong odor
.
Organic matter.
Organic matter.
Intermixing of black organic with gray clay. 129.2
BORING NUMBER 17-VANE-6
UC Berkeley
Davis Hall
Berkeley, California
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DATE STARTED 4/11/06 GROUND ELEVATION 3.8 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR
Bottom of hole at 15.2 feet.
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
Black organic matter.
COMPLETED 4/11/06
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    SPT N VALUE    
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
37
49.3
49.3
65.8
47
44.6
446.3
123.3
111.6
152.7
NOTES South end of breach, levee crest.
129.2
94
38
39
40
41
42
Non-engineered CL fill.
Non-engineered CL fill.
Dark gray CH, traces organic.
Dark gray CH, traces organic, top of marsh.
Marsh, wood. 246.7
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
PROJECT NUMBER
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DATE STARTED 4/11/06 COMPLETED 4/11/06
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GROUND WATER LEVELS:
20 40 60 80
DRILLING CONTRACTOR
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
20 40 60 80
R
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94
Organic matter, 80% wood.
70.5
29.4
352.4
211.4
47
43
44
45
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
Organic matter, 80% wood.
Bottom of hole at 16.6 feet.
NOTES North end of breach, levee crest.
GROUND ELEVATION 4 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
Gray, silty, sandy CL, traces black organic.
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
B
LO
W
C
O
U
N
TS
(N
 V
A
LU
E
)
PAGE  1  OF  1
BORING NUMBER 17-VANE-8
PROJECT NUMBER
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
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DRILLING CONTRACTOR GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DATE STARTED 4/11/06 COMPLETED 4/11/06
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    SPT N VALUE    
AT END OF DRILLING ---
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
20 40 60 80
35.2Black organic matter, mixing with gray CH.
28.2
16.4
54
176.2
54
39.9
129.2
46
47
HOLE SIZE
49
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Dark gray CH, traces organic.
Dark gray CH, traces organic.
Gray CH (fibrous).
Bottom of hole at 10.0 feet.
NOTES South end of breach, levee toe.
GROUND ELEVATION -6 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
48
PROJECT NAME 17th Street Canal (East)
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BORING NUMBER 17-VANE-9
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
PROJECT NUMBER PROJECT LOCATION 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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AT END OF DRILLING ---
199.71Organic silty clay, some roots.
Bottom of hole at 2.5 feet.
NOTES LAC (East)- at max. tilt of wall, by the swimming pool
GROUND ELEVATION -4.68 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DATE STARTED 3/15/06 COMPLETED 3/15/06
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane
PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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BORING NUMBER LAC-VANE-1
CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team) PROJECT NAME London Avenue Canal
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MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
DATE STARTED 3/15/06 COMPLETED 3/15/06
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GROUND WATER LEVELS:
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DRILLING CONTRACTOR
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
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35.2
Gray clay with organic matter.
52.9
2.3
105.7
140.9
47.0
2
3
4
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
Organic matter mixing with gray clay.
Bottom of hole at 5.2 feet.
NOTES LAC (East)- between swimming pool and toe of levee
GROUND ELEVATION -4.0 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
Organic clay.
PROJECT NAME London Avenue Canal
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BORING NUMBER LAC-VANE-2
PROJECT NUMBER
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
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DRILLING CONTRACTOR GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DATE STARTED 3/15/06 COMPLETED 3/15/06
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    SPT N VALUE    
AT END OF DRILLING ---
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    FINES CONTENT (%)    
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35.2Stiff marsh.
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5.9
5.9
540.3
199.7
94
94
5
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HOLE SIZE
8
B
LO
W
C
O
U
N
TS
(N
 V
A
LU
E
)
Organic matter mixing with gray clay.
High PI gray clay, traces of organic matter.
High PI gray clay, traces of organic matter.
Bottom of hole at 7.1 feet.
NOTES LAC (East)- south end of rockfill, at levee toe.
GROUND ELEVATION -3.0 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
7
PROJECT NAME London Avenue Canal
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BORING NUMBER LAC-VANE-3
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
PROJECT NUMBER PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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COMPLETED 4/10/06
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DATE STARTED 4/10/06
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
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LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
11.75
117.5
105.71
9
10
Marsh with dark gray CH.
Marsh with dark gray CH, wood.
Bottom of hole at 15.2 feet.
GROUND ELEVATION 4.3 ft
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
NOTES LAC North (East)- south end of rockfill, levee crest.
PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team) PROJECT NAME London Avenue Canal
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65.8
AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
23.5
129.2
199.7
Marsh with dark gray CH.
Marsh with dark gray CH, wood.
Bottom of hole at 11.4 feet.
NOTES LAC North (East)- south end of rockfill, levee crest.
GROUND ELEVATION 4.3 ft
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
DRILLING CONTRACTOR GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DATE STARTED 4/10/06
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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CLIENT ILIT (Independent Levee Investigation Team)
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DATE STARTED 4/10/06 COMPLETED 4/10/06
G
R
A
P
H
IC
LO
G
    SPT N VALUE    
GROUND WATER LEVELS:
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DRILLING CONTRACTOR
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
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23.5
Organic clay, sandy at the tip.
23.5
11.7
117.5
70.5
25.8
13
14
15
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
Marsh, roots.
Bottom of hole at 5.8 feet.
NOTES LAC North (East)- south end of rockfill, 50ft from levee toe.
GROUND ELEVATION -6.5 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
AT END OF DRILLING ---
AFTER DRILLING ---
HOLE SIZE
Marsh, roots.
PROJECT NAME London Avenue Canal
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BORING NUMBER LAC-VANE-6
PROJECT NUMBER
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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DRILLING CONTRACTOR GROUND WATER LEVELS:
CHECKED BY D. Cobos-Roa
DATE STARTED 4/10/06 COMPLETED 4/10/06
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AFTER DRILLING ---
    SPT N VALUE    
AT END OF DRILLING ---
20 40 60 80
    FINES CONTENT (%)    
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35.2Dar brown-black silty organic clay. 35.2
21.1
35.2
152.7
108.1
140.9
117.5
18
16
HOLE SIZE
17
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Organic clay.
Mixing of black and gray organic clay.
Dark brown organic clay.
Bottom of hole at 5.0 feet.
NOTES LAC North (East)- 6060 & 6078 Warrington St., 50' from levee toe.
GROUND ELEVATION -6.5 ft
LOGGED BY A. Athanasopoulos
DRILLING METHOD Field Vane AT TIME OF DRILLING ---
19
PROJECT NAME London Avenue Canal
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BORING NUMBER LAC-VANE-7
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION
PROJECT NUMBER PROJECT LOCATION London Avenue Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana
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 APPENDIX F: LOOKING BACK  
Appendix F:  Looking Back 
We must expect more catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina - and possibly 
even worse. In fact, we will have compounded the tragedy if we fail to learn 
the lessons - good and bad - it has taught us and strengthen our system of 
preparedness and response. We cannot undo the mistakes of the past, but 
there is much we can do to learn from them and to be better prepared for the 
future. This is our duty. 
 
Frances Gragos Townsend 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism 
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned 
Report to the President of the United States, February 2006 
 
 
F.1 Synopsis of History of the New Orleans Flood Defense System 1965 - 2005 
This synopsis of the history of the New Orleans Flood Defense System (NOFDS) 
starts in 1965 in the period following hurricane Betsy. This is only the most recent phase in a 
history of the NOFDS that dates back 300 hundred years. 
September 1965: Hurricane Betsy sweeps over New Orleans with winds exceeding 
100 miles per hour and tides up to 16 feet above mean sea level. Betsy was the most 
destructive hurricane on record to strike the Louisiana coast. It inundated an area of some 
4,800 square miles, killed 81 persons within the state, caused about 250,000 people to be 
evacuated and disrupted transportation, communication, and utility service throughout the 
eastern coastal area of Louisiana for many months. East New Orleans, St. Bernard Parish, and 
the Lower Ninth Ward were particularly hard hit. Residents blamed flooding on the 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO, completed 1961) and its connection to the Gulf Inter-
Coastal Water Way (GIWW) and the Industrial Canal (Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, 
IHNC). Earlier in the year, the Orleans Levee Board began driving sheet pilings on the 17th 
Street canal and other drainage canal levees that had been raised following flooding caused by 
a hurricane in 1947. Maintenance dredging was initiated by the Corps of Engineers on the 
MR-GO. 
October 1965: Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers plan to strengthen the 
NOFDS to protect from flooding caused by a storm surge or rainfall associated with a 
Standard Project Hurricane (SPH, estimated to have a 200 to 300 year return period), which is 
roughly the same as what is now classified as a fast moving Category 3 hurricane. The Corps 
proposed massive floodgates and barriers on the far end of Lake Pontchartrain to stop 
hurricane surges from the Gulf of Mexico (Barrier Plan). Also included were additional 
protection to areas around the lake in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and St. 
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Charles. This protection included a series of levees along the lakefront and concrete 
floodwalls along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. This plan was selected over another 
alternative, known as the High Level Plan which excluded the barriers and flood gates and 
instead employed higher levees. The Barrier Plan was favored because it was believed to be 
much less expensive and quicker to construct. Although federally authorized, it was a joint 
federal, state, and local effort with the federal government paying 70 percent of the costs and 
the state and local agencies paying 30 percent. The Corps was responsible for project design 
and construction. State and local interests were responsible for operations and maintenance 
of the flood controls. The project was forecast to take about 13 years to complete (1978) and 
cost about $85 million. 
October 1968: The Corps of Engineers performed field tests of levee construction in 
the Atchafalaya Basin. These test sections were built in 1964 and 1965 to investigate the 
performance of new levee designs. The sections were instrumented and their performance 
monitored during and after construction. Important information was developed regarding 
characterizations of the soil properties and how these should be used in analyzing levee 
stability factors of safety. Definitive differences were found between soil strengths near the 
centers and at the toes of the levee test sections. Differences in factors of safety due to 
different analysis methods were analyzed and it was noted that the method used at that point 
in time by the Corps of Engineers tended to over-predict the overall factors of safety. 
August 1969: Construction of floodwalls along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, 
started in 1966, was almost completed as was an earthen levee elevated to 12 feet along 
Lakeshore Drive from West End Boulevard to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal when 
hurricane Camille surge conditions produced similar surge conditions to those of hurricane 
Betsy. Temporary sheet piling had been driven by the Orleans Levee Board to increase their 
effective height. Only minor flooding occurred in the project area. Hurricane Camille 
(Category 5 hurricane) crossed the Mississippi coast at Pass Christian and devastated the 
coastal communities along the Mississippi coast to Biloxi Alabama.  
November 1969: Corps of Engineers issues report on Standard Project Hurricane 
surge and wave conditions for St. Bernard Parish. Effects of MR-GO and its adjacent levee 
are incorporated into these conditions. 
December 1973: In order to accelerate construction, the Orleans Levee board 
financed and constructed portions of the floodwalls along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal 
and these were virtually completed at this time.  
August 1976: Corps of Engineers estimate that he cost of the improved NOFDS had 
risen to $352 million, and its completion delayed to 1991. In a review of progress, the 
Comptroller General’s Report to the Congress (1976) observed: “…its (Corps of Engineers) 
own belated completion of design, plans, and specifications, has contributed to the delays.” 
The Citrus Back Levee, Michoud Slip Levee, New Orleans East Back Levee, New Orleans 
East South Point to Gulf Intercoastal Water Way were substantially completed as was the 
flood protection structure at Bayou Bienvenue. 
December 1977: In reaction to a suit brought by a coalition of local fishermen and the 
Save Our Wetlands environmental group in 1976, the Fifth Federal District Court ruled the 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Corp’s Barrier Plan was inadequate and enjoined 
construction of the entire project. The Court ordered the Corps of Engineers to produce an 
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environmental impact report on the proposed Barrier Plan. The injunction was subsequently 
modified to permit construction of the levee and floodwall elements of the hurricane 
protection plan. 
September 1979: NOAA issues official revisions to Standard Project Hurricane 
guidelines first issued during 1959 and used as a basis for the authorization of the Lake 
Pontchartrain and Vicinity congressional authorization. These revised SPH guidelines 
increased the sustained and maximum wind speeds, and modified the hurricane radius to the 
maximum winds and forward speeds. These changes resulted in increases in the surge and 
wave heights over those in the original SPH. These changes were not reflected in later design 
guidelines for the flood protection system. 
April 1980: Flooding overtops east side of the London Avenue canal south of Robert 
E Lee, where 200 feet of sheet piling had been removed at a point where the levee was 
eroding. 
January 1981: Stability analysis performed by consulting engineers Modjeski and 
Masters shows that proposed higher levees for the 17th Street canal would fail in high water. 
Factors of safety less than 1.3 and as low as 0.8 were found for substantial portions of the 
canal. Additional studies were recommended.  
September 1981: Corps of Engineers issues a design memorandum and revised 
environmental impact statement in which it is observed: “There is an unresolved issue with 
regards to the three main outfall canals in New Orleans which empty into Lake Pontchartrain 
along the reach known as the New Orleans Lakefront. Return levees flank these gravity 
drainage canals for a considerable distance inland from the lake, tying into lift pump stations 
at the head of the canals. Since the time of project authorization, it has been determined that 
the return levees are inadequate in terms of both grade and stability.” Work was underway to 
raise the lakefront levees to a height of 16 feet.  
August 1982: At this time, only about half of the improved NOFDS project had been 
completed. Costs were estimated to have grown to $757 million, not including any work 
along the drainage canals, and project completion had slipped to 2008. The General 
Accounting Office (1982) observed: “We believe that improved planning is needed by the 
Corps to resolve certain environmental, technical, and financial issues. Environmental 
concerns have remained unresolved for almost 5 years after a court injunction prohibited the 
Corps from constructing certain parts of the projects. The Corps is considering a change in its 
solution of providing protection from constructing barrier structures at the entrance to the lake 
and the raising of some levee heights (Barrier Plan) to constructing much higher levees with 
no barriers (High Level Plan).” The report observed: “Costly project work at the drainage 
canals has not been reported to the Congress, and technical and financial concerns which may 
impede project completion remain unresolved.” Further this report observed: “Subsequent to 
project authorization and based on the Weather Bureau’s new data pertaining to hurricane 
severity (NOAA 1979), the Corps determined that the levees along the three main drainage 
canals, which drain major portions of New Orleans and empty into Lake Pontchartrain, were 
not high enough since they are subject to overflow by hurricane surges.” 
A report issued to Modjeski and Masters by Eustis Engineering notes following 
installation of piezometers to determine water pressures on both sides of the canal (17th Street) 
“..the planned improvements to deepen and enlarge the canal may remove the seal that has 
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apparently developed on the bottom and side slopes, thereby allowing a buildup of such 
pressures in the sand stratum (under the levee).” Further, it was noted “computations indicate 
the possibility of a blow-out during extreme high water in the canal. Unless more definitive 
information can be developed regarding the potential hydrostatic uplift pressure at the levee 
toe through this reach, measures should be taken to prevent a blow-out during extreme high 
water conditions.” Additional correspondence addressed preventative measures including a 
65-foot long (deep) sheet pile cutoff wall and a concrete lining for the canal. 
November 1984: The Corps of Engineers encounter project delays and cost increases 
due to design changes caused by technical issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges, 
and local opposition to various aspects of the project. Foundation problems were encountered 
during construction of levees and floodwalls which increased construction time; delays were 
also encountered in obtaining rights-of-ways. The Corps of Engineers presents an alternative 
to the Barrier Plan identified as the High Level Plan. The Corps of Engineers propose to build 
floodgates on the canals, but local officials want to construct floodwalls on the levees. 
December 1984: Report issued to St. Bernard Parish, NOAA and the Louisiana 
Department of Natural Resources on the MR-GO bank stabilization. The history of 
construction, ship traffic, channel dredging, and erosion were documented together with 
recommendations for protective measures to help prevent further erosion and destruction of 
wetlands. 
July 1985: The Corps of Engineers reach agreements with state and local agencies to 
proceed with the High Level Plan based on construction of floodwalls on the levees. The 
Corps of Engineers make a decision to continue use of 1983 benchmark elevations even 
though National Geodetic Survey information indicates that these elevations are one or more 
feet low: “Hurricane protection projects which are partially complete will use the NGS 
benchmarks current at the time of construction of the first increment of the project” (1965). 
July 1987: Construction was virtually completed on the lakefront levees and 
floodwalls raising these defenses to an elevation of approximately 18 feet in accordance with 
the Corps of Engineers’ High Level Plan. 
June 1988: The Corps of Engineers issues a technical report documenting results from 
a full-scale field load test performed on a PZ-27 sheet pile wall located in the Atchafalaya 
Basin south of Morgan City. Flood loading was simulated by ponding water against the wall 
which was founded in soft clays similar to those underlying the New Orleans area. The wall 
was designed to carry an 8 foot head of water with a factor of safety of 1.25. The wall ‘failed’ 
(rapidly increasing wall displacements) when the water head reached 8 feet. A gap developed 
between the loaded sheet pile and the supporting soil on the water side (indicated by slope 
indicators located in the soils and on the piles). The Corps of Engineers Waterways 
Experiment Station (WES) was contracted to perform additional analyses of the data.  
August 1988: The Corps of Engineers issues Design Memorandum 19 for the Orleans 
Avenue outfall canal work. Issues were raised regarding the factors of safety for use in design 
of the flood walls and evaluation of the levee stability (specified to be a minimum of 1.3), 
quality control problems with reporting the soil characteristics, how soil shear strengths are 
averaged and selected for the foundation layers, the presence of very low shear strength 
layers, challenges associated with dredging the canal so that the embankment stability would 
not be threatened, and concerns for seepage from the canal to the protected sides. Changes in 
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the SPH developed in 1979 were not reflected in changes in the flood protection design 
elevations. 
December 1988: The Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station issues a 
report that proposes a new method for soil-structure interaction analysis of floodwalls. The 
report shows that during loading of a floodwall the deformations and strains in the sheet 
piling are controlled by the movements of the soil supporting the sheet piling. It was noted 
that as the water level rises, the increased loading may produce separation of the soil from 
the pile on the flood side (a tension crack develops behind the wall). Intrusion of free water 
into the tension crack produces additional hydrostatic pressures on the wall side of the crack 
and equal and opposite pressures on the soil side of the crack. This part of the loading was 
noted to be a function of the levee soil - sheet pile system deformations. 
January 1989: The Corps of Engineers issues Design Memorandum 19A for the 
London Avenue outfall canal work. Issues are raised concerning how the levee stability 
analyses are performed (including the shapes of the failure surfaces) and how the soil shear 
strengths are treated in the analyses. Concerns for differences in soil shear strengths along 
and at the toes of the levees are raised. 
September 1989: The Waterways Experiment Station issues a report on analyses of 
sheet pile walls based on the E99 tests performed in 1985. The work indicates that deep-
seated movements in the levee foundation control the magnitude of the sheet-pile deflection 
with the result that the height of water loading that can be sustained by a particular I wall is 
controlled by the stability of foundation as determined by a slope stability analysis. It was 
concluded that conventionally determined deflections of the sheet piling were a poor criterion 
for design because movements were caused by deformations in the foundation and not the 
cantilever action of the sheet piles. 
March 1990: The Corps of Engineers issues Design Memorandum 20 for the 17th 
Street outfall canal work. There are discussions concerning analysis of the soil shear 
strengths, the shapes of the failure surfaces for stability analyses and factors of safety for 
evaluation of the levees and sheet pile walls. 
August 1990: The Orleans Levee Board initiates work on the 17th Street canal levee. 
The levee board elected to take the lead to achieve savings because the New Orleans 
Sewerage and Water Board planned to deepen and widen the canal to meet their drainage 
needs. The Corps of Engineers issued permits to the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board 
in 1984 and 1992. The work required modifications to the existing levees and floodwalls. 
After the dredging, the bottom was 18.5 feet below sea level (below the bottom of the sheet 
piling), and the canal side levee on the Orleans side had been shaved so narrow, water now 
touched the wall. Concerns were again raised on details associated with how the levee 
stability analyses were being performed including concerns about factors of safety, analysis of 
soil shear strengths, and shape of the slope stability analyses geometries. 
October 1990: Congress orders the Corps of Engineers to begin raising the levees on 
the London and Orleans avenues drainage canals. 
September 1997: Two technical papers published in the Electronic Journal of 
Geotechnical Engineering (www.ejge.com) summarize results from the E99 sheet pile load 
tests performed in 1985 and the subsequent research conducted at the Corps of Engineers 
Waterways Experiment Station. Advanced analytical methods developed during the period 
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1982 - 1989 for determining the deformations developed in levees and the interaction of sheet 
pile floodwalls with the levees were summarized. In the first paper (Oner et al, 1997a) in the 
section on Incremental Loading (p.10) it was noted “The rising water produces several 
loading effects on a flood wall system. Most apparent is the hydrostatic pressure on the 
exposed wall above the ground surface. This part of the loading is independent of system 
deformations. …As the water level rises, the increased loading may produce separation of the 
sol from the pile on the flood side (i.e., a “tension crack” develops behind the wall). Intrusion 
of free water into the tension crack produces additional hydrostatic pressure on the wall side 
of the crack and equal and opposite pressures on the soil side of the crack. This part of the 
loading is a function of system deformations.” 
February 1998: Decision reached by administrative judge, member, Corps of 
Engineers Board of Contract Appeals regarding a construction claim filed by the Pittman 
Construction Company for difficulties encountered while constructing a section of the 
floodwall on the 17th Street canal (in vicinity of breach). It was Pittman’s contention that the 
lack of structural integrity of the existing sheet pile around which the concrete was poured and 
the weakness of the soils resulted in difficulties in pouring the concrete walls to the required 
tolerances. Pittman’s expert witness, Dr. Herbert Roussel, concluded that the soils is so weak 
and may have been further weakened by the additional driving of the sheet pile that 
increasing the penetration ca not get the deflection within tolerance. Questions were also 
raised concerning the reasonableness of the specified tolerances for the concrete flood walls 
(0.25 inches in 10 feet). The claim was rejected by the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract 
Appeals. 
September 1998: Hurricane Georges was headed directly for New Orleans but turned 
and made landfall instead at Biloxi, Mississippi. Storm tides reached 2 to 3 feet in Lake 
Pontchartrain and flooded the New Orleans Lakefront Airport. Only minor flooding occurred 
in the greater New Orleans area.  
May 2005: The estimated cost of construction for the completed enhanced NOFDS 
was estimated to be $738 million with an estimated completion date of 2015. A Corps of 
Engineers report on the High Level Plan indicated that construction work on the project was 
60 - 90 percent complete in different areas. Work on bridge replacement and floodproofing 
was underway along Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals and on the Hammond 
Highway bridge over the 17th Street canal. During the last 10 years (1996-2005), federal 
appropriations generally declined from about $15-20 million annually in the earlier years to 
about $5-$7 million in the last three years. The Corps of Engineers noted that the appropriated 
amount for 2005 was insufficient to fund new construction contracts. The Corps of Engineers 
also noted it could spend $20 million in 2006 on raising levees that had settled and needed to 
be raised to provide the design-level of protection. 
August 2005: Hurricane Katrina strikes the NOFDS with winds that exceeded 140 
miles per hour and a surge that ranged from approximately 10 to 11 feet (Lake Pontchartrain) 
to 14 to 18 feet (Lake Borgne) flooding more than 85% of the city. The NOFDS failed 
catastrophically. More than 1,500 people died as a result of the flooding (about 400 more are 
currently missing). Failure of the NOFDS constitutes the single most catastrophic and costly 
failure of a civil engineered system in the history of the United States. 
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F.2 Learning from Failures 
Detailed studies have been made of more than 600 well documented major failures 
and accidents involving engineered systems (Turner 1978; Whittow 1979; Petroski 1985; 
1994; Allison 1993; Roberts 1993; Sowers 1993; Groeneweg 1994; Lancaster 1996; Dorner 
1996; Dumas 1999; Perrow 1999; Bea 2000; Chiles 2002). These studies include recent 
accidents including the Challenger and Columbia space shuttles (Vaughn 1996, 1997; 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003), the collapse of the World Trade Center 
towers, the failures of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear power plants , the Teton 
dam collapse, the Union Carbide Bhopal chemical plant catastrophe, failures of the offshore 
platforms Occidental Piper Alpha and Petrobras P36 and the groundings of the oil tankers 
Torry Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, Exxon Valdez and Braer. Sufficient reliable documentation is 
available about these failures and accidents to understand the roles of the various components 
that comprised the systems during their life-cycle phases leading to the accident or failure. In 
many cases, personnel who participated in the events were interviewed to gain additional 
insights about how and why the accidents and failures developed. Extensive care was 
exercised to neutralize biases in this work (e.g., triangulation of multiple reliable sources, use 
of different assessors with different backgrounds) (Hale et al. 1997; Center for Chemical 
Process Safety 1994; Rasmussen et al. 1987). 
Background from these detailed studies (conducted over a 15-year period) provided 
important analysis templates that helped development of understanding of the failure of the 
NOFDS. Results from these studies are summarized in this Chapter. In addition, because it 
has particular relevance to this investigation, a summary will be presented of results from the 
investigation of the NASA Columbia accident. This summary will be preceded by 
introduction of the primary concepts associated with high and low reliability organizations. 
F.2.1 Engineered Systems 
The studies indicated that the system involved in development of failures needed to be 
carefully defined and evaluated (Bea 2006). Seven primary interactive, inter-related, and 
highly adaptive components were defined to help characterize engineered systems: 1) 
structure (provides support for facilities and operations), 2) hardware (facilities, control 
systems, life support), 3) procedures (formal, informal, written, computer software), 4) 
environments (external, internal, social), 5) operators (those who interface directly with the 
system), 6) organizations (institutional - organizational frameworks in which operations are 
conducted), and 7) interfaces among the foregoing. 
The studies clearly identified the importance of system interfaces in the development 
of failures. Breakdowns in communications and other actions frequently developed at the 
interfaces between the operators and the organizations that controlled resources, means, and 
methods. Communication malfunctions at organization-to-organization interfaces, 
information filtering, distortion, and ‘stove-piping’ communication barriers in large 
bureaucratic organizations were even more prevalent. 
An important part of this system is the Technology Delivery System (TDS) involved 
in development, operation, and maintenance of the engineered system. Technology is a social 
process by which specialized knowledge from science and experience is employed to deliver a 
system to meet specific needs of a society. The TDS is an ensemble of institutions involving 
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the public, government, and enterprise (industry) which are linked by webs of information 
channels. Inputs to the TDS consist of technical knowledge, natural resources, capital, human 
talents, and value preferences. Outputs are the intended goods and services to provided by the 
engineered system, including unintended and unwelcome consequences. The basic elements 
of a TDS are further developed in Appendix H.  
The studies showed it was essential to identify how the system developed throughout 
its life-cycle to the point of failure including development of concepts, design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance. The history (heritage) of a system generally had much to do with 
development of failures. The studies indicated that in a very large number of cases, the seeds 
for failure were sown very early in the life of a system; preceding and during the concept 
development and design phases. These seeds were allowed to flourish during the construction, 
operation and maintenance phases, and with the system in a weakened flawed and defective 
condition, when severely challenged, it failed. 
F.2.2 Causes of Failures 
Uncertainties that were primary contributors to the accidents and failures were 
organized into four major categories: 1) natural variability (information insensitive), 2) 
analytical modeling uncertainties (information sensitive), 3) human and organizational 
performance uncertainties, and 4) knowledge related uncertainties. This organization of 
uncertainties was developed to permit definition of means and measures that could be used to 
help manage the causes and effects of the uncertainties. 
The studies showed that the causative factors most often (80 % or more) involved 
human, organizational and knowledge related uncertainties (Reason 1990, 1997; Perrow 
1999; Bea 2000, 2006). These were identified as Extrinsic Factors (not belonging to the 
essential nature of the system). Frequently, these factors are identified as human errors. The 
remaining 20% of the factors involved natural and analytical model related uncertainties. 
These were identified as Intrinsic Factors (belonging to the essential nature of the system) 
(Vick 2002). 
Of the Extrinsic Factors, about 80% of these developed and became evident during 
operations and maintenance activities; frequently, the maintenance activities interacted with 
the operations activities in an undesirable way. Of the failures that occurred during operations 
and maintenance, more than half were traced to seriously flawed engineering concept 
development and design. The physical system may have been designed according to accepted 
standards and yet was seriously flawed due to limitations and imperfections embedded in the 
standards and/or in how they were used. Frequently, engineered systems were designed that 
could not be built, operated, and maintained as originally intended. Changes (work-arounds) 
were made during the construction process to allow the construction to proceed; flaws were 
introduced by these changes or flaws were introduced by the construction process itself. After 
the structure was placed in operation, modifications were made in an attempt to make it 
workable or to facilitate operations, and in the process additional flaws were introduced. 
Thus, during operations and maintenance phases, operations personnel were faced with a 
seriously deficient or defective system that could not be operated and maintained as intended. 
A useful analogy to describe the Extrinsic Factors was that of a ‘spear’ (Reason 1997) 
The pointed end of the spear represented the operators (operating teams) who are responsible 
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for performing the activities during the life-cycle development of the system. The blunt end or 
shaft of the spear represented the organizations that controlled means, methods, and resources. 
The activity at the pointed end of the spear was largely determined by what happened along 
the shaft of the spear; the TDS. 
The 20% of the causation factors that involved natural and model related uncertainties 
represented residual risks that developed from exceedances of the criteria and conditions used 
to design, construct, operate, and maintain the system. These could identified as ‘acts of god’ 
(Bernstein 1996; Molak 1996; Prigogine 1997). 
F.2.3 Magnitudes of Failures 
An important discriminating difference between major (catastrophic) and not-so-major 
failures involved the magnitude of consequences developed during and after the failures. Not-
so-major failures generally involved only a few people, a few malfunctions or breakdowns, 
and small magnitude consequences. Major or catastrophic failures involved of many people 
and their organizations, a multitude of malfunctions or breakdowns developed over long 
periods of time, and very large magnitudes of consequences (direct, indirect, on-site, off-site, 
short-term, long-term). Frequently, organizations construct barriers to prevent failure 
causation to be traced in this direction. In addition, until recently, the legal process focused on 
the proximate causes of failures (human errors). There have been some recent major 
exceptions to this focus; the important roles of organizational and institutional malfunctions in 
accident causation have been recognized in court and in public. Not-so-major accidents, if 
repeated very frequently, can lead to major losses and it is obvious that it is important to 
develop approaches and strategies to address both categories of accidents. 
F.2.4 Breaching Defenses 
Most failures involved never to be exactly repeated sequences of events and multiple 
breakdowns or malfunctions in the components that comprise a system. Failures resulted from 
breaching multiple defenses that were put in place to prevent them. These events are 
frequently dubbed incredible or impossible. After many of these failures, it was observed that 
if only one of the barriers had not been breached, the accident or failure would not have 
occurred. Experience adequately showed that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
recreate accurately the time sequence of the event that actually took place during the period 
leading to failure. Unknowable complexities generally pervade this process because detailed 
information on failure development is not available, is withheld, or is distorted by memory. 
Hindsight and confirmational biases are common as are distorted recollections. Stories told 
from a variety of viewpoints involved in the development of a failure are the best way to 
capture the richness of the factors, elements, and processes that unfold in the development of 
a failure. 
Defenses against breaching could be organized into proactive, interactive, and 
reactive categories (Bea 2000). These categories represented the timeframes in which 
activities were conducted to defend the system against failure. Reason (1997) suggested the 
analogy of Swiss Cheeze; failures could develop when ‘holes’ in these three defenses aligned. 
The larger the number and sizes of the holes, then the more likely they were to align and 
allow a failure to develop. While generally a lot of attention was given to proactive measures, 
insufficient attention was given to interactive and reactive defenses.  
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Development of effective reactive defenses often degraded because of an 
unwillingness or inability to recognize the ‘truth’, measures employed to depress development 
of accurate facts, and deficiencies introduced because of a wide variety of unrecognized 
biases (e.g., recall, hindsight, rational, control, wishful thinking, small samples, knowledge, 
correlation, perception, belief, confirmational, reductive). Searches were often conducted to 
assign blame and distribute pain. Often, once the facts and truth were known, there were 
efforts to restrain communications or put a ‘spin’ on the information so it would not appear as 
unfavorable as it was. In general, there were very numerous and large holes in reactive 
defenses. 
Development of ineffective interactive defenses often developed because their 
importance was not recognized (Klein 1999). A key example of interactive defenses was 
quality control (quality assurance is a proactive measure). Often the wrong things were 
inspected by the wrong people at the wrong times using the wrong things and for the wrong 
reasons. Proper detection, analysis and correction of potential flaws was inhibited by a variety 
of problems  (Sasou and Reason 1997). In many cases, even though very thorough proactive 
quality assurance procedures and processes were developed, they were not followed 
(violations). Often insufficient resources were allocated to implementation of interactive 
defenses. In general, there were very numerous and large holes in the reactive defenses 
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). 
F.2.5 Knowledge Challenges 
One sobering observation concerning many accidents and failures is that their 
occurrence is directly related to knowledge (information) access and development. 
Information access and development challenges were organized into two general categories: 
unknown knowables, and unknown unknowables. The first category represents information 
access and understanding challenges (Weick 1995; Klein 1999). The information exists but is 
either ignored, not used, not accessed, or improperly used. This category is identified as 
rejection - misuse of technology. Others identify this category as ‘predictable surprises’ 
(Bazerman and Watkins 2004). 
The second category - unknown unknowables -  represents limitations in knowability 
or knowledge. There are significant limitations in abilities to project system developments or 
characteristics very far in space or time. Human abilities to know all the things that are 
potentially important to the future success of systems is limited. Often, there are major 
limitations in knowledge concerning new or innovative systems and the environments in 
which these systems will be developed and exist. There is ample history of accidents and 
failures due to both of these categories of challenges to knowledge. They appear to be most 
important during the early phases of constructing and operating engineered systems; burn-in 
failures. Things develop that one did not know or could not know in advance. They also 
appear to be most important during the late life-cycle phases; wear-out failures. In this case, 
the quality characteristics of the system have degraded due to the effects of time and 
operations (frequently exacerbated by improper or ignored maintenance) and the hazards 
posed by unknown knowables and unknown unknowables interact in undesirable ways. This 
recognition poses a particularly important limitation on proactive risk analyses that are 
conducted before systems are constructed and put in service; in a predictive sense, one can 
only analyze what one understands or knows. The most effective approach identified during 
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these studies is interactive risk assessment and management (National Academy of 
Engineering 2004; Klein 1998; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Interactive risk assessment and 
management can be facilitated through a variety of people and system enhancements which 
promote abilities to detect, analyze, and correct challenges to quality and reliability before 
they are allowed to propagate to failures (Loosemore 2000). 
F.2.6 Organizational Malfunctions 
Analysis of the history of failures of engineered systems provides many examples in 
which organizational and institutional malfunctions were primarily responsible for the failures 
(Wenk 1986, 1998; Dorner 1997; Hopkins 1999, 2000; Reason 1997; Vaughn 1996; 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003). Organization malfunction is defined as a 
departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of a group or groups of individuals 
that results in unacceptable or undesirable results (Roberts and Bea 2001a, 2001b). 
Frequently, the organization develops high incentives for maintaining and increasing 
production; meanwhile hoping for quality and reliability (rewarding ‘A’ while hoping for ‘B’) 
(Roberts 1993; Roberts and Libuster 1993). The formal and informal rewards and incentives 
provided by an organization have a major influence on the performance of operators and on 
the quality and reliability of engineered systems. In a very major way, the performance of 
people is influenced by the incentives, rewards, resources, and disincentives provided by the 
organization. Many of these aspects are embodied in the organization’s culture (shared 
beliefs, artifacts). This culture largely results from the organization’s history (development 
and evolution). For many successful organizations, success breeds arrogance that can lead to 
failure (lethal arrogance). Cultures are extremely resistant to change. 
Several major organizational malfunctions developed because of down-sizing and out-
sourcing practices adopted in response to pressures to increase organizational efficiency. Loss 
of corporate memories (leading to repetition of errors), inadequate core competencies in the 
organization, creation of more difficult and intricate communications and organization 
interfaces, degradation in morale, unwarranted reliance on the expertise of outside 
contractors, cut-backs in quality assurance and control, and provision of conflicting incentives 
(e.g. cut costs, yet maintain quality) are examples of activities that lead to substantial 
compromises in the intended quality of systems. Much of the down-sizing (‘right-sizing’), 
outsourcing (‘hopeful thinking’), and repeated cost-cutting (‘remove the fat until there is no 
muscle or bone’) seems to have its source in modern ‘business consulting.’ While some of 
this thinking can help promote ‘increased efficiency’ and maybe even lower CapEx (Capital 
Expenditures), the robustness (damage and defect tolerance) of the organization and the 
systems it creates are greatly reduced. Higher OpEX (Operating Expenditures), more 
‘accidents’, and unexpected compromises in desired quality and reliability can be expected; 
particularly over the long-run. 
Experience indicates that one of the major factors in malfunctions is the organization’s 
culture (Reason 1997; Merry 1998; Meshkati 1995). Organizational culture is reflected in how 
action, change, and innovation are viewed; the degree of external focus as contrasted with 
internal focus; incentives provided for risk taking; the degree of lateral and vertical integration 
of the organization; the effectiveness and honesty of communications; attention to the 
potentials for failures; diligence in the use of information; particularly bad or unwelcome 
news (lethal arrogance); autonomy, responsibility, authority and decision making; rewards 
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and incentives; and orientation toward the quality of performance contrasted with the quantity 
of production. One of the major culture elements is how managers in the organization react to 
suggestions for change in management and the organization. Given the extreme importance of 
quality and reliability, it is essential that these managers see suggestions for change 
(criticism?) in a positive manner. This is extremely difficult for some managers because they 
do not want to relinquish or change the strategies and processes that helped make them 
managers. 
F.2.7 Engineering Challenges 
New technologies compound problems of latent system flaws (structural pathogens) 
(Reason 1997). Excessively complex design, close coupling (failure of one component leads 
to failure of other components) and severe performance demands on systems increase the 
difficulty in controlling the impact of human malfunctions even in well operated systems. The 
field of ergonomics (people-hardware interfacing) has much to offer in helping create ‘people 
friendly’ engineered systems. Such systems are designed for what people will and can do, not 
what they should do. Such systems facilitate construction (constructability), operations 
(operability), and maintenance (maintainability, reparability).  
It is becoming painfully clear that the majority of engineering design codes and 
guidelines do not provide sufficient direction for creating robust,  damage/defect tolerant 
systems. Thinking about sufficient damage tolerance and inherent stability needs rethinking. 
Thinking about designing for the ‘maximum incredible’ events needs more development. 
While two engineered systems can both be designed to ‘resist the 100-year conditions’ with 
exactly the same probabilities of failure, the two structures can have very different robustness 
characteristics. The minimum CapEx system will not have a configuration, excess capacity, 
ductility , or appropriate correlation to allow it to weather the inevitable defects and damage 
that should be expected to develop during its life. Sufficient damage tolerance almost 
invariably results in increases in CapEx; the expectation and the frequent reality is that OpEx 
will be lowered. But one must have a long-term view for this to be realized. 
Robustness (defect and damage tolerance) can be developed through a combination of 
four key elements. The first is appropriate configuration of the elements that comprise the 
system. The second is excess capacity built into the system elements that will allow 
‘overloads’ to be carried without compromising the basic quality and reliability characteristics 
of the system. The third is ductility or an ability to stretch without breaking so that overloads 
can be shifted to other under-loaded elements. The fourth is appropriate correlation of the 
elements; for series (weak link) type systems, high degrees of correlation are needed to reduce 
the likelihood of weak links; for parallel (redundant) type systems, low degrees of correlation 
are needed to help insure independence in performance.  
Other strategies to achieve robust systems include those of fail-safe and inherently-
safe design. In fail-safe design the system is configured and proportioned so that when its 
‘capacities’ are exceeded the system fails in a way that does not compromise basic safety 
requirements. In design of intrinsically safe systems, the system is configured so that there are 
fewer inherent hazards, there is a reduced probability of unwanted events, there is reduced 
inventory and damage potential (reduced severity), there are fewer people exposed, there is 
reduced scope for smaller incidents to escalate and overwhelm the facilities, and there is a 
clear focus on simplicity, reliability and longevity to reduce exposure. 
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This work has clearly shown that the foregoing statements about structure and 
hardware robustness apply equally well to organizations and operating teams; frequently, this 
is termed organizational redundancy. Proper configuration, excess capacity, ductility, and 
appropriate correlation play out in organizations and teams in the same way they do in a 
structure and hardware. When the organization or operating team encounters defects and 
damage – and is under serious stress, the benefits of robustness become evident. A robust 
organization or operating team is not a repeatedly downsized (lean and mean), out-sourced, 
and financially strangled organization. A robust organization is a High Reliability 
Organization (HR0) (Roberts 1989, 1990, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board 2003). 
Software and engineering guideline errors in which incorrect and inaccurate 
algorithms were coded into computer programs or written into engineering guidelines have 
been at the root cause of several recent failures of engineered systems. Extensive software and 
guidelines testing and validation is required to assure that the desired performance and results 
are realized. Of particular importance is the provision of qualified independent checking 
processes and people using those process who can be used to validate the results from 
analyses and engineering work. High quality procedures need to be verifiable based on first 
principles, results from testing, and field experience. 
Given the rapid pace at which significant industrial and technical developments are 
taking place, there is a tendency to make design guidelines, construction specifications, and 
operating manuals more and more complex. Such a tendency is apparent in many current 
guidelines used for designing engineered systems. In many cases, poor organization and 
documentation of software and procedures has exacerbated the tendencies for humans to 
make errors. Simplicity, clarity, completeness, accuracy, and good organization are desirable 
attributes in procedures developed for the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of 
engineered systems. 
F.2.8 Initiating, Contributing, Compounding Events 
These studies illustrate the failure development process as organized into three 
categories of events or stages: 1) initiating, 2) contributing, and 3) propagating. The 
dominant initiating events were developed by operators (e.g. design engineers, construction, 
maintenance personnel) performing erroneous acts of commission; what is carried out has 
unanticipated and undesirable outcomes. The other initiating events are acts or developments 
involving omissions (something important left out, often intentional short-cuts and 
violations). Communications breakdowns (withheld, incomplete, untrue, not timely) were a 
dominant category of the initiating events. Various categories of violations (intentional, 
unintentional) were also very prevalent and were highly correlated with organizational and 
social cultures. 
The dominant contributing events were organizational malfunctions (about 80%); 
these contributors acted directly to encourage or trigger the initiating events. Communication 
malfunctions, interface failures (organization to operations), culture malfunctions (excessive 
cost cutting, down-sizing, outsourcing, and production pressures), unrealistic planning and 
preparations, and violations (intentional departures from acceptable practices) were dominant 
categories of these organizational malfunctions.  
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The dominant propagating events also were found to be organizational malfunctions 
(about 80%); these propagators were responsible for allowing the initiating events to unfold 
into a failure or accident. With some important additions, the dominant types of malfunctions 
were the same as the contributing events. The important additions concerned inappropriate 
selection and training of operating personnel, failures in quality assurance and quality control 
(QA/QC), brittle structures and hardware (damage and defect intolerant), and ineffective 
planning and preparations. 
 
 
F.2.9 High and Low Reliability Organizations: The NASA Columbia Accident 
        Investigation 
 
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle 
Program’s history and culture, including the original compromises that were 
required to gain approval for the Shuttle Program, subsequent years of 
resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, 
mischaracterizations of the Shuttle as operational rather than 
developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision. Cultural traits and 
organizational practices detrimental to safety and reliability were allowed to 
develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound 
engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not 
performing in accordance with requirements/specifications); organizational 
barriers which prevented effective communication of critical safety 
information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of 
integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an 
informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated 
outside the organization’s rules. 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003) 
The findings documented in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
Report (2003) have particular relevance to development of insights about how technology can 
have unintended consequences or revenge effects when an organizational - institutional 
culture of low reliability is allowed to develop. After introducing the concepts of High and 
Low Reliability Organizations, findings of the CAIB regarding the organizational - 
institutional issues will be summarized . 
F.2.10 High Reliability Organizations 
Studies of HRO (High Reliability Organizations) has shed some light on the factors 
that contribute to errors made by organizations and risk mitigation in HRO. HRO are those 
organizations that have operated relatively error free over long periods of time making 
consistently good decisions resulting in high quality and reliability operations. A variety of 
HRO ranging from the U. S. Navy nuclear aircraft carriers to the Federal Aviation 
Administration Air Traffic Control System have been studied.  
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The HRO research has been directed to define what these organizations do to reduce 
the probabilities of serious errors (Roberts, 1989). Reduction in error occurrence is 
accomplished by the following: 
• Command by exception or negation, 
• Redundancy, 
• Procedures and rules,  
• Training,  
• Appropriate rewards and punishment 
• Ability of management to “see the big picture”. 
Command by exception (management by exception) refers to management activity in 
which authority is pushed to the lower levels of the organization by managers who constantly 
monitor the behavior of their subordinates. Decision making responsibility is allowed to 
migrate to the persons with the most expertise to make the decision when unfamiliar 
situations arise (employee empowerment). 
Redundancy involves people, procedures, and hardware. It involves numerous 
individuals who serve as redundant decision makers. There are multiple hardware components 
that will permit the system to function when one of the components fails. 
Procedures that are correct, accurate, complete, well organized, well documented, and 
are not excessively complex are an important part of HRO. Adherence to the rules is 
emphasized as a way to prevent errors, unless the rules themselves contribute to error. 
HRO develop constant and high quality programs of training. Training in the conduct 
of normal and abnormal activities is mandatory to avoid errors. Establishment of appropriate 
rewards and punishment that are consistent with the organizational goals is critical. 
Lastly, Roberts defines an HRO organizational structure as one that allows key 
decision makers to understand the big picture. These decision makers with the big picture 
perceive the important developing situations, properly integrate them, and then develop high 
reliability responses. 
In recent organizational research reported by Roberts and Libuser (1993), they 
analyzed five prominent failures including the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the grounding 
of the Exxon Valdez, the Bhopal chemical plant gas leak, the mis-grinding of the Hubble 
Telescope mirror, and the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger. These failures were 
evaluated in the context of five hypotheses that defined “risk mitigating” organizations. The 
failures provided support for the following five hypotheses. 
• Risk mitigating organizations will have extensive process auditing procedures. Process 
auditing is an established system for ongoing checks designed to spot expected as well as 
unexpected safety problems. Safety drills would be included in this category as would be 
equipment testing. Follow ups on problems revealed in prior audits are a critical part of 
this function. 
• Risk mitigating organizations will have reward systems that encourage risk mitigating 
behavior on the part of the organization, its members, and constituents. The reward system 
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is the payoff that an individual or organization gets for behaving one way or another. It is 
concerned with reducing risky behavior. 
• Risk mitigating organizations will have quality standards that meet or exceed the referent 
standard of quality in the industry. 
• Risk mitigating organizations will correctly assess the risk associated with the given 
problem or situation. Two elements of risk perception are involved. One is whether or not 
there was any knowledge that risk existed at all. The second is if there was knowledge that 
risk existed, the extent to which it was acknowledged appropriately or minimized. 
• Risk mitigating organizations will have a strong command and control system consisting 
of five elements: a) migrating decision making, b) redundancy, c) rules and procedures, d) 
training, and e) senior management has the big picture. 
Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (1998) have extended these concepts to characterize 
how organizations can organize for high reliability. Their extensive review of the literature 
and studies of HRO indicate that organizing in effective HRO’s is characterized by: 
• Preoccupation with failure – any and all failures are regarded as insights on the health of a 
system, thorough analyses of near-failures, generalize (not localize) failures, encourage 
self-reporting of errors, and understand the liabilities of successes. 
• Reluctance to simplify interpretations – regard simplifications as potentially dangerous 
because they limit both the precautions people take and the number of undesired 
consequences they envision, respect what they do not know, match external complexities 
with internal complexities (requisite variety), diverse checks and balances, encourage a 
divergence in analytical perspectives among members of an organization (it is the 
divergence, not the commonalties, that hold the key to detecting anomalies). 
• Sensitivity to operations – construct and maintain a cognitive map that allows them to 
integrate diverse inputs into a single picture of the overall situation and status (situational 
awareness, ‘having the bubble’), people act thinkingly and with heed, redundancy 
involving cross checks, doubts that precautions are sufficient, and wariness about claimed 
levels of competence, exhibit extraordinary sensitivity to the incipient overloading of any 
one of it members, sensemaking. 
• Commitment to resilience – capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have 
become manifest, continuous management of fluctuations, prepare for inevitable surprises 
by expanding the general knowledge, technical facility, and command over resources, 
formal support for improvisation (capability to recombine actions in repertoire into novel 
successful combinations), and simultaneously believe and doubt their past experience. 
• Under-specification of structures – avoid the adoption of orderly procedures to reduce 
error that often spreads them around, avoid higher level errors that tend to pick up and 
combine with lower level errors that make them harder to comprehend and more 
interactively complex, gain flexibility by enacting moments of organized anarchy, loosen 
specification of who is the important decision maker in order to allow decision making to 
migrate along with problems (migrating decision making), move in the direction of a 
garbage can structure in which problems, solutions, decision makers, and choice 
opportunities are independent streams flowing through a system that become linked by 
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their arrival and departure times and by any structural constraints that affect which 
problems, solutions and decision makers have access to which opportunities. 
F.2.11 Low Reliability Organizations 
Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (1998) observe that low reliability organizations 
(LROs) are characterized by a focus on success rather than failure, and efficiency rather than 
reliability. In these organizations the cognitive infrastructure is underdeveloped, failures are 
localized rather than generalized, and highly specified structures and processes are put in 
place that develop inertial blind spots that allow failures to cumulate and produce catastrophic 
outcomes. Efficient organizations practice stable activity patterns and when they encounter 
unusual cognitive processes these often result in errors. They do the same things in the face of 
changing events, these changes go undetected because people are rushed, distracted, careless, 
or ignorant.  
LROs are characterized by expensive and inefficient learning. Diversity in problem 
solving is not welcomed. Information, particularly ‘bad’ or ‘useless’ information is not 
actively sought, failures are not taken as learning lessons, and new ideas are rejected; lethal 
arrogance. Communications are regarded as wasteful and hence the sharing of information 
and interpretations between individuals is stymied. Divergent views are discouraged, so that 
there is a narrow set of assumptions that sensitize it to a narrow variety of inputs.  
Success breeds confidence and fantasy, managers attribute success to themselves, 
rather than to luck, and they trust procedures to keep them appraised of developing problems. 
Under the assumption that success demonstrates competence, LROs drift into complacency, 
inattention, and habituated routines which they often justify with the argument that they are 
eliminating unnecessary effort and redundancy. Down-sizing and out-sourcing are used to 
further the drives of efficiency. Insensitivity is developed to overloading and its effects on 
judgement and performance. Redundancy (robustness) is eliminated or reduced in the same 
drive resulting in elimination of cross checks, assumption that precautions and existing levels 
of training and experience are sufficient, and dependence on claimed levels of competence. 
With outsourcing, it is now the supplier, not the buyer, that must become preoccupied with 
failure. But, the supplier is preoccupied with success, not failure, and because of low-bid 
contracting, often is concerned with the lowest possible cost success. The buyer now becomes 
more mindless and if novel forms of failure are possible, the loss of a preoccupation with 
failure makes the buyer more vulnerable to failure. LROs tend to lean toward anticipation of 
expected surprises, risk aversion, and planned defenses against foreseeable accidents and 
risks; unforeseeable accidents and risks are not recognized or believed. 
F.2.12 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Findings 
The following quotations from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
Report provide important insights into how NASA in the span of three decades developed into 
a LRO. 
Accident Theories: To develop a thorough understanding of accident 
causes and risk, and to better interpret the chain of events that led to the 
Columbia accident, the Board turned to the contemporary social science 
literature on accidents and risk and sought insight from experts in High 
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Reliability, Normal Accident and Organizational Theory. High Reliability 
Theory argues that organizations operating high-risk technologies, if properly 
designed and managed, can compensate for inevitable human shortcomings, 
and therefore avoid mistakes that under other circumstances would head to 
catastrophic failures. Normal Accident Theory, on the other hand, has a more 
pessimistic view of the ability of organizations and their members to manage 
high-risk technology. Normal Accident Theory holds that organizational and 
technological complexity contributes to failures. Organizations that aspire to 
failure-free performance are inevitably doomed to fail because of the inherent 
risks in the technology they operate. Normal Accident models also emphasize 
systems approaches and systems thinking, while the High Reliability model 
works from the bottom up: if each component is highly reliable, then the 
system will be highly reliable and safe. 
Though neither High Reliability Theory nor Normal Accident Theory is 
entire appropriate for understanding this accident, insights from each figured 
prominently in the Board’s deliberation. Fundamental to each theory is the 
importance of strong organizational culture and commitment to building 
successful safety strategies. 
What Went Wrong: The Board believes the following considerations 
are critical to understand what went wrong during STS-107. 
1) Commitment to a Safety Culture: NASA’s safety culture has become reactive, 
complacent, and dominated by unjustified optimism. Over time, slowly and 
unintentionally, independent checks and balances intended to increase safety 
have been eroded in favor of detailed processes that produce massive amounts 
of data and unwarranted consensus, but little effective communication. 
Organizations that successfully deal with high-risk technologies create and 
sustain a disciplined safety system capable of identifying, analyzing, and 
controlling hazards throughout a technology’s life cycle. 
2) Ability to Operate in Both a centralized and Decentralized Manner: The ability 
to operate in a centralized manner when appropriate, and to operate in a 
decentralized manner when appropriate, is the hallmark of a high-reliability 
organization. 
3) Importance of Communication: At every juncture of STS-107, the Shuttle 
Program’s structure and processes, and therefore the managers in charge, 
resisted new information. 
4) Avoiding Oversimplification: The Columbia accident is an unfortunate 
illustration of how NASA’s strong cultural bias and its optimistic 
organizational thinking undermined effective decision-making. 
5) Conditioned by Success: Even when it was clear from the launch videos that 
foam had struck the Orbiter in a manner never before seen, the Space Shuttle 
Program managers were not unduly alarmed. They could not imagine why 
anyone would want a photo of something that could be fixed after landing. 
More importantly, learned attitudes about foam strikes diminished 
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management’s wariness of their danger. The Shuttle Program turned the 
experience of failure into the memory of success. 
6) Significance of Redundancy: The Human Space Flight Program has 
compromised the many redundant processes, checks, and balances that should 
identify and correct small errors. Redundant systems essential to every high-
risk enterprise have fallen victim to bureaucratic efficiency. Years of 
workforce reductions and outsourcing have culled from NASA’s workforce the 
layers of experience and hands-on systems knowledge that once provided a 
capacity for safety oversight. Safety and Mission Assurance personnel have 
been eliminated, careers in safety have lost organizational prestige, and the 
Program now decides on its own how much safety and engineering oversight it 
needs. 
Organizational Development: The Board’s investigation into the 
Columbia accident revealed two major causes with which NASA has to 
contend: one technical, the other organizational. The Board studied the two 
dominant theories on complex organizations and accidents involving high-risk 
technologies. These schools of thought were influential in shaping the Board’s 
organizational recommendations, primarily because each takes a different 
approach to understanding accidents and risk. 
The Board determined that high-reliability theory is extremely useful in 
describing the culture that should exist in the human space flight organization. 
NASA and the Space Shuttle Program must be committed to a strong safety 
culture, a view that serious accidents can be prevented, a willingness to learn 
from mistakes, from technology and from others, and a realistic training 
program that empowers employees to know when to decentralize or centralize 
problem-solving. 
The Board believes normal accident theory has a key role in human 
space flight as well. Complex organizations need specific mechanisms to 
maintain their commitment to safety and assist their understanding of how 
complex interactions can make organizations accident-prone. Organizations 
can not put blind faith into redundant warning systems because they inherently 
create more complexity, and this complexity in turn often produces unintended 
system interactions that can lead to failure. 
The Shuttle Program’s complex structure erected barriers to effective 
communication and its safety culture no longer asks enough hard questions 
about risk. Safety culture refers to an organization’s characteristics and 
attitudes - promoted by its leaders and internalized by its members - that serve 
to make safety the top priority. 
By their very nature, high-risk technologies are exceptionally difficult 
to manage. Complex and intricate, they consist of numerous interrelated parts. 
Standing alone, components may function adequately, and failure modes may 
be anticipated. Yet when components are integrated into a total system and 
work in concert, unanticipated interactions can occur that can lead to 
catastrophic outcomes. the risks inherent in these technical systems are 
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heightened when they are produced and operated by complex organizations 
that can also break down in unanticipated ways. 
Despite periodic attempts to emphasize safety, NASA’s frequent 
reorganizations in the drive to become more efficient reduced the budget for 
safety, sending employees conflicting messages and creating conditions more 
conducive to the development of a conventional bureaucracy than to the 
maintenance of a safety-conscious research-and-development organization. 
Over time, a pattern of ineffective communication has resulted, leaving risks 
improperly defined, problems unreported, and concerns unexpressed. The 
question, is why? 
The Shuttle Independent Assessment Team’s report documented these 
changes, noting that the size and complexity of the Shuttle system and of the 
NASA / contractor relationships place extreme importance on understanding, 
communication, and information handling. among other findings, the Shuttle 
Independent Assessment Team observed that: The current Shuttle program 
culture is too insular. There is a potential for conflicts between contractual 
and programmatic goals; There are deficiencies in problem and waiver-
tracking systems; the exchange of communication across the shuttle program 
hierarchy is structurally limited, both upward and downward. 
The Board believes that deficiencies in communication, including those 
spelled out by the shuttle Independent Assessment Team, were a foundation for 
the Columbia accident. These deficiencies are byproducts of a cumbersome, 
bureaucratic, and highly complex Shuttle Program structure and the absence 
of authority in two key program areas that are responsible for integrating 
information across all programs and elements in the Shuttle Program. 
Principles of Organizational Change: The Board consistently 
searched for causal principles that would explain both the technical and 
organizational system failures. The Board’s analysis of organizational causes 
supports the following principles that should govern the changes in the 
agency’s organizational system. 
Leaders create culture. It is their responsibility to change it. Top 
administrators must take responsibility for risk, failure, and safety by 
remaining alert to the effects their decisions have on the system. Leaders are 
responsible for establishing the conditions that lead to their subordinates’ 
successes or failures. The past decisions of national leaders - the White House, 
Congress, and NASA Headquarters - set the Columbia accident in motion by 
creating resource and schedule strains that compromised the principles of a 
high-risk technology organization. The measure of NASA’s success became 
how much costs were reduced and how efficiently the schedule was met.” 
Changes in organizational structure should be made only with careful 
consideration of their effect on the system and their possible unintended 
consequences. Changes that make the organization more complex may create 
new ways that it can fail. When changes are put in place, the risk of error 
initially increases, as old ways of doing things compete with new. Institutional 
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memory is lost as personnel and records are moved and replaced. Changing 
the structure of organizations is complicated by external political and 
budgetary constraints, the inability of leaders to conceive of the full 
ramifications of their actions, the vested interests of insiders, and the failure to 
learn from the past.” 
Strategies must increase the clarity, strength, and presence of signals 
that challenge assumptions about risk. Twice in NASA history, the agency 
embarked on a slippery slope that resulted in catastrophe. Each decision, 
taken by itself, seemed correct, routine, and indeed, insignificant and 
unremarkable. Yet in retrospect, the cumulative effect was stunning. In both 
pre-accident (Challenger, Columbia) periods, events unfolded over a long time 
and in small increments rather than in sudden and dramatic occurrences. 
NASA’s challenge is to design systems that maximize the clarity of signals, 
amplify weak signals so they can be tracked, and account for missing signals. 
A safety team must have equal and independent representation so that 
managers are not again lulled into complacency by shifting definitions of risk. 
It is obvious but worth acknowledging that people who are marginal and 
powerless in organizations may have useful information or opinions that they 
don’t express. Even when these people are encouraged to speak, the find it 
intimidating to contradict a leader’s strategy or a group consensus. Extra 
effort must be made to contribute all relevant information to discussion of risk. 
Because ill-structured problems are less visible and therefore invite the 
normalization of deviance, they may be the most risky of all. 
F.2.13 Summary 
The history of major accidents involving engineered systems clearly shows that the 
vast majority of these accidents have their roots firmly embedded in human and 
organizational malfunctions or breakdowns. While the majority of these accidents develop 
during the operations and maintenance phases, the studies also clearly show that the majority 
of the flaws in the system are developed during the concept development and design phases.  
A key signature of major accidents is that they generally develop over long periods of 
time, involve large numbers of people and different organizations, and involve a multitude of 
breakdowns or malfunctions; there is no such thing as a ‘root cause’ to explain these 
accidents. These major accidents are focused in organizational - institutional breakdowns; 
malfunctions of the Technology Delivery System that is used to develop, operate, and 
maintain the engineered systems. What is frequently indicated as an ‘engineering failure’ (or 
‘pilot error’) is in fact a failure of the Technology Delivery System. 
Breakdowns in Technology Delivery Systems are most often present in Low 
Reliability Organizations (LROs) and interfaces between such organizations. LROs are 
characterized by a focus on success rather than failure, and efficiency rather than reliability. 
The cognitive infrastructure is underdeveloped, failures are localized rather than generalized, 
and highly specified structures and processes are put in place that develop inertial blind spots 
that allow failures to cumulate and produce catastrophic outcomes. They do the same things in 
the face of changing events, these changes go undetected because people are rushed, 
distracted, careless, or ignorant. LROs are characterized by expensive and inefficient learning. 
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Diversity in problem solving is not welcomed. Information, particularly ‘bad’ or ‘useless’ 
information is not actively sought, failures are not taken as learning lessons, and new ideas are 
rejected; lethal arrogance. Divergent views are discouraged, so that there is a narrow set of 
assumptions that sensitize the LRO to a narrow variety of inputs. Under the assumption that 
success demonstrates competence, LROs drift into complacency, inattention, and habituated 
routines. Down-sizing and out-sourcing are used to further the drives of efficiency. 
Insensitivity is developed to overloading and its effects on judgement and performance. 
Robustness (damage and defect tolerance) is eliminated or reduced in the same drive resulting 
in elimination of cross checks, assumption that precautions and existing levels of training and 
experience are sufficient, and dependence on claimed levels of competence. With 
outsourcing, it is now the supplier, not the buyer, that must become preoccupied with failure. 
But, the supplier is preoccupied with success, not failure, and because of low-bid contracting, 
often is concerned with the lowest possible cost success. The buyer now becomes more 
mindless and if novel forms of failure are possible, the loss of a preoccupation with failure 
makes the buyer more vulnerable to failure. LROs tend to lean toward anticipation of 
expected surprises, risk aversion, and planned defenses against foreseeable accidents and 
risks; unforeseeable accidents and risks are not recognized or believed. 
 
 
F.3 Quotations from Key Reports and Papers 
F.3.1 Townsend, F. F. (2006). The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons 
Learned, Report to the President of the United States, The White House, 
Washington, DC, February. 
Katrina creates an opportunity - indeed an imperative - for a national dialogue about 
true national preparedness, especially as it pertains to catastrophic events. We are not as 
prepared as we need to be at all levels within the country: Federal State, local, and individual. 
Hurricane Katrina obligates us to re-examine how we are organized and resourced to address 
the full range of catastrophic events - both natural and man-made. The storm and its aftermath 
provide us with the mandate to design and build such a system. 
The magnitude of Hurricane Katrina does not excuse our inadequate preparedness and 
response, but rather it must serve as a catalyst for far-reaching reform and transformation.  To 
do this, we must understand Hurricane Katrina in its proper context. 
The storm surge, extreme amounts of rain, and high winds stressed the city’s complex 
350 mile levee system to its breaking point. Several of the levees and flood walls were 
overtopped, and some were breached through the day of landfall. It was this overtopping and 
breaches of the levee system that lead to the catastrophic flooding of New Orleans. In addition 
to the levee and floodwall breaches, many of the pumping stations - which would have 
otherwise removed water from the city and prevented some of the flooding - stopped working 
due to power outages and flooded pumping equipment. 
Some overtopping of the levees was expected due to the intensity of the storm, which 
would result in localized flooding. However, such overtopping would not have lead to the 
catastrophic events that occurred due to the levee and flood wall breaches. Further, the New 
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Orleans Flood and Hurricane Protection System is designed so that individual breaches will 
not lead to catastrophic flooding. The compartmented design, with four main basins, is 
intended to minimize the threat of flood to the entire system. Thus, had only one basin 
experienced serious overtopping or a breach, it would have been possible to avoid the 
catastrophic flooding New Orleans experienced. 
New Orleans flooded as the levees and flood walls gave way and the pumping stations 
stopped operating; at its height, approximately 80 percent of New Orleans was filled with 
water up to twenty feet deep. This unprecedented flooding transformed Hurricane Katrina into 
a “Catastrophe within a catastrophe” as the storm shattered the lives of countless residents and 
presented State and local officials with challenges far exceeding their capabilities. 
We must expect more catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina - and possibly even worse. 
In fact, we will have compounded the tragedy if we fail to learn the lessons - good and bad - it 
has taught us and strengthen our system of preparedness and response. We cannot undo the 
mistakes of the past, but there is much we can do to learn from them and to be better prepared 
for the future. This is our duty. 
F.3.2 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, 2006. A Failure of Initiative, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, DC. 
The preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina show we are still an analog 
government in a digital age. We must recognize that we are woefully incapable of storing, 
moving, and accessing information - especially in times of crisis. Many of the problems we 
have identified can be categorized as ‘information gaps’ - or at least problems with 
information-related implications, or failures to act decisively because information was sketchy 
at best. Better information would have been an optimal weapon against Katrina. Information 
sent to the right people at the right place at the right time. 
We reflect on the 9/11 Commission’s finding that ‘the most important failure was one 
of imagination.’ the Select Committee believes Katrina was primarily a failure of initiative. 
But there is, of course, a nexus between the two. Both imagination and initiative - in other 
words, leadership - require good information. And a coordinated process for sharing it. And a 
willingness to use information - however imperfect or incomplete - to fuel action. 
The levees protecting New Orleans were not built to survive the most severe 
hurricanes. It was a well-known and repeatedly documented fact that a severe hurricane could 
lead to overtopping or breaching of the levees and flooding of the metropolitan area. In fact, 
for years the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has had a written plan for dewatering 
(i.e. draining) New Orleans in such a contingency. 
Once construction of the levees was completed by USACE, the responsibilities for 
operating and maintaining the levees were split among many local organizations, which is the 
standard cooperation agreement for carrying out flood control projects nationwide. The costs 
of constructing these projects are shared, with operation and maintenance being a 100 percent 
local responsibility. These include levee boards in each parish, as well as separate water and 
sewer boards. The number of organizations involved, and disagreements among them, makes 
accountably diffuse and creates potential gaps and weaknesses in parts of the flood protection 
system. In one case, improvements to levee strength which may have mitigated or prevented 
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some of the critical breaches that flooded downtown New Orleans were rejected by the 
competing local organizations. There also appear to have been lapses in both maintenance and 
inspections of selected levees, including those that breached. Also, prior to Hurricane Katrina, 
residents along these same levees reported they were leaking, another potential lapse in 
maintenance. 
Despite the well-known importance of the levees, and the consequences of failure, the 
local levee boards responsible for maintaining and operating the levees did not have any 
warning system in place. While federal regulations require that they monitor levees during 
periods of potential flooding, the requirement is impractical to implement during a hurricane. 
In addition to no warning system, the loss of communications and situational awareness, and 
only sporadic reports of flooding from a variety of sources, made it difficult to confirm that 
there were breaches in the levees and then to assess the damage. These factors, as well as 
physical difficulties of getting to the breach sites, combined to delay repair of the levee 
breaches. 
A lot of hurricanes threaten the Gulf coast every year, and New Orleans is particularly 
vulnerable because of its location and topography. The majority of the metropolitan area is 
below sea level. Over the years, the city has continued to sink, due to drainage, subsidence, 
and compaction of the soils. As an example of previous damage, Hurricane Betsy brought 
extensive destruction to New Orleans when it made landfall in Louisiana in September 1965. 
Unfortunately, many of the descriptions and photos from Hurricane Betsy sound and look 
familiar to our nation as it considers the damage from Hurricane Katrina, forty years later. 
After Hurricane Betsy in 1965, federal and state governments proposed a number of 
flood control projects to deal with the threat of hurricanes and the flooding they might cause 
in New Orleans. These included a series of control structures, concrete floodwalls, and levees 
along Lake Ponchartrain and several other waterways. One of the major projects is formally 
called the Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project. This 
project included levees along the Lake Ponchartrain lakefront, the 17th Street Canal, the 
London Avenue Canal, the Orleans Avenue Canal, the Intercoastal waterway, the Industrial 
Canal, The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and other areas. Although the project was federally 
authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort with shared costs. 
“The levees protecting New Orleans were not designed to withstand the most severe 
hurricanes. According to USACE’s plans for dewatering New Orleans, ‘the hurricane 
protection system is not designed for the largest storms and as a result, the metropolitan area 
is vulnerable to flooding from hurricane storm surges.’ USACE originally designed the levees 
around New Orleans to protect against a hurricane intensity that might occur once every 200-
300 years. 
According to USACE, the ‘standard project hurricane’ was used to design the New 
Orleans levees and is roughly equivalent to a fast moving, or moderate category 3 hurricane. 
However, there is no direct comparison of the standard project hurricane to a specific category 
on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale - which did not exist when the levees were designed. 
As shown in the table below, the standard project hurricane is equivalent to a hurricane with  
category 2 winds, category 3 storm surge, and category 4 barometric pressure. 
In addition, there is no ‘standard’ hurricane - the actual forces that levees need to 
withstand are a function of several factors. According to the preliminary NSF study, ‘the 
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actual wind, wave, and storm surge loadings imposed at any location within the overall flood 
protection system are a function of location relative to the storm, wind speed and direction, 
orientation of levees, local bodies of water, channel configurations, offshore contours, 
vegetative cover, etc.. They also vary over time as the storm moves through the region.’ 
Similarly, USACE documents indicate that overtopping will depend upon the intensity of the 
storm, the track that the center or eye of the storm follows and the speed at which it travels 
along the track. 
Although the Lake Ponchartrain project is named a hurricane protection project, a 
number of factors other than saving lives and property are included in the design of such 
projects. For example, in addition to protection urban and community lives and health, the 
design of such projects must include environmental and economic effects, and ensure that 
benefits of the completed project outweigh its cost of construction. In discussing the design of 
the Lake Ponchartrain project in a 1978 hearing, USACE District Commander for New 
Orleans, Colonel Early Rush, stated ‘Even Though economists may, and in this case did, 
favor protection to a lower scale to produce a higher ratio of benefits to costs, the threat of 
loss of human life mandated using the standard project hurricane. 
Even with its hurricane protection system, it was common knowledge that New 
Orleans was susceptible to hurricane-caused flooding. The risks of a major hurricane and 
flooding in New Orleans had been covered in the general media - by Scientific American 
(October 2001) and National Geographic (October 2004) - as well as in emergency 
management literature. A recent article in the Natural Hazards Observer stated: ‘When 
Hurricane Katrina came ashore on August 29, she ended decades of anticipation. There were 
few hazards in the United States more studied by scientists and engineers and there was ample 
warning that a strong storm could cause the City of New Orleans to flood. 
Because of the well-known potential for flooding, USACE has had a plan for several 
years for draining New Orleans - Dewater Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, 
Louisiana, dated August 18, 2000. This plan provides details on the hurricane protection 
system and describes methods to get the water out after catastrophic flooding from a 
hurricane. The premise of the plan is that a category 4 or 5 hurricane may produce storm 
surge water levels of sufficient height to overtop the existing protection system. The plan lays 
out a series of scenarios that could occur and suggests appropriate emergency responses to 
dewater the area. For example, in one case…’There is catastrophic flooding due to complete 
overtopping of the levees and floodwalls and inundation of the protected area. There will be 
extensive and severe erosion of levees and perhaps complete breaches. Due to the high water 
levels, all of the pumping stations will probably be flooded with major damages….The levee 
districts and drainage departments may be dysfunctional to some degree. 
In more recent years, well before Hurricane Katrina, questions were raised about the 
ability of the Lake Ponchartrain project to withstand more powerful hurricanes than the 
‘standard project hurricane,’ such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. USACE had discussed 
undertaking a study of modifications needed to increase the strength of the exiting levees, but 
no formal study was undertaken. 
Several organizations are responsible for building, operating, and maintaining the 
levees surrounding metropolitan New Orleans. USACE generally contracts to design and 
build the levees. After construction USACE turns the levees over to a local sponsor. USACE 
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regulations state that once a local sponsor has accepted a project, USACE may no longer 
expend federal funds on construction or improvements. this prohibition does not include 
repair after a flood. Federally authorized flood control projects, such as the Lake Ponchartrain 
project, are eligible for 100 percent federal rehabilitation of damaged by a flood. 
The local sponsor has a number of responsibilities. In accepting responsibilities for 
operations, maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation, the local sponsor signs a contract (called 
Cooperation Agreement) agreeing to meet specific standards of performance. This agreement 
makes the local sponsor responsible for liability for that levee. For most of the levees 
surrounding New Orleans, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development was 
the sate entity that originally sponsored the construction. After construction, the state turned 
over control to local sponsors. These local sponsors accepted completed units of the project 
from 1977 to 1987, depending on when the specific units were completed. The local sponsors 
are responsible for operation, maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of the levees when the 
construction of the project, or a project unit, is complete. 
The local sponsors include a variety of separate local organizations. For example, 
different parts of the Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project, 
were turned over to four different local sponsors - to include the Orleans, East Jefferson, Lake 
Borgne, and Ponchartrain levee districts. In addition ,there are separate water and sever 
districts that are responsible for maintaining pumping stations. 
The different local organizations involved had the effect of diffusing responsibility 
and creating potential weaknesses. For example, levee breaches and distress were repeatedly 
noted at transition sections, where different organizations were responsible for different 
pieces and thus two different levee or wall systems joined together. According to USACE, ‘at 
sections where infrastructure elements were designed and maintained by multiple authorities, 
and their multiple protection elements came together, the weakest (or lowest) segment or 
element controlled the overall performance. 
Both USACE and the local sponsors have ongoing responsibility to inspect the levees. 
Annual inspections are done both independently by USACE and jointly with the local 
sponsor. In addition, federal regulations require local sponsors to ensure that flood control 
structures are operating as intended and to continuously patrol the structure to ensure no 
conditions exist that might endanger it. 
Records reflect that both USACE and the local sponsors kept up with their 
responsibilities to inspect the levees. According to USACE, in June 2005, it conducted an 
inspection of the levee system jointly with the state and local sponsors. In addition, GAO 
reviewed USACE’s inspection reports from 2001 to 2004 for all completed project units of 
the Lake Ponchartrain project. These reports indicated the levees were inspected each year 
and had received ‘acceptable’ ratings. 
However, both the NSF-funded investigators and USACE officials cited instances 
where brush and even trees were growing along the 17th Street and London Avenue canals 
levees, which is not allowed under the established standards for levee protection. Thus, 
although the records reflect that inspections were conducted and the levees received 
acceptable ratings, the records appear to be incomplete or inaccurate. In other words, they 
failed to reflect the tree growth, and of course, neither USACE nor the local sponsor had 
taken corrective actions to remove the trees. 
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In addition, there was apparently seepage from one canal before Hurricane Katrina, 
indicating problems had developed in the levee after construction. Specifically, residents of 
New Orleans who live along the 17th Street Canal said water was leaking from the canal and 
seeping into their yards months before Hurricane Katrina caused the levee system to collapse. 
The leaks, they said, occurred within several hundred feet of the levee that later failed. 
Because the eye of Katrina passed just slightly to the east of New Orleans, the 
hurricane threw unusually severe wind loads and storm surges on the flood protection 
systems. The surge overtopped large sections of the levees during the morning of August 29 
east of New Orleans, in Orleans and St. Bernard Parish, and it also pushed water up the 
Intercoastal waterway and into the Industrial Canal. The water rise in Lake Ponchartrain 
strained the floodwalls along the canals adjacent to its southern shore, including the 17th 
Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal. Breaches along all of these canals led to flooding 
of 80 percent of New Orleans to depths up to 20 feet. The flooding of central New Orleans led 
to the most widespread and costly damage of the hurricane. It also lead to the difficulties 
encountered by emergency responders that are documented elsewhere in this report. 
Despite the well-known importance of the levees, and the consequences of failure, the 
local levee boards responsible for maintaining and operating the levees do not have any 
warning system in place. Federal regulations require local sponsors to ensure that flood 
control structures are operating as intended and to continuously patrol the structure during 
flood periods to ensure that no conditions exist that might endanger it. However, it would be 
impractical to monitor the levees during a hurricane. 
There were also physical barriers that made assessments and repair difficult. 
Specifically, emergency repair operations to close some of the breaches were seriously 
hampered by lack of access roads. USACE regulations generally require access roads on top 
of levees to allow for inspections, maintenance, and flood-fighting operations, and most 
USACE levees built in the United States meet this requirement. However, in New Orleans, 
exceptions were made to these regulations because of its highly urban nature. Access roads 
were foregone when it was decided to use I-walls in the levee crowns to minimize right-of-
ways into surrounding neighborhoods. When Hurricane Katrina led to the breaches in the 
levees, the lack of access roads atop the levees resulted in very significant increases in time 
and cost to repair the damaged areas. 
Hundreds of miles of levees were constructed to defend metropolitan New Orleans 
against storm events. These levees were not designed to protect New Orleans from a category 
4 or 5 monster hurricane, and all of the key players knew this. The original specifications of 
the levees offered protection that was limited to withstanding the forces of a moderate 
hurricane. Once constructed, the levees were turned over to local control, leaving the USACE 
to make detailed plans to drain New Orleans should it be flooded. 
The Local sponsors - a patchwork quilt of levee and water and sewer boards - were 
responsible only for their own piece of levee. It seems no federal, state, or local entity 
watched over the integrity of the whole system, which might have mitigated to some degree 
the effects of the hurricane. When Hurricane Katrina came, some of the levees breached - as 
many had predicted they would - and most of New Orleans flooded to create untold misery. 
The forces that destroyed the levees also destroyed the ability to quickly access 
damage and make repairs. The reasons for the levee failures appear to be some combination 
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of nature’s wrath (the storm was just too large) and man’s folly (an assumption that the 
design, construction, and maintenance of the levees would be flawless). While there was not 
failure to predict the inevitability and consequences of a monster hurricane - Katrina in this 
case - there was a failure of initiative to get beyond design and organizational compromises to 
improve the level of protection afforded. 
F.3.3 Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 
Hurricane Katrina, A Nation Still Unprepared, United States Senate, Washington, 
DC, May 2006. 
The Contribution of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet to Damage from Hurricane Katrina 
Congress authorized construction of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) in 
1956 to facilitate commercial shipping access to the Port of New Orleans from the Gulf of 
Mexico. Upon its completion in 1965, the MRGO provided a route 40 miles shorter than the 
alternative up the Mississippi River. The MRGO also provides a connection from the Gulf of 
Mexico to the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW), which is a recreational and commercial 
waterway running east-west from Texas to Florida. Though the MRGO produced commercial 
benefits, those benefits came at a cost to the environment. The Corps estimates that the 
construction of the channel led to substantial loss of wetlands, which, as noted above, help 
slow and decrease the power of storms before they hit populated areas. 
The MRGO also contributed to a potential “funnel” for storm surges emerging from 
Lake Borgne and the Gulf into the New Orleans area. The “funnel” was created by the 
intersection of the MRGO from the southeast and the GIWW from the northwest into the 
confined channel, referred to as the GIWW/MRGO that separates New Orleans East and the 
Ninth Ward/St. Bernard Parish. The levees on the south side of the MRGO and the levees on 
the north side of the GIWW converge from being about 10 miles apart where they straddle 
Lake Borgne to a few hundred yards apart where the MRGO merges into the GIWW. The 
western part of the “funnel” is a 6 mile-long section of the combined GIWW/MRGO which 
was enlarged by a factor of three when the MRGO was built in order to expand from a barge 
channel to accommodate oceangoing vessels. 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, many warned that the potential funnel would accelerate 
and intensify storm surges emerging from Lake Borgne and the Gulf into the downtown New 
Orleans area. The funnel had been described as a “superhighway” for storm surges or the 
“Crescent City’s Trojan Horse” that had the potential to “amplify storm surges by 20 to 40 
percent,” according to some storm modeling.  Researchers at LSU believed that in creating 
this funnel, “the US Army Corps of Engineers had inadvertently designed an excellent storm 
surge delivery system - nothing less - to bring this mass of water with simply tremendous 
‘load’ - potential energy - right into the middle of New Orleans. 
The extent to which MRGO, and the funnel it helped create actually contributed to the 
hurricane’s damage is still being investigated, but there have been some preliminary findings. 
A recent report issued by the Corps’ IPET concluded that the portion of MRGO running from 
the GIWW to the Gulf (called “Reach 2”) did not significantly impact the height of Katrina’s 
storm surge, not because the “funnel” effect was nonexistent, but because the storm was so 
great it nullified the impact of either the wetlands or the 35 intersection of the MRGO and the 
GIWW - the funnel - at the height of the surge. 
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The building of MRGO and the combined GIWW/MRGO resulted in substantial 
environmental damage, including a significant loss of wetlands that had once formed a natural 
barrier against hurricanes threatening New Orleans from the east. MRGO and the 
GIWW/MRGO provided a connection between Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain that 
allowed the much greater surge from Lake Borgne to flow into both New Orleans and Lake 
Pontchartrain. These channels further increased the speed and flow of the Katrina surge into 
New Orleans East and the Ninth Ward/St. Bernard Parish, increasing the destructive force 
against adjacent levees and contributing to their failure. As a result, MRGO and the combined 
GIWW/MRGO resulted in increased flooding and greater damage from hurricane Katrina. 
The Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana 
Department of Transportation and Development and the Orleans Levee District: 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Levee systems of the size needed to protect the New Orleans area are often 
collaborative efforts between federal and local governments. The federal role in such projects 
is carried out by the Corps, an agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) charged with 
both military and civilian missions. Military missions are assigned within the military 
command structure, while civilian flood control projects are authorized by Congress in 
legislation. 
Flood-control projects usually begin when a community feels a need for protection 
and contacts the Corps. If the Corps does not already have the statutory authority to respond, 
then Congress may grant it. After initial studies, the Corps may enter into a project 
cooperation or assurance agreement with a local sponsor acting on behalf of the community. 
The assurance agreements for projects generally set forth roles of the parties, including 
payment obligations, design and construction responsibilities, and operations and 
maintenance (O&M) duties before and after the project is complete. 
The levee system that protects most of New Orleans, including areas that experienced 
major breaches and flooding during Katrina - such as the 17th Street and London Avenue 
Canals, New Orleans East, and most of St. Bernard Parish - is a Corps project called the Lake 
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (Lake Pontchartrain Project). There 
are several other federal cost-shared projects that protect other parts of southeastern 
Louisiana. The Corps’ involvement in these projects was mostly through its New Orleans 
District, one of the Corps’ largest with more than 1,200 employees and part of the Corps’ 
Mississippi Valley Division headquartered in Vicksburg, Mississippi. When Katrina made 
landfall, the New Orleans District was under the command of Colonel Richard P. Wagenaar, 
who had assumed control only six weeks before. 
The assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project made the Corps 
responsible for designing and constructing the project. Local sponsors provided the land for 
levee construction and rights-of-way, and agreed to share the cost. The Corps was to turn the 
completed project over to the local sponsors for O&M consistent with the Corps’ standards, i.e., 
making sure the flood-control system actually works on a day-to-day basis and protects those 
living inside the system. 10 To help the local sponsor do this, the Corps is required by its rules 
and regulations to provide the local sponsor with an operations manual” and then conduct 
annual inspections to be sure the local sponsor is doing what it is supposed to do. 
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In addition to its authority to build flood-control projects, the Corps also has statutory 
authority in federal cost-share flood-control projects like the Lake Pontchartrain Project to act 
in anticipation of, or response to, flood emergencies. In this role, the Corps may help the local 
sponsors deal with the flood threat to the levee system, and aid state and local governments 
trying to prevent flood damage. This “flood-fighting” authority is authorized by Public Law 
84-99, also known as the “Flood Act.” In the days following Katrina, the Corps used its Flood 
Act authority to close off the levee breaches at the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals, 
which were filling the city with water, and to make other emergency repairs. 
The Orleans Levee District 
One of the local sponsors for the Lake Pontchartrain Project was the Orleans Levee 
District, one of the first five levee districts created by the state in 1879. The levee districts, 
which were established to be a funding source for and to ensure local involvement in levee 
construction and operation, all had the same general duty: to do what was necessary to “insure 
the thorough and adequate protection of the lands of the district from damage by flood ... for 
the adequate drainage control of the district.” 
Like the Corps under the Flood Act, the levee districts have broad statutory 
obligations in addition to their obligations under their assurance agreements on individual 
levee projects. For example, regardless whether a project was being designed and constructed 
by the Corps or had been turned over for O&M to the local sponsor, state law charged the 
levee districts with adopting rules and regulations for maintaining a “comprehensive levee 
system.” State law authorized them to obtain engineering assistance from the Louisiana 
Department of Transportation and Development (LA DOTD) in Baton Rouge if they needed 
additional technical expertise.’  State law also required levee-district board members to attend 
once during their term in office an educational program on how to care for and inspect levees. 
To carry out their primary duty of flood control, state law not only authorized the 
levee districts to serve as local sponsors for federal cost-share projects, but also to raise 
money pursuant to taxing and bonding authorities. In the unique case of the Orleans Levee 
District, it was also authorized to engage in various business enterprises, 20 making the 
Orleans Levee District a unique entity with some governmental qualities (taxing and bonding 
authority) and some corporate qualities: the authority to engage in for-profit businesses like 
operating the Lakefront Airport, running two marinas along Lake Pontchartrain, and leasing 
dock space to a riverboat casino. 
The revenues the Orleans Levee District earned from the businesses and its taxing and 
bonding authority were substantial. The Orleans Levee District financial statements for the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 2005, show it collected more than $24 million from property taxes 
and $14 million from its business-type activities in the previous 12 months. The same report 
said the district had $21 million in unallocated general funds and $13 million in a “special 
levee improvement fund. The levee improvement fund, according to the levee district’s former 
president, Jim Huey, could “only be used for flood protection projects and/or flood-related 
projects. 
Although the levee district’s primary responsibility was flood protection it spent large 
amounts on non-flood related activities (e.g., the licensing of a casino or the operation of an 
airport and. marinas or the leasing of space to a karate club, beautician schools or restaurants) 
rather than apply the money to flood protection or emergency preparedness. 25 For example, 
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the Orleans Levee District’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) sat outside the protection 
of the levee system at the Lakefront Airport, vulnerable to the very hurricanes the levee 
system was designed to protect against. For years the district had, studied moving its EOC 
inside the flood protection system, but never did. The levee district’s Chief Engineer, Stevan 
Spencer, described the situation as a “very bad joke” that dated back to at least 1998, when 
Hurricane Georges flooded the airport. Spencer said “there was never funding” to move the 
EOC. Yet in 2003, the Orleans Levee District spent $2.4 million to repair the “Mardi Gras 
Fountain” in a park near Lake Pontchartrain. When Katrina made landfall, Orleans Levee 
District staff had to be rescued, mostly by boat, from the flooded EOC at the airport  before 
they could survey damage or assist with repair efforts at the 17th Street and London Avenue 
Canals. 
The Orleans Levee District was also aware of a levee in New Orleans East that was 
considered to be three feet below its design height. Levee-district board minutes and 
conversations with Corps personnel suggest that paying for repairs to this low levee was 
considered to be the Corps’ responsibility. Federal funding was unavailable, but instead of 
paying for the repairs itself and asking for reimbursement from the Corps, as it had with 
previous projects, the levee district merely sent letters to its Congressional delegation asking 
for federal funding. 
Pressed to explain how the Orleans Levee District made spending decisions, Huey 
offered no direct explanation, but focused on the district’s multiple obligations - not only was 
the district responsible for flood control, but it also had statutory requirements to maintain 
recreational space and was authorized by state law to engage in non-flood related business 
ventures. A review of the levee-district board minutes of recent years revealed that the board 
and its various committees spent more time discussing its business operations than it did the 
flood-control system it was responsible for operating and maintaining.  
The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LA DOTD) 
Though not a party to the assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, LA 
DOM and its Office of Public Works (OPW) have statutory responsibilities to assist and 
oversee certain levee district functions. State law tasks LA DOM with approving any activity 
that might compromise the levees, and with administering training sessions to levee-district 
board members and their inspectors on caring for and inspecting levees.  
To the extent training sessions were held, they were organized by the Association of 
Levee Boards of Louisiana, an organization that lists Edmund Preau as its Secretary 
Treasurer. Preau is an Assistant Secretary in LA DOTD and leads the OPW within the 
Department, which is responsible for LA DOTD’s levee-related activities. 
When Huey, who served on the levee district’s board for more than 13 years (nine as 
president), was read the section of state law describing the training requirement, he said it was 
the first he had heard of it. Huey explained: “You know what that is? That’s going up to a 
workshop for a weekend and having a crawfish boil up here and hear a couple people talk 
about some things and they get a little piece of paper and they honored the law Huey was then 
asked whether the Association sessions addressed how to inspect levees. He responded, “No, 
nothing. LA DOTD also had the statutory responsibility to “review” each levee district’s 
emergency-operations manual every two years . According to Preau, this review entailed 
checking whether relevant contact information had been updated and whether the levee 
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district had included any new flood-control systems within its jurisdiction in its planning. The 
review entailed no assessment of whether the levee district had stockpiled materials or had the 
personnel necessary to assess an emergency and respond accordingly. Preau said he assumed 
any more elaborate review would have been done by the Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). 
Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) made the LA DOTI) the primary state 
agency overseeing Emergency Support Function (ESF-3), Public Works and Engineering. 
ESF-3 encompassed critical infrastructure in the state, including the “construction, 
maintenance and repair of state flood control works. ESF-3 also dictated that, “When an 
emergency is imminent, the ESF 3 Coordinator [who is to be designated by LA DOTD 
Secretary Johnny Bradberry] will assess the potential impact of the threat on the state’s 
infrastructure and work with other authorities to ensure that any necessary immediate repairs 
or arrangements for critical structures and facilities are initiated. ESF-3 also said, “As the 
emergency progresses, the coordinator will monitor the status of the infrastructure and effect 
emergency repairs where needed and feasible.” 
The LA DOTD did not acknowledge or accept its responsibility under ESF-3. Preau 
told Committee investigators that he didn’t think the provision applied to LA DOM “I’m not 
sure what that means, because we don’t have any state flood control works. State doesn’t own 
any flood control works. By Preau’s reading, a levee project was covered only if it was owned 
by the state, not simply if it was in the state. As Preau read it, LA DOTD had no responsibility 
to coordinate with levee districts on critical facilities like the Lake Pontchartrain Project. This 
response is problematic: the responsibilities articulated under ESF-3 are specifically delegated 
to the LA DOTD, and the plain language employed by the State’s Emergency Operations Plan 
cannot be unilaterally dismissed as meaningless by the people it covers. 
The result was that neither LA DOTD nor any state agency made sure that the state’s 
levee districts were integrated into the state’s emergency-planning process, much less 
genuinely prepared for an emergency. As a result, when Katrina made landfall, no Orleans 
Levee District personnel were located at, or in contact with, emergency managers in Baton 
Rouge; nor was any mechanism in place to request additional support from the state. Not 
withstanding Preau’s insistence that the LA DOTD had no responsibilities under ESF-3 for 
the levee system, LA DOTD ultimately played an active role in efforts to close levee breaches 
in New Orleans in the aftermath of Katrina. 
 
Design and Construction of the Lake Pontchartrain Project 
During Katrina, levees and floodwalls were overwhelmed throughout the New Orleans 
area, and in several places were breached. Some of these failures occurred in parts of the Lake 
Pontchartrain Project. Understanding the link between the breaches and the nature and 
organization of the Lake Pontchartrain Project requires some background. Congress 
authorized the Lake Pontchartrain Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965 to provide 
hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain in Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, 
and St. Charles Parishes. The project called for design and construction of about 125 miles of 
levees and floodwalls to be completed by 1978 at a cost of $85 million. The project was still 
not complete when Katrina hit, and its cost had grown to more than $750 million as of 2005 . 
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As authorized by Congress, the project was to protect the area from what the Corps 
called the “Standard Project Hurricane” (SPH), a model storm “based on the most severe 
combination of meteorological conditions considered reasonably characteristic of that 
region.” The SPH was developed in 1959 by what was then called the United States Weather 
Bureau, which updated the SPH after the devastating impact of Hurricane Betsy in 1965. The 
SPH was revised again in 1970, 1977, and 1979 by the Weather Bureau’s successor, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). There is no evidence that design 
parameters of the Lake Pontchartrain Project were modified in light of NOAA’s changes to 
the reference-model storm. 
Nevertheless, the Corps has repeatedly maintained that the SPH was the equivalent of 
a fast-moving Category 3 storm on the Saffir-Simpson scale - a measurement scale that rates 
the strength of hurricanes on a scale of Category I to Category 5, with Category 5 being the 
most intense. For example, at a press conferences immediately after the storm, Lieutenant 
General Carl Strock, the Commander of the Corps and its Chief of Engineers, explicitly said 
that the Corps “knew” that the levee system “would protect from a Category 3 hurricane,” and 
the page on the Lake Pontchartrain Project on the Corps’ website after Katrina said, “The 
SPH is equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane.” 
This claim is misleading: the Saffir-Simpson scale was not adopted until 1977, 12 
years after the Lake Pontchartrain Project was authorized. Al Naomi, the Corps’ Senior 
Project Manager for the project, acknowledged that the Corps never conducted a formal study 
comparing the SPH to the Saffir-Simpson scale, so the claim that the Lake Pontchartrain 
Project provided Category 3 protection was at best a rough estimate, and at worst, simply 
inaccurate: 
SPH has ... wind speed, central pressure, and surge. You go in and say what is my 
wind speed for an SPH? You look at it. It’s a very high Category 2 storm on the 
Saffir-Simpson Scale. I look at my central pressure for SPH. I go to the 
Saffir-Simpson Scale, it’s a mid-range Cat 4. 1 say what is my surge? SPH surge 
in the lake at two and a half [feet] on the Saffir-Simpson that is a Category 3 
range. What am I going to tell the Rotary Club? What do I have? Generally in 
talking to the hydrologist, you can say it’s about equivalent to a fast moving Cat 3. 
It’s not really that, but for their understanding that is what you can say. That is 
what we say. What happens is the press gets this and it says we have Cat 3 
protection. That is not really true. It’s SPH protection which may be equivalent to 
a fast moving Cat 3 storm. 
However, the view that the hurricane protection system could protect the greater New 
Orleans region from a moderate and/or fast-moving Category 3 storm was widely held within 
the Corps’ New Orleans District. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans District issued 
numerous news releases to the general public (some of which are referenced below), stating 
that the hurricane protection system provided some level of Category 3 protection: 
• December 19, 200 1, N. 0. hurricane bridge contract awarded, Corps, Levee 
Board will floodproof two bridges in Gentilly: “The bridge floodproofing will 
protect neighborhoods along the London Avenue, Orleans Avenue and 17th Street 
canals from storm surges from Lake Pontchartrain. The system of levees, 
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floodwalls and bridges is designed to protect against fast-moving Category 3 
hurricanes.”  
• May 27, 2003, Cross Bayou Drainage Structure to reduce flooding in St. 
CharlesParish: “The structure is part of the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane 
Protection Project and is the second of five such structures to be built in St. 
Charles Parish These contracts, to be completed in 2004, will result in a levee 
system that provides protection from a Category 3 storm for St. Charles Parish” 
• August 21, 2003, Filmore Bridge in Gentilly will reopen on Friday, Aug. 22. 
Mirabeau Bridge is closing Wednesday, Aug. 27 for hurricane floodproofing: 
“The systems of levees, floodwalls and bridges is designed to protect against fast 
moving Category 3 hurricanes. This view was also held by the Corps’ New 
Orleans District Commander (Col. Wagenaar 63 ) and the District’s Emergency 
Manager (Michael Lowe). Further, the same representations were made in more 
substantive Corps written materials. 
Moreover, the Lake Pontchartrain Project, as it stood in the path of Katrina, was still 
not complete as designed. Some portions were still under construction, and soil subsidence 
(sinking) had left portions of the project with less elevation above sea level than intended. In 
other words, some elements of the project were not even high enough to protect against the 
Standard Project Hurricane, let alone a genuine Category 3 hurricane. 
The Corps was well aware of this fact. As Jerry Colletti, the New Orleans District’s 
Manager for Completed Works explained, the Corps never tried “to provide full-level 
protection on an annual basis.... we just can’t raise everything to the design height for each 
storm that would come through.” 
Meanwhile, the National Weather Service (NWS) concluded from a new model of 
projected storm surges that the Lake Pontchartrain Project would be more vulnerable to 
hurricanes than previously thought - that more Category 3 and even certain Category 2 
hurricanes would overtop parts of the levee system and produce flooding. Dr. Wilson Shaffer, 
who studies storm surges at NWS, said this discovery was shared with the Corps, perhaps as 
early as 2003, but certainly by 2004. The findings were also shared with LOHSEP and with 
state and local emergency managers at the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association’s 
June conferences in 2004 and 2005 . At a minimum, this information should have prompted a 
fresh look at the adequacy of the Lake Pontchartrain Project, but like the NOAA updates to 
the Standard Project Hurricane in the 1970s, it does not appear that either the state or the 
Corps took any action to respond to the new information. 
 
Effect of Subsidence on the Level of  Protection 
As noted earlier, the level of protection provided by the levee system was affected not 
only by its design, but also by geologic subsidence, or regional sinking. The entire coastal 
region of Louisiana had been subsiding for millions of years, as the enormous weight of the 
sediments continually deposited by the Mississippi River enters the Gulf of Mexico, pushing 
down on the earth’s crust. Human activities like extracting oil and natural gas, pumping water, 
raising buildings, and even adding to levees and floodwalls all accelerate subsidence. (See 
Chapter 9.) As the entire region subsides, the effective height of the levees above sea level, 
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and thus the level of protection they provide, decreases. A recent report concluded that a 
section of levee that was overtopped and failed during Katrina was nearly three feet below its 
design height. 
All of these factors should have persuaded the Corps to reconsider its public claims 
that the Lake Pontchartrain Project provided Category 3 level protection. 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
Maintaining a flood control system is essential, but is complicated in southeast 
Louisiana by the recurring need to rebuild levees to compensate for subsidence. The Corps is 
not supposed to turn over a project until it is complete; until then, the Corps is responsible for 
O&M.  Once a project is turned over, the local sponsor must conduct O&M to Corp standards 
“to obtain maximum benefits.” This includes checking for “undue settlement” of the levee, 
water seeping through or under it, and growth of damaging brush, and taking immediate 
action to address potential emergencies.  
Because the Lake Pontchartrain Project was not complete, according to the Corps’ 
Senior Project Manager for the project, none of it had been formally turned over to the local 
sponsor, but remained in an “interim” status: 
There are still pieces that have to be done. We are not going to turn over a 
piece of the project until every piece in that ring of protection is completed. If 
there is one little thing left to do I think by regulation - I could be wrong - I 
think we have to have the entire system 100 percent complete so we turn over 
the entire segment that is protected, a certain area of the City. 
Nonetheless, the Corps did nominally turn over parts of the project to local sponsors to 
maintain when it determined that construction on that particular part or “reach” was complete. 
The Corps sent letters to the Orleans Levee District and others to this effect, informing each 
district that it now had O&M responsibility for that unit. Personnel within the Corps’ New 
Orleans District referred to these letters as “turnover letters” even though they were not the 
“official total project completion turnover” letters. The Orleans Levee District did not respond 
to these letters or even acknowledge their receipt. 
When the Committee asked for copies of the de-facto turnover letters, it received only 
a limited response. The letters submitted did not cover the entire project, and some were pre- 
1965, before the project was even authorized. In short, the exact legal status of the project 
segments and the degree to which the Corps and local sponsors like the Orleans Levee District 
were truly responsible for maintenance is at best uncertain. 
Other conflicting and irregular procedures in the turnover process went beyond the 
turnover letters. The Corps was supposed to require local sponsors to report semiannually to 
its District Engineer on inspection and O&M for the flood-control system. Colletti, the Corps’ 
Operations Manager for Completed Works, explained that the Corps unilaterally decided not 
to require the Orleans Levee District to provide the report. In addition, for each completed 
work, the Corps is required to give the local sponsor an operations manual . Colletti said his 
office gave no such manual to the Orleans Levee District for levees and floodwalls, but 
merely provided a one-page set of guidelines similar to a part of the Code of Federal 
Regulations that detailed obligations of local sponsors. 
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The Corps’ observance of rules and regulations for completed projects took the form 
of a required annual inspection conducted around June 1 - the start of hurricane season - by 
representatives from the Corps, the Orleans Levee District, the LA DOTD, and other 
interested parties (e.g., the City and the Port of New Orleans). These inspections appear to 
have taken about four hours, covered at least a hundred miles of levees and floodwalls, and 
would usually involve a motorcade that would stop at pre-determined spots to allow the group 
to look over an area and discuss issues. The purpose of the inspections, according to the 
Corps, was to ensure O&M compliance by the local sponsor, but not to test the system’s 
actual structural integrity or measure whether it was at design height. Perhaps the most 
colorful explanation of the annual inspection was offered by former Orleans Levee District 
president Huey, who suggested that the event was more of a social occasion than a genuine 
technical inspection: 
They normally meet and get some beignets [pastries] and coffee in the morning 
and get to the buses. And the colonel and the brass are all dressed up. You 
have corrunissioners, they have some news cameras following you around and 
you have your little beignets and then you have a nice lunch somewhere or 
whatever. And that’s what the inspections are about. 
  
Ineffective Inspection Regime 
The weaknesses of this inspection approach can be seen in the last pre-Katrina annual 
inspection of the Lake Pontchartrain Project in May 2005. It apparently did not address some 
known vulnerabilities. The W-30 Floodgate along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal had 
been destroyed by a train accident in 2004 by the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad . This 
gate was intended to close off the levee at a point where the railroad track passed through it. 
The railroad had provided money for repairs, but the floodgate was still broken when Katrina 
struck, even though Huey, then board president, told an April 5, 2005, levee-district board 
meeting that he considered the broken gate to be an “emergency.” Under state law, Huey had 
the authority to address such emergencies without going through the standard contracting 
process.  Asked why he did not use his emergency authority to repair the gate before hurricane 
season, Hue simply said, “I do not know. My bottom line straightforward answer: I don’t 
know.” 
Another problem apparently not dealt with in the annual inspection was a levee in 
New Orleans East that was three feet short of its design height. Like the W-30 floodgate, the 
problem remained unaddressed when Katrina made landfall, even though Naomi, the Corps’ 
Senior Project Manager, considered repair “vital” to protecting the city. In addition, Corps 
rules and regulations for completed works require local sponsors, like the Orleans Levee 
District, to fix defects promptly. Finally, the Corps’ rules on levees require local sponsors to 
ensure that “No trees exist, the roots of which might extend under the wall and offer 
accelerated seepage paths.” However, one of the forensic teams investigating the levees’ 
failure, and Corps officials, found trees growing along the 17th Street and London Avenue 
Canals. In spite of the major defects requiring repairs, the Orleans Levee District’s Chief 
Engineer said he expected the district to get “an outstanding review in regards to the 
maintenance of the levees” from the 2005 inspection.  
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The Committee learned during its investigation that the 17th Street and London 
Avenue Canal floodwalls weren’t part of the 2005 inspection because they were inaccessible 
by car. It appears likely that they were never inspected by the Corps after construction was 
finished in the early 1990s, partially because the floodwalls abutted private property which 
made them difficult, but certainly not impossible, to access. It seems likely that the only 
physical inspections they received would have been conducted by Orleans Levee District 
personnel mowing the grass, making visual inspections, and identifying problems like holes 
dug by wild animals, significant erosion, etc. The personnel responsible for this work received 
no specialized training on care or inspection of levees and floodwalls, and supporting 
documentation of these inspections comprised nothing more than worker timesheets 
indicating the work conducted, such as mowing the grass, the location of the work, and the 
hours spent doing the job. 
When asked who was responsible for fixing problems once they were identified, 
Orleans Levee District leadership explained that there was an undocumented understanding 
that “major” problems would be brought to the attention of the Corps and “minor” problems 
would remain the responsibility of levee district personnel . However, and as noted by the 
Orleans Levee District Chief Engineer, Steven Spencer, the district’s total in-house, 
engineering expertise amounted to three engineers , a level of expertise not on par with the 
challenges posed by the hurricane protection system within the jurisdiction of the Orleans 
Levee District. 
The only other inspection the Orleans Levee District claims to have made of the levees 
was a field survey of floodwall heights every two to three years to check for subsidence. If the 
Orleans Levee District did, in fact, conduct these surveys, they did not identify the severity of 
the subsidence along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals documented by the Corps’ 
forensic team. The Orleans Levee District certainly did not conduct any structural analysis of 
the floodwalls; nevertheless, when asked by the Committee about the quality of the Orleans 
Levee District’s operations and maintenance regime over the years, Colletti said that the 
Corps “felt that they’ve done an outstanding job.”  
The Orleans Levee District’s O&M practices and the passive oversight by the Corps 
did not meet what experts consider to be the standard of care for a flood control system like 
the Lake Pontchartrain Project. For example, in a letter to the Committee, Dr. Ernst G. 
Frankel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology explained that visual surveys are not 
sufficient because potentially catastrophic voids can occur well below the surface of the 
levees. To expose internal degradation, holes must be drilled in the levees to retrieve core 
samples for analysis. Acoustic equipment can be used to scan the density of material layers at 
various depths. No entity conducted such an analysis of the New Orleans flood-control 
structures, nor were efforts made by the Levee District to obtain equipment to improve its 
inspection regime.  Professor Frankel added that inspection of levees below the waterline was 
also necessary to detect hidden threats to their integrity. The Orleans Levee District’s simple 
visual inspections failed in this respect as well. 
 
Lack of Coordination with the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans 
Because New Orleans and surrounding parishes are below sea level and ringed by 
levees, rain and flood waters that enter must be pumped out. The Sewerage and Water Board 
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of New Orleans (the Water Board) has the responsibility for maintaining a system of pumps 
and canals for this purpose. (The Water Board also runs the municipal water and sewer 
systems.) Floodwalls along two of these drainage, or outfall, canals sustained major breaches 
- the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals. However, the Orleans Levee District and the 
Corps, at least to the extent the Corps had not turned over the entire project to the local 
sponsor, are responsible for the floodwalls that line these canals. 
In the aftermath of Katrina, the New Orleans Times-Picayune newspaper reported that 
six months before Katrina, several residents near the 17th Street Canal reported to the Water 
Board that they had found water in their yards. A similar report was carried by National 
Public Radio. Following the Times Picayune report, the Water Board conducted an inquiry 
into these allegations and concluded that the water reported by these property owners was 
coming from a water-service line and not from the canal. This conclusion was documented in 
a letter from the Water Board to the Times-Picayune and provided to the Committee. The 17th 
Street Canal floodwall broke within several hundred feet of where the water seepage was 
reported. The Committee was not able to independently confirm either the news reports or the 
Water Board’s explanation. However, it is clear that the Water Board had no plan in place or 
arrangement with either the Corps or the Orleans Levee District to address this sort of 
situation. The Water Board’s Executive Director, Marcia St. Martin, explained how her 
organization dealt with such situations: 
What we do is if a person says that there’s water that’s ponding in front of my 
house, we look to see whether or not a Board asset, which is the water meter, has 
a defect or a leak. If we determine it has a defect or a leak, we repair it. If we 
determine it’s not coming from the Board’s asset, we say to the customer, “It has 
to be a private property leak and you need to seek the services of a plumber. 
The Corps has relied on local residents to inform it about these types of problems, but 
had no public outreach program to urge residents to do so. When the Corps did receive reports 
of seepage or other issues, it had no process to formally document and address the issues.  
Likewise, the Orleans Levee District had no plan to reach out or communicate with residents 
to encourage the identification or the sharing of reports of leakage or other problems.” 
 
Subsidence in the Metropolitan New Orleans Area 
In addition to design and construction issues, soil subsidence - “the lowering or 
sinking of [the] earth’s surface” - has impaired the protection offered by the New Orleans 
levee system. In the New Orleans area, subsidence is caused primarily by the cumulative 
weight of millions of years of soil and silt deposits left by the Mississippi River as it enters 
the Gulf of Mexico. The sediment literally presses down on the earth’s crust, causing the land 
to sink. As a result, the water level rises, gradually increasing its vulnerability to tides and 
storms. The levees themselves can also subside because of their own weight pressing down 
on the swampy soils upon which they are built. 
As a result, it appears that the level of protection actually provided by the levee 
system in the New Orleans region, at the time of Katrina, was significantly less than intended: 
many sections of the levees and floodwalls were substantially below their original design 
elevations, an effective loss of protection. For example, the structures associated with the 
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal were originally constructed to an elevation of 15 feet (relative 
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to mean sea level) but are now just over 12 feet, a typical loss of approximately 2.7 feet in 
elevation over the lifetime of the project. The report noted that “subsidence is occurring at a 
rate of up to one inch every three years” in the New Orleans region. 
Subsidence routinely creates problems for those trying to construct levees and other 
structures at known heights above sea level. As stated in one MET report, due to the complex 
and variable subsidence in Southeast Louisiana, “establishing an accurate vertical reference 
for measurements has been a constant challenge.” Unfortunately, until the October 2005 
release (by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s (NOAA) National Geodetic Survey) of updated locations of 85 benchmarks 
located in southern Louisiana, which showed heights (elevations) accurate to between 2 and 5 
centimeters (roughly I to 2 inches), surveyors, engineers, and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers in New Orleans evaluated the levees and structures built and in use with vertical 
heights that had not been calibrated nor checked for several years. 
As a result, it appears that the levees were not built and maintained at the proper level 
above sea level. Since the level of protection that the levees provide is so closely related to 
their height above sea level, and thus their ability to block increased water levels driven by 
hurricanes, the failure to build and maintain the levees at the proper elevation diminished the 
level of protection they would provide. 
F.3.4 American Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel (ERP). Letter to 
LTG Carl Strock, Chief of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, February 20, 2006. 
Four critical areas that warrant urgent and thorough examination: 
Organizational issues: No one person or organization is in charge of the New Orleans 
hurricane protection system. Local levee districts are responsible for maintaining the levees. 
Local parishes are responsible for operating pump stations (and even for deciding whether 
they will be operated during a hurricane). Numerous penetrations affecting such infrastructure 
as rail lines, bridges, and roadways have been made below the tops of levees and floodwalls 
under various jurisdictions. Construction contracts are awarded piecemeal, sometimes 
resulting in abrupt discontinuities in the elevations of floodwalls or levees. Even within the 
U.S. Army Corps of engineers differing levels of responsibility exist at the district, division, 
and headquarters levels. The City of New Orleans, the state of Louisiana, and perhaps other 
entities  also are involved in hurricane protection for New Orleans. 
The ERP sees clearly that organizational complexities and the ways in which decisions 
are made are among the most important factors that influenced the performance of the 
hurricane protection system. Organizational effectiveness has been and will continue to be 
questioned, with justification. It is impossible for the ERP to conceive a mechanism through 
which the levee system can be rebuilt and operated effectively and efficiently with such 
organizational discontinuities and chaos. The ERP recommends that organizational issues be 
assessed critically and thoroughly as soon as possible. 
System issues: The hurricane protection system of New Orleans evolved over a long 
period of time. The system is not an integrated, well-thought-out system; rather, it is a joined 
series of individual pieces conceived and constructed piecemeal. Examples include the 
following: (1) the canals, which evolved over a period of decades to accommodate the 
pumping technologies available at the time and the continuing land reclamation northward 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 
                                                                     F - 40  
toward Lake Pontchartrain (even though the logic of having many miles of exposed levee and 
floodwalls along the canals as opposed to closing off the mouths of the canals with a gate or 
short section of levee, is weak at best); (2) the connections between rigid structures and 
earthen levees, which experienced numerous failures during Katrina; (3) discontinuities and 
differences in crest elevations of levees and floodwalls; and (4) the pumps, which were 
designed to remove rainwater and infiltrating groundwater but, when not turned on, are not 
protected from backflow and exacerbate flooding during a hurricane. 
A logical hurricane protection system for New Orleans would integrate components 
and the management of components, would be robust and resilient, and would contain a level 
of redundancy sufficient that, if a levee failed, all would not be lost. A system wide strategy 
would also ensure that critical structures - for example, pumping stations, hospitals, places of 
refuge, and electrical generation and distribution nodes - were protected. The lack of a 
broader, system-oriented strategy exerted a major deleterious influence on the performance of 
the system and deserves serious consideration. 
System development: It is obvious that the hurricane protection system for New 
Orleans failed miserably during Katrina. That the system was so clearly overwhelmed and 
failed so catastrophically demonstrates to the ERP that fundamental flaws were part of how 
the system was conceived and developed. For example, what was the basis for selecting the 
standard project hurricane and, hence, the authorized level of protection? What process was in 
place to review the safety of the design as new knowledge evolved over time? How safe and 
redundant was the system intended to be upon design? Was adequate funding in place to 
ensure that satisfactory design standards could be implemented? How were safety margins for 
design established, and are they appropriate in light of new knowledge and the risks involved? 
How was the potential for loss of life factored into decision making? 
Overtopping of levees: A fundamental flaw in the floodwalls and levees is that they 
include no means of accommodating overtopping that does not inflict major damage or 
destruction. Once the levees were overtopped during Katrina, rushing water eroded away 
many sections of levee and in other cases undermined floodwalls. Most of the 350 miles of 
levees in New Orleans are unprotected from devastating damage and potentially total 
destruction if overtopped. No mater how high the levees are built, a possibility always 
remains of a hurricane causing a surge elevation that is even higher than the one for which the 
levees were designed. 
One of the lessons of Katrina that is already obvious is that once the levees were 
overtopped, destruction was catastrophic. In addition to the tragic loss of life, there were at 
least two other critical results: extensive and catastrophic flooding and an enormous 
destruction of capital investment. The question is not whether the levees will again be 
overtopped but when and by how much they will be overtopped. The levees need to be 
protected from catastrophic failure resulting from overtopping. 
On multiple occasions, statements by top Corps officials have assured the public that 
the levee system will be adequately safe, and its risks sufficiently low for displaced residents 
to return to the city by June 1. These statements have seriously compromised task 10 (risk 
assessment) efforts by introducing a motivational bias that predetermines the outcome of its 
risk determinations. This undermines the credibility of task 10 and ultimately of the Corps 
itself. The lesson to be learned is that task 10 will not produce technically sound risk 
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estimates unless there is full support and cooperation from the Corps at the highest levels for 
unbiased outcomes free of any appearance of manipulation of predetermined conclusions. 
F.3.5 Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Protection Projects, National 
Academy of Engineering and the National Research Council, 2006. Report to The 
Honorable John Paul Woodley, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civil Works, 
Washington, DC, February. 
The New Orleans and southeastern Louisiana hurricane protection system includes 
many engineering, geologic, hydraulic and hydrologic, administrative, and economic and 
cultural features that interact in complex ways. the levees, floodwalls, and other protective 
structures in New Orleans and southeast Louisiana have been constructed in a region of active 
alluvial deposition, subsidence, and fluvial dynamics. The Mississippi River delta, for 
example, has changed location several times in the past 5,000 years. the region is underlain by 
deep deposits of recent sediments with high clay content and by sites with varying rates of 
geologic subsidence - conditions that pose many stringent engineering challenges. 
In addition to geologic and engineering considerations, there is a long history of 
piecemeal construction and maintenance of the system. Construction of levees and floodwalls 
in the New Orleans area dates to early stages of urban development in the area. An important 
event in this history was Hurricane Betsy in 1965. Betsy was responsible for 75 deaths and 
billions of dollars of property damage, prompting efforts to create a regional program of 
hurricane protection. In the aftermath of Betsy, Congress authorized construction of a 
hurricane protection system to protect areas in the vicinity of Lake Pontchartrain and 
surrounding parishes from storm surges. The various projects that make up this system are 
paid for with a combination of federal state, and local funds. The decision-making and 
investment processes that have lead to the development of the system have involved 
numerous stakeholders for more than 50 years. 
Primary responsibility for design and construction of hurricane protection projects has 
been assigned to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Actual project construction has been 
contracted to numerous private sector firms. Once projects are constructed and fully 
completed, responsibility for their maintenance is often assigned to local authorities. Since 
1965, approximately 125 miles of levees, concrete floodwalls, and other structures have been 
built in the New Orleans region. Not all projects authorized for construction by the U.S. 
Congress, however, had been completed as of August, 1005. The hurricane protection 
structures that existed in New Orleans and the surrounding area in August 2005 were not a 
single system constructed as part of a unified plan; rather, the system had been added to and 
repaired by different administrative units - federal, state, and local - operating with different 
mandates, levels of resources, and staff backgrounds and capacities. No single entity has been 
fully “in charge” of constructing and maintaining all hurricane protection structures, 
complicating efforts at systematic repair and construction and efforts to retrieve and assess 
data on historical decisions and pre-existing conditions. 
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F.3.6  U.S. Government Accountability Office, Army Corps of Engineers History of the 
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, Statement of Anu 
Mittal, Director Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony Before the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, November 9, 2005; 
also Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, September 28, 2005. 
What the GAO Found 
Congress first authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane 
Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965. The project was to construct a series of 
control structures, concrete floodwalls, and levees to provide hurricane protection to areas 
around Lake Pontchartrain. the project, when designed, was expected to take about 13 years to 
complete and cost about $85 million. Although federally authorized, it was a joint federal, 
state, and local effort. 
The original project designs were developed based on the equivalent of what is now 
called a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane that might strike the coastal Louisiana region once 
in 200-300 years. As GAO reported in 1976 and 1982, since the beginning of the project the 
Corps has encountered project delays and cost increases due to design changes caused by 
technical issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges, and local opposition to portions of 
the project. As a result, in 1982, project costs had grown to $757 million and the expected 
completion date had slipped to 2008. None of the changes made to the project, however, are 
believed to have had any role in the levee breaches recently experienced as the alternative 
design selected was expected to provide the same level of protection. In fact, Corps officials 
believe that flooding would have been worse if the original proposed design had been built. 
When Hurricane Katrina struck, the project, including about 125 miles of levees, was 
estimated to be from 60-90 percent complete in different areas with an estimated completion 
date for the whole project of 2015. The floodwalls along the drainage canals that were 
breached were complete when the hurricane hit. 
The current estimated cost of construction for the completed project is $738 million 
with the federal share being $528 million and the local share $210 million. Federal allocations 
for the project were $458 million as of the enactment of the fiscal year 2005 federal 
appropriation. This represents 87 percent of the federal government’s responsibility of $528 
million with about $70 million remaining to complete the project. Over the last 10 fiscal years 
(19965-2005), federal appropriations have totaled about $128.6 million and Corps 
reprogramming actions resulted in another $13 million being made available to the project. 
During that time, appropriations have generally declined from about $15 - 20 million annually 
in the earlier years to about $5-7 million in the last three fiscal years. while this may not be 
unusual given the state of completion of the project, the Corps’ project fact sheet from May 
2005 noted that the President’s budget request for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and the 
appropriated amount for fiscal year 2005 were insufficient to fund new construction contracts. 
The Corps had also stated that it could spend $20 million in fiscal year 2006 on the project if 
the funds were available. The Corps noted that several levees had settled and needed to be 
raised to provide the level of protection intended by the design. 
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During the first 17 years of construction on the barrier plan, the Corps continued to 
face project delays and cost increases due to design changes caused by technical issues, 
environmental concerns, legal challenges, and local opposition to various aspects of the 
project. For example, foundation problems were encountered during construction of levees 
and floodwalls which increased construction time; delays were also encountered in obtaining 
rights-of-ways from local interests who did not agree with all portions of the plan. By 1981, 
cost estimates had grown to $757 million for the barrier plan, not including the cost of any 
needed work along the drainage canals, and project completion had slipped to 2008. At that 
time, about $171 million had been made available to the project and the project was 
considered about 50 percent complete, mostly for the lakefront levees which were at least 
partially constructed in all areas and capable of providing some flood protection although 
from a smaller hurricane than that envisioned in the plan. 
More importantly, during the 1970s, some features of the barrier plan were facing 
significant opposition from environmentalists and local groups who were concerned about 
environmental damages to the lake as well as inadequate protection from some aspects of the 
project. The threat of litigation by environmentalists delayed the project and local opposition 
to building the control complexes at Rigolets and Chef Menteur had the potential to seriously 
reduce the overall protection provided by the project. This opposition culminated in a 
December 1977 court decision that enjoined the Corps from constructing the barrier 
complexes, and certain other parts of the project until a revised environmental impact 
statement was prepared and accepted. After the court order, the Corps decided to change 
course and completed a project reevaluation report and prepared a draft revised 
Environmental Impact Statement in the mid-1980s that recommended abandoning the barrier 
plan and shifting to the high-level plan originally considered in the early 1960s. 
In recent years, questions have been raised about the ability of the project to withstand 
larger hurricanes than it was designed for, such as a Category 4 or 5, or even a slow-moving 
Category 3 hurricane that lingered over the area and produced higher levels of rainfall.  Along 
this line, the Corps completed in 2002 a reconnaissance or pre-feasibility study on whether to 
strengthen hurricane protection along the Louisiana coast. A full feasibility study was 
estimated to take at least five years to complete and cost about $8 million. In March 2005, the 
Corps reported that it was allocating $79,000 to complete a management plan for the 
feasibility study and a cost-share agreement with local sponsors. The President’s fiscal year 
2006 budget request did not include any funds for the feasibility project. 
F.3.7  U.S. General Accounting Office, Improved Planning Needed by the Corps of 
Engineers to Resolve Environmental, Technical, and Financial Issues on the Lake 
Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project, Report to the Secretary of the 
Army, August 17, 1982. 
Although the Corps’ District Office in New Orleans considers this $924 million 
project a high priority, its completion date has slipped from 1978 to 2008. In the 17 years 
since congressional authorization in 1965, only about one-half of the project has been 
completed. 
We believe that improved planning is needed by the Corps to resolve certain 
environmental, technical and financial issues. Environmental concerns have remained 
unresolved for almost 5 years after a court injunction prohibited the Corps from constructing 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 
                                                                     F - 44  
certain parts of the project. The Corps is considering a change in its solution of providing 
protection from constructing barrier structures at the entrance to the lake and the raising of 
some levee heights (the barrier plan) to constructing much higher levees with no barriers (the 
high-level plan). 
Various problems and conditions have caused delays in the project. Specifically: 
Engineering and environmental concerns have caused delays in project completion. Costly 
project work at the drainage canals has not been reported to the Congress, and technical and 
financial concerns which may impeded project completion remain unresolved. Current project 
financing by the local sponsors has not been assured because of limited resources. Project cost 
estimates are understated, and a project plan has not been formally adopted. 
The local sponsors agreed with information in a draft of this report, but were 
concerned over their financial capability to meet their share of project costs. They believed 
the project construction could be pursued more expeditiously. One sponsor believed that 
Corps standards may be too high to obtain adequate, affordable, and speedy protection. 
F.3.8  Houck, O. (2006). “Can We Save New Orleans?”, Tulane Environmental Law 
Journal, Vol 19, Issue 1, 1-68, New Orleans, Louisiana. 
 On the other hand, for the City That Care Forgot to call anything ‘fantasy’ is a bit 
bold, and everything about the run-up to the Katrina disaster had fantasy written all of it: on 
slab development, on fill development, subdivisions in wetlands (protected by wooden 
fences), condos on beaches (protected by nothing), canals as senseless as the Mississippi 
River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), oil and gas channels by the thousands, coastal mitigation 
programs that failed to work (failed even to materialize), disappearing levee money, tinker-
toy levee plans, what-the-hell levee construction, drive-by-and-when’s-lunch levee 
inspections – and we haven’t even gotten to FEMA yet. Detailed reporting in local papers, 
science colloquiums, National Geographic, NOVA and government planning sessions 
predicting this very storm in this very way with these very results were tossed away like so 
many Mardi Gras beads. So there is plenty of fantasy to go around. 
We know a couple of things more, going in. For openers, we are short on land 
building materials. We live on a sinking delta, and the silts and plant mass that created it and 
offset its natural rate of subsidence are down to a fraction of their volumes a century ago. We 
have a lot less to work with than Mother Nature did. Even within the city, we are sinking. 
Post-Katrina surveys are finding many buildings about a half a foot lower than they were 
thought to be, and down by two feet in the East. Which is not good. 
 We also know that we are terribly late to the restoration game, about 1,900 square 
miles late, what is left is largely sick, and what we’ve managed to recoup over the past few 
years couldn’t stand up to the latest storms. The newly restored marshes of the $80 million 
Canaervon diversion project ended on the rooftops in St.  Bernard. 
We know, worse, news, that hurricanes are coming more frequently now and with 
greater anger, that our levees are subpart, and – although it still seems to escape the grasp of 
the President and the Louisiana congressional delegation in Washington, D.C. – that the seas 
are rising and that global warming will raise them by more than a foot within the lifetimes of 
our children. 
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You would think that flood control and the protection of the City of New Orleans 
would be job one for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. And you would be wrong. It isn’t, 
and it never was. ...The Army’s field engineers were the only government entity around with 
the ability to blow things up and move dirt around, and so this became their job, to maintain 
navigation on the navigable waters of the United States. Navigation was interstate commerce, 
the means of interstate commerce, and it made money for people. Flood control, by contrast, 
was seen as a form of land use, a local affair, cemented in place when the federal government 
ceded lands to local levee boards in the 1850’s, in part to persuade them to stay loyal to the 
Union. That part didn’t work so well, but it set a mold for local levee boards that we have yet 
to change. It also further cemented the mindset that navigation comes first. 
 The Flood Control Act of 1936 opened a huge candy store, something like the 
discovery of gold at Sutters Mill, only this time the miners ere in Washington and wearing 
suits. Ostensibly authorizing the Corps of pursue projects for ‘flood control and related 
purposes,’ the other purposes quickly took over and by the 1960s the country was being 
dammed, drained, pumped, and leveed by hundreds of Corps projects feeding real estate 
development, energy production, soybean crops and right on down to recreational lakes with 
wave machines and the McCurtin County Catfish Farm. The Act’s one caveat, that the 
benefits of these projects ‘to whomsoever they may accrue,’ was turned into a weapon of 
destruction, with the Corps discovering benefits so chimeric that they became legend in the 
fields of government and political science, the object of ridicule in the press that the 
government should participate in these projects ‘if the benefits to whomever they may accrue 
are in excess of the estimated costs,’ and recurrent calls for Corps Reform. Not to worry; the 
Corps had the ally that mattered, the Congress of the United States. 
 The rise of the water project bonanza has had several large consequences for flood 
control in south Louisiana. Basically, it eclipsed it. The first consequence is that flood control 
has no head. Unlike every other federal activity in the country, this one is overseen and 
directed by the Corps, members of Congress, local levee districts and lobbyists among which 
are found some of Louisiana’s most illustrious power brokers: Bob Livingston, Bennet 
Johnston, John Breaux, Jimmy Hayes, just to start the list. Congress determines budgets, and 
promotion from Colonel to General. For Colonels heading the New Orleans District, it has 
been a trial by fire that has made and ended careers. It also produces conformity. When 
project funding for hurricane protection along Lake Pontchartrain dwindled in the early 
1990s, nobody squawked out loud: a former director of the Corps Waterways Experiment 
Center in Vicksburg explained to the New York Times, ‘I don’t think it was culturally in the 
system for the corps to say this is crazy.’ Whatever the merits of this diffusion of authority, it 
does not produce coherent flood control. 
 All of which works as long as there are no floods. Then, they become somebody 
else’s fault. The didn’t fund me. Well, you didn’t ask. So it goes, and so it went after Katrina. 
 The second impact is that the program is not based on the completion of a few major 
projects but, rather, on spreading construction money and benefits around as many projects 
and about-to-be-made-happy constituencies as possible. This is true at the national level, 
where water resources bills are passed in omnibus fashion, meaning that they are approved in 
one big lump with something inside for everyone’s district. Those brave or fiscally minded 
souls who object to a particularly sad entry end up ostracized or worse; one year the 
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leadership announced the Pinocchio award for members who stuck their noses into other 
member’s water resources projects. 
So it is at the Louisiana level as well. Every cycle there is something in there for 
everyone, your new port, my new waterway, their pumps and drainage upstream. In this mix, 
New Orleans is just one more open beak among the chicks. It is not in the Corps’ political 
interest and it is not in the Congress’s political interest to satisfy one beak at the expense of 
others. The political objective is to spread the food around as widely as possible, and if that 
takes more time it also keeps more contractors working in more parts of the state. Inviolate 
Rule of Politics: Happier people is better than fewer happy people. Inevitable Effect of Rule: 
Short change for hurricane protection for the City of New Orleans. 
 Case in point: Louisiana has received nearly $2 billion for Corps water projects over 
the past 5 years. It has for time immemorial received the lion’s share of water resources 
funding, with California, Texas, Illinois and Florida distant seconds (around $1.2 billion each 
over the last 5 years), and no one else even close. It’s not a question of getting money down 
here. It’s where it goes. In 2002, the Bush Administration rejected a Corps request for $27 
million for additional hurricane protection along Lake Ponchartrain of which the Congress 
only restored $5.7 million in its appropriations. Meanwhile, Congress was boosting funding 
for the $780 million Industrial Canal Lock (the most expensive on record), a $194 million 
dredging project for the New Iberia, and tens of millions more on canals like the MRGO. 
A third consequence of the game is that flood control for developed urban areas comes 
in last. The sad fact is, it doesn’t make money for anyone. By leveeing off wetlands for new 
development makes lots of money in real estate (set aside the fact that the homes and streets 
will subside and begin to flood from spring rains). Floating boats also produces identifiable 
payouts (albeit they are calculated by asking shippers if they would like to use the canal once 
it is built, which is a little like using Monopoly money; very few Corps waterways live up to 
their traffic predictions, and some are ludicrously underused). Even converting cypress 
swamps to soybeans has a market price. By contrast, lives saved by levees don’t receive 
economic benefits in the decisions that justify Corps projects and determine their funding 
priorities. Nor do they attract powerful lobbyists. The Industrial Canal lobby can afford to put 
ex-senators, congressmen and entire law firms on its payroll. The City of New Orleans, on the 
other hand is broke, and one doubts that St. Bernard and Plaquemine even field full-time 
representatives in Washington. Money talks. 
 A final most perverse effect of the water resources game is that it produces projects 
that not only conflict with flood control for money and fame, but cause floods as well. Big 
ones. The role of the MRGO in the Katrina and Rita flooding is by now undeniable. What 
remains impressive, however, is the tenacity with which the Corps and the Louisiana 
congressional delegation hung on to this project – indeed, continue to hang onto it – against 
the pleas of the St. Bernard Police Jury, the Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, and coastal 
scientists who have been complaining that it had destroyed 20,000 acres of the Parish, was 
killing much of the lakeshore, and was going to bring major hurricanes right into the city. 
These claims were never rebutted. They were simply ignored. 
 What we have here, then, is a game that is not focused on flood control, and never has 
been. It has been focused on making money first for people with boats and then for as many 
people as possible, even when that has meant increasing hurricane risks and putting other 
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people right into harm/s way. It has been denial about its impacts, and remains largely in 
denial. And it as been accompanied by a similar series of body blows to the coastal zone from 
another sources which is even more powerful and difficult to turn around: the oil and gas 
industry. 
The impact of oil and gas extraction on the natural systems of the Louisiana coast is 
hard to exaggerate. The initial space of the access canals is relatively minor. It’s what happens 
next that matters. The canals erode, exacerbated by wave wash from passing boats. In 10 
years the widths have doubled; then they double again. While intact, the spoil banks cut off 
the natural drainage for hundreds of yards around, impounding half of the marsh and 
drowning the other half. Up the canal comes saltwater from the gulf. The grasses go belly up, 
the root masses die, the soils are released, the whole thing falls apart. Recent studies by the 
United States Geological survey discover a related phenomenon. The industry has excavated 
billions of gallons of brines, salts, and minerals from under the wetlands, much of it close to 
the surface, following which - surprise! - they caved in. Marsh erosion or subsurface 
extraction: pick your weapon, they both kill. 
About 70 years ago, Louisiana made a deal with the oil and gas industry. the industry 
would get what it wanted; the state would get a piece of the take. In Plaquemines Parish the 
industry took nearly everything, save what it paid back to Leander Perez. The state’s near 
slavish defense of the industry since that time is a matter of legend; Bennett Johnston was 
commonly referred to as the Senator from Oil, and his successor was one of the three 
Democratic votes to open the arctic wildlife refuge to oil and gas and to remove the rights of 
states to decide on drilling off their coasts. It’s in the genes. As Louisiana moved forward on 
its coastal restoration plan, it would ask the federal government for massive amounts of 
money. Part of the rationale, no small part, was to protect the oil and gas industry’s pipelines 
and infrastructure through the coastal zone. Nowhere, however, did the state ask the industry 
to pay a penny for the restoration that would save its base. Over 10,000 miles of canals are 
now eroding and the marshes are caving in and somebody big is walking away from the table. 
There is something special about Louisianans when it comes to flood control. We 
could call it courage. We could call it denial. Or we could call it anything in between and 
probably all of them and not be wrong. but Louisianans settled a state that flooded regularly 
from the north and from the south, from rivers and the Gulf, and some of its most gripping 
stories - Lanterns on the Levee, Last Island - are scenes of tragedy from high winds and 
waters that no book or film could fully capture. and yet we built, and built again. For a long 
while, we tended to build elevated homes, on ridges, and kept the boats handy for what we 
knew would come. Then we raised levees. when they didn’t work we got the federal 
government to raise levees and built out back into the swamps and put in pumps. Before long 
we were building on slab. and still we flooded. We lead the nation in flood losses. No reason 
not to. The federal government pays us for it. 
And so we had a cozy game of build-flood-and-get-paid going until coastal erosion 
weighed in, and the onset of an awesome and unanticipated season of hurricanes that, 
apparently, has only just begun. Louisiana towns that used to sit well inland were finding 
themselves on the front line with the Gulf of Mexico, which has been coming north at about 
10 to 30 meters a year. A 1990 report by the National Academy of Sciences recommended 
mapping the erosion zones and moving new construction away from them through the flood 
insurance program. there were no takers. Five years later, FEMA recommended that the 
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government at least chart the zones. No takers either. Nor on its almost annual pleas to raise 
the flood insurance rates to something close to real life. Louisiana knows a good thing when it 
sees it.  
The northeast gets its railroad subsidies, the far west gets grazing and timber 
subsidies; this one is ours.” “The hurricanes came. They have, of course, always come, and 
when Betsy and Camille came ashore in the late 1960s the nation gasped. There were record 
storms, record damages, record loss of life, we must do something. What we did was go back 
on the same beaches and vulnerable strips of coastal wetlands and build the same stuff, only 
more expensive. there was a lull while it all came together - the casinos, the high rises, a 
building boom on Grand Isle, ditto Holly Beach, ditto a boomlette that was just starting down 
in the marshes of St Bernard, ditto all around Lake Pontchartrain - all subsidized by people 
who don’t enjoy houses on the shore. No longer quaint low-end bungalows. Some very 
expensive housing for our wealthiest fellow citizens who get below cost flood insurance and 
income tax deductions for their second home mortgages. Another hayride. 
Global temperatures rise and fall over geologic time. As they rise and fall, they 
produce sea changes in life history, species go extinct, civilizations advance and disappear. 
There is a normal range of variation. but the current climate is warming at a rate without 
precedent for the last several hundred thousand years. 
So what? Here in Louisiana we will be warmer in summer (think, maybe, 103 degrees 
at Jazz fest), warmer in winter, and considerably drier (think about sugar, soybeans, rice and 
other wet-soil crops). Without winter freezes we’ll have a lot more insects - mosquitoes, 
termite and cockroach numbers soared between 1990 and 1995 when there were no killing 
frosts - and the bayous will be blanketed with alge blooms. We’re tough. We can handle that. 
Pass the pesticides. 
What will be a little harder to handle is sea level rise. A heated ocean expands, and - 
according to the most definitive international panel on climate change yet assembled - the 
oceans will rise from a half a foot to three feet, absolute. that’s before we get to subsidence in 
places like Louisiana, where the relative rise could go to four feet. And that’s before adding 
increasing snowmelt and the run from polar glaciers. For which we add another half a foot. 
It’s already happening. Rocky Mountain peaks are going dry. The famed snows of 
Kilimanjaro have about disappeared. Temperatures around the North Pole are rising so rapidly 
that a new sea route is opening between the oceans, expected to be clear even for unarmored 
ships within the next 30 years. Native Inuit report seeing warm weather birds, beyond 
anything in the legends of their people. 
Four feet is a killer for South Louisiana. On a landscape as flat as the coastal zone, and 
where building elevations are in the single digits, relative sea rise of only a few inches covers 
an enormous amount of ground. Worse for New Orleans, which is buffered by coastal 
systems, for coastal towns that fish, trap and work their natural resources, and even for the oil 
and gas industry whose wells and pipelines lie increasingly exposed in open water above 
sinking bottoms, a few inches of relative sea rise will be enormously hard to match with 
coastal restoration programs. The game is not static. It’s like trying to score touchdowns but 
they keep moving the goalposts back. Way back. Think about trying to devise a way to 
rebuild 1,000 square miles of Louisiana wetlands already lost and another 20 to 30 each year, 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 
                                                                     F - 49  
against the relentless pressure of the Gulf of Mexico. Now add this: you will have to build and 
maintain the whole thing several more feet into the air. 
And now we add this. an increasing body of data shows a strong correlation between 
warmer seas and violet hurricanes. And more frequent ones. It makes sense: warm waters are 
hurricane food, which is why the season comes at the end of the summer. The doubters have 
since weighed in with their list of unprovens - which is the way science works, healthy 
science anyway - and the case is not ironclad. But there seems to be good evidence that global 
warming is not only destroying Louisiana’s defenses, it is also fueling what could be, any 
year, its ultimate storms. 
Are We Serious Yet? Because we certainly haven’t been serious up to this point at all. 
Katrina and Rita have to be the most well predicted and publicized disasters in history, and we 
did next to nothing to stave them off or to prepare for the hits. In August 2005, a couple of 
weeks before the storms, a Homeland Security brochure came in the mail on hurricane 
preparedness. It consisted of a map marking evacuation routes out of town, with major 
revelations like the existence of I-10 and I-59. 
Meanwhile, we continued to treat flood control as the stepchild of navigation projects 
that were in large part boondoggles, and in full measure drained monies and attention away 
from the hurricane protection needs of the Crescent City. We treated the whole water 
resources effort more like a re-election machine than a serious program, run by local interests, 
lobbyists, congressmen and ex-congressmen who are glued to the status quo. We let the 
largest party in coastal destruction walk away from the table without paying, while we in turn 
pay no end of public subsidies for people to build and live in the hurricane hit zone. We turn 
our back on the pall of jeopardy that global warming and rising seas throw over the future of 
the region; worse, we advocate against doing anything about it. And that’s just in 
Washington. 
Back home, the scene is little more encouraging. We have a dysfunctional system for 
building levees, and even more dysfunctional one for maintaining them, aggravated by a 
Byzantine arrangement of levee boards, port authorities, and other bodies that so fragment the 
process that it seems primarily directed towards maintaining political alliances and local 
perks. Post-Katrina down here has been like the Wizard of Oz. When the curtain is finally 
pulled back, there are a couple of flood control guys in suits and uniforms and they haven’t a 
clue. If they are not protected by sovereign immunity, they are facing the largest negligence 
verdict in history. 
Hurricane Betsy brought a rude awakening to New Orleans and the Army Corps of 
Engineers. for more than a century they had been putting bigger and better locks on the front 
door, against the high spring floods of the Mississippi River. Now it was plain that the big one 
would come in the back door, with the capricious, violet, and increasingly frequent hurricanes 
of late summer and fall. And so, in 1965, Congress authorized the Corps to proceed with a 
plan to protect the city and the region from the east and south: the Lake Pontchartrain and 
Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project. It would defend against a Betsy-type storm, winds up 
to 100 mph, waves at maybe ten feet. It would take about 13 years to complete, with an 
estimated price tag of $85 million. 
The Corps had two basic options, a high-level plan relying on levees fronting 
Pontchartrain along New Orleans and Jefferson Parish, or a lower set of levees, fronted by 
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barriers 40 miles out at the inlets to Lake Pontchartrain across the Rigolets and the Chef 
Menteur pass. Initially, the barriers prevailed. They were seen as less costly, quicker to build 
(higher levees would require more time for the fill to settle), and - what many considered to 
be the driving factor at the time - they would allow for the drainage and development of 
wetlands in St. Charles Parish and New Orleans East where in the Corp’s words ‘protection 
would not be incrementally justified.’ Indeed, some 79% of benefits came from protecting 
new wetland development; protection New Orleans came in a distant second. 
Developing the wetlands was in high swing at the time. New Orleans itself had just 
finished expanding over marshes and swamps to the edge of the lake. (The streets and houses 
hadn’t started to crack open yet.) President Lyndon Johnson was partner (with his wife and 
Dallas Cowboys owner Clint Murchison) in a project to develop new Orleans East (a Lenin’s 
tomb-like monument along I-10 still bears the name), and had managed to finesse federal 
highway regulations to build three interchanges for the venture. A similar venture along the St 
Charles lakefront advertised scenes of upland development complete with contented dairy 
cows so obviously deceptive that it was shut down after protest by the Louisiana Attorney 
General. What these developers wanted, of course, was exactly what environmentalists feared. 
The barrier plan looked like a stalking horse for wetland development, New Orleans 
piggybacking the scheme. 
The plan had another problem. It would block off most of the Rigolets and Chef 
passes, which were the migration corridors for the aquatic life of the interior lakes. Lake 
Pontchartrain had been the seafood market for the city, and crabbing along its banks was in 
the family memory of thousands of local families. Commercial fishers were worried as well 
and, despite Corps statements that gates in the barriers would maintain necessary flows, a 
groundswell of opposition grew on both sides of the lake. A poll by Congressman Bob 
Livingston showed his constituents doubting the barriers, causing him to express reservations 
as well. an Environmental lawsuit challenged the impact statement on the plan, which the 
Corps later admitted was a cursory job. Like so many such lawsuits at the time, the court 
found the statement inadequate and required the Corps to write a new one. Most of the time 
the Corps did just that, and then proceed with its original plan. In this case, though, the Corps 
changed its mind. 
In 1982, its review completed, the Corps announced for the high levee option. It 
would turn out to be less expensive after all, they found, less harmful to the environment and 
more 0protecteditve as well. (Among other things it would guard against waves kicked up by 
hurricane-force winds across the lake itself). And so the project marched forward, its costs 
ballooning to an estimated $757 million, towards a pre-Katrina estimated completion date of 
2015. At that point the Corps had thrown up 125 miles of levees around the city, in various 
stages of readiness. The all-important interior canal walls - the ones that failed - were parts of 
the project declared to be complete. Appropriations for the project were declining, however, 
from some $15-20 million annually in the early years to about $5-7 million in recent years. 
The monies were going elsewhere. 
So when Katrina and Rita hit the fan, it was little surprising that two former Corps 
employees, high level ones at that, told the L.A. Times that environmentalists had drowned the 
city with their lawsuit. The Wall Street Journal, ever eager for news like that, and a pack of 
right wing blogs picked up the cry, which carried to Washington DC and the House Resources 
Committee. The Committee, in turn, ever eager for news like that, held hearings on it, absent 
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the benefit of witnesses who had participated either in the project or the case. The United 
States Justice Department, ever eager for news like that, even asked its field offices to report 
any and all environmental cases that had obstructed Corps flood projects. None were ever 
disclosed. 
In the end, the story flopped. The Chief of Engineers and the Government Accounting 
Office, which had been bird-dogging the project for years, both testified before other 
committees that the barrier plan would not have protected New Orleans any better than 
functioning levees, and in fact could have worsened the flooding by trapping the storm surge 
against the city. As serious investigations proceeded, it became clear that the problem was not 
the high levee plan. Category 3 levees would have kept the city dry. Instead, the city got 
tinker toys and they fell apart. 
F.3.9  Member Scholars of the Center for Progressive Reform (2005). An Unnatural 
Disaster: The Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Center for Progressive Reform 
Publication, CPR Publication #512, September. 
Hurricane Katrina tragedy is not a ‘wake-up call,’ as some have described it; rather, it 
is a consequence of past wake-up calls unheeded. By any reasonable measure, government 
failed the people of New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster of enormous 
proportion, but its tragic consequences have been made even worse by an unnatural disaster - 
the failure of our government adequately to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to the 
devastation that the hurricane brought. One very powerful message of the ideology that now 
dominates both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government is that 
actions have consequences. The Katrina tragedy has demonstrated that inaction also has 
serious consequences. 
New Orleans sat in the path of Katrina like a stretch of road with too little banking and 
with no one having taken responsibility for its repair. In this case, the government failures that 
preceded Katrina and made it worse seem to span a wide range of environmental, natural 
resource, disaster-planning, and emergency-response functions for which we rely upon 
government. Identifying those systematic and programmatic contributors to the Katrina 
disaster will give us the information we need to demand that government do better. 
The proper response to Hurricane Katrina is action at every level of public life to 
restore the critical protections and safety nets that only government can provide for the 
people. 
Today, government must again play an active role in protecting its citizens from the 
visibly power forces of nature and from the less visible, but equally powerful forces of policy-
making that is sometimes slanted away from protecting and serving the public and toward 
protecting profit margins. 
 In addition, we strongly recommend that Congress create an independent commission 
to pursue these questions, in an atmosphere free of the bitter partisan strife that seems to 
swamp both houses in anticipation of the 2006 mid-term elections. The notion of a bipartisan, 
objective congressional investigation, promoted by the President, does not seem possible or 
desirable given the rancor of recent days. 
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The failure of New Orleans’ levees was preceded by a failure of environmental 
protection and planning. Louisiana’s coastal plain contains one of the largest expanses of 
coastal wetlands in the contiguous United States, but it is being lost at a rate of 6,600 acres 
per year. the main culprit in wetlands loss in the area is the vast network of levees, 
navigational channels, and oil-and-gas infrastructure. Important though the network is to 
safety and commerce, it accelerates coastal land loss by reducing the natural flow of a river’s 
freshwater and sediment to wetland areas where lost land would then naturally be replenished. 
In addition, the area’s major navigational channels pose their own special threat to flood 
control by sometimes acting as ‘hurricane highways,’ allowing storms to sweep inland, past 
marshland, like liquid bulldozers. 
Broken Levees: Predictions that Came True. Over a period of many years, 
scientists had predicted that a strong storm could breach the levees, and some had predicted 
what appears to be the precise sequence of breaches that flooded the city. The failure to 
protect New Orleans resulted from inadequate planning by the Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps), and from the failure of the federal government to fund badly needed improvements 
once those limitations were recognized. Neither the Corps nor Congress adequately accounted 
for the loss of life and property that would occur if a catastrophic hurricane hit New Orleans. 
“Moreover, although the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal was a primary 
cause of the flooding, it is seldom used and heavily subsidized by taxpayers. Less than three 
percent of the New Orleans port’s cargo traffic uses the MRGO, less than a ship a day. 
Although New Orleans’ vulnerability was widely predicted, the Corps declined to move 
forward with enhancements to the levee and flood wall system because ‘no clear bureaucratic 
mandate exists for reassessing the blueprints once levees are built.’ Moreover, when Congress 
has appropriated money to protect New Orleans better, the Corps has not been in a hurry to 
get the job done. Finally, the Bush Administration and its predecessors have failed to fund 
Corps requests. 
Why the City Flooded. The water that flooded New Orleans did not flow over the 
levees situated between the lake and the city. Instead, it appears that the surge flowed up the 
17th Street and London Avenue canals and caused one breach of the floodwall along the 17th 
Street canal and two breaches of the floodwall along the London Avenue canal. In other 
words, the water moved to the path of least resistance - the floodwalls along the canals. 
The city also flooded because the levee system did not protect it from the ‘end around’ 
exposure that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. The hurricane surge entered Lake Borgne 
from the Gulf of Mexico and proceeded up the MRGO canal to the Industrial canal in the 
heart of New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina appears to have destroyed as much as 90 percent of 
the levees and flood walls along the MRGO canal in St. Bernard Parish as it pushed up the 
narrowing canal from Lake Borgne to the conjunction of the MRGO canal with the Industrial 
canal. Colonel Richard Wagenaar, the Corps head engineer for the New Orleans district, 
reported that the eastern levees were ‘literally leveled in places’. That same surge probably 
caused the breaches in the floodwalls along the Industrial canal. 
 We Knew This Would Happen. Not long after the levees broke and water from 
Lake Pontchartrain on the north and Lake Borgne on the east began to fill New Orleans, 
President Bush told television correspondent Diane Sawyer that no one could have foreseen 
the breach of those levees. In fact, over a period of many years, scientists had predicted that a 
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strong storm could also breach the levees. Scientists especially feared that even a relatively 
weak storm coming from the right direction would push a wall of water into the heart of New 
Orleans from Lake Borgne through the funnel-shaped MRGO canal and into the Industrial 
canal, destroying the levees along the canal and flooding much of St. Bernard Parish and the 
Lower Ninth Ward. It now appears that this is exactly what happened. 
Moreover, the risks posed by the MRGO canal were evident. In 2002, the Corps of 
Engineers acknowledged that ‘the MRGO levee is more likely to be affected than the area on 
the lake itself.’ Proponents of closing the canal pointed out that, with the erosion of the 
wetlands in the unleveed stretches south and east of the city, it had ‘evolved into a shotgun 
pointed straight at New Orleans’. 
The Failure to Protect: Bad Planning, Skewed Priorities. The failure to protect 
New Orleans resulted from inadequate planning by the Corps to save the city, and from the 
failure of federal government to fund badly needed improvements once those limitations were 
recognized. Neither the Corps nor Congress adequately accounted for the loss of life and 
property that would occur if a catastrophic hurricane hit New Orleans. 
The hurricane protection plan that was implemented after 1985 by the Corps was 
designed to protect the city against the ‘standard project’ hurricane that roughly corresponds 
to a fast-moving Category 3 storm. Scientists had for years prior to the storm predicted that 
the levee system woulc not withstand a Category 4 or Category 5 storm. Hurricane Katrina 
struck the Louisiana / Mississippi coast as a Category 4 storm. 
Moreover, although the MRGO canal was a primary cause of the flooding, it is seldom 
used and heavily subsidized by taxpayers. The canal, which was completed in 1968, is a deep 
draft seaway channel that extends for approximately 76 miles east and southeast of New 
Orleans into Brenton Sound and the Gulf of Mexico. It was designed to shorten the distance 
for ships from the eastern shipping lanes of the gulf to New Orleans, but it has never lived up 
to its predicted economic expectations. Less than three percent of the New Orleans port’s 
cargo traffic uses the MRGO; this amounts to less than one ship per day. According to one 
estimate, the government spends $7 to 8 million dollars per year (about $10,000 for every 
large vessel that uses the canal) just to maintain the canal. 
Although the vulnerability of New Orleans to a catastrophe was well known and 
widely predicted, the Corps has floundered in its efforts enhance the protection of New 
Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain. In an award winning series of articles on the levee system, 
The Times-Picayune concluded that the Corps of Engineers has declined to move forward 
with enhancements to the levee and floodwall system because ‘no clear bureaucratic mandate 
exists for reassessing the blueprints once levees are bu9ilt.’ For example, an attempt in 1996 
to reevaluate the Lake Pontchartrain levees broke down in disputes over modeling and other 
bureaucratic disagreements. When Congress has appropriated money to protect New Orleans 
better, the Corps has not been in a hurry to get the job done. For example, the Congress in 
1999 appropriated money for a $12 million study to determine how much it would cost to 
protect New Orleans from a Category 5 hurricane, but the study had not even been launched 
as of September 2005. 
In addition, the Bush Administration has failed to fund Corps requests. Mike Parker, a 
former Republican Congressman from Mississippi who was until 2002 the chief of the Corps, 
was forced to resign when he publicly sated to the Senate Budget Committee that the national 
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interest was being harmed by President Bush’s proposal to cut over $2 billion from the Corps’ 
$6 billion budget. The Bush Administration rejected an Corps request for $27 million to pay 
for hurricane protection projects along Lake Pontchartrain and proposed a budget of only $3.7 
million for the projects, but the Corps still had to delay seven levee improvement contracts. 
After Hurricane Katrina struck, Mr. Parker stated that President Bush had not adequately 
funded improvements to the very levees in New Orleans that had been breached; indeed, Mr. 
Parker stated that had full funding been authorized ‘there would be less flooding than you 
have.’ an official Corps memo dated May 2005, long after Parker left the agency, seemed to 
corroborate this possibility. It stated that the bush Administration funding levels for fiscal 
years 2005 and 2006 were not enough to pay for new construction on the New Orleans levees. 
There are now strong indications that the critical floodwalls along the outlet canals did 
not breach because the water surged over them and eroded their support but because they 
were not capable of withstanding even the surge of a Category 3 hurricane. Whether this 
failure of the floodwalls was attributable to poor design or poor construction and maintenance 
remains to be seen, but in either case the Corps and the local levee authorities bore the 
responsibility for ensuring that the floodwalls were adequately designed, built, and 
maintained. 
Although it is tempting to blame the current administration for the failure to fund 
critical levee improvement projects, the truth is that improving the Lake Pontchartrain levees 
has been a low priority for many administrations, Democratic and Republican, and for 
Congress. The Bush Administration and Congress have had other priorities over a longer 
period of time than the last four years. In fact, it seems clear that even the Louisiana 
congressional delegation has on occasion insisted that the Corps direct its resources to 
projects like a $194 million project for deepening the Port of Iberia and replacing the lock on 
the Industrial canal. 
The Bush Administration and Congress are influential in setting budget priorities 
because the Corps is very reluctant to participate in the process of setting priorities for its 
projects. Moreover, once the Corps has determined that the benefits of a proposed project 
exceed its costs, the Corps leaves it to Congress to decide through the appropriations process 
which projects receive funding and which do not. Congress is ordinarily willing to consider 
passing appropriations for large public works projects, however, only in the wake of major 
disasters or after years and years of study. 
The reasons why New Orleans and its vulnerable citizens were not better protected are 
clear. The levee system was not designed to protect the city from more than a Category 3 
hurricane system and there was little administration or congressional support for making 
improvements in the levee system despite the fact that its limitations were widely recognized. 
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Corps’ guidance 
(Engineer Regulation 1105-2-100) directs analysts to address the issue of prevention of loss of 
life when evaluating alternative plans, but they are not required to formally estimate the 
number of lives saved or lost as a potential effect of a project. 
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F.3.10  Braun, S. and Vartabedian, R. (2005). “The Politics of Flood Control,” Los 
Angeles Times, December 25. 
NEW ORLEANS -- When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and New Orleans levee 
officials joined forces in July 1985 to protect the city from a long-feared hurricane, the two 
agencies could not agree on how to proceed. It was the beginning of a dysfunctional 
partnership that ushered in two decades of chronic government mismanagement. 
Corps engineers wanted to install gates in front of the city’s three main internal canals 
to protect against violent storm surges from Lake Pontchartrain. The Orleans Levee District, 
the city’s flood protection agency, preferred to build higher flood walls for miles along the 
canals. For five years, neither side yielded. 
But in October 1990, a deft behind-the-scenes maneuver by the levee board forced the 
corps to accept higher flood walls. As Senate and House negotiators gathered to craft the 
Water Resources Development Act of 1990, Louisiana’s congressional delegation quietly 
inserted a lobbyist’s phrasing ordering the corps to raise the levee walls. “It was stealth; 
legislative trickery,” recalled New Orleans lawyer Bruce Feingerts, who lobbied for the levee 
board. “We had to push every button at our disposal.” 
The gambit was a crucial victory over the Corps by the Orleans levee district, the most 
powerful and well-financed among 18 Louisiana boards that supervise more than 340 miles of 
storm levees across the hurricane-prone southern half of the state. The Corps had to abandon 
its floodgate plan and shoulder 70% of the project’s costs while allowing the Orleans board to 
hire its own consultants to design the strengthened levees. 
But their fractious partnership proved disastrous. While the Corps and the Orleans 
board settled into an acrimonious 15-year relationship, spending $95 million to buttress the 
city’s canal levees, their shared supervision failed to detect crucial weaknesses inside the 
flood walls before Hurricane Katrina struck. “No one felt the urgency, none of us,” said 
Lambert C. Boissiere Jr., a former Orleans levee commissioner. “The corps and our own 
engineers told us the levees were strong enough. They were all dead wrong.” 
Structural inspections were cursory. Maintenance was minimal. A confusing 
regulatory patchwork of ownership over the levees and canals blurred the lines of authority -- 
all shortcomings cited by independent engineering teams analyzing the levees’ collapse. 
Although the Corps and federal officials kept a tight leash on funding, the Orleans 
board spent money lavishly, diverting resources to high-stakes investments such as casinos 
and marinas. The levee board’s unusual authority to hire its own consultants allowed its 
officials to select firms that regularly gave campaign contributions to politicians with 
influence over levee board business. 
Left unchecked because of repeated failures by the Louisiana Legislature to reform the 
levee board system, critics say, the Orleans district operated its own patronage system. “The 
New Orleans board had the reputation of being one of the worst -- by worst, I mean more 
political than professional,” said former Louisiana Gov. Charles E. “Buddy” Roemer III, a 
Republican whose Orleans board appointees launched the 1990 power play in Congress. 
When Katrina hit in late August, floodwater from Lake Pontchartrain burst through the 
walls of the 17th Street and London Avenue levees, where steel foundations gave way in 
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porous soil. Storm water also flowed through a 200-foot gap in the Orleans Avenue levee, a 
section left unfinished due to Bush administration funding cuts. 
Last week, the corps announced plans to seal off the three broken canals with 
permanent barriers and relocate New Orleans’ pump houses from inside the city to the 
lakeshore -- at a cost of $3.1 billion. The corps’ move to abandon the old flood-control system 
it built with the Orleans board came as a bitter coda to a 20-year relationship. 
Least Cost Project.  Money was the most pressing concern in July 1985, when Orleans 
levee officials signed “assurances” -- an official commitment -- to join the corps in buttressing 
New Orleans’ hurricane protection system. The Corps’ traditional preference for a “least cost” 
project made floodgates a far more attractive option -- at $20 million -- than the $60-million 
estimate for raising the levees. We were caught between the [Reagan] administration saying 
keep the cost down, and Congress and New Orleans officials saying spend more,” said Fred 
H. Bayley III, then the Corps’ director of engineering for the Lower Mississippi Valley 
Division. 
But the Corps’ proposed “butterfly-valve gate” -- a concrete-and-steel barrier that 
would open to let out water and close to seal off storm surges -- was untested in high storm 
conditions. The corps’ plan also clashed with the city’s practice of using its system of 
antiquated pump stations -- two miles inside the city -- to force floodwater out into the lake 
through the canals. Officials with the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board who 
supervised the canals feared that in a major hurricane, the gates would jam with debris and 
canals would back up, submerging the city. 
Corps engineers had been fixated on floodgates since the 1970s, when the agency 
proposed using towering gates to block off surges at the far eastern end of the lake. That plan 
was the corps’ response to Hurricane Betsy, a storm that hit New Orleans in 1965, swamping 
the city’s Lower 9th Ward, killing at least 75 people and causing more than $1 billion in 
property damage. 
Louisiana’s congressional delegation, led by Democratic Sens. Russell Long and J. 
Bennett Johnston, won legislative approval for the barrier plan. But by the early 1980s, the 
project was shelved, scuttled by a judge’s order, opposition by environmental and business 
groups, and bickering levee boards. 
The Corps, convinced that raising levees was risky, shifted its plans, proposing to 
build gates at the lakeshore. Higher flood walls required deep sheet piles -- heavy-gauge steel 
foundations -- sunk into the soft coastal soil to brace against water pressure. To raise the 
levees properly, corps engineers warned that houses along the 17th Street and London Avenue 
levees might have to be razed. But the corps refused to absorb the costs, and the levee board 
shied from taking on neighborhood groups -- a pivotal early error. 
Eager to show off their prototype, corps engineers herded city officials into the 
Army’s cavernous Hydraulics Lab in Vicksburg, Miss. The hinged doors opened and closed 
easily. But city sewerage officials peppered the engineers with doubting questions. Indeed, 
according to a November 1987 Corps report, the “original design did not perform as 
intended.” Only when corps engineers altered the model, “the gate design performed 
satisfactorily.” 
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Despite the skepticism, Corps officials moved firmly to clear a path for the floodgate 
plan. The Corps ruled that it would not pay for raising the levees because the city’s canals 
were used for local drainage, not navigation -- beyond the scope of the Corps’ authority over 
river and waterway projects. 
The decision forced Orleans levee officials to gamble. Although the corps refused to 
pay for raising the levees, the Lake Pontchartrain, La., and Vicinity High-Level Plan was still 
in its planning stages. Under the drawn-out design process, levee officials still had the ability 
to research their own alternative -- at the board’s cost. They aimed to keep the levee-raising 
option alive by hiring their own design consultants, then using political leverage to win their 
levee-raising plan later. 
Involving Politics. From the Orleans levee office on Stars and Stripes Boulevard to the 
governor’s mansion in Baton Rouge, Louisiana’s political veterans knew the unstated rules of 
the levee-building game. There were scores of qualified civil engineers in New Orleans, all 
angling to score lucrative public contracts. Many firms boasted former Corps engineers who 
knew how the Corps worked and had friends still in the service. 
“The Corps had these relationships with the levee boards,” Roemer recalled acidly. “In 
their conversations, the levee board would ask the Corps: ‘What do we need to do to have 
safety and economic development?’ And the Corps would give unofficial answers. Then the 
levee board would hire a consulting engineer and go to the window the Corps had opened. It 
was sweet.” 
Normally, the Corps used its own contractors to design and build flood-control 
projects. But with the Corps’ approval, levee boards could hire consultants as a way to pay 
their 30% local share of a project’s cost. In hindsight, said the Corps’ commander, Lt. Gen. 
Carl A. Strock, the decision to let the Orleans board hire its own contractors was “an unusual 
practice for us.” Some Corps veterans worried about the intrusion of local politics and budget 
complications. “Generally, when there were more layers involved, it got more difficult,” 
Bayley said. 
The political lines stretched to Louisiana’s governors, who chose the majority of 
commissioners on local levee boards. In 1985, the power in Baton Rouge was Roemer’s 
predecessor, Democratic Gov. Edwin Edwards, who had installed New Orleans lawyer Emile 
Schneider as levee board president. Schneider moved quickly. The board issued $50 million 
in bonds, then began hiring private engineers. The consultants were chosen on their 
qualifications. But politics and hiring sometimes mixed, said former commissioners. 
All three engineering consultants who were selected by the Orleans board to design 
the levees contributed to the political campaigns of officials with sway over the board. Burk-
Kleinpeter Inc., the engineering firm that designed the raised London Avenue flood wall, gave 
$5,000 to Edwards in 1991 before he won the 1992 governor’s race. Walter Baudier also 
donated during the period that his firm, Design Engineering Inc., planned the Orleans Avenue 
levee. Baudier gave $2,200 to Roemer in 1987 and $3,000 to Edwards in 1991. “Everybody 
gave to everybody,” Baudier said. “That neutralized any advantage.” 
Baudier’s firm was also awarded a separate contract with the Orleans district, 
coordinating other levee board projects. Louisiana’s legislative analyst criticized the 
arrangement in 1992, warning of potential conflicts between the firm’s dual roles. Baudier 
insists his firm dealt only with financing and did not “review other people’s designs.” Levee 
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board contractors also frequently gave campaign money to Francis C. Heitmeier, a powerful 
state legislator from New Orleans who has long wielded influence over Orleans levee district 
affairs. Among Heitmeier’s donors from 1996 through 2002 were Baudier ($5,000), Burk-
Kleinpeter ($10,000), and Modjeski and Masters Inc., an engineering firm that designed the 
17th Street levee ($750). Officials with Burk-Kleinpeter and Modjeski and Masters did not 
return calls seeking comment. 
For years, former Orleans levee officials say, Heitmeier, who headed the state Senate’s 
public works committee and now its Finance Committee, was influential in levee board 
decisions on hiring, policy and contracts. Roemer was stymied by Heitmeier when he tried to 
reform the levee board system and wrest contracts away from local authorities. His “biggest 
battles,” Roemer said, were with Heitmeier. Just last month, Heitmeier again played 
obstructionist, helping to snuff out a post-Katrina attempt by reformers to create a unified 
state levee board. Critics howled. Heitmeier shrugged. “They can say what they want,” he 
said. 
Questions About Depth. By 1990, faced with spiraling costs for its gates at the 17th 
Street canal, the Corps agreed to pay for raised levees there. But the Corps still insisted on 
gates at Orleans and London avenues. Even before the Corps made its concession, the board 
had acted on its own, hiring a construction firm to drive sheet piles at 17th Street. 
The Orleans board’s impatience with the Corps was shared by neighboring levee 
agencies. In recent years, Plaquemines Levee District President Benny Rousselle twice 
ordered crews to raise levees along a local highway despite formal Corps orders to desist. And 
earlier this year, the East Jefferson Levee District bolstered its side of the 17th Street levee by 
a foot and a half without the corps’ approval. “When you deal with the Corps, it takes years of 
studies,” Rousselle said. 
Corps engineers were openly peeved in 1990 when they learned about the Orleans 
board’s decision. The move posed “an undesirable situation for this office and the Corps,” 
Bayley wrote to the corps’ district commander. Bayley also warned that work crews were not 
driving the steel foundations deep enough. It was the first alarm about shallow sheet piles 
under the levee. 
Despite the Corps’ recent insistence that 17th Street’s foundations were properly 
designed at 17 feet below sea level, a National Science Foundation team of engineering 
experts has described the pile depths as inadequate. 
By autumn of 1990, the Orleans board had also quietly hired Bruce Feingerts, a former 
aide to Russell Long, to lobby in Washington for levee expansion. Feingerts had discovered 
that the levees of Orleans and London avenues might win federal funding if he could persuade 
Congress to expand the coverage of the post-Betsy hurricane plan passed in 1965. Sens. 
Johnston and John B. Breaux agreed to help, Feingerts said, as did most of the state 
delegation. When Senate and House versions of the 1990 Water Resources bill neared passage 
in October, Feingerts went into action. Johnston recalled that former Louisiana Rep. Jimmy 
Hayes was the “point man” as a House manager for conference negotiations. 
Now a Washington lobbyist, Hayes did not respond to interview requests. But a 
former aide, Rhod Shaw, said he often aided New Orleans projects and “would have been 
carrying whatever the delegation wanted.” The military engineers were “asleep at the wheel,” 
Feingerts said. “If they had seen it coming, they would have blown a gasket.” The final bill 
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passed with his language intact: “The conferees direct the Corps to treat the outfall canals as 
part of the overall hurricane project.” 
As new levee construction projects geared up at Orleans and London avenues, work 
crews at the 17th Street canal were struggling with construction obstacles. Unable to operate 
from the land side of the canal because property lines backed tightly up against the levee, 
construction crews had to maneuver by barge up the canal with a 300-foot crane to drive steel 
piles and raise the concrete wall. 
Lakeview resident Bud Thaller stormed outside one day when his house began to 
shake violently. A levee crew driving foundations at 17th Street with a vibrating hammer had 
just struck a sandbar. The foreman shrugged when Thaller approached. He told me they were 
having a hard time getting the piles in, Thaller recalled. 
Boh Brothers, a Louisiana construction firm, was the first of three companies to drive 
sheet piles under the levee walls. They were joined by concrete specialists, some working for 
the Orleans board, others hired by the Corps and the sewerage board. A parade of inspectors 
and engineers also crowded over the site, so many that “it could get confusing,” recalled Boh 
Vice President Dale Biggers, then a crew foreman. 
The Corps was always the final authority -- even overseeing the number of hammer 
blows used to drive in the sheet piles. But on any given day, crews also had to coordinate with 
state and city officials and inspectors for Modjeski and Masters, the levee board’s design 
consultant. The question of who performed the inspections is crucial because engineering 
experts have had difficulty learning how on-site decisions were made. 
“No one was in charge,” said Raymond Seed, a UC Berkeley engineering professor 
leading a National Science Foundation inquiry. Seed’s team has heard allegations that piles 
were deliberately shortchanged. The Justice Department is investigating. 
Structural engineer Herbert J. Roussel Jr., who testified for a construction firm that 
sued the corps during one dispute, recalled Army engineers as dismissive: “The Corps had an 
attitude problem. It was: ‘We’re the Army Corps of Engineers. We know what we’re doing 
and you don’t.’ “ 
Levee board officials complained about excessive Corps delays. They were slow. 
We’d come up with a design, and the corps would always send them back,” Boissiere said. 
Army engineers raised their own complaints. Baudier’s firm was removed as Orleans 
Avenue designer in 1992, accused by the Corps of missing deadlines. As sections of the flood 
walls were finished piece by piece through the mid-1990s, the levee board’s emphasis turned 
to the mundane chores of grass-cutting and maintenance. That left ample time for board 
business that had little to do with flood protection. 
Outside Interests. When lawyer Robert Harvey was installed as the Orleans district’s 
president in 1992, the levee board was a recreation powerhouse. A year after Mississippi 
River floods swamped New Orleans in 1927, Louisiana political legend Huey Long had 
prodded the state Legislature to allow the Orleans board to expand its influence into parks, 
beaches and other “places of amusement. 
By the late 1980s, the board operated an airport, two marinas and lakeshore rental 
properties, but the agency was hemorrhaging money. Leases went unfilled at the airport, and 
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its South Shore Marina had too many vacant boat slips. Instead of scaling back, Harvey 
accelerated the board’s outside interests. The tough-talking lawyer won his post after 
contributing $5,000 to the 1991 campaign of Gov. Edwards, an old friend. “It’s a plum job,” 
Harvey recalled. “Your connection with the governor is close. You have 300 employees, lots 
of contracts.” 
 When Edwards pushed for state gambling -- a position that led to his federal 
corruption conviction in 2001 -- Harvey wooed the Bally’s gambling empire to locate a casino 
boat at a dock owned by the levee board. The boat brought in millions in gambling taxes, but 
other Harvey projects fell flat. A flirtation with film studios went nowhere. A series of probes 
by the state auditor found cases of financial mismanagement, conflicts of interest and risky 
investments. At one point, six attorneys were working for the board without formal contracts. 
And Harvey was accused by the New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission of padding 
the levee board payroll with old friends. The controversies took their toll. Harvey resigned in 
1995, followed by an FBI probe of his levee board tenure. “They didn’t find anything,” 
Harvey said. 
His successor, James P. Huey, waded into his own controversies. Huey’s board hired 
his wife’s first cousin, George Carmouche, as a lobbyist in Baton Rouge. After Katrina struck, 
the board sublet a Baton Rouge office from Carmouche. And Huey pocketed nearly $100,000 
in back pay, failing to first obtain permission from state lawyers. He returned the money after 
resigning under pressure. Huey, who did not respond to interview requests, is under 
investigation by state and federal authorities. 
At the same time, the newly raised flood walls received haphazard scrutiny. Harvey 
recalls staring jealously at East Jefferson Levee District’s well-trimmed border of the 17th 
Street canal, then at untamed foliage and trees massed along the Orleans levee wall. “I’d look 
at the Orleans side and get depressed,” he said. 
Neither the corps nor the Orleans board had a rigorous program for scanning for 
structural defects. Instead, the two agencies joined twice a year for five-hour-long inspection 
tours. A caravan of officials would make random stops along the floodwalls. Sometimes corps 
officials issued citations. Then they would head out for long lunches. “That was always on the 
agenda,” said former Orleans commissioner Peggy Wilson. 
On one tour, Wilson was joined by only one other levee board official. When they 
stopped briefly at the levees, corps officials seemed in a rush. “I kept asking them what I was 
supposed to look for, puddles of water?” she said. They said, ‘Oh, don’t worry.’ The agencies 
relied largely on maintenance crews and neighbors to flag levee problems. “If something 
structural came up, we’d tell the corps,” said retired Orleans levee board crewman Ed 
Robbins.” 
But at 17th Street, Corps engineers were a rare sight, recalled Eric Moskau, a 
commercial real estate agent who has lived near the flood wall since 2001. “I’d just see them 
driving out near the walls,” Moskau said. “I always wondered exactly what they did out 
there.” 
17th Street. When Katrina’s swells blew out huge chunks of 17th Street’s cement wall 
on the morning of Aug. 30, Harvey was prepared for disaster. Years of interagency spats with 
the Corps and his own engineers had left him a skeptic. He bought an inflatable rubber boat 
and stored it in the attic of his house near the 17th Street levee. When floodwaters rose, 
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Harvey dragged down his boat and began rescuing neighbors. “Nobody wanted to go into a 
starvation mode and pay for real protection in the halls of Congress,” he said afterward. 
Since 2001, the Bush administration had repeatedly turned down requests from the 
levee board and the Louisiana delegation for more flood protection. When Katrina struck, 
Orleans Avenue’s levee walls held firm. But when Walter Baudier, the levee’s original 
designer, drove out with another engineer to the canal weeks later, he was stunned to find a 
200-foot gap between the levee wall and the pump station. The wall was left unfinished 
because of the government’s refusal to fund the project, according to the corps and levee 
officials. The gap allowed floodwater to flow freely into the city. 
Near the breach at 17th Street, an 18-foot section of levee wall ended up in Moskau’s 
living room. Displaced to Idaho, Moskau returned weeks later to survey the damage. He hiked 
over hardened mud, gaping at the two-block-long rupture. Crowds of red-shirted corps 
engineers swarmed nearby, directing repairs. There were more engineers, he realized, than he 
had seen in the four years he had lived near the levee. The government was just like 
everybody who lived near the levee,” Moskau said later. “They took those walls for granted. 
F.3.11  Vartabedian, R. and Braun, S. (2006). “Fatal Flaws: Why the Walls Tumbled in 
New Orleans,” Los Angeles Times, January 17. 
NEW ORLEANS -- In the frantic days after Hurricane Katrina, the Army Corps of 
Engineers scrambled to plug a breach on the 17th Street levee, dropping massive sandbags 
from a fleet of helicopters. But the engineers were baffled: The sandbags kept disappearing 
into the watery breach. The pit eventually swallowed 2,000 sandbags, each weighing between 
3,000 and 20,000 pounds. It was an early sign that the hurricane had opened an 
extraordinarily deep hole in the foundation of the storm wall, pointing to a fundamental 
breakdown in the engineering of the city’s levee system. 
Investigators recently told The Times that the 17th Street levee failed because its 
engineers made a series of crucial mistakes, one of which was to base the levee design on the 
average strength of the soil rather than on the strength of its weakest layer. The errors may 
reflect a loss of expertise during the 1990s, when the corps sharply downsized its soil 
laboratories. The faulty soil analysis is one of many defects or flaws in concept, design, 
construction and maintenance that left many of the levees in New Orleans especially 
vulnerable to Katrina. Environmental miscalculations, including the loss of natural protection 
from marshes, added to the problems. The errors might have been offset had the corps 
required larger safety margins, and that raises questions about the corps’ internal culture. 
Although the levees’ shortcomings became apparent shortly after the hurricane hit, 
experts are only now pinpointing the underlying causes of the collapses. What they find will 
determine who bears the political and legal responsibility for the flood and provide a technical 
basis for any future levee system to protect New Orleans from a monster storm. The levee 
failures were among the most costly engineering errors in the United States, measured by 
lives lost, people displaced and property destroyed, said half a dozen historians and disaster 
experts. 
Katrina flooded New Orleans with about 250 billion gallons of water and killed more 
than 1,000 people. “I don’t think there is anything comparable in recent American history,” 
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said retired engineering professor Edward Wenk Jr., a science advisor to three presidents and 
investigator of the Exxon Valdez accident. 
Early blame for the levee failures has fallen largely on the Army Corps of Engineers, 
the principal architect of a 40-year project to protect New Orleans from hurricanes. Corps 
officials say they will accept responsibility for the failures if investigations prove that their 
supervision of the system was deficient. “What I don’t think we understand yet is the forces 
that caused those failures,” said Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, corps commander and its chief of 
engineers. “A failure is really where a design does not perform as intended. If forces we 
designed for were exceeded, there may not be a design failure. 
However, a preliminary report funded by the National Science Foundation has found 
evidence of design flaws in the city’s concrete storm walls, where at least six catastrophic 
failures caused half of the flooding. A handful of technical, civil and criminal investigations 
are underway, including an effort by the Justice Department to look for possible criminal 
negligence. The corps is conducting the federal government’s official investigation, despite 
widespread concern that only an independent board of investigators is likely to be impartial. 
The corps was slow to make public all of its engineering paperwork on the levees and 
has still not produced a full record of the internal correspondence that occurred during the last 
15 years. Moreover, it is not examining what role its organization and culture played in 
technical lapses, which, Wenk said, typically are at the root of engineering disasters. The 
corps says it has addressed those concerns by recruiting outside experts to participate in its 
investigation. The agency is expected to make its final report in June. 
The corps is attempting to temporarily repair 50 miles of damaged levees before the 
hurricane season next June. The Bush administration announced last month it would spend 
$3.1 billion for temporary levee repairs and limited upgrades in the next several years. 
However, many local leaders believe the levee system must be strengthened to withstand the 
strongest possible hurricane -- a Category 5 -- to restore full confidence in the city. Katrina, a 
Category 5 storm over the Gulf of Mexico, weakened to a Category 3 by the time it hit New 
Orleans. 
Making his ninth visit to New Orleans since Katrina struck, President Bush last week 
praised the $3.1-billion initiative but said nothing about Category 5-level protection. And, 
according to the corps, even the temporary repairs and limited upgrades will not protect the 
city from another Category 3 storm, which has winds up to 130 mph and storm surges as high 
as 12 feet above normal. 
 Meanwhile, more than four months after the hurricane, investigators are still coming 
to grips with the levee system’s technical failures and shortcomings that paved the way for 
Katrina’s destruction. 
Weak, Slippery Soil. No levee failure was more dramatic than the breach at the 17th 
Street Canal, where a 465-foot section of concrete wall gave way Aug. 29, flooding the 
affluent Lakeview section of New Orleans. Floodwaters were 3 to 5 feet below the top of the 
levee wall when it collapsed. The soil under the levee, composed of layers of loose clay and 
softer organic peat, was too weak to handle the weight of the water pushing against the levee 
walls. 
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The earthen base of the levee slid backward by about 45 feet, taking the concrete 
storm wall along for the ride. The whole system relied in part on heavy-gauge steel beams, 
called sheet piling, driven into the soil for reinforcement. But they only went to a depth of 17 
feet below sea level, not deep enough to provide a strong foundation, National Science 
Foundation investigators say. 
In rebuilding the damaged sections of the canal levees, the corps is sinking sheet 
piling 45 feet, and in some areas is using heavier gauge piling up to 70 feet deep. The corps 
says the deeper piles are needed because soil in the damaged areas is even weaker than before 
Katrina. 
The levee design was overseen by the corps but assigned to two firms: Eustis 
Engineering, which analyzed the soil under the levee; and Modjeski and Masters Consulting 
Engineers, which did the structural design. (Neither firm returned phone calls seeking 
comment.). The levee design depended on crucial soil measurements along the canal that 
began in 1981. Technicians drilled for soil samples 300 to 500 feet apart to measure the 
strength of the soil. 
The soil tests provided accurate and complete data about the weak soils, but 
government and private design engineers made three crucial errors analyzing the information, 
said Bob Bea, a UC Berkeley engineering professor who is part of the National Science 
Foundation investigating team. First, engineers determined the overall strength of the soil by 
averaging different layers and different sections along the banks of the canal. But it was the 
weakest layers of soil that would determine the overall strength, and using the average gave 
the engineers a false confidence, Bea said. 
Second, the levee design failed to account for the fact that the soil would weaken 
significantly once the canals were full of water and the soil became saturated, Bea said. Soil 
tests conducted before the levees were built showed the soil’s shear strength was about four 
times greater than after Katrina. The engineers incorrectly believed that sediment in the canals 
would prevent water from intruding through foundations, but dredging and other activity 
disturbed that natural seal, he said. 
Finally, the engineers miscalculated how the levee foundation could slide, if it did fail. 
They assumed the greatest risk of failure was in one of the stronger layers of soil, whereas it 
failed in a weaker layer. 
Since Katrina, the corps has proposed installing storm gates that would seal off the 
17th Street Canal, along with the city’s two other major drainage canals. Once the canals were 
sealed off from Lake Pontchartrain, hurricane surges would no longer be able to travel 
through them into the heart of the city. 
Not long after construction started on the levee, signs of trouble popped up. The 
company that built the 17th Street storm wall, Pittman Construction, warned the corps in the 
early 1990s that the pilings were unstable and had caused problems during construction. The 
company filed a claim for more money but lost its case. “Pittman told the corps he was 
concerned about the weak soils,” said Herbert Roussel, a consulting engineer hired by the 
company’s owner, A.E. Pittman. “The corps acted as though it was his problem.” 
 Loss of Expertise. As questions about the soils were being raised, the corps shut 
down its soils lab in the New Orleans district and curtailed its geotechnical research lab in 
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Vicksburg, Miss. The labs had long performed crucial soil analysis and research for projects 
around the country, but the corps’ leadership wanted staff engineers to oversee outside 
contractors, said Bill Marcuson, the former director of the New Orleans soils lab and 
president-elect of the American Society of Civil Engineers. 
“That trend leads to less in-house capability and competence,” Marcuson said. “If the 
corps is not physically doing research, it is hard to evaluate the quality of others’ research.” 
Strock said the moves were part of a larger federal government trend to save money by 
turning over work to the private sector. He conceded that the practice “eroded our technical 
capability,” but said the damage was limited. 
But Bea countered that the agency lost significant technical capability, particularly in 
its large civilian workforce. “They don’t have the number of people or the quality of people 
that they used to,” said Bea, who began his engineering career with the corps. 
Levees Without Armor. Along many levee sections, particularly those on the 
waterway known as the Industrial Canal, water poured over the tops of storm walls and 
cascaded down the backside, scouring and weakening the foundations. Eventually, the walls 
collapsed. If they had remained standing, they would have acted as a buffer and slowed the 
pace of flooding. 
The levees could have survived the overtopping if the backs of the walls had had 
concrete or heavy stone pads at their base, a protection known as “armoring.” Some of the 
storm walls in New Orleans were built with armored foundations and significantly stronger 
sheet piling, known as T-walls. Those levees did not fail and incurred far less damage during 
Katrina. 
 The corps generally assumed that hurricane flood waters would not rise high enough 
to spill over the levees. But most outside experts say that assumption was a mistake. “There 
are only two kinds of levees: those that have been overtopped and those that will be 
overtopped some day,” said Gerald Galloway, a levee expert at the University of Maryland. 
He added that armoring “is not cheap or simple.” 
The corps is replacing some failed sections of levees with T-walls. Brig. Gen. Robert 
Crear, the corps’ district engineer in New Orleans, said the agency was preparing to armor 
many levees under the $3.1-billion rebuilding program. The armoring will include placing 
beds of rock or concrete at the base of the walls to prevent erosion in future storms. 
Thin Safety Margins. Doubts about the corps’ oversight have also flared over the low 
margin for error designed into the canal floodwalls. Engineers design structures to withstand 
forces far greater than the maximum anticipated loads to compensate for uncertainties in their 
own understanding and for possible defects in construction. 
According to Wenk, the engineering expert, public structures typically have safety 
margins as high as four, meaning they are four times as strong as it is anticipated they will 
need to be. Corps documents indicate that engineers approved a margin of 1.3 for the 
floodwalls. That meant the walls were designed to be 30% stronger than the maximum stress 
expected from a hurricane flood surge. Wenk said he was astounded by such a low factor, 
particularly for a system that protected such a large urban area. 
 Strock agreed that the issue needed close attention. “I was not aware before this event 
that the factor was 1.3,” he said. Critics have questioned whether the corps devoted sufficient 
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attention to safety, and Strock acknowledged that the low safety margins “may get back to the 
cultural issue.” 
Overgrown Trees, Brush. Years of neglected maintenance in southern Louisiana 
may have contributed to the heavy flooding, engineering experts said. The growth of large 
trees near the 17th Street Canal levee may have helped undermine the floodwall. Katrina’s 
strong winds blew down a massive oak near the levee breach and investigators believe the 
roots of the tree pulled out a large plug of soil from the embankment. 
The Orleans Levee District is responsible for maintenance and employs work crews to 
trim grass along the levee slope. But trees and bushes sprouted from the yards of private 
homes near the breach site and were left untrimmed for years because of opposition from 
homeowners and the failure of levee officials to move aggressively. The Orleans Levee 
District could have taken action, critics say. Just across the 17th Street Canal, the levee wall 
owned by the neighboring East Jefferson Levee District is regularly shorn of trees and heavy 
brush. “It is a major concern,” said Jim Baker, superintendent of operations for the East 
Jefferson Levee District. “If you have a tree blow over, it can open up a good size hole. I 
don’t like trees growing on our levees.” 
Lost Wetlands Barrier. Closer to the Gulf of Mexico, a different kind of 
environmental miscalculation also contributed to the disaster. Environmentalists, political 
leaders and engineers warn that decades of neglect and corps-sponsored dredging led to the 
disappearance of vital wetlands, allowing hurricane storm surges to threaten New Orleans. 
When Hurricane Katrina roared up the Gulf of Mexico, it spawned a storm surge 
toward New Orleans through a navigation channel known as the Mississippi River Gulf 
Outlet, or MRGO. The outlet was built from marsh and wetlands by the corps in the early 
1960s to allow large ships quicker access to the Port of New Orleans. Originally designed as a 
300-foot-wide channel, the outlet has widened to more than 3,000 feet, the result of repeated 
dredging by the corps and of ships’ wakes. 
You can put more surge through a wider body,” said Thomas Sands, a retired corps 
general who headed the New Orleans district. “When I was district engineer, the erosion 
along the MRGO was horrible.” The project also allowed salt water to penetrate and destroy 
hundreds of square miles of wetlands that acted as a natural flood barrier. 
Henry “Junior” Rodriguez, president of St. Bernard Parish, said that the heavy 
flooding that topped his community’s levees during Katrina was far worse than during 
Hurricane Betsy in 1965. “Listen, we didn’t even have levees during Hurricane Betsy and the 
flooding wasn’t as bad,” Rodriguez said. 
After Katrina, the corps has pledged to halt dredging of the MRGO for at least a year 
and is considering proposals to scale it back. The agency is also proposing to channel 
sediments and freshwater into the marshes to reduce future wetlands losses, though the 
National Research Council recently termed the current proposals inadequate. 
We will never be able to rebuild the coast we had 50 years ago, but the wetlands still 
out there can be preserved,” said Carlton Dufrechou, executive director of the Lake 
Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, a leading environmental group in the region. “If we do 
nothing, the gulf will be lapping at the edges of New Orleans in future decades,” Dufrechou 
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said. “And if the MRGO stays open, you might as well put a bull’s-eye on the city and tell 
everybody to clear out on June 1 when the hurricane season starts. 
 
F.3.12  Irons, L. (2005). “Hurricane Katrina as a Predictable Surprise,” Homeland 
Security Affairs, Vol. I, Issue 2, Article 7, http://hsaj.org/hs a. 
How can a surprise be predictable? Paradoxically, many people think low-probability 
events are just that: low probability; not impossible but very unlikely. People find it difficult 
to sustain a high level of preparedness for events that are unlikely to happen on any given day, 
especially if the preparation requires spending scarce time and resources. As Max Bazerman 
and Michael Watkins observe in their recent book, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You 
Should Have Seen Coming, And How To Prevent Them, ‘We don’t want to invest in 
preventing a problem that we have not experienced and cannot imagine with great specificity. 
Bazerman and Watkins outline four major characteristic traits of predictable surprises. 
1. Leaders know problems exist and will not solve themselves. 
2. Organizational members realize a problem is getting worse. 
3. Fixing the problem requires significant cost in the present with no immediate 
benefit (rewards for avoiding the costs of prevention are uncertain but potentially 
larger than incurring the costs). 
4. Humans tend to maintain the status quo if it functions (minorities protect their own 
interests, subverting efforts by leaders to implement change. 
One basic lesson to learn from Hurricane Katrina is that organizations managing 
preparedness for flood control and hurricanes, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as 
well as organizations managing responses to disasters, such as FEMA, can benefit from 
developing learning organizational processes. Those same processes make it more likely that 
staff will avoid surprises by recognizing them, prioritizing the challenges, and mobilizing 
resources to prevent them from developing. 
A basic step in preparing an organization to use the affect of its people to enhance 
their efficiency and effectiveness is for its leadership to admit that it is not perfect, that 
operations require continuous improvement. Professional criticisms of operational 
performance must flow up the organization as well as down, with the organization 
encouraging such contributions. Indeed, a learning organization does the following: 
• defines a clear mission, designed to inspire workers to do their best; 
• creates a culture that emphasizes professionalism; 
• provides top-notch technical training; 
• provides leadership development for managers; 
• pushes responsibility down the ranks so employees in the field are authorized to act 
quickly; and 
• advocates continuous improvement. 
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Learning organizations are challenges to promote a level of awareness sufficient to 
enable surprise-avoidance capability from their members. Indeed, the structure of large and 
complex organizations increases the difficulty leaders’ face in anticipating predictable 
surprises. As the complexity of organizations, or even project teams, increases, the way 
expertise is coordinated tends to develop into silos. Organizational silos often disperse 
responsibility as well as information. In other words, organizational silos encourage staff to 
‘let someone else’ deal with recognized problems, essentially supporting surprise-conducive 
processes. 
Leadership is a key point of interest when considering the way organizations attempt 
to avoid, or mitigate the impact of, predictable surprises. There is little dispute of the point 
that local, state, and federal leaders knew about the vulnerability of the New Orleans’ levee 
protection system and the threats it posed to the city. Although some officials initially claimed 
that non one expected the levees and flood walls in New Orleans to collapse, most experts 
knew about the vulnerability for many years. 
 The evidence indicates the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers knew about the threat of 
breaches, as opposed to overtopping, since the early 1980s. Moreover, all concerned agencies, 
including those at the local, state, and federal levels, knew about the threat of overtopping and 
consequent flooding in even a Category 3 hurricane. 
Improving the levee and floodwall system in New Orleans was a recognized challenge 
for decades, as was the challenge of a receding delta providing less protection to the New 
Orleans area from storm surges resulting from a hurricane. The Breaux Act of 1990 created a 
task force involving several federal agencies and gave it the mission of restoring wetlands. 
The task force received only forty million dollars per year to stop the erosion of the delta. A 
University of New Orleans study estimated the effort averted only about two percent of the 
overall loss, leaving an erosion rate of twenty-five square miles of delta per year. 
Basic flaws in the design of the levee protection system were first recognized over two 
decades ago, before the wetlands were so diminished. An outside contractor, Eustis 
engineering, was the first to express concerns about the levee vulnerability to breaching in the 
early 1980s. In 1981, the New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board developed a plan to improve 
street drainage by dredging the 17th Street Canal. The Corps of Engineers issued permits to do 
the dredging in 1984 and 1992, though the Corps was not a partner in the Project. Eustis 
Engineering contracted to do a design study for Modjeski and Masters, the consulting 
engineers on the project, and performed soil investigations on a section of the 17th Street 
Canal from south of the Veterans Memorial Boulevard bridges to just north of those 
structures. They found that ‘the planned improvements to deepen and enlarge the canal may 
remove the seal that has apparently developed on the bottom and side slopes, thereby allowing 
a buildup of such pressures in the sand stratum.’ Eustis’ concerns about a ‘blow-out’, or 
breach, of the levee were strong enough that the company recommended test dredging before 
the final design. the company recommended that, without test dredging, the bottom of the 
canal needed sealing with a concrete liner or building a seepage cutoff wall, like sheet pilings, 
to a depth of 65 feet below sea level versus the existing 12 feet. Engineers studying the levee 
breaches consider the report by Eustis significant because the stretch of canal the firm studied 
is widely considered to exhibit stronger soil layers than those that breached during Hurricane 
Katrina. 
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The most puzzling point about the dredging project is that the Corps of Engineers 
planned to follow the project by raising the floodwall from 10 feet to 14.5 feet. It is unclear 
whether the Corps paid attention to the contractor’s concerns since most of the documents 
related to the work remain unavailable to the public. Although the Corps of Engineers was not 
a direct partner in the dredging, it was aware of the work and knew it would have an impact 
on its later project. Indeed, contractors working for the Corps on the later project raised their 
own concerns about the soil and foundations of the levee. 
Reports indicate that key sections of the levee system’s soil and foundation, 
particularly the floodwall on the 17th Street Canal where much of the serious flooding 
occurred, posed serious problems for the contractors involved. Court papers from 1998 show 
that Pittman Construction indicated to the Corps of Engineers as early 1993 that the soil and 
foundation for the walls were ‘not of sufficient strength, rigidity and stability’ to build on. 
The construction company claimed that the Corps of Engineers did not provide it with 
complete soil data when it developed a bid on the levee project. 
Though the construction company lost its suit against the Corps of Engineers, the gist 
of their complaints about the condition of the soil and existing foundation was not disproven. 
Engineers now say the difficulties Pittman Construction faced were early warning signs that 
the Corps of Engineers ignored. 
The Corps of Engineers officially disputed the points made by Pittman Construction 
regarding the soil condition, though it now seems clear that the crucial breaches in New 
Orleans occurred in levees where the floodwall foundations were not as deep as the canals and 
that the Corps of Engineers was aware of the issue. The soil then allowed water to percolate 
under the levee and floodwalls, weakening the structure so that the storm surges from 
Hurricane Katrina moved it entirely, or breached it. Would an organization with processes in 
place to support ongoing learning, and surprise-avoidance, fail to recognize the legitimacy of 
the contractor’s point rather than argue about purely budgetary issues related to the contract? 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is historically an insular agency, known for doing 
things its own way. It is not possible to say whether surprise-avoidance processes are in place 
at the Corps of Engineers, until the public receives more access to internal documents. The 
failure of Corps’ staff to recognize and prioritize the challenges of levee upgrades and 
receding wetlands to the city of New Orleans, and surrounding areas, strongly suggests that 
surprise-conducive processes characterize its organization. the Corps’ organization has over 
the past few decades outsourced more work, lost many engineers to private industry, and 
consequently suffered a diminished capacity to attract top-notch engineers. 
Bazerman and Watkins note that predictable surprises play out over long time frames, 
sometimes longer than the typical tenure of organizational leaders. They contend ‘this creates 
a variation on the free-rider problem. Why, a leader might ask, should I be the one to grapple 
with this problem and take all the heat when nothing is likely to go wrong during my watch? 
In other words, members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conceivably, made a 
collective bet that the unlikely occurrences that, in fact, did end up happening, were not worth 
the expense, form a professional or organizational initiative point of view. …The sheer 
magnitude of the problems faced in the New Orleans levee protection system probably 
appeared overwhelming to members of an organization enduring ongoing budget concerns 
and staff turnover. 
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Consider the scale of the plans offered to fix the levee challenges: a plan floated in 
early 2001 involved two to three billion dollars proposed to divert sediment from the 
Mississippi River back into the delta, rather than allow the sediment to wash down the levee 
system and dump into deep water. The project was compared to the four billion dollar 
restoration initiative for the Florida Everglades. However, these projects are typically funded 
through matching grants in which the state has to match a federal dollar with one of its own. 
Louisiana was only able to match each dollar with fifteen to twenty-five cents. Facing the 
scale of such a challenge, and the state’s limited ability to pay for its share of the costs, the 
response of most people was to maintain the status quo. the result was a catastrophic disaster 
that cost many times the few billion dollars needed to initiate a full-scale rebuilding program 
for the levee protection system and the surrounding wetlands. Essentially, those responsible 
for the levee protection system in New Orleans saved money in the short term only to permit 
one of the largest disasters in American history to occur over the long haul. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers currently finds its authority questioned by many, 
not because of the competence of its engineers’ expertise, but rather due to concerns about its 
organizational processes that allowed such basic design flaws to go without sustained 
questioning by engineers exercising professional judgement. 
New Orleans had dodged the bullet many times, with the major force of hurricanes 
skirting around the area. Nevertheless, most people with a reason to know about it were aware 
that a Category 3 hurricane posed a severe threat to the New Orleans’ levee protection system, 
and a Category 5 hitting land as a Category 4, as with Katrina, posed a catastrophic threat. 
 The occurrence of a hurricane like Katrina was not unexpected in New Orleans; 
neither were the complications faced in the aftermath of the storm. Given this understanding, 
and the neglect in preparing for a hurricane like Katrina, as well as the ineffective response 
preparations, it seems reasonable to assert that Katrina as well as its aftermath was a 
predictable surprise. The threats posed by the hurricane, and the likely aftermath, were well 
known and unsurprising to most who thought about the hurricane threat to New Orleans. 
Unfortunately, much of the local, state, and federal leadership, especially the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, appears to have remained complacent about preparing the levees for a 
catastrophic hurricane. 
F.3.13  Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (2005). Protecting New 
Orleans: From Hurricane Barriers to Floodwalls, N. T. Carter, Washington DC, 
December. 
Understanding why New Orleans’ hurricane protection system failed is essential for 
moving beyond simply making repairs to damaged levees and floodwalls. Knowing why the 
floodwalls failed is central to assessing the city’s vulnerability to storm surge flooding and 
deciding on how to most effectively combine approaches for managing flood risk during 
rebuilding efforts (.e.g, investing in coastal wetlands loss and hurricane protection 
infrastructure, requiring flood-proofing in certain areas, and mapping areas for the federal 
flood insurance program. 
The original design of the Lake Pontchartrain project was sent to Congress in July 
1965. The project was designed to protect the city from a standard hurricane for the region, 
which was roughly equivalent to a Category 3 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Scale. The 
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standard hurricane was defined as high sustained wind speeds reasonably characteristic for a 
specified coastal location. Reasonably characteristic was defined as only a few hurricanes on 
record over the general region had been recorded to have more extreme wind and other 
meteorological characteristics. The standard hurricane was determined by the U.S. Weather 
Service. 
Two months later in September 1965, Hurricane Betsy, a Category 3 hurricane, struck 
Louisiana’s coast, causing damage in New Orleans. Congress authorized construction of the 
Lake Pontchartrain project in the Flood Control Act of 1965, enacted in October 1965. 
Modifications to the authorization have been made in subsequent legislation. Since that 
original design, there have been two major developments in the project relevant to current 
investigations into the floodwall failures: (1) the shift from the barriers at the inlets to Lake 
Pontchartrain to higher levees along the lake; and (2) the shift from floodgates at the mouth of 
the city’s storm water outfall canals that drain into Lake Pontchartrain to higher floodwalls 
along the length of the canals. 
The original July 1965 Lake Pontchartrain project design consisted of the Barrier Plan 
for constructing inlet barriers at Lake Pontchartrain’s three main tidal entrances as well as 
levees and floodwalls for surge protection. The barriers generally would remain open and 
allow for navigation, and would close during coastal storms to reduce storm surges from 
entering the lake. Based on updated weather data and experience learned during the city’s 
flooding in September 1965 by Hurricane Betsy, changes in project were sought before 
construction began. For almost two decades, technical issues, environmental concerns, legal 
challenges, and local opposition to various components slowed construction. 
The design that the Corps eventually chose was the High-Level Plan which consists of 
higher levees and floodwalls, instead of the originally planned inlet barriers and lower levees 
and floodwalls. The change from the Barrier Plan to the High-Level Plan was approved by the 
Corps chief of Engineers in February 1985; both the barrier and the high-level plans were 
designed to protect from the rough equivalent of a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane. The 
Chief’s decision to adopt the High Level Plan was based on a 1984 project reevaluation study 
conducted by the agency in response to a 1977 court injunction on the construction of inlet 
barriers until an adequate Environmental Impact Statement (pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 P.L. 91-190) was completed. the reevaluation study 
recommended the change because ‘the High level Plan has greater net benefits, is less 
damaging to the environment, and is more acceptable to the public’ than the Barrier Plan. 
To drain the city of storm water (i.e., accumulated rainfall), the city pumps water into 
three outfall canals - the 17th Street canal, the Orleans Avenue canal, and the London Avenue 
canal - that flow into Lake Pontchartrain. The pumps are located at the southern ends of the 
canals, away from the lake. To protect the city from rising water in Lake Pontchartrain during 
hurricanes, levees were built along the length of the canals. The levees along the outfall canals 
were considered adequate when the Corps developed the original design for the Lake 
Pontchartrain project that was sent to Congress in July 1965. 
Subsequent to the U.S. Weather Bureau’s adoption of a more severe standard 
hurricane for the region, the Corps determined that the levees along the outfall canals were 
inadequate in their height and stability to protect the city from the standard hurricane. The 
Corps eventually integrated hurricane protection for the canals into its Lake Pontchartrain 
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project. The Corps considered improved canal protection necessary regardless of the selection 
of the Barrier or High-Level Plan. The two basic canal options evaluated were: ‘butterfly’ 
floodgates at the mouths of the outfall canals that would close when water levels in Lake 
Pontchartrain exceeded levels in the canals (known as fronting protection); and higher and 
stronger levees and floodwalls along the canals (known as parallel protection). 
The Orleans Levee District and the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans 
favored parallel protection over floodgates; they were concerned that the operation of the 
butterfly floodgates would reduce the ability to pump storm water out of the city during 
storms. The Corps analyzed the options and recommended parallel protection for the 17th 
Street Canal; in contrast, the Corps recommended butterfly flood gates for the Orleans and 
London Avenue canals. The Corps concluded that the butterfly floodgate plan for the London 
Avenue canal ‘fully satisfies the project’s mandate to provide protection against the hurricane 
generated tidal surges and yet provides the maximum latitude for operation of local interest 
interior drainage (i.e., storm water removal). The butterfly control valve plan has been shown 
to be the least costly fully responsive plan. When compared to the parallel protection plan it is 
approximately three times less costly’. 
The conclusion for the Orleans Avenue canal was similar; the Corps found the 
butterfly gates to fully satisfy the project purpose of hurricane storm surge protection and to 
be one-fifth the cost of parallel protection. 
Rather than having the Corps proceed with construction of the butterfly floodgates, the 
Orleans Levee District decided to construct on its own most elements of the parallel 
protection on the Orleans and London Avenue canals. this local construction was designed in 
accordance with Corps criteria, so that the parallel protection would be incorporated into the 
larger Lake Pontchartrain project. The Corps recommended that the federal cost-share 
contribution for the parallel protection of the two canals be capped at 70% of the less-costly 
butterfly floodgates design. In H. Rept. 101-966, the Conference Report for the Water 
Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1990 (P.L. 101-640), Congress directed the Corps to 
consider favorably parallel protection for the two canals and for the federal government to 
bear part of the costs, but did not specify what percentage of the cost. This report was 
followed by the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-104) 
in which Congress stated: ‘The Secretary of the Army is authorized and directed to provide 
parallel hurricane protection along the entire lengths of the outfall canals and other pertinent 
work necessary to complete an entire parallel protection system, to be cost shared as an 
authorized project feature, The Federal cost participation in which shall be 70 percent of the 
total cost of the entire parallel protection system, and the local cost participation in which 
shall be 30 percent of the total cost of such entire parallel protection system’. 
Concerns about levee and floodwall reliability are compounded by concerns about the 
level of protection provided by the existing infrastructure given New Orleans’ increasing 
vulnerability to hurricane storm surge. Land in the city has subsided; barrier islands and 
wetlands have been disappearing; and sea levels have risen. These factors have raised 
concerns about the ability of the city’s infrastructure to provide Category 3 protection. 
According to the project justification sheet included in the Administration’s Corps FY 2006 
budge request, ‘the project was initially designed in the 1960s, and a reanalysis was 
performed for part of the project in the mid-1980s. Continuing coastal land loss and 
settlement of land in the project may have impacted the ability of the project to withstand the 
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design storm.’ The challenge of protecting New Orleans could become even greater. 
According to some scientists, higher sea surface temperatures may result in increased 
hurricane intensity. Climate change concerns and other factors have raised questions about 
whether both estimates of the likelihood of hurricanes of various strengths and past 
infrastructure investment decisions based on these estimates need to be reevaluated. 
Hurricane Katrina has resulted in some questioning why a Category 4 or 5 hurricane 
protection system was not in place for New Orleans, and whether it should be part of the 
rebuilding effort. The Corps currently only as congressional authorization for a Category 3 
system; additional congressional authorization would be necessary to build a more protective 
system Discussions of Category 4 or 5 protection for the city often include the extent to which 
coastal wetlands restoration may play a role in reducing the city’s vulnerability to storm surge 
and whether some of the regional navigation improvements may increase storm surge 
vulnerability. these discussions raise broader policy issues related to the appropriate level of 
investment to protect against low probability-high consequence events; to protect against loss 
of life and economic disruption; and whether structural storm and flood control measures 
provide a false sense of security in vulnerable areas like New Orleans. The corps’ cost 
estimates are $1.6 billion to return coastal Louisiana’s federal levees and floodwalls to pre-
Katrina conditions by June 2006, and an additional $3.5 billion to increase protection for New 
Orleans from Category 3 to Category 5. State officials have estimated the cost of Category 5 
protection and wetlands restoration for all of coastal Louisiana as high as $32 billion. Most 
local stakeholders argue for the inclusion of coastal wetlands restoration in any plan to 
improve hurricane protection. 
Understanding why the hurricane protection system failed in New Orleans is essential 
to moving beyond simply making repairs, to identifying and reducing vulnerabilities in the 
system, addressing coastal wetlands loss, and rebuilding the city. Nonetheless, the Corps is  
having to proceed with available information in order to perform repairs to the failed 
floodwalls and other breaches to meet the June 2006 deadline, which marks the start of the 
hurricane season. Consequently, congressional oversight of New Orleans’ hurricane 
protection is likely to continue as the nation grapples with decisions on what type and level of 
hurricane protection to provide New Orleans and other coastal areas around the nation, and 
who should bear responsibility and costs for protection in coastal, floodplain, and other 
hazard-prone areas. 
F.3.14  Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (2005). Flood Risk 
Management: Federal Role in Infrastructure, N. T. Carter, October, 
Washington DC. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for much of the federal investment 
in flood control and storm protection infrastructure. Corps involvement in flood control 
construction is predicated on the project being in the national interest, which is determined by 
the likelihood of widespread and general benefits, a shortfall in the local ability to solve the 
water resources problem, the national savings achieved, and precedent and law. 
The 100-year flood standard was established at the recommendation of a group of 
experts in the late 1960s. ‘It was selected because it was already being used by some agencies, 
and it was thought that a flood of that magnitude and frequency represented a reasonable 
probability of occurrence and loss worth protection against and an intermediate level that 
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would alert planners and property owners to the effects of even greater floods. The adoption 
of the 100-year flood standard in many respects guides perceptions of what is an acceptable 
level of vulnerability. The 100-year flood standard is a vulnerability standard, and not a risk 
standard. Thus, the question of does the 100-year flood standard combined with threat and 
consequence information result in an acceptable level of risk remains largely unaddressed; 
this question is especially relevant for low probability, high consequence events such as a 
Category 4 hurricane hitting a major urban center. 
Attempting to provide at least 100-year flood protection largely drives local floodplain 
management and infrastructure investments, resulting in a measure of equity within and 
across communities. That equity in vulnerability, however, results in uneven levels of risk 
because flooding of different communities has different consequences, such as differences in 
the potential loss of life, social disruption, structures damaged, and economic impact because 
of variations in land use and development patterns. 
The residual flood risk behind levees or downstream of dams remains largely 
unaccounted for in the National Flood Insurance Plan and often is not incorporated into 
individual, local, and state decision-making. Residual risk is the portion of risk that remains 
after flood control structures have been built. Risk remains because of the likelihood of the 
measures’ design being surpassed by floods’ intensity and of structural failure of the 
measures. Often when the designs of flood control structures are surpassed or when structures 
fail for other reasons, the resulting flood is catastrophic, as shown by the floodwall breaches 
in New Orleans (LA) with Hurricane Katrina. The consequences of floods increase as 
development occurs behind levees and below dams; ironically, this development may occur 
because of the flood protection provided. The nation’s risk of low-probability events (e.g., 
150-year flood, or Category 4 hurricane) having high-consequences in terms of lives lost, 
economic disruption, and property damage is increased by overconfidence in the level and 
reliability of structural flood protection for events that are less probability than the 100-year 
flood. 
The risk posed by low-probability events may be underestimated by the current 
methods for analyzing flood control investments. The benefit-cost analyses compiled to 
support federal decision-making for water resources projects focus on the ‘national economic 
development benefits’ of investments; regional, social, and environmental benefits may be 
analyzed but often are largely excluded from the decision-making. Moreover, the Corps 
generally limits its benefit-cost analyses of the consequences of flooding to damages. That is, 
estimated benefits from flood control infrastructure investments are primarily the avoided 
losses to existing structures and land uses. 
The Corps’ benefit-cost analysis of a project may result in a recommended plan for 
flood control infrastructure providing for protection greater than or less than the 100-year 
flood. Local project sponsors can request that a ‘locally preferred alternative’ be built, instead 
of the plan identified by the benefit-cost analysis. The National Flood Insurance Plan creates 
incentives for communities to support flood control alternatives providing at least the 100-
year level of protection, but the program provides few incentives for more protection. For 
some local leaders and communities, the financial capital required to cost-share a Corps flood 
control project may represent a barrier to pursuing greater protection. 
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The Corps’ benefit-cost analysis does not constitute a comprehensive risk analysis, 
because the consequences considered are largely limited to property damage, leaving out 
other potential consequences, such as loss of life, public heath problems, and economic and 
social disruption. ..Although potential loss of life is noted in Corps feasibility reports, there 
are no Corps regulations or guidelines for how to incorporate loss of life into the agency’s 
benefit-cost analyses. …Therefore, although preventing loss of life is a goal of federal flood 
control policy, current practice results in property damage being the primary consequence 
metric used for making Corps flood control investment decisions. A related benefit-cost 
analysis issue commonly debated is whether there is a bias toward lower levels of flood 
protection for low-income communities due to their lower property values. another commonly 
debated issue is whether there is a bias toward structural flood control measures over 
nonstructural options (e.g. buyouts of structures in flood-prone areas). 
Because the Corps’ benefit-cost analyses are focused on damages, the Corps projects 
funded in the Administration’s FY 2006 request are those that reduce the most damages per 
dollar spent, which may not be the projects most efficient at reducing risk more broadly. Also, 
the remaining benefits to remaining costs (RB/RC) metric is used for multiple types of Corps 
water resources projects - navigation, flood control, and storm protection. Because the Corps 
benefit-cost procedures vary by project type, comparisons of the RB/RC ratio of navigation 
projects, flood control, and storm protection projects may be misleading, especially if 
significant benefits derived from projects, such as the potential benefits of lives saved, are not 
quantified. In other words, benefit-cost analyses as applied by the Corps are tools for 
informing decisions on individual projects but were not performed with the intent to 
determine the most cost-effective projects. Metrics that include consequences in addition to 
damages could be combined and weighted to produce a risk-ranking for flood control 
projects; however, attempts to prioritize the Corps budget across multiple types of water 
resources projects continues to be a challenge because of the varying and inter-related types 
of benefits and costs of ecosystem restoration, flood control, navigation, and multi-purpose 
projects. 
A fundamental question being raised in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
is: do current federal policy, programs, practices result in an acceptable level of aggregate risk 
for the nation? Risk management is being increasingly viewed as a method for setting 
priorities for managing some hazards in the United States. Because floodplain and coastal 
development are largely managed by local governments, some aspects of national flood risk 
management likely would be unwelcome and infeasible, and could be perceived as resulting 
in an inequitable distribution of flood protection. For example, if floods in large urban 
concentrations are perceived as representing a greater risk for the nation, federal resources 
may be directed away from protecting smaller communities and less-populated states. Two of 
the concerns raised in discussions of greater emphasis on risk analysis in the development and 
design of specific projects are that risk analysis may result in lower levels of protection being 
implemented in some areas, and that information and knowledge are insufficient to perform 
an adequate analysis. However, an argument can be made that the federal government has an 
interest in reducing risks resulting in national consequences, and in prioritizing federal 
involvement and appropriations accordingly. 
“actors complicating the determination of the nation’s flood risk include changing 
conditions and incomplete information. For example, many flood control projects were built 
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decades ago using the available data and scientific knowledge of the period that may have 
underestimated flood hazards for particular areas. Similarly, there are issues with changes in 
risk over time due to processes such as land loss, subsidence, sea-level rise, reduced natural 
buffers, urban development, and infrastructure aging. For existing dams, there is some 
information on consequences of failure as measured by loss of life, economic loss, 
environmental loss, and disruption of lifeline infrastructure (such as bridges and power grids); 
however, the database with this information only tracks the amount and type of losses, not the 
likelihood of failure. 
A risk-reduction approach for organizing federal flood-related investments likely 
would incorporate many structural and nonstructural flood management measures already 
being considered and implemented, but change their priority and mix. Options considered in a 
risk-centered approach may include shifting federal policy toward wise use of flood-prone 
areas (e.g. rules or incentives to limit some types of development in floodplains), 
incorporating residual risk and differences in riverine and coastal flood risk into federal 
programs (e.g. residual risk premiums as part of the National Flood Insurance Program), 
creating a national inventory and inspection program for levees, promoting greater flood 
mitigation and damage mitigation investments, re-evaluating operations of flood control 
reservoirs for climate variability and uncertainty, and investing in technology and science for 
improved understanding of the flooding threats. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have focused the nation’s attention once again on issues 
that flood experts have debated for decades. The disasters have renewed public concerns 
about reliability of the nation’s aging flood control levees and dams. The debate over what is 
an acceptable level of risk - especially for low-probability, high-consequence events - and 
who should bear that risk is taking place not only in the states affected by the hurricanes, but 
nationally. The concerns being raised range widely, including interest in providing more 
protection for concentrated urban populations, risk to the nation’s public and private 
economic infrastructure, support for reducing vulnerability by investing in natural buffers, and 
equity in protection for low-income and minority populations. 
The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have included discussions of expanding 
mitigation activities (such as floodproofing structures and buyouts of structures on the most 
flood-prone lands), investing in efforts to restore natural flood and storm surge attenuation, 
and assuring vigilant maintenance of existing flood control structures, as well as interest in 
new and augmented structural flood protection measures. Although major flood events, such 
as the Midwest Flood of 1993, generally spur these discussions, the policy changes 
implemented often are incremental. The 109th Congress, like previous Congresses, faces a 
challenge in reaching consensus on how to proceed on anything other than incremental 
change because of the wealth of constituencies and communities affected by federal flood 
policy. Another practical challenge is the division of congressional committee jurisdictions 
over the federal agencies and programs involved in flood mitigation, protection, and response. 
For example, Senate Committees that would likely have jurisdiction over elements of 
any comprehensive change in federal flood policy would include Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs; Environment and Public Works; and Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs. 
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F.3.15   Office of Management and Budget (2006). Agency Scorecards, Washington, DC. 
Good intentions and good beginnings are not the measure of success. What matters in 
the end is completion: performance and results. Not just making promises, but making good 
promises. 
The scorecard employs a simple ‘traffic light’ grading system common today in well-
run businesses: green for success, yellow for mixed results, and red for unsatisfactory. Scores 
are based on five standards for success defined by the President’s Management Council and 
discussed with experts throughout government and academe, including individual fellows 
from the National Academy of Public Administration. 
The Corps of Engineers ratings: Human Capital - yellow, Competitive Sourcing - Red, 
Financial Performance - Red, Enhancing E-Government - Red, and Budget Performance 
and Integration - Red 
Reducing the Construction Backlog. Between 2000 and 2005, funding for the Corps 
construction program increased by 30 percent in nominal terms. Much of this increase was for 
work on projects with relatively low benefits or outside of the Corps’ three main mission 
areas: 1) facilitating commercial navigation; 2) reducing damages caused by floods and 
storms; and 3) restoring aquatic ecosystems. During the same period, the Corps construction 
workload grew at an unmanageable rate and more projects faced construction delays, as 
additional projects were authorized without funding for timely completion. This growth trend 
has resulted in a $50 billion cost to complete authorized projects, of which only $15 billion is 
for projects that are both within the Corps’ main mission areas and meet current economic and 
environmental performance standards. Funding new projects further stresses the Corps’ 
workload as these projects inevitably compete for funding with ongoing projects that offer 
much greater benefits, relative to their costs. As a result, some projects cost more than they 
need to, and most projects are completed many months - and sometimes years - later than they 
could. 
F.3.16  Senator Susan Collins and Senator Joseph Liberman, Senate Homeland Security 
Committee Holds Hurricane Katrina Hearing to Examine Levees in New 
Orleans, Press Release, November 2, 2005. 
Examining why the levees in New Orleans failed following Hurricane Katrina is a 
crucial part of our committee’s investigation. While some of the flood walls and levees were 
overtopped, something much more catastrophic happened that was not anticipated. Some of 
the levees and flood walls failed outright, leaving gaping holes through which water rushed 
uncontrollably into the neighborhoods of New Orleans. 
This flooding caused enormous destruction and tragic loss of life that would not have 
occurred if the levees had held. The people of New Orleans put their faith in the levee system 
and unless the cause of this failure is investigated and addressed, New Orleans will remain a 
city in jeopardy.  
A lot of the flooding of New Orleans should not have happened, and would not have 
happened if not for human error and the 0possibility of malfeasance suggested by one of our 
witnesses in the design and construction of the city’s levees.  
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Today’s testimony about the inadequacy of the levees to protect the people of New 
Orleans is as disheartening, as heartbreaking, as infuriating, and ultimately as embarrassing as 
the scenes of degradation and despair that we saw in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina.  
Both Senators expressed their concern by the fact that the levees were constructed to 
withstand a Category 3 hurricane. But while Katrina was only a Category 1 when it hit parts 
of New Orleans, the levees still failed, causing 80 percent of the city to flood, more than twice 
as much as would have occurred had the levees held. 
F.3.17  Senator Susan Collins (2005). “Hurricane Katrina: Who’s In Charge of the New 
Orleans Levees?” Hearing Statement Before Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, December 15, Washington, DC. 
While the levees were absolutely critical to the survival of the city, our November 2nd 
hearing demonstrated that this last line of defense was fatally flawed in design, construction, 
or maintenance. The people of New Orleans and surrounding parishes depended on the levees 
to protect them. It now appears their faith had little foundation. Even though the hurricane 
caused extensive damage, it was the flooding from the levee breaches that actually destroyed 
the City of New Orleans.  
The Army Corps of Engineers, the Orleans Levee District, and the Louisiana 
Department of Transportation and Development are the key players. But they each played 
their parts in a system fragmented by overlapping obligations and inexplicable past practices. 
Once the levees were constructed the Army Corps of engineers is expected to: turn over 
completed sections to the Orleans Levee District; perform an annual inspection with the 
District; and review the semi-annual reports filed by the District. 
The Orleans Levee District is charged by law with: operating and maintaining the 
levees; conducting a quarterly inspection of the levees at least once every 90 days; and filing a 
semi-annual report with the Army Corps. The Louisiana Department of Transportation is 
obligated by state law to: approve the soundness of the engineering practice and the feasibility 
of the plans and specifications submitted by the Orleans Levee District; conduct training of 
the District’s commissioners; and review the District’s emergency plans.  
Today we will hear about the reality, about the confusion on issues as fundamental as 
control, the misunderstandings, and what appear to be outright abdications of responsibility.” 
“the uncertainty about control, combined with overlapping responsibility for emergency 
management, affected the repair efforts at one of the breach sites after Hurricane Katrina. In a 
staff interview, the Commander of the New Orleans District of the Army Corps of Engineers 
described the confusion: ‘Who is in charge? Where’s the Parish President? Where is the 
Mayor? And then the State?…Who is in charge?” 
F.3.18  Herman Leonard and Arnold Howitt (2006). “Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for 
and Responding to Future Katrina-Class Disturbances in the United States,” 
Testimony U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee, Washington DC, March 8. 
The inescapable reality is that the United States - its governmental units and its society 
as a whole - is not now and never has been prepared adequately to deal with a disaster the 
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scale of Hurricane Katrina. … but while there were individual failures involved, the story is 
not principally a story of individual failures - it is, instead, a story of failures of systems and 
of failures to construct systems in advance that would have permitted and helped to produce 
better performance and outcomes. 
The leadership failures that contributed to the events we witnessed on the Gulf Coast 
last August and September began long, long before Katrina came ashore. It literally took 
centuries to make the mistakes that rolled together to make Katrina such a vast natural and 
human-made calamity. First, for hundreds of years, people have been constructing and placing 
large amounts of previous (human lives) and expensive (infrastructure, homes, communities) 
value in  new Orleans and along the Gulf Coast in the known path of severe storms. Second, 
for decades, we have been living with inadequately designed, built, or maintained man-made 
protections (levees, building codes, pumps, and so on), and have pursued policies and 
interventions that actively contributed to the destruction of the natural buffers (salt marshes, 
dunes, and other natural barriers) against the hazards created by placing value in harm’s way. 
Third for years - at least since 9/11, but even before that - we have known that we had 
systems of preparation and response that would prove inadequate against truly large scale 
disasters. Fourth, in the days and hours before Katrina’s landfall, we failed to mobilize as 
effectively as we might have those systems that we did have in place. And fifth, the days 
following the impact, we did not execute even the things that we were prepared to do as 
quickly and smoothly as we should have. 
How do we not, in the future, find ourselves again with those same regrets? Our work 
needs to begin with a judicious and honest assessment of threats, followed by investments in 
prevention and mitigation and by construction of response systems that will be equal to a 
larger of class of disturbances than we have previously allowed ourselves to contemplate. 
F.3.19  Congressional Research Service (2003). Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works 
Program: Issues for Congress, Issue Brief for Congress, N. Carter and P. Sheikh, 
Washington DC, May 21. 
The Corps is a unique federal agency located in the Department of Defense with 
military and civilian responsibilities; it is staffed predominantly by civilians. Through its 
military program, the Corps provides engineering, construction, and environmental 
management services to the Army, Air Force, government agencies, and foreign governments. 
the Corps military program is currently active in restoring the capability for oil production, oil 
refining, and gas processing as well as other activities in Iraq. 
At the direction of Congress, the Corps plans, builds, operates, and maintains a wide 
range of water resources facilities under its civil works program. The Corps’ oldest civil 
responsibilities are creating navigable channels and controlling floods. during the last decade, 
Congress has increased Corps responsibilities in the areas of ecosystem restoration, 
environmental infrastructure, and other non-traditional activities such as disaster relief and 
remediation of formerly used nuclear sites. The economic and environmental impacts of 
Corps projects can be significant locally and regionally, and at times are quite controversial. 
The civil works budget of the Corps consists primarily of funding for the planning, 
construction, and maintenance of specific projects; appropriations are made as part of the 
Energy and Water Development Appropriations bills. Funding for Corps civil works has often 
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been a contentious issue between the Administration and Congress, with appropriations 
typically providing more funding than the Administration has requested, regardless of which 
political party controls the white House and Congress. 
Congress typically authorizes Corps projects as part of a biennial consideration of a 
Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). The trend in the last decade has been to 
authorize projects earlier in the development and review process than in the past. Congress 
might authorize a project following a review by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 
Works and the Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
and a favorable Chief of Engineers report; on the basis of a favorable Chief’s report without 
senior administrative review; or contingent on a favorable Chief’s report being completed 
within a year. Most projects authorized since WRDA 1996 have not undergone senior 
administrative or OMB review prior to receiving congressional authorization. 
Contingent authorization, authorization prior to OMB review, and another practice - 
authorization in appropriations bills - have been criticized by some Members of Congress and 
Corps critics. The critics contend that contingent authorization rushes projects through critical 
stages of the development process and that congressional decisions are made without basic 
project information. They also argue that authorizations prior to senior review by the 
Administration result in insufficient review from a national perspective. 
There also has been criticism regarding the type of projects authorized in recent 
WRDAs. Local sponsors of navigation and flood control projects fear that the Corps’ growing 
involvement in ecosystem restoration and other new responsibilities detracts from the 
agency’s more traditional missions. 
Criticism of Corps project development has been raised for decades, particularly since 
the growth of the environmental opposition to large water resources development projects in 
the 1970s. Although Congress passed greater local cost-sharing requirements in 19865, it has 
enacted few changes to how the Corps develops and evaluates projects. 
In response to two events in 2000, support for changing how the Corps undertakes and 
reviews projects has gained some momentum. First, the Washington Post published a series of 
articles raising questions about the integrity of the Corps planning process. Second, a Corps 
economist when public as a whistleblower contending that Corps officials manipulated a 
benefit-cost analysis to support expensive lock improvements on the Upper Mississippi River-
Illinois Waterway. 
The Bush Administration has generally approached reform as a fiscal issue linked 
primarily to the agency’s growing construction backlog. Over the longer term, many more 
projects have received authorization than appropriations, resulting in a backlog consisting of 
over 500 ‘active’ authorized projects with a federal cost of approximately $44 billion. To 
reduce the construction backlog, the President’s FY 2004 budget request focuses the agency’s 
civil works activities on specific projects within the agency’s water resources missions of 
navigation, flood control, and environmental restoration. during the 1990s, Congress 
continued biennial authorizations of navigation and flood control projects and began 
authorizing more environmental activities and non-traditional projects. 
In contrast, legislative proposals during the 107th and 106th Congresses consisted less 
of fiscal reforms and more of improved project development processes and review 
procedures. In 2003, Corps officials testified on how the agency is ‘transforming’ itself in 
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response to the criticism levied against its practices. Corps officials defended the integrity of 
the agency’s review processes and detailed recent efforts to further strengthen it. 
There are currently two initiatives to change the operation of the Corps civil works 
program: the government-wide President’s Management Agenda and an Army initiative 
referred to as the Third Wave. Neither initiative specifically targets the Corps, but both 
encompass Corps activities. The President’s Management Agenda was undertaken by the 
Bush Administration as part of a movement toward more entrepreneurial government; one of 
the five components of the President’s Management Agenda is a competitive sourcing 
initiative. The President’s Management Agenda directed executive agencies to competitively 
source commercial activities in order to produce quality services at a reasonable cost through 
efficient and effective competition between public and private sources. The administration 
mandated for FY 2002 and FY 2003 the competition of 5% and 10%, respectively, of the 
positions performing commercial activities at agencies, including the Corps. 
The Army’s Third Wave initiative is broader than the President’s Management 
Agenda. The Third Wave is a search for ways to improve the Army’s operations by focusing 
its energies on its core war-fighting competencies. This includes a review of all positions and 
functions (i.e., entire areas of responsibilities and missions, such as wetlands regulation) that 
are not part of the Army’s core military competencies. Actions that can be considered under 
the Third Wave for non-core functions and positions include competitive sourcing, 
privatization, transfer of responsibilities to other agencies, and divestiture. A significant 
portion of the Corps workforce was included in the first phase of the third Wave because 
much of the water resources work performed by the Corps is not considered essential to the 
Army’s war fighting competencies. 
F.3.20  U.S. General Accounting Office (2003). Corps of Engineers Improved Analysis of 
Costs and Benefits Needed for Sacramento Flood Protection Project, Report to 
Congressional Requesters, GAO-04-30, Washington DC, October. 
The Corps did not fully analyze likely cost increases for the Common Features Project 
or report them to Congress in a timely manner. Corps guidance generally directs the Corps to 
seek new spending authority from Congress if it determines, before issuing the first 
construction contract, that it cannot complete the project without exceeding its spending limit. 
A severe storm in January 1997 demonstrated vulnerabilities in the American River levees 
and alerted the Corps of the need to do additional work to close the gaps in the cut-off walls at 
bridges and other areas and extend the depth of some cut-off walls from about 20 feet to about 
60 feet. Although these design changes were likely to increase project costs significantly, the 
Corps did not use cost risk analysis, or any other analysis, to determine the potential extent of 
the increases. the Corps then began constructing the redesigned American River levee 
improvements without communicating to Congress the project’s potential exposure to 
substantial cost overruns. In 2002, when the Corps finally updated project costs, it had already 
completed or contracted at a much higher cost for most of the American River levee 
improvements that were authorized in 1996. Because of the reporting delay, Congress did not 
have the opportunity to determine whether, at these higher costs, building these levee 
improvements was an efficient and effective use of public funds. by 2003, the corps had 
committed most of the funding authorized for the entire Common Features Project to the 1996 
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American River work, thereby leaving the 1999 work and the Natomas Basin improvements 
without funding. 
In response to the criticism that the Corps had failed to design the levee protection to 
account for seepage that caused failure of some of the levees in the 1997 flooding, the Corps 
replied to the GAO: “The Army stated that the levee improvements were not originally 
designed to withstand the destructive effect of seepage and that this design was not an error. 
Rather, an unknown condition (i.e., the potential for destructive seepage under the levees) 
resulted in design changes and increased costs. 
The Corps made several mistakes in estimating the economic benefits for the 
American River levee improvements. First, in 1996, the Corps incorrectly calculated the 
economic benefits by over-counting the residential properties that the levees would protect. 
The actual number of protected residential properties was about 20 percent less than the 
number that the Corps estimated. although the Corps updated its benefit estimate in 2002, it 
again made mistakes in estimating benefits because it incorrectly determined that the levee 
improvements authorized in 1999 would protect a larger area from flooding that they will and 
used an inappropriate methodology to determine the amount of flood damages the levee 
improvements would prevent. However, it is also important to recognize that the levee 
improvements may reduce the loss of human lives in the event of a flood, which is a benefit 
that is not included in the Corps’ analysis. Second, although the Corps’ policy calls for 
reporting a range of benefits from the levee improvements and the likelihood of realizing 
them, in 2002 the Corps reported only a single estimate of benefits. The Corps did not provide 
a range of benefits to Congress because it did not use the most current version available of its 
computer software, which could have performed the analysis. Finally, although the Corps has 
a three-tiered quality control process to ensure that it prepares economic analyses accurately 
and appropriately, this process did not identify the mistakes we found, which raises questions 
about the effectiveness of the Corps quality control process. 
It is important to remember that, in addition to the economic benefits from preventing 
property damage, levee improvements may reduce the risk of loss of human lives, which is a 
benefit that is not included in the Corps’ calculations. According to the Corps, about 305,000 
people live within the American River floodplain and the number of lives lost because of 
levee failure would depend on a variety of factors, such as the size of the flood, warning time, 
time of day, and availability of evacuation routes. Because of the many factors involved and 
the lack of historical data, the Corps was not able to estimate the number of lives that would 
be lost as a result of levee failure and flooding in the Sacramento area. 
The Corps’ guidance (Engineer Regulation 1105-2-100) directs the Corps to address 
the issue of prevention of loss of life when evaluating alternative plans - which the Corps did. 
However, the Corps is not required to formally estimate the number of lives saved or lost as a 
potential effect of a project. In situations where historical data exist, the Corps has the option 
to estimate the number of persons potentially affected by a project, and include this number as 
an additional factor for the consideration of decision makers. 
It is critical that decision making and priority setting be informed by accurate 
information and credible analysis. Reliable information form the Corps about costs and 
benefits for the American River component of the Common Features Project has not been 
present to this point. the analysis on which Congress has relied contained significant mistakes. 
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and of most relevance today, the analyses for the remaining work do not provide a reliable 
economic basis upon which to make decisions concerning the American River levee 
improvements authorized in the WRDA of 1999. To provide a reliable economic basis for 
determining whether these improvements are a sound investment, the Corps’ analysis needs to 
adequately account for the risk that project costs could increase substantially, correctly count 
and value the properties the project would protect, and include information on the range of 
potential project costs and benefits. 
F.3.21  Heinzerling, L. and Ackerman, F. (2002). “Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Environmental Protection,” Georgetown Environmental Law and 
Policy Institute, Georgetown University Law Center. 
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis make two basic arguments in its favor. First, use of 
cost-benefit analysis ostensibly leads to more efficient allocation of society’s resources by 
better identifying which potential regulatory actions are worth undertaking and in what 
fashion. advocates of cost-benefit analysis also contend that this method produces more 
objective and more transparent government decision-making by making more explicit the 
assumptions and methods underlying regulatory actions. 
In fact, cost-benefit analysis is incapable of delivering what it promises. First cost-
benefit analysis cannot produce more efficient decisions because the process of reducing life, 
health, and the natural world to monetary values is inherently flawed. Efforts to value life 
illustrate the basic problems. Cost-benefit analysis implicitly equates the risk of death with 
death itself, when in fact they are quite different and should be accounted for separately in 
considering the benefits of regulatory actions. Cost-benefit analysis also ignores the fact that 
citizens are concerned about risks to their families and others as well as themselves, ignores 
the fact that market decisions are generally very different from political decisions, and ignores 
the incomparability of many different types of risks to human life. the kinds of problems 
which arise in attempting to define the value of human life in monetary terms also arise in 
evaluating the benefits of protecting human health and the environment in general. 
Second, the use of discounting systematically and improperly downgrades the 
importance of environmental regulation. While discounting makes sense in comparing 
alternative financial investments, it cannot reasonably be used to make a choice between 
preventing non-economic harms to present generations and preventing similar harms to future 
generations. Nor can discounting reasonably be used to even make a choice between harms to 
the current generation; the choice between preventing an automobile fatality and a cancer 
death should not turn on prevailing rates of return on financial investments. In addition, 
discounting tends to trivialize long-term environmental risks, minimizing the very real threat 
our society faces from potential catastrophes and irreversible environmental harms, such as 
those posed by global warming and nuclear waste. 
Third, cost-benefit analysis ignores the question of who suffers as a result of 
environmental problems and, therefore, threatens to reinforce existing patterns of economic 
and social inequality. Cost-benefit analysis treats questions about equity as, at best, side 
issues, contradicting the widely shared view that equity should count in public policy. Poor 
countries, communities, and individuals are likely to express less willingness to pay to avoid 
environmental harms simply because they have fewer resources. Therefore, cost-benefit 
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analysis would justify imposing greater environmental burdens on them than on their 
wealthier counterparts. With this kind of analysis, the poor get poorer. 
Finally, cost-benefit analysis fails to produce the greater objectivity and transparency 
promised by its proponents. For the reasons described above, cost-benefit analysis rests on a 
series of assumptions and value judgments that cannot remotely be described as objective. 
Moreover, the highly complex, resource-intensive, and expert-driven nature of this method 
makes it extremely difficult for the public to understand and participate in the process. Thus, 
in practice, cost-benefit analysis is anything but transparent. 
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APPENDIX G: LOOKING FORWARD 
for Success 
The inescapable reality is that the United States - its governmental units and its 
society as a whole - is not now and never has been prepared adequately to deal 
with a disaster the scale of Hurricane Katrina. … but while there were individual 
failures involved, the story is not principally a story of individual failures - it is, 
instead, a story of failures of systems and of failures to construct systems in 
advance that would have permitted and helped to produce better performance and 
outcomes. The leadership failures that contributed to the events we witnessed on 
the Gulf Coast last August and September began long, long before Katrina came 
ashore. It literally took centuries to make the mistakes that rolled together to make 
Katrina such a vast natural and human-made calamity.  
First, for hundreds of years, people have been constructing and placing large 
amounts of previous (human lives) and expensive (infrastructure, homes, 
communities) value in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast in the known path 
of severe storms. Second, for decades, we have been living with inadequately 
designed, built, or maintained man-made protections (levees, building codes, 
pumps, and so on), and have pursued policies and interventions that actively 
contributed to the destruction of the natural buffers (salt marshes, dunes, and 
other natural barriers) against the hazards created by placing value in harm’s 
way. Third for years - at least since 9/11, but even before that - we have known 
that we had systems of preparation and response that would prove inadequate 
against truly large scale disasters. Fourth, in the days and hours before Katrina’s 
landfall, we failed to mobilize as effectively as we might have those systems that 
we did have in place. And fifth, the days following the impact, we did not execute 
even the things that we were prepared to do as quickly and smoothly as we should 
have. 
How do we not, in the future, find ourselves again with those same regrets? Our 
work needs to begin with a judicious and honest assessment of threats, followed 
by investments in prevention and mitigation and by construction of response 
systems that will be equal to a larger of class of disturbances than we have 
previously allowed ourselves to contemplate. 
Herman Leonard and Arnold Howitt (2006) 
Preparing for and Responding to Future Katrina-Class Disturbances in the United States 
Testimony U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
Washington DC, March 8. 
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G.1 High Reliability Organization: The USN Nuclear Propulsion Program 
A high reliability organization (HRO) is one that successfully works with extremely 
complex, potentially hazardous technologies by operating at extremely high levels of reliability 
and safety. We can extend this definition to include organizations that operate at extremely high 
levels of quality. Quality is defined as freedom from unanticipated defects and the ability to 
satisfy the serviceability, safety, compatibility, and durability requirements of those that own, 
operate, design, construct, regulate, and are affected by the engineered system. 
Research has shown that serious accidents involving hazardous systems can be prevented 
through intelligent organizational design and management. HROs are thus organizations that 
must operate in a challenging environment requiring the use of advanced engineering methods in 
which the cost of failure is so great that it needs to be avoided all together. High reliability theory 
does not take the naive stance that people have the ability to behave with perfect rationality. 
However the theory does assert that organizations can compensate for human frailties and can 
therefore be significantly more rational and effective than individuals.  
Over the years, high reliability theorists have identified four critical causal factors that 
constitute a HRO (Sagan 1993): 
…the prioritization of safety and reliability as a goal by political elites and the 
organization’s leadership; high levels of redundancy in personnel and technical 
safety measures; the development of a “high reliability culture” in decentralized 
and continually practiced operations; and sophisticated forms of trial and error 
organizational learning. 
While the exact mix of strategies appropriate in a given case depends on the nature of a 
particular problem, the catastrophe-aversion strategy outlined above should be applicable to 
virtually any risky technology (Marone and Woodhouse 1986). In this section, we will briefly 
look at some of the characteristics of the United States Navy’s Nuclear Reactor Program under 
Hyman G. Rickover’s leadership that made it a HRO. 
G.1.1 The USN Nuclear Propulsion Program 
... the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program embodies unsurpassed engineering and 
sustained excellence that few technical programs in or out of government can 
claim. In every area of performance, standards, safety, and environmental care, 
the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has excelled. ... 
Former President Bill Clinton 
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is a joint Department of Defense / Energy 
program formed between 1947 and 1948 following WWII under the direction of then Captain 
Hyman G. Rickover. Its goal was to utilize the new knowledge developed during the war to 
research, design, construct, operate, and maintain all nuclear-powered submarines. Later the 
organization’s scope was broadened to include all U.S. nuclear-powered warships (i.e., aircraft 
carriers). Previous studies have argued that the Nuclear Propulsion Program (a.k.a. the Naval 
Reactors (NR) program) is an archetypal HRO and has all four critical elements identified by 
high reliability theory (Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003). NR has over 900 reactor-
years of experience with nuclear technology with an unblemished safety record. As a result, 
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many important observations regarding public high reliability organizations can be drawn from 
looking at the NR program under Rickover’s command including: 
• People are the most important element to an organization’s reliability. An extraordinary 
amount of time and resources are needed to ensure proper selection, education, and 
training of the personnel. 
• Complex jobs cannot be executed reliably with transient personnel. 
• Scientist or engineers should not make assumptions if they truly do not understand the 
environment of the problem. 
One characteristic of a HRO is that it fits into what W. Richard Scott has called the 
“closed rational systems” approach in organization theory. The HRO are rational in the sense 
that they set up highly formalized structures that are oriented toward the achievement of clear 
and consistent goals. They are closed in the sense that great effort is put into minimizing the 
effects the environment outside the organization has on the achievement of its objectives. 
In this respect, the Naval Reactors program was intentionally formed under both the US 
Navy Bureau of Ships (BuShips) and the Department of Energy’s Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC). The BuShips has the authority to design, build, and maintain all US naval ships. NR’s 
association with BuShips gave the agency the legal authority to sign contracts, spend money, and 
approve ship design features. The 1946 Atomic Energy Act on the other hand states that the 
responsibility and authority for anything atomic is in the AEC’s hands. This includes atomic fuel 
procurement, fabrication, reprocess, reactor safety inspections & evaluations. Therefore 
Rickover intentionally established the NR program to be in the AEC to give it the legal authority 
to sign contracts and make arrangements to deal with classified atomic materials and 
information. This “dual citizenship” of sorts served to give the NR program the legal authority to 
do its job with a minimum degree of outside interference. 
Within Naval Reactors, strong, clear, and open communications continues to be 
paramount to the organization’s success. Rickover continually made the point to the media that 
he had no organizational structure. In 1980, with a total of 359 engineering, financial, naval, and 
clerical personnel in his Washington office, he solemnly issued an elaborate organization chart to 
the media. Only the title, date, and signature were in English; the numerous squares bore Chinese 
characters (Duncan 1990). Rickover was attempting to communicate, albeit sarcastically, that 
NR has as little communication barriers as possible in the organization to enable people to 
communicate with whomever they felt was the most capable of answering their question.  This 
quality is crucial in ensuring the future safety and reliability of the program. Regardless of how 
well trained and educated personnel may be, a channel to communicate information to the 
highest levels of the organization’s management without barriers is often needed. 
It is worth mentioning while the NR program seeks to minimize the degree of outside 
interference other organizations had on its ability to design, construct, and operate nuclear 
submarines, NR is dependent on private contractors and institutions in both the public and 
private sector in fulfilling its mission. NR addresses this challenge by working to ensure that 
their own personnel be at least as knowledgeable as the outsourcer’s staff. This allows NR to 
perform reliable oversight of outsourced activities by decreasing the likelihood of being misled, 
and internally provides the capability of leading outsourced duties at the desired level of quality 
if the outsourcer is unable. Rickover for example had an extensive amount of knowledge about 
industry and the level of quality they can achieve if appropriately encouraged. This allowed him 
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to outsource work to private contractors and still maintain a high quality engineering product.  
This further highlights the importance of recruiting and maintaining a highly qualified 
engineering workforce even if the agency continues to expand its outsourcing efforts in the hope 
of improving efficiency. 
As the nation begins to consider how it might ‘re-engineer’ the Army Corps of 
Engineer’s Civil Works program in light of Katrina, it is important that the Corps relationships 
with other private and public organizations that might enhance or diminish the quality of water 
resource projects also be evaluated. This includes relationships with the White House, Congress, 
local and state governments, and private contractors. 
G.1.2 Personnel Recruitment and Retention 
Complex jobs cannot be accomplished effectively with transients. 
Extensive historical investigations of engineered systems where quality was 
compromised, and this led to a catastrophic consequence (i.e., human life or financial) were 
performed by the authors, and it was concluded that 80% of these failures were due to human or 
organizational factors. Of these HOF failures in engineering systems, most occur during their 
operation or maintenance as a result of errors in design or construction. Therefore, to effectively 
build and maintain an organization that reliably designs and constructs large-scale complex 
engineering systems, a lot of time and care must be put into its personnel. Rickover shared this 
belief and in 1979 testified before the subcommittee on energy research and production of the 
House Committee on Science and Technology following the Three-Mile Island incident 
(Rickover 1979): 
Properly running a sophisticated technical program requires a fundamental 
understanding of and commitment to the technical aspects of the job and a 
willingness to pay infinite attention to the technical details. I might add, infinite 
personal attention. This can only be done by one who understands the details and 
their implications. The phrase, “The Devil is in the details” is especially true for 
technical work. If you ignore those details and attempt to rely on management 
techniques or gimmicks you will surely end up with a system that is 
unmanageable, and problems will be immensely more difficult to solve. At Naval 
Reactors, I take individuals who are good engineers and make them into 
managers. They do not manage by gimmicks but rather by knowledge, logic, 
common sense, and hard work and experience. 
The challenging and exciting projects at the NR program have allowed the agency to 
recruit, select and maintain a highly qualified personnel workforce. At the time of its founding, 
the US Navy Nuclear Reactors program was one of the premier engineering organizations a 
young person could hope to work for. The organization was leading the world in advancing 
science and technology with respect to reactor design.  The excitement of working on cutting-
edge projects allowed the organization to successfully recruit from the cream of the Navy 
Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) community, National Laboratories, and the submarine force 
(Krahn, unpublished manuscript, 1992).  
From this pool, the NR program’s senior leadership (Rickover included) spent a 
significant amount of time evaluating and selecting prospective NR engineering personnel. As 
noted earlier in this investigation, approximately 80% of engineering system failures are caused 
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by human errors (Bea 2006). In order to effectively reduce the probability of failure, it is critical 
that the performance of the men and women that directly interface with its design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance be improved. One way to effectively improve personnel performance 
is to spend more time selecting individuals who have “the right stuff” and less time trying to 
“train” individuals who don’t. The right stuff in the NR program was identified to be a 
combination of desirable technical and behavioral traits. Often times, especially in engineering, 
employees are selected almost exclusively on practical technical competence.  In addition to this, 
the NR program also assesses the behavioral traits through personal interviews. In addition to 
other traits this interview serves to understand an engineer’s ethics when exposed to anything 
from normal to high levels of pressure/stress.  Rickover highlighted the objective of this part of 
the selection process in the NR program (Rockwell 1992): 
…what I’m trying to find out is how they will behave under pressure. Will they lie, 
or bluff, or panic, or wilt?  Or will they continue to function with some modicum 
of competence and integrity?  I can’t find that out with routine questions. I’ve got 
to shake ‘em  up. That’s the only way I’ll know…. 
Engineering organizations charged with designing, constructing, operating, or 
maintaining complex engineering systems cannot do so successfully with low personnel 
retention. When an engineering organization has a large turnover, one can expect low morale and 
dedication amongst personnel as well as high error rates. Although the effect of turnover level on 
organizational performance depends critically on the nature of the system in which the turnover 
occurs, generally an organization can expect disruption of social and communication structures, 
increased training and assimilation costs, and decreased cohesion and commitment of members 
who stay (Arthur 1994). Additionally, the organization can expect lower levels of organizational 
memory and learning.  
The NR program shared the belief that complex jobs cannot be accomplished effectively 
with transients. To minimize the agency’s turnover rate, the NR program required that all 
prospective engineering personnel be volunteers. Furthermore, the personnel were continually 
offered the kind of challenges and rewards in their work such that they could overlook the 
shortcomings of their monetary compensation as typical in many public-sector organizations. 
This allows the organization to benefit fully from their knowledge, experience, and corporate 
memory (Rockwell 1992). This includes the reporting of near-misses, which as we will see later 
is a crucial element to managing risk in a complex system (i.e., organizational learning).  
Former director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion program, Admiral “Skip” Bowman, 
discussed some of the program’s issues with respect to retention following a decrease in 
submarine orders after the Cold War: 
Although the build rate had changed dramatically, the importance of maintaining 
tight controls didn’t change, and the demographics of the organization became an 
issue. Were we going to wake up six years from now and find that the old guard 
had tuned gray and gone away and that we hadn’t watched closely enough the 
professional development of the youngsters who need to be stepping in as section 
heads? We looked at the retention pattern at Naval Reactors, and it wasn’t good. 
So we dramatically changed the opportunities for professional development and 
worked at making young engineers feel more and more a part of this organization 
– to create a niche where they could feel comfortable supporting their own 
desires, aspirations, and families. 
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The Naval Reactor program would not survive very long if the personnel were not clearly 
dedicated to their jobs. For this reason the NR program can be said to follow what human 
resource researchers have called a commitment versus a control human resource system. 
Commitment human resource systems focus on developing committed employees who can be 
trusted to use their discretion to carry out job tasks in ways that are consistent with 
organizational goals (e.g., quality). In contrast, control human resource system’s objective is to 
improve efficiency by enforcing employee compliance with specified rules and procedures and 
basing rewards on some measurable output criteria. Generally, organizations that adopt this 
strategy have a much higher percentage of non-dedicated personnel that are hence more likely to 
violate the formal and informal procedures in the organization and less inclined to adopt 
management’s leadership in creating a quality culture within the organization (Arthur 1994). 
G.1.3 Engineering Assumptions 
A critical aspect to life-cycle engineering is the treatment of uncertainties. In design and 
construction, many traditional engineering approaches are deterministic and thus require 
“conservative” assumptions of random variables. These variables can include anything from the 
price of steel to the compressive strength of concrete. The industry has notably established a 
variety of inspection and testing activities that improve our ability to predict the performance of 
our systems.  
In designing the first nuclear powered submarine, many engineers who have never been 
on a submarine were asked to make very important design decisions. Rickover felt it was critical 
that any engineer or scientist not make assumptions if they truly did not understand the materials 
being used and environment the finished submarine must operate in. This includes the internal 
(e.g., temperature), external (e.g., squalls or blast loads), and social (e.g., training/knowledge of 
crew or variable operational stress climates) environments. Rickover used videos to help impress 
upon engineers the nature of the problem they are being asked to design. Furthermore, the 
organization went to great lengths to minimize communication barriers so that information could 
be transferred freely directly to the people who need it.  
G.1.4 Conclusion 
... Particularly noteworthy are the conservative rugged designs, standardized 
plants, thorough testing, comprehensive plant maintenance, emphasis on 
correcting small problems before they can grow, and the high degree of selection, 
training, and qualification of officers and enlisted personnel who operate the 
plants.  These high standards and achievements continue to be reflected in the 
quality and competence of the Naval Reactors Headquarters and field 
organizations, including their dedicated laboratories, shipyards, manufacturing 
activities, and training facilities. ... 
Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Shirley Jackson 
Failure was never an acceptable option for Rickover. While this was due in part to the 
widely reported fact the Navy was looking for ‘any’ reason to get rid of Rickover and the 
program, it was also because the consequences of a nuclear reactor failure are incredibly high. 
The flooding of New Orleans has made it abundantly clear that the consequences of a poorly 
designed, constructed, and maintained water resource and flood protection infrastructure are also 
far too high for our country to sustain.  
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Many of the organizations responsible for building and maintaining flood protection in 
New Orleans, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the local levee districts, can learn 
a lot from High Reliability Theory and the example that the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
continues to set. The fluid organizational structure, vibrant exchange of ideas (coupled with 
developed communication skills), and coherent training programs are to be desired by many 
public and private organizations. The structure of the organization allowed anyone to do 
whatever it is they saw that needed to be done, and to seek the necessary resources to do it. 
People were limited only by their own abilities and not by formal titles and organizational charts. 
The Corps leadership along with Congress and the White House must recognize the important 
role technical people have within the Civil Works program and take major steps to create an 
environment that stresses quality and reliability to its personnel, and that can clearly be seen 
through all ranks of the organization. 
 
 
G.2 Findings from Other Studies: Organizing for Success 
G.2.1 Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2006). 
Hurricane Katrina, A Nation Still Unprepared, United States Senate, Washington, 
DC, May. 
A vital part of the Hurricane Katrina story lies in nearly two centuries of natural and 
manmade changes to the Louisiana coastline. When New Orleans was settled in 1718, the 
primary flood threat was the Mississippi River, not the Gulf of Mexico, which was separated 
from the city by an expansive coastal landscape that served as a buffer from storms emerging 
from the Gulf. 
That protective landscape no longer exists. The ever changing and disappearing coastline 
left New Orleans more susceptible to hurricanes and contributed to the damage inflicted by 
Katrina. Should this trend continue, New Orleans and the rest of coastal Louisiana will become 
ever more vulnerable to damage from future storms, and efforts to protect the city with levees 
and floodwalls will be progressively undermined. 
While a comprehensive analysis of coastal Louisiana’s environmental challenges and 
potential remedies is beyond the scope of this report, this section briefly examines some of the 
potential impacts of Louisiana’s altered landscape on hurricane protection. 
 
Louisiana’s Changing Coastal Landscape is Increasing Hurricane Vulnerability 
The Louisiana coastline is changing more rapidly than the coastline of any other part of 
the country and, as a result, becoming more vulnerable to hurricanes. Over the last 70 years, 
Louisiana has lost over 1,900 square miles of coastal land - an area roughly the size of Delaware. 
At the peak of the trend in the 1960s and 1970s, Louisiana was losing 40 square miles of coastal 
land per year. This loss has slowed in recent years, primarily because the most vulnerable lands 
have already disappeared, but Louisiana is still losing 10 square miles of coastal land per year. 
As a civil engineering magazine put it, “in southeastern Louisiana a football field worth of 
wetlands sinks into the sea every 30 minutes.” 
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These coastal lands primarily consist of wetlands, including extensive cypress swamps 
and grass marshes. But Louisiana’s barrier islands (an elongated chain of islands running parallel 
to the coast and serving as a barrier against waves) and even many higher ridges, which were 
formed by large amounts of sediment piling up along past banks of the Mississippi River, are 
also disappearing. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) projects that an additional 700 square 
miles could be lost by 2050 if no further actions are taken to halt or reverse current processes. 
The Mississippi River is the single most important factor in sustaining coastal Louisiana. 
The river brings water, sediments, and nutrients from 41 percent of the land area of the 
contiguous U.S. to the coast of Louisiana. Prior to the extensive building of levees and dams 
along the Mississippi, the river carried nearly 400 million tons of sediment to the Louisiana 
Coast every year - enough to cover 250 square miles one-foot deep in sediment. The growing 
wetlands fed by the accumulating sediments, nutrients, and fresh water of the Mississippi have 
added 9,600 square miles of land to the Louisiana coastline over the last 6,000 years - a rate of 
1.25 square miles per year. At its peak, this land, known as the Mississippi deltaic plane, 
accounted for nearly 20 percent of the land area of present-day Louisiana, including New 
Orleans. 
Major causes of land loss in Louisiana have been identified. Dams and diversions along 
the Mississippi River and its tributaries have greatly reduced the amount of sediment that reaches 
coastal Louisiana, and levees force the remaining sediment so far offshore that it falls directly 
onto the outer continental shelf and beyond, where it no longer contributes to sustaining or 
building coastal lands. By blocking natural flooding cycles, levees prevent fresh water and 
nutrients from the Mississippi River from nourishing and sustaining wetlands. Ten major 
navigation canals and more than 9,000 miles of pipelines servicing approximately 50,000 oil and 
gas production facilities in coastal Louisiana result in a large direct loss of land and also 
contribute to wetland loss from saltwater intrusion and dredging. 
The Louisiana deltaic plane is essentially sinking, in a process known as subsidence, 
which occurs naturally as sediments deposited by the Mississippi are compacted over time. Oil 
and gas production further contribute to subsidence, potentially causing local subsidence three 
times greater than the highest natural subsidence rates. Finally, sea level is rising, primarily as a 
result of global warming. 
The deterioration of Louisiana’s coastal landscape of barrier islands, wetlands and higher 
ridges, and the effects of subsidence, have made coastal communities more vulnerable to 
hurricane flooding. New Orleans, in particular, is widely considered to be more vulnerable to 
hurricanes both because land in the city has subsided and because much of the barrier islands and 
wetlands that once surrounded the city have disappeared. 
Many of the mechanisms by which barrier islands, shoals, marshes, forested wetlands, 
and other features of the coastal landscape protect against hurricanes are well-known. Geologic 
features such as barrier islands or the land mass associated with wetlands can block or channel 
flow, slow water velocities, and reduce the speed at which storm surge propagates. These effects 
can significantly restrict the volume of water available to inundate the mainland. 
Forested wetlands can greatly diminish wind penetration, reducing surface waves and 
storm surge. Shallow water depths weaken waves via bottom friction, interactive damping and 
braking, while vegetation provides additional frictional drag and further limits wave buildup. 
Where wetlands and shallow waters are in front of levees, they absorb wave energy and reduce 
the destructiveness of storm waves on the levees. 
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Depending on the rate of relative sea-level rise, healthy coastal wetlands can maintain a 
near sea-level landscape by trapping sediments or accumulating organic material, thus helping to 
counter subsidence and global sea-level rise. In contrast, when Louisiana’s coastal wetlands 
deteriorate and disappear, the land held in place by the wetlands undergoes wave erosion, 
eventually washing away and leaving behind open water 10 to 12 feet deep. 
On the other hand, the quantitative impact of wetlands and other coastal features on 
hurricane protection is poorly known. Anecdotal data accumulated after Hurricane Andrew 
suggests a storm-surge reduction along the Louisiana coast of about three inches per mile of 
marsh. During Hurricane Katrina, bottom friction and breaking reduced the average height of the 
highest one-third of waves from 55 feet in deep water (with peak waves above 80 feet), to 18 feet 
in shallower water outside of the barrier island east of New Orleans, to a fraction of that height in 
protected areas. 
Researchers at the Louisiana State University (LSU) Hurricane Center found that, during 
Hurricane Katrina, levees protected by wetlands had a much higher survival rate than those 
bordering open water. For example, large sections of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) 
levees that had little or no wetlands separating them from Lake Borgne disintegrated, while the 
nearby 20-Arpent Canal levee, protected by a buffer of marsh and wooded wetlands, remained 
standing. According to LSU researchers, an area about the size of a football field with the tree 
density equal to that found in most Louisiana swamps would reduce wave energy in a storm by 
approximately 90 percent. These researchers further found that friction from marsh grasses and 
shrubs reduced water speed from Hurricane Katrina in some places from seven feet per second to 
three feet per second. 
Subsidence is also contributing substantially to hurricane vulnerability. Subsidence 
occurs across the entire region, and therefore impacts not only natural features such as wetlands 
and barrier islands, but also man-made structures such as buildings and levees. According to a 
recent report by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Interagency Performance Evaluation 
Task Force (IPET, June 1, 2006), which examines the hurricane protection levee system, the 
average rate of subsidence across the area is 0.6 feet over a decade. The rate of subsidence is 
frequently greater under cities and towns than under natural features: when areas are drained in 
order to prepare them for buildings, organic material in the soil decomposes and leads to further 
subsidence. In addition, the levees themselves further subside due to their own weight pressing 
down on the unstable soils of the New Orleans area. As a result, the effectiveness of the levee 
system deteriorates over time as both the levees and the region subside. The IPET report 
concluded that some portions of the hurricane protection system around New Orleans are almost 
two feet below their original elevations, further increasing their own vulnerability, and that of the 
areas they are designed to protect, to the power of hurricanes. 
The changes to Louisiana’s coastline have serious implications for the long-term 
sustainability of the region. Land subsidence and predicted global sea-level rise during the next 
100 years mean that areas of New Orleans and vicinity now 5 to 10 feet below mean sea level 
will likely be 8 to 13 feet or more below mean sea level by 2100. At the same time, the loss of 
wetlands, barrier islands, and other natural features could eliminate protection from waves and 
allow for higher and faster moving storm surges. According to the National Academy of 
Sciences, these trends will make much of Louisiana’s southern delta uninhabitable without 
substantial new engineering projects. In the long-term, New Orleans and other regions of the 
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Louisiana deltaic plane cannot be protected without taking proper account of the tremendous 
change that is continuing to occur to Louisiana’s coastal landscape. 
 
G.2.2 Senator Susan Collins (2006). “Opening Statement”, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Government Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for 
Reform,” Washington DC, March 8. 
The excuse we have heard from some government officials throughout this investigation, 
that Katrina was an unforeseeable ultra-catastrophe, has not only been demonstrated to have been 
mistaken, but also misses the point that we need to be ready for the worst that nature or evil men 
can throw at us. Powerful though it was, the most extraordinary thing about Katrina was our lack 
of preparedness for a disaster so long predicted. 
This is not the first time the devastation of a natural disaster brought about demands for a 
better, more coordinated government response. In fact, this process truly began after a series of 
natural disasters in the 1960s and into the 1970s. One of those disasters was Hurricane Betsy, 
which hit New Orleans in 1965. The similarities with Katrina are striking: levees overtopped and 
breached, severe flooding, communities destroyed, thousands rescued from rooftops by 
helicopters, thousands more by boat, and too many lives lost. 
Katrina revealed that this kaleidoscope of reorganizations has not improved our disaster 
management capability during these critical years. Our purpose and our obligation now is to 
move forward to create a structure that brings immediate improvement and guarantees continual 
progress. This will not be done by simply renaming agencies or drawing new organizational 
charts. We are not here to rearrange the deck chairs on a ship that, while perhaps not sinking, 
certainly is adrift. 
This new structure must be based on a clear understanding of the roles and capabilities of 
all management agencies. It must establish a strong chain of command that encourages, 
empowers, and trusts frontline decision-making. It must replace ponderous, rigid bureaucracy 
with discipline, agility, cooperation, and collaboration. It must build a stronger partnership 
among all levels of government with the responsibilities of each partner clearly defined, and it 
must hold them accountable when those responsibilities are not met. 
 
G.2.3 Newt Gingrich (2006). “Why New Orleans Needs Saving,” Time Magazine, March 6. 
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, Speaker of the House Dennis 
Hastert wondered aloud whether the Federal Government should help rebuild a city much of 
which lies below sea level. The most tough-minded answer to that question demonstrates that 
rebuilding and protecting new Orleans is in the national interest. Reason: The very same 
geological forces that created that port are what make it vulnerable to Category 5 hurricanes and 
also what make it indispensable. 
If engineering the Mississippi made New Orleans vulnerable, it also created enormous 
value. New Orleans is the busiest port in the U.S.; 20% of all U.S. exports and 60% of our grain 
exports, pass through it. Offshore Louisiana oil and gas wells supply 20% of domestic oil 
production. but to service that industry, canals and pipelines were dug through the land, greatly 
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accelerating the washing away of coastal Louisiana. The state’s land loss now totals 1,900 sq. 
miles. That land once protected the entire region from hurricanes by acting as a sponge to soak 
up storm surges. If nothing is done, in the foreseeable future an additional 700 sq. mi. will 
disappear, putting at risk port facilities and all the energy-producing infrastructure in the Gulf. 
There is no debate about the reality of that land loss and its impact. On that the energy 
industry and environmentalists agree. There is also no doubt about the solution. Chip Groat, a 
former director of the U.S. Geological Survey, says, “This land loss can be managed, and New 
Orleans can be protected, even with projected sea-level rise.” Category 5 hurricane protection for 
the region, including coastal restoration, storm-surge barriers and improved levees, would cost 
about $40 billion - over 30 years. Compare that with the cost to the economy of less international 
competitiveness (the result of increased freight charges stemming from loss of the efficiencies of 
the port of New Orleans), higher energy prices and more vulnerable energy supplies. Compare 
that with the cost of rebuilding the energy and port infrastructure elsewhere. Compare that with 
the fact that in the past two years, we have spent more to rebuild Iraq’s wetlands than 
Louisiana’s. National interest requires this restoration. Our energy needs alone require it. Yet the 
White Houses proposes spending only $100 million for coastal restoration. 
Washington also has a moral burden. It was the Federal Government’s responsibility to 
build levees that worked, and its failure to do so ultimately led to New Orleans’ being flooded. 
The White House recognized that responsibility when it proposed an additional $4.2 billion for 
housing in New Orleans, but the first priority remains flood control. Without it, individuals will 
hesitate to rebuild, and lenders will decline to invest. 
How should flood control be paid for? States get 50% of the tax revenues paid to the 
Federal Government from oil and gas produced on federally owned land. States justify that by 
arguing that the energy production puts strains on their infrastructure and environment. 
Louisiana gets no share of the tax revenue from the oil and gas production on the outer 
continental shelf. Yet that production puts an infinitely greater burden on it than energy 
production form other federal territory puts on any other state. If we treat Louisiana the same as 
other states and give it the same share of tax revenue that other states receive, it will need no 
other help from the government to protect itself.  Every day’s delay makes it harder to rebuild the 
city. It is time to act. It is well past time. 
 
G.2.4 Houck, O. (2006). “Can We Save New Orleans?”, Tulane Environmental Law 
Journal, Vol 19, Issue 1, 1-68, New Orleans, Louisiana. 
So What Do We Do? Here is what we know. It is not just the tire, it’s the car. And it’s 
not just the car, it’s the driver. Nothing in the system has made a numero uno priority either of 
protecting New Orleans from hurricanes or to restoring even hanging onto - the Louisiana coast. 
We have a flood control program, a navigation program, a permitting program, a coastal 
management program, a flood insurance program, a coastal restoration program - just for openers 
- and they do not talk to each other. They are riddled with conflicts, basically headless, basically 
goal-less, weakened by compromises and refusal outright to deal with first causes and first needs. 
So, this is a tall order. 
We also know this. As they came ashore, there were really two Katrinas. One blew 
through the levees into New Orleans and St. Bernard, and topped the ones further south. The 
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other smashed into coast-front development in a wide swath from Alabama to Texas, wiping out 
the first half-mile or so of Pass Christian, Waveland, Gulfport, Biloxi, half of Grand Isle, and all 
the way over to Holly Beach. Same set of storms, but the run-up for one was negligence, and the 
run-up for the other was arrogance. Building behind levees is one thing; you have some reason to 
think they’ll hold up. Building on the edge of the gulf and thumbing your nose at it is another. 
The vision for New Orleans is relatively clean. The city is a given, fixed in its history, 
architecture, economy and culture and these contributions call for maintaining it, as is, for as 
long as we can. Nobody needs to reinvent New Orleans: we simply need to get it back. Its 
protection will cost a fortune, and will take more than anyone wants to concede (and no small 
amount of luck, as we race the clock against the near-term hurricane seasons). But at least we 
know what we are driving at. Whether we succeed will depend on levees, flood gates, rational 
storm water management within the city walls, conservative building elevations, levees and one 
thing more: a viable coastal zone to buffer them, without which the system will not hold over 
time. 
So here is the starting point: exactly what we do want the Louisiana coast to look like, to 
do for us, for say, the next century? …Earth to Louisianans: you really can’t have this cake and 
eat it too. With all due respect, it is not just a matter of doing everything we want ‘smarter.’ It is 
a matter of getting straight what we want, and what comes first. … what comes next is the 
hardest step for any American community to take, and shall be heresy in South Louisiana. A 
plan. The mere mention of planning raises blood pressures and brings on cries of Godless 
Communism. …What we have had in the city of New Orleans and along the entire gulf coast is 
planning by default (local attorney Bill Borah calls it ‘planning by surprise’). Planning takes 
place. It’s just that we haven’t taken part in it. Where water resources are concerned, it starts 
with real estate developers, port authorities, levee boards and other outside-the-ballot-box 
enterprises, their projects facilitated and funded by the Army Corps of Engineers. In their minds, 
the only question is a technical one: what kind of engineering do we need to get our project 
done? The system has produced the expected results: more rip-rap here, more drainage there, and 
levees to the horizon. The goal is - although it is never stated anywhere - to develop as much of 
the coast as possible. When you add the projects up, they determine the destiny of the city and 
South Louisiana. 
What is apparent is that these levees, designed by engineers and approved by Congress, 
are the basic planning documents for the future of South Louisiana. What is north of these levees 
will be developed. What is south of them will be anyone’s guess, although not for long; the map 
on global warming shows these coastal marshes gone within a century. De facto, we end up with 
a wall. Not all that adequate a wall, by the way. Only Category three, if that. Can you imagine 
the costs of maintaining even a Category three levee system winding back and forth to the Gulf 
from New Orleans to Texas” Can we imagine what will happen when development piles in 
behind it, and then gets flooded? Do we already know, from Lakeview and New Orleans East, 
what happens to land elevations behind levees once they are drained and paved? 
Our choice is to start this process from the other end. If we do, another range of options 
open. There are a dozen major towns across the southern tier with thousands of homes and 
residents, and they deserve protection. But the way to provide it may be with the same kind of 
ring levee systems that protects (or should) New Orleans and its surrounding parishes, 
supplemented by flood gates at the mouths of the main canals. Or, it may mean peninsular levee 
systems down the historic ridges of the bayous, protecting what has always been the high 
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ground. …Problem is, we have lacked the process - we have lacked even the language - for such 
a discussion. In addition to scientists and engineers, we may need some social workers. In saying 
this, I am most serious. 
The Dutch have been fighting the North Sea for a thousand years, and their historic 
methods - dikes, drainage canals and pumps - look quite familiar, as does their continuing and 
accelerated rate of subsidence. Parts of the coast are now 23 feet below the level of the sea. The 
temporary successes of this engineering look familiar too, always followed by greater, 
catastrophic losses. Finally, in 1953 a major hurricane blew in and left 1,800 bodies in its wake, 
50,000 destroyed homes and 350,00 acres of flooded land. In a country half the size of 
Louisiana. 
Vowing ‘Never Again,’ the country devised a new plan. Back in 1932, they had dikes off 
the Zuiderzee, an estuary twice the size of Lake Pontchartrain, with a barrier more than 20 miles 
long. Their new Delta Plan would apply that same strategy to the entire Atlantic Coast. They 
dammed every one of their major rivers, some of them multiple times. They diked off their 
estuaries, diked off entire seas, and reduced their coastline by more than two-thirds. The water is 
the enemy, explained a professor of engineering. ‘You don’t let the enemy, before the fight 
starts, penetrate your territory.’ 
They won. At a cost of about $18 billion over some 40 years, they completed their first 
rounds of the Delta plan and they haven’t flooded since. They predict their strategy to hold for 
the next 500 years. At the same time they moved aggressively to fill lands behind their coastal 
barriers, ‘polders’ created literally from the sea. The polders produced fruit and vegetables. So 
far, it was all win-win. 
Then another bill came in. Over half the estuaries disappeared, and those remaining were 
in trouble. Coastal fisheries were hammered. At the mouth of two of Europe’s major rivers, the 
Meuse and the Rhine, the Grevelingen was the largest and most productive estuary on the 
Atlantic coast. Within two weeks of completing the barrier across it the mussels and shellfish 
were dead.  The government tried to turn what is  now a lake behind the barrier to tourism, but 
the water was, and remains, so contaminated that it is unfit for human contact. It is covered with 
toxic algae and more than 5 billion feet of polluted sludge has settled on the bottom. They had 
made a dead zone.  …. Interfering with natural processes and natural systems is always a bad 
thing, says one. ‘Mother nature is the best engineer’. 
There is also a question of commitment. The Netherlands is a small country, and it has 
dedicated itself to fighting the sea. It cannot afford not to. Sixty percent of its land is below sea 
level. Louisiana, as valuable as it is to the nation and to those of us who live here, is only one 
piece of America, and America’s attention span for this or any other endeavor is limited.  So will 
be federal funding, and we are still in the heyday of a petroleum economy that cannot and will 
not, last. Unless Louisiana goes in a direction that is more self-sustaining over the long term, it 
could (end) up with a large white elephant on its hands. 
Perhaps the most important lesson from the Netherlands experience is how it has since 
evolved. As noted, Dutch engineers have tried to retrofit their structures to accommodate natural 
processes, to recreate natural processes, with mixed success.  Easier to do that from the start. As 
a matter of engineering strategy, they have now explicitly rejected big-levee and big-drainage 
solutions as unworkable. They have instead come to rely on multiple layers of defense, 
redundant in the safety they provide, and none designed to provide full protection on their own. 
Most significantly, they have changed their philosophy from ‘flood control’ to ‘water 
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management,’ and are tiptoeing to the next logical, indeed the only logical step: people 
management. It is rather remarkable. 
Meanwhile, in its most recent report, under the title Lessons Learned, the Netherlands 
Water Partnership says: The Netherlands is changing its approach to water. The country will 
have to make more frequent concessions. The report explains, we will have to relinquish open 
space to water, and not take back existing open spaces, in order to curb the growing risk of 
disaster due to flooding. Giving space does not mean the height of ever taller levees or depth by 
channel dredging. Rather, space in the sense of flood plains. …Only by relinquishing our space 
can we set things right; if this is not done in a timely manner, water will sooner or later reclaim 
the space on its own, perhaps in a dramatic manner. 
 If a sustainable coast is the goal, we need a map of what we can sustain. That map, in 
turn, should drive what we do for restoration and for human development, and for its protections. 
…If on the other hand, we start from the position of maintaining as much of the coastal zone and 
its natural storm barriers as we can, we meet a different set of possibilities. We interfere with 
natural processes as little as possible; remove barriers to them, and over time move to the 
traditional places Louisianans have always lived, the ridges of the natural bayous and 
distributaries leading to the gulf. We protect those zones. We also protect critical infrastructure 
for oil and gas, fisheries and essential navigation canals. For the rest, we let nature have the 
space it needs to rebuild and it will protect us in turn. 
We also need new mapmakers. We have always thought of coastal management in terms 
of engineering, and engineering agencies are well funded at every level from the Corps to local 
levee districts, politically supported from top to bottom, and largely autonomous. …The nice 
thing about engineering is that it seems so certain. It may be faulty and the building may fall 
over, but it responds to numbers and rules of physics. We are comforted by it. Usually, it works, 
or we would never take an airplane ride. And so we like engineering solutions. Among other 
things, they made living in this part of the world possible. They also look impressive, big dams 
and canals. And, down inside, they allow us to move dirt and water around which we have all 
done and enjoyed from early childhood.  Hard structure engineering has a great deal of history, 
money, and human nature going for it. Which is why we have lots of engineering maps. 
Coast 2100, We can now put the puzzle together. In a post-Katrina world of greater 
urgency, funding and public awareness of the plight of New Orleans and the Louisiana coastal 
zone, we have the opportunity to go beyond Coast 2050, take it off the leash and see where we 
can really go: Coast 2100. Before suggesting a few principles for that new plan, let us reach two 
understandings. 
The first is that restoring coastal Louisiana is a national issue and will require remedies 
beyond this state. We lie at the receiving end of a large watershed, and some of what we need 
has been turned off and other stuff that is hurting us has been turned on. The Corps districts need 
to talk to each other, the EPA has to step up to the plate, and upstream states have to change 
some habits too. If the nation’s taxpayers are going to be asked to spend more money than 
America spent on the Marshall Plan to fix all of post-war Europe, then they have a right to 
expect a national effort. 
The second is the funding. When it comes to restoring the city of New Orleans itself, the 
funding should be federal. Not just restoring the levees, the city. However you look at it, and 
with plenty of supporting actors, the Corps of Engineers drowned New Orleans and the sight of 
individual homeowners trying to rip out, detoxify and rebuild their homes is one of the most 
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unjust features of a post-Katrina world. New Orleans is a federal responsibility. You flood 
somebody, you pay. 
Conventional wisdom holds that the Corps is immune from liability for its role in the 
levee failures, and case law supports that conclusion. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 612 
(1986). On the other hand, it seems a far stretch to say that 1929 statute dealing exclusively with 
Corps works on the Mississippi River should immunize the Corps for activities in a different 
location, of a different nature, at a later time. Whatever the legal merits, the federal government’s 
moral obligation to repair the catastrophic damaged caused by its own agents seems clear. The 
obligation is not simply to provide better flood control; it is to repair the harm. 
With these understandings, here are ten criteria for a coastal plan with the maximum 
long-term chance of success: 
1. Draw the maps. Not just a flood protection plan. …To be sure, we need to know what 
the engineering possibilities are. But they beg the question, engineering to do what? Right now, 
we have the cart before the horse. 
2. Review the bidding. The Corps and other agencies have projects pending that could 
seriously compromise an all-out effort to restore the coastal zone. …That Congress has already 
authorized them is not persuasive. Like MRGO, they were authorized in a very different day 
under very different circumstances. Katrina changed the equation. They need to be looked at 
again, new restoration map in hand. They should be consistent with the future, not the past. 
3. Free the upstream sediments. The Mississippi today at the latitude of New Orleans 
carries about 80 million tons of sediment a year. An impressive figure, until we realize that a 
century and half ago it carried about 400 million….The point is that most of those silts today lie 
behind dams on the upper watershed. We need them, and the Mississippi is their natural 
conveyor belt. The bumper sticker should read: Free the Mississippi 400 Million. 
4. Free the rivers. Which, until today, we have tiptoed around with a few, very 
expensive freshwater diversion structures whose efficacy has been further compromised by their 
capacity and politics….We can cut sills in the levees to replicate natural crevasses, and let the 
river do its thing. 
5. Cut upstream fertilizers. …The upstream states are in denial, so is Louisiana for that 
matter, and EPA is in hiding. It is time to insist. A less polluted river is not a matter of aesthetics. 
It is a matter of survival. 
6. Heal the marsh. Which is hemorrhaging from the inside out. Push in the spoil banks. 
Crevasse the ones that remain. Plant grass. Pretend we’re farmers. We can build wetlands, if 
necessary, by hand. Not fully - manmade marshes still come out looking a little weird - but we 
need to rebuild a base for natural processes to then improve upon. A coast fully ceded to open 
water will be harder to restore. 
7. Stop the bleeding. We will have to make historic commitments to hold onto even the 
base of coastal wetlands we currently enjoy, an order of magnitude beyond the ambition of Coast 
2050. Meanwhile, we continue to permit dredging and filling of the same wetlands for access 
canals, waste dumps, new subdivisions and the like. Every acre of the coast we allow to be 
destroyed is certain loss. ..An ounce of prevention is worth a ton of restoration. 
8. Make space for natural processes.  Elevate roads and railroads. Open new 
floodways. Move oyster leases, consolidate energy, port and navigation facilities, zone 
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development within protected areas and let the rest rebuild. We shouldn’t try to storm-proof the 
coastal zone, and the more we try to storm-proof the more we will loose. 
9. Dare to think retreat. …People and structures in the most vulnerable areas should be 
offered the opportunity to relocate in protected areas, at full and fair compensation. The costs of 
such a program will be more than offset by the savings in the attempt to protect these same 
residences forever, and in reduced looses to future storms. The more we delay this process, the 
harder it will be. 
10. Face global warming. It is real. And it makes everything else we do to save the coast 
infinitely more difficult, if not impossible. 
Senator Landrieu inserted an $800 million appropriation into the 2005-06 budget, 
directing the Corps to conduct such a study for both New Orleans and all of South Louisiana on a 
very tight schedule; a scant six months for a draft plan. It may seem curious to some that, for 
these purposes, we would go back to the very agency that built failing levees in the first place 
and has shown historic resistance to thinking outside the box. Such is the abiding faith of the 
congressional delegation in its historic water resources partner. It is what Congress knows. The 
output of such a process is likely to be the maximum development model. It is what the Corps 
Knows. An alternative model is not yet on the table. 
The technical decisions here, form the outset, call for a broader base than that of the 
Corps. The Corps is qualified to make engineering and technical decisions. But as history shows, 
decisions of this magnitude should be reviewed by an entity that is truly independent, also 
expert, and with the authority to remand an unsupported conclusion. It could be the National 
Academy of Sciences, although the Academy is not structured to provide long-term services. It 
could be an empowered state agency. What ever the vehicle, well-qualified and independent 
review seems essential. 
As the Katrina relief debacle illustrated, shared responsibilities are necessary, but joint 
command is fatal. …but, our job calls for a new command with a single, unfragmented mandate - 
to save the Louisiana coastal zone - and the capacity to ensure that all other players are working 
towards that goal. This authority’s first job is to prepare the maps that guide all that follows. Its 
second job is to review ongoing projects, flood-control and otherwise, that could affect the 
success of their plans. Its third job is to integrate restoration, development and flood control 
initiatives - in that order - to achieve long term sustainability. An agency with less autonomy, or 
with a different set of priorities, will not succeed. 
Can We Save New Orleans? Here is our choice. We can live with nature next time 
around, or we can fight it for all the turf we can take and spend fortunes trying to defend it. 
When it comes to floods and hurricanes, a little space goes a long way. ….more problematically, 
we are likely to propose large outer barriers to protect the city as well, a second ring across the 
Rigolets and to the south. We are likely to extend these barriers, leaky or otherwise, across the 
entire Louisiana coast, for as far as the money will go. That is what we have always done, it is 
what the Corps of Engineers knows how to do, it avoids the need to plan, it sets up killings in 
real estate, and it is the easy path for politicians. Of course, it will be increasingly hard to 
maintain for even this century, the costs in trying will be enormous, and when there are failures 
more people will die. But those consequences are for another day. We are living now. 
The point of this Essay is that we have a choice. Rather than start with the premise that 
we are going to protect as much of the Louisiana coast as we can from hurricanes and then graft 
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on some restoration measures, we can start with the premise that we are going to restore as much 
of the Louisiana coast as we can and then see what we need to do, within that context, to protect 
people from hurricanes. The approaches are not the same, and they will lead to two very different 
futures. We are entitled to see the second one, before we are handed the first as a fait accompli. 
The first one is being prepared, by the Corps, on an unrealistically hasty schedule, as we speak. 
There is another engineering outfit on the scene, however. Mother Nature. The best way 
to restore coastal Louisiana and to provide long-term safety for New Orleans and other coastal 
residents is to help nature get back in the game, and then stand back. Not very far back. Just far 
enough for it to work for us: a natural, self-sustaining, horizontal, first and major line of defense 
spinning off renewable resource dividends for generations to come. We can have a coast and live 
and work in it safely for a very long time. Just not everywhere, and doing every damn thing we 
want. Can we save New Orleans? It’ll be a journey. Will we? Depends on no rain in the morning, 
and the path we choose. 
 
G.2.5 Netherlands Water Partnership (2005). Dutch Expertise, Water Management & 
Flood Control, Delft, The Netherlands, November. 
Climate changes are increasing the likelihood of flooding and water-related problems. In 
addition population density continues to increase, as does the potential for economic growth, and 
consequently, the vulnerability to economic and social disaster. two undesirable developments 
that, in terms of safety, exacerbate one another - a grown risk with even larger consequences. As 
such, the safety risk is growing at a n accelerated pace (safety risk - chance multiplied by 
consequence). 
The Netherlands is changing its approach to water. This change involves the idea that the 
Netherlands will have to make more frequent concessions. We will have to relinquish open space 
to water, and not take back existing open spaces, in order to curb the growing risk of disaster due 
to flooding, we will also need to limit water-related problems and be able to store water for 
expected periods of drought. By this we do not mean space in terms of the height of ever taller 
levees or depth through continued channel dredging, but space in the sense of flood plains. This 
approach will require more area, but in return we will increase our safety and limit water related 
problems. Safety is an aspect that must plan a different role in spatial planning. Only by 
relinquishing our space can we set things right; if this is not done in a timely manner, water will 
sooner or later reclaim the space on its own, perhaps [in a] dramatic manner. 
We are developing a new risk management approach that includes determining how far 
the government can and should go in providing protection against high water levels and how 
much it can and should spend for that purpose. We will base the approach on factors including 
the ‘safe Netherlands roadmap.’ In that project, the Ministry has joined forces with provincial 
governments and water boards to gauge the likelihood and consequences of flooding in each 
levee ‘ring’ (an area that is completely surrounded by levees). 
The consequences of flooding are also taken into account in the Dutch risk management 
approach. Human and economic values also determine risk standards. Which means that not just 
technical expertise in dealing with flood management is needed, but also socio-economic 
experience. We support the decision-making process by providing scenarios, alternatives and 
public relations advice. 
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The Netherlands is divided into compartments with different risk levels of flooding. High 
density areas with greater human and economic interest, like Rotterdam and Amsterdam, are 
surrounded with stronger levees than rural areas and therefore have a lower risk level from 
flooding than others. One of the most difficult policy decisions the Dutch face in the next decade 
is to decide what level of protection is necessary, acceptable and cost-effective for each 
compartment. 
 Our standards are accepted risks related to the design-criteria of our dikes. Those 
standards are laid down in the Flood Defense Act. For the economically most important and 
densely populated part of the country, we design our dikes and dunes to be strong enough to 
withstand a storm-situation with a probability of 1 to 10,000 a year. That means that a Dutchman 
- if he should live a 100 years - has a chance of 1 percent to witness such an event. For our 
parliament, these odds became the acceptable standard. For the less important coastal areas we 
calculate the probability of 1 to 4,000 and along the main rivers 1 to 1,250. 
 
G.2.6 Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee (1994). Sharing the 
Challenge: Floodplain Management into the 21st Century, Report to Administration 
Floodplain Management Task Force, Washington DC, June. 
Over the last 30 years the nation has learned that effective floodplain management can 
reduce vulnerability to damages and create a balance among natural and human uses of 
floodplains and their related watersheds to meet both social and environmental goals. The nation, 
however, has not taken full advantage of this knowledge. The United States simply has lacked 
the focus and incentive to engage itself seriously in floodplain management. The 1993 flood has 
managed to focus attention on the floodplain and has provided the incentive for action. 
The Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee proposes a better way to 
manage the floodplains. It begins by establishing that all levels of government, all businesses and 
all citizens have a stake in properly managing the floodplain. All of those who support risk 
behavior, either directly or indirectly, must share in floodplain management and in the costs of 
reducing that risk. The federal government can lead by example; but state and local governments 
must manage their own floodplains. Individual citizens must adjust their actions to the risk they 
face and bear a greater share of the economic costs. 
While development of the region has produced significant benefits, it has not always been 
conducted in a wise manner. As a result, today the nation faces three major problems: 
First, as the Midwest Flood of 1993 has shown, people and property remain at risk, not 
only in the floodplains of the upper Mississippi River Basin, but also throughout the nation. 
Many of those at risk do not fully understand the nature and the potential consequences of that 
risk; nor do they share fully in the fiscal implications of bearing that risk. 
Second, only in recent years has the nation come to appreciate fully the significance of 
the fragile ecosystems of the upper Mississippi River Basin. Given the tremendous loss of habitat 
over the last two centuries, many suggest that the nation now faces severe ecological 
consequences. 
Third, the division of responsibilities for floodplain management among federal, state, 
tribal and local governments needs clear definition. Currently, attention to floodplain 
management varies widely among and within federal, state, tribal and local governments. 
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Now is the time to: 
Share responsibility and accountability for accomplishing floodplain management among 
all levels government and with all citizens of the nation. The federal government cannot go it 
alone nor should it take a dominant role in the process. 
Establish, as goals for the future, the reduction of the vulnerability of the nation to the 
dangers and damages that result from floods and the concurrent and integrated preservation and 
enhancement of the natural resources and functions of floodplains. Such an approach seeks to 
avoid unwise use of the floodplain, to minimize vulnerability when floodplains must be used, 
and to mitigate damages when they do occur. 
Organize federal programs to provide the support and the tools necessary for all levels of 
government to carry out and participate in effective floodplain management. 
 
G.2.7 Input from Citizens of the Greater New Orleans Area; Levees.Org 
We the citizens of Levees.Org are pleased to submit the issues that we believe are critical 
to the future of New Orleans and southern Louisiana. 
Mission. Flood protection must be the primary mission of the entity in charge of design 
and construction of the flood protection system.  The US Army Corps of Engineers views their 
mission as not rocking the boat and following Congress’ authorization.  We feel that is the wrong 
mission.   
Cost/Benefit. The Dutch have developed sophisticated and rigorous cost benefit analysis 
focused on protecting property and lives.  This has guided hard decisions about what to protect 
and what to give back to nature.  Decisions must be based upon sound cost benefit analysis and 
not politics. 
Peer Review. There must be real-time independent peer review of the Corps’ projects 
and practices to assure that the right projects are being done right.  This review can be done both 
at the state level via the local levee boards and via private groups formed by local business and 
environmental interest.  The review must be done concurrently so as not to delay time-sensitive 
projects. 
Outrage. Finally, we at Levees.Org wonder: Where is the outrage? Over a thousand have 
died, a hundred thousand homes have been destroyed, and a historic American city lies in ruins.  
This was not a natural disaster.  This was a manmade disaster caused by deeply ingrained 
institutional problems of the US Army Corps of Engineers and Congress. Every American 
should be outraged.   
It is our hope that, through the expert opinion revealed in the National Science 
Foundation report, that the nation and Congress will come to a better understanding of the issues 
concerning August 29, 2005.  Hopefully, finally, we can all agree on what caused the Greater 
New Orleans Flood and begin the process of rebuilding New Orleans and southern Louisiana and 
making its citizens whole. 
Respectfully submitted by 
Sandy Rosenthal 
Founder, Levees.Org 
www.levees.org 
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G.2.8 Congressional Research Service (2005). Aging Infrastructure: Dam Safety, Report 
for Congress, K Powers, Washington DC, September 29. 
While dams have multiple benefits, they also represent a risk to public safety and 
economic infrastructure. This risk stems from two sources: the likelihood of a dam failure and 
the damage it would cause. While dam failures are infrequent, age, construction deficiencies, 
inadequate maintenance, and seismic or weather events contribute to the likelihood. To reduce 
the risk, regular inspections are necessary to identify deficiencies and then corrective action must 
be taken. 
To identify deficiencies that could cause dam failures, the federal government established 
inspection requirements for the nation’s federal dams. Once deficiencies are identified, most 
agencies finance repairs through their operation and maintenance accounts. Funding mechanisms 
vary for larger rehabilitation activities. At the Bureau of Reclamation, for example, most larger 
repairs are conducted with annual appropriations to its dam safety program. At some other 
agencies, dam rehabilitation must compete with other construction projects for funding. 
At non-federal dams, safety is generally a state responsibility, though some federal 
assistance has been provided. Funding through the National Dam Safety Program, which is 
authorized through FY 2006, helps states improve their dam safety programs and train 
inspectors. In addition, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Department of 
Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration require regular inspections at the non-federal 
dams within their jurisdiction. Even so, there are concerns that most state dam safety programs 
have inadequate staff and funds to effectively inspect or monitor all of the dams for which they 
are responsible. Further, there are concerns that states, local governments, and other non-federal 
dam owners may not have the financial resources to maintain and rehabilitate their dams. 
Following the failure of the levees at Lake Pontchartrain in 2005, it is likely that there 
will be increased scrutiny of flood control infrastructure and the structural stability of high 
hazard-potential dams. Further, there has been periodic pressure for Congress to pass legislation 
authorizing federal support for rehabilitation work at non-federal dams. Demand for such 
assistance is likely to increase, but there is currently no federal policy that describes the 
conditions under which federal funding is appropriate, nor has congress established criteria for 
prioritizing funding among non-federal projects. 
 
G.2.9 Sparks, R. E. (2006). “Rethinking, Then Rebuilding New Orleans,” Issues in Science 
and Technology, National Academy Press, Winter 2006, p 33-39, Washington DC. 
New Orleans will certainly be rebuilt. But looking at the recent flooding as a problem that 
can be fixed by simply strengthening levees will squander the enormous economic investment 
required and, worse, put people back in harm’s way. Rather, planners should look to science to 
guide the rebuilding, and scientists now advise that the most sensible strategy is to work with the 
forces of nature rather than trying to overpower them. This approach will mean letting the 
Mississippi River shift most of its flow to a route that the river really wants to take; protecting 
the highest parts of the city from flooding and hurricane-generated storm surges while retreating 
from the lowest parts; and building a new port city on higher ground that the Mississippi is 
already forming through natural processes. The long-term benefits - economically and in terms 
of human lives - may well be considerable. 
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To understand the risks that New Orleans faces, three sources need to be considered. 
They are the Atlantic Ocean, where hurricanes form that eventually batter coastal areas with high 
winds, heavy rains, and storm surge; the gulf of Mexico, which provides the water vapor that 
periodically turns to devastatingly heavy rain over the Mississippi basin; and the Mississippi 
River, which carries a massive quantity of water from the center of the continent and can be a 
source of destruction when the water overflows its banks. It also is necessary to understand the 
geologic region in which the city is located: the Mississippi Delta. 
If Hurricane Katrina, which in 2005 pounded New Orleans and the delta with surge and 
heavy rainfall, had followed the same path over the Gulf 50 years ago, the damage would have 
been less, because more barrier islands and coastal marshes were available then to buffer the 
city. Early settlers on the barrier islands offshore of the Delta built their homes well back from 
the beach, and they allowed driftwood to accumulate where it would be covered by sand and 
beach grasses, forming protective dunes. The beach grasses were essential because they helped 
stabilize the shores against wind and waves and continued to grow up through additional layers 
of sand. In contrast to a cement wall, the grasses would recolonize and repair a breach in the 
dune. Vegetation offers resistance to the flow of water, so the more vegetation a surge 
encounters before it reaches a city, the greater the damping effect on surge height. The greatest 
resistance is offered by tall trees intergrown with shrubs; next are shorter trees intergrown with 
shrubs; then shrubs; followed by supple seedlings or grasses; and finally, mud, sand, gravel, or 
rock with no vegetation. 
Of course, the vegetation has its limits: Hurricanes uproot trees and the surge of salt or 
brackish water can kill salt-intolerant vegetation. Barrier islands, dunes, and shorelines can all be 
leveled or completely washed away by waves and currents, leaving no place for vegetation to 
grow. the canals cut into the Delta for navigation and to float oil-drilling platforms out to the gulf 
disrupted the native vegetation by enabling salt or brackish water to penetrate deep into 
freshwater marshes. The initial cuts have widened as vegetation dies back and shorelines erode 
without the plant roots to hold the soil and plant leaves to dampen wind- or boat-generated 
waves. 
The ecological and geological sciences can help determine to what extent the natural 
system can be put back together, perhaps by selective filling of some of the canals and by 
controlled flooding and sediment deposition on portions of the Delta through gates inserted in the 
levees. 
If New Orleans is to be protected against both hurricane-generated storm surges from the 
sea and flooding from the Mississippi river, are there alternative cost-effective approaches other 
than just building levees higher, diverting floods around New Orleans, and continuing the 
struggle to keep the Mississippi River from taking its preferred course to the sea? Yes, as people 
in other parts of the world have demonstrated. 
Could the same approach be taken in the Delta, in the new Atchafalaya lobe? Advocates 
for rebuilding New Orleans in its current location point to the 1,000+ year levees and storm 
surge gates that the Dutch have built. But the Netherlands is one of the most densely populated 
countries in Europe, with 1,000 people per square mile, so the enormous cost of building such 
levees is proportional to the value of the dense infrastructure and human population there. The 
same is not true in Louisiana, where there are approximately 100 people per square mile, 
concentrated in relatively small parcels of the Delta. This low population density provides the 
luxury of using Delta lands as a buffer for the relatively small areas that must be protected. 
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However, the Dutch should be imitated in several regards. First, planners addressing the 
future of New Orleans should take a lesson from the long-term deliberate planning and project 
construction undertaken by the Dutch after their disastrous flood of 1953. These efforts have 
provided new lands and increased flood protection along their coasts and restored floodplains 
along the major rivers. Some of these projects are just now being realized, so the planning 
horizon was at least 50 years. 
Planners focusing on New Orleans also would be wise to emulate Dutch efforts to 
understand and work with nature. Specifically, they should seek and adopt ways to speed the 
natural growth and increase the elevation of the new Atchafalaya lobe and to redirect sediment 
onto the Delta south of New Orleans to provide protection from storm waves and surges. A key 
question for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the FEMA equivalents at the 
state level, planners and zoning officials, banks and insurance companies, and the Corps of 
Engineers is whether it is more sustainable to rebuild the entire city and a higher levee system in 
the original locations or to build a ‘new’ New Orleans somewhere else, perhaps on the 
Atchafalaya lobe. 
Under this natural option, old New Orleans would remain a national historic and cultural 
treasure, and continue to be a tourist destination and convention city. Its highest grounds would 
continue to be protected by a series of strengthened levees and other flood-control measures. 
City planner sand the government agencies (including FEMA) that provide funding for 
rebuilding must ensure that not all of the high ground is simply usurped for developments with 
the highest revenue return, such as convention centers, hotels, and casinos. the high ground also 
should include housing for the service workers and their families, so they are not consigned 
again to the lowest-lying, flood-prone areas. The flood-prone areas below sea level should be 
converted to parks and planted with flood-tolerant vegetation. If necessary, these areas would be 
allowed to flood temporarily during storms. 
At the same time, the Corps, in consultation with state officials, should guide and 
accelerate sediment deposition in the new Atchafalaya lobe, under a 50- to 100-year plan to 
provide a permanent foundation for a new commercial and port city. If old New Orleans did not 
need to be maintained as a deepwater port, then more of the water and sediment in the 
Mississippi could be allowed to flow down the Atchafalaya, further accelerating the land-
building. The new city could be developed in stages, much as the Dutch have gradually increased 
their polders. The port would have access to the Mississippi River via an exiting lock 
(constructed in 1963) that connects the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi, just downstream of the 
Old River Control Structure. 
This plan will no longer force the Mississippi River to go down a channel it wants to 
abandon. The shorter, steeper path to the sea via the Atchafalaya might require less dredging that 
the Mississippi route, because the current would tend to keep the channel scoured. Because the 
Mississippi route is now artificially long and much less steep, accumulating sediments must be 
constantly dredged, at substantial cost. Traditional river engineering techniques that maintain the 
capacity of the Atchafalaya to bypass floodwater that would otherwise inundate New Orleans 
also might be needed to maintain depths required for navigation. These techniques include bank 
stabilization with revetments and wing dikes that keep the main flow in the center of the channel 
where it will scour sediment. 
Action to capitalize on the natural option should begin immediately. The attention of the 
public and policymakers will be focused on New Orleans and the other Gulf cities for a few 
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more months. The window of opportunity to plan a safer, more sustainable New Orleans, as well 
as better flood management policy for the Mississippi and its tributaries, is briefly open. Without 
action, a new New Orleans - a combination of an old city that retains many of its historic charms 
and a new city better suited to serve as a major international port - will go unrealized. And the 
people who would return to New Orleans rebuilt as before, but with higher levees and certain 
other conventional flood control works, will remain unduly subjected to the wrath of hurricanes 
and devastating floods. No one in the Big Easy should rest easy with this future. 
 
G.2.10   Curole, W. (2005). Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan Guidelines, General 
Manager, South Lafourche Levee District Presentation to French Quarter Citizens 
Group, November 2005. 
Wendell Curole provided the following concepts for provision of a comprehensive 
hurricane protection plan for populated areas of southern Louisiana: 
• Protection of evacuation routes with a hurricane levee system or flood proofing. 
• Plan for freshwater and sediment diversion projects to regain natural protection from storm 
surges. 
• Coordinate on-going flood studies by the Corps of Engineers and others. State and local 
officials should decide when and where the flood protection should be directed. 
• Keep the public informed of the threat a hurricane poses to them and their property. 
• Increase level of already constructed hurricane protection levees to Category 4 or 5 
standards. 
• Plan for internal drainage from the upper reaches of the drainage basin to the barrier 
islands: a) Gravity drainage through water control structures in the hurricane levee, b) 
Interior drainage levees, c) Pump systems, d) Channel improvements. 
• Protection of infrastructure (highways, navigation channels). 
• Stress elevation in construction of bu9ildings through education not regulation. 
Curole stressed that “the most dependable way to protect from all types of flooding 
(river, rainfall, or hurricane) is constructing buildings with as high an elevation as possible.” 
 
G.2.11  Lopez, J. (2005). The Multiple Lines of Defense Strategy to Sustain Louisiana’s 
Coast. Report to Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, New Orleans. 
The tragedies of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 have revealed to the world the 
enormous challenge Louisiana now faces. South Louisiana appears to have entered a period 
when the convergence of two powerful forces is working against its survival. Since the 1950’s, 
the processes driving coastal loss have continued only slightly abated. Since 1990, 
meteorological and oceanic processes driving tropical systems have more frequently generated 
Category 4 and 5 hurricanes. More destructive hurricanes are predicted for coming decades. 
South Louisiana’s ongoing peril is the continued overlap of weakened hurricane protection with 
more frequent and intense hurricanes. 
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In light of this predicament, how can the coast and culture of south Louisiana survive? 
The survival of a culture and a region is at stake. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita may have 
narrowed the field of discussion from what we might want, down to what we absolutely need. 
There is a growing consensus that what is needed is a pragmatic and effective strategy to 
integrate both coastal habitat restoration and engineered flood protection, such as levees. This 
strategy must be established soon and while under duress. The next hurricane season will always 
be just 180 days away. 
This is a plan of how to merge coastal habitat restoration and engineered flood protection. 
When both are achieved, the ecology and economy of the region can continue and together they 
will save and sustain Louisiana’s Coast for future generations. This can be achieved and this is 
how it may be done. 
The examples shown and areas discussed in this report focus on the delta portion of the 
Louisiana coast; however, the same principles are applied to the entire coast of Louisiana. Maps 
of the Chennier plain in southwestern Louisiana are under development. 
The Multiple Lines of Defense Strategy proposes that two key elements of the coast be 
managed and perpetuated that will together sustain the coast. The two planning elements are: 
1) Utilizing natural and manmade features which directly impede storm surge or reduce 
storm damage (Lines of Defenses), 
2) Establishing and sustaining the wetland habitat goals (Target Habitat Types).  
These two, when integrated, can sustain the coast. This strategy is not a new restoration 
technology; rather, it is a new strategy to coordinate and prioritize conventional restoration 
methods and projects for coastal habitats. 
This coastal management vision acknowledges the reality that environmental habitat 
restoration and engineered flood protection are not separable goals. It is unlikely that sufficient 
flood protection in south Louisiana can be accomplished by a “levees only” strategy. It is also 
true that adequate flood protection cannot be accomplished by simply restoring coastal habitats. 
Both habitat restoration and engineered flood protection must proceed in a coordinated plan 
which maximizes regional benefits and minimizes costs. Because there are substantial costs 
associated with both coastal habitat restoration and engineered flood protection, their financial 
justifications are codependent on a sustainable coastal economy. 
The Lines of Defense include the Gulf of Mexico shelf, the barrier islands, the sounds, 
marsh landbridges, natural ridges, manmade ridges, flood gates, flood levees, pump stations, 
home & building elevations, and evacuation routes. Identification of these Lines of Defense on a 
map allows hydrologists, levee district managers, emergency personnel, etc. to all share a 
common landscape template to evaluate, abate, and monitor flood risk or other storm impacts. 
The Target Habitat Types include swamp, fresh marsh, intermediate marsh, brackish 
marsh and salt marsh. Maintaining the target salinity regime and then optimally managing the 
habitat types, puts all the natural resources and resource managers on the same page with a 
unified biological and natural resource vision. Since each habitat has a differing profile of 
vegetation, fisheries, soils, hydrology, waterfowl, etc., it is imperative that geographic areas of 
each habitat be identified to optimize restoration and management for the needs for each habitat 
type. The establishment and maintenance of the Target Habitat Types requires a corresponding 
salinity gradient goal. This salinity gradient would be maintained by controlled river 
reintroductions and, if needed, hydrologic restoration. 
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Types for coastal planning are useful separately to articulate and develop projects. 
However, additional value is gained by overlaying of these elements on a single map. This 
integrated map becomes the central coastal management planning tool since it depicts a unifying 
landscape vision for the coast, embracing environmental habitat restoration and engineered flood 
protection. The Lines of Defense define priority areas for coastal habitat restoration; that is, the 
“where” of restoration. The target habitats types define potential restoration methods or 
limitations of coastal habitat restoration; that is, the “how” of restoration. This complimentary 
relationship together focuses restoration finding on priority areas and guides the type of 
restoration possible or required. Coastal habitat restoration using traditional restoration 
techniques may proceed while producing ecologic benefits and enhancing flood protection to the 
coastal infrastructure. The integrated map may satisfy the National Research Council 
recommendation to include an explicit map of the desired future condition or goals for the coast. 
At least two important results of the Multiple Lines of Defense Strategy should be noted. 
One is that a natural ridge’s ecologic function is recognized as generally being a hydrologic 
barrier. This makes their ecologic function compatible with using them as economic corridors. 
Natural ridges such as Bayou Lafourche may be leveed and still retain its ecologic function, 
which opens an economic corridor with flood protection. A second result is that restoration is 
generally focused on remaining marsh, and avoids large areas where previous heavy wetland loss 
has occurred. This may avoid areas with chronic causes for wetland loss that may be ongoing, 
such as subsidence. 
In summary, the proposal described here is a unified vision for the coast which embraces 
environmental habitat restoration as well as engineered flood protection. Goals can be clearly 
articulated through maps of the Target Habitat Types and Lines of Defense. The Multiple Lines 
of Defense Strategy should be evaluated quickly for the entire Louisiana coast to begin 
implementation if it is deemed to be warranted. 
The eleven Lines of Defense are: 
1st: Offshore shelf within the Gulf of Mexico. The offshore shelf ranges in depth from 300 feet 
at the shelf edge to zero depth at the gulf shoreline. Its width vanes from a few miles to hundreds 
of miles. The primary benefit of the shallow shelf is to dramatically reduce wave height and 
wave energy from an approaching tropical system. A negative aspect of the shelf is that it will 
promote higher storm surges inland. The variable influences on storm surges due to the geometry 
of the shelf needs to be considered for storm surge analysis. Also, dredging activities on the shelf 
should avoid increasing shoreline erosion by wave refraction around dredge holes. The gulf 
fisheries and the oil and gas industry are key economic aspects of the shelf. Examples: Narrow 
shelf at the mouth of Mississippi River & Wide shelf offshore from Cameron Parish 
2nd:  Barrier Islands. The Louisiana barrier island shoreline is characterized by fragmented 
barriers or shoals with low vertical profiles and low sand content. However, barrier islands 
provide an important wave barrier for interior sounds and coastal marsh. The primary benefits of 
barrier islands are the near-complete reduction in wave height and the slight reduction in storm 
surge further inland. A negative aspect of barrier islands is their ephemeral nature and 
unpredictable local impacts to them from hurricanes. Barrier islands also have significant 
recreational aspects such as fishing and birding. Examples: Chandeleur Islands and Grand Isle 
3rd: Sounds. The primary benefit of the sounds is to provide a relatively shallow water buffer to 
deep water currents. Sounds do have a negative aspect during storms by allowing waves to re-
generate on the on the sound side of barrier islands. Also, sounds may cause storm surge and 
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wave erosion on the back side of barrier islands. 
4th: Marsh Landbridges. Marsh landbridges are areas of emergent marsh with relative 
continuity compared to adjacent bays, sounds or areas of significant marsh/land loss. Ideally, 
landbridges connect other elevated landforms such as natural ridges. Since some ridges are 
developed and have adjacent levees, marsh landbridges may also bridge adjacent levee systems 
and economic corridors. Marsh landbridges compose much of the residual internal framework of 
the coast which reduces fetch and shoreline erosion of interior marshes and lagoons. Landbridges 
impede storm surge movement inland and protect other emergent marsh areas that may perform 
the same function. Some landbridges are threatened themselves by various processes of marsh 
loss and need to be sustained through restoration and maintenance. The landbridges represent an 
increasing fraction of the remaining emergent marsh of the coast and provide typical high 
productivity and fishery benefits typical of coastal wetlands. Examples: East Orleans landbridge, 
Biloxi Marsh landbridge, Barataria Basin landbridge, Upper Terrebonne Bay landbridge, Grand 
Lake-White Lake landbridge, Western Marsh Island landbridge, south Calcasieu Lake landbridge 
5th: Natural Ridges. In southeast and central Louisiana, most natural ridges are the natural 
levees of abandoned distributary channels. These channels now act as tidal channels and are 
often colloquially named bayous or rivers. In southwest Louisiana, most natural ridges are 
chenniers running parallel to the Gulf coastline. Natural ridges may have continuous elevation of 
several feet and, therefore, will impede overland flow across the ridge and potentially reduce 
storm surge. Natural ridges often define (at least historically) the hydrologic basins of the coast. 
Natural ridges are most effective when they have at least 6 feet of elevation and well drained 
soils to maintain upland forests. Forests will also slow the movement of overland flow and may 
also provide a wind barrier. Natural ridges tend to be the economic corridors across the coast 
including primary state highways and coastal communities. These highways are also likely to be 
evacuation routes. Examples: Bayou la Loutre, Bayou Lafourche 
6th: Manmade Soil Foundations. Manmade soil foundations for transportation may provide 
incidental benefit to storm surges. Railroads, highways and spoil banks may run parallel to the 
coast and locally provide a manmade ridge several feet in height. These foundations may have 
settled and may need improvement to provide reliable transportation routes without chronic 
flooding. If highway improvements are contemplated, the effects on storm surge may be 
considered. Examples: Highway 90, Hwy 82. 
7th: Flood Gates. Flood gates are typically designed to withhold flood water and, therefore, 
remain open under most conditions. Flood gates are generally open so as not to impede 
navigation or natural ebb and flow of tides and aquatic organisms. Flood gates would be closed 
during a threat of flooding and to reduce flood tides in channels. Because of the generally low 
elevation of the coast, the effectiveness of flood gates may depend on the nearby topography or 
constructed features such as levees or spoil banks. Examples: Bayou Bienvenue, Bayou Dupre 
8th: Flood protection levees. Flood protection levees are designed and constructed for flood 
protection of municipalities or other coastal infrastructure features. Levees are generally 
designed to be an absolute barrier defining a flood side and a protected side. The intent is to have 
zero storm surge flooding on the protected side, but an unintended consequence may be to 
increase water levels on the flood side. Levees are generally not designed to be overtopped or to 
withstand significant wave erosion. Exceptions include “potato levees” or other low relief levees 
designed to reduce flooding from non-storm tides. Typical hurricane protection levees protect 
limited portions of the coast with intense economic development. Examples: St. Bernard levee, 
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Jefferson and Orleans Parish levees on Lake Pontchartrain 
9th: Flood protection pumping. Pumping stations are generally within leveed areas and are used 
to reduce flood risk from rainfall and are not designed to pump out flood water from a significant 
levee breach. Most pumping stations are not prepared with fuel, staff or other requirements to be 
effective to pump out flood water from a significant levee breach. Generally, these are large 
capacity pumps which displace water vertically above the water level on the flood side of the 
levee. Pumping stations are generally to protect areas of intense development. Examples: Orleans 
and Jefferson Parish’s pumping stations 
10th: Elevated homes and businesses. All homes and businesses in south Louisiana are subject 
to being flooded if they are not elevated above the normal land elevation. Even those behind 
levees are not 100% safe. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita made this painfully clear. Ah attempts to 
reduce storm surge height or its extent are limited by the intensity and attributes of particular 
storm events. Since there will always be the potential of a storm exceeding the limits of 
protection from storm surges, immovable assets such as homes and businesses should be 
elevated to the appropriate flood elevation risk. This is the last line of defense for immovable 
assets. Elevated homes also provide important side benefits such as improved protection from 
termites and more economic capacity to re-level or raise the houses due to settlement or 
increased flood risk. Example: pre-1940 housing in New Orleans, LUMCON, Marina del Ray in 
Madisonville 
11th: Evacuation. Evacuation routes are typically highways, but could also include other means 
of transportation such as railroads, air transportation, etc. Evacuation routes are the last line of 
defense for people or moveable assets. Evacuation routes and procedures should be established 
for the coast. Ideally, evacuation routes may also serve as re-entry routes for first responders and 
as routes to re-populate after a storm event. Evacuation routes are generally selected based on 
capacity to move a large number of people to safer areas as a storm approaches the coast. Some 
routes may be subject to flooding quickly and need to be improved. Examples: Regional contra-
flow evacuation plan for southeast Louisiana. 
 
G.2.12 Committee on the Restoration and Protection of Coastal Louisiana (2006). Drawing 
Louisiana’s New Map, Ocean Studies Board, National Research Council, The 
National Academies Press, Washington DC. 
Coastal wetlands develop within a fine balance of many geomorphologic and coastal 
ocean processes. Relative sea level rise, wave action, tidal exchange, river discharges, hurricanes 
and coastal storms, and the rates of sediment accretion due to sediment deposition and 
accumulation of organic material play particularly important roles. The interplay of these 
processes and the wetland’s resilience to natural or anthropogenic perturbations determine its 
sustainability. Some of the processes of land loss and gain in the Louisiana coastal area are 
natural and have occurred for centuries. Others are the result of human activities in the wetlands 
and the watershed of the Mississippi River system. 
Annual land loss rates in coastal Louisiana have varied over the last 50 years, declining 
from a maximum of 100 square kilometers (km2) per yr (39 square miles [mi2] per yr) for the 
period 1956—1978. Cumulative loss during this 50-year period in Louisiana represents 80 
percent of the coastal land loss in the entire United States. Initial efforts to prevent catastrophic 
land loss were implemented under the federal Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, and 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 
                                                                                              G - 28  
Restoration Act (CWPPRA) in partnership with Louisiana’s efforts through Act 6 (L.A.R.S. 
49:213 et seq.). Passed in 1990, CWPPRA called for the development of a comprehensive 
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Restoration Plan (P.L. 101-646 §303.b). The first such plan was 
completed in 1993 and has been in use since that time. In addition, the Louisiana Coastal 
Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and the Wetlands Conservation and 
Restoration Authority prepared a plan for the coast in 1998 entitled Coast 2050: Toward a 
Sustainable Coastal Louisiana (Coast 2050). 
Coast 2050 was developed under a number of federal and state legislative mandates and 
is the result of recognition by federal, state, and local agencies that a single plan and coordinated 
strategy were needed. Coast 2050 was then appended to the 1999 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
905(b) reconnaissance report. In October 2003, a draft comprehensive study (Louisiana Coastal 
Area, LA—Ecosystem Restoration: Comprehensive Coastwide Ecosystem Restoration Study 
[draft LCA Comprehensive Study]) for implementing coastal restoration was released. After 
reviewing the draft LCA Comprehensive Study, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
requested a near-term approach to focus the scope of work and maintain restoration momentum. 
The resulting final version of Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA), Louisiana—Ecosystem Restoration 
Study (LCA Study) was released by USACE in November 2004. As plans for completion of the 
LCA Study were being finalized, Louisiana’s Office of the Governor requested that the National 
Academies review the LCA Study’s effectiveness for long-term, comprehensive restoration 
development and implementation. 
The LCA Study and its envisioned successors are unique in many respects, including 
geographic scope, pervasiveness of the destructive processes involved, complexity of potential 
impacts to stakeholders, success of preceding efforts to achieve stakeholder consensus, and 
documentation of earlier planning and restoration efforts. Indeed, the environmental and social 
challenges confronting coastal Louisiana in the near and distant future are without precedent in 
North America. Clearly, execution of the LCA Study alone will not achieve its stated goal “to 
reverse the current trend of degradation of the coastal ecosystem,” although successful 
completion of some of the projects outlined in the LCA Study will reduce this trend, thereby 
representing an important step toward the goal of sustaining or expanding wetlands in some local 
areas. By definition, the activities proposed in the LCA Study were intended to provide a 
foundation for successful future restoration and protection efforts, including those developed and 
implemented in response to hurricanes like Katrina and Rita. 
Taken individually, the majority of the projects proposed in the LCA Study are based on 
commonly accepted, sound scientific and engineering analyses. It is not clear, however, that in 
the aggregate, whether or not these projects represent a scientifically sound strategy for 
addressing coastal erosion at the scale of the affected area. Thus, at foreseeable rates of land loss, 
the level of effort described by the LCA Study will likely decrease land loss only in areas 
adjacent to the specific proposed projects. As stated in numerous USACE policy statements and 
recommended in past NRC reports, planning and implementation of water resources projects 
(including those involving environmental restoration) should be undertaken within the context of 
the larger system. A group of projects within a given watershed or coastal system may interact at 
a variety of scales to produce either beneficial or deleterious effects. Cost-effectiveness analyses 
discussed in the LCA Study and in supporting documents reflect an effort to identify least-cost 
alternatives but do not appear to reflect a system-wide effort to maximize beneficial synergies 
among various projects. The selection of any suite of individual projects in future efforts to 
restore coastal Louisiana should include a clear effort to maximize the beneficial, synergistic 
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effects of individual projects to minimize or reverse future land loss. Further, because there is a 
finite availability of water flow and sediment and many of the proposed projects must function 
for decades to deliver maximum benefit, care should be taken to ensure that implementation of 
an individual project does not preclude other strategies or elements that are being considered for 
the future. To achieve this, the development of an explicit map of the expected future landscape 
of coastal Louisiana should be a priority as the implementation of the LCA Study moves ahead. 
The approaches advanced in the LCA Study focus largely on proven engineering and 
other methods to address land loss at the local scale. In general, individual projects appear to be 
based on commonly accepted, sound scientific and engineering analyses. The emplacement of 61 
kilometers [km]) (38 miles [mi]) of revetment along the banks of MRGO as one of the five major 
wetland restoration projects proposed in the LCA Study, however, does not appear to be 
consistent with the study’s stated goals. Despite an estimated cost of $108.3 million, this project 
is expected to reduce land loss by only 0.5 km2 per yr (0.2 mi2 per yr) over the next 50 years. 
(Louisiana is projected to lose an average of 26.7 km2 per yr [10.3 mi2 per yr] over the next 50 
years.) Although the location of the land loss may make it more significant, the need for and 
potential value of this project are directly related to the outcome of a study being conducted by 
USACE, scheduled for completion in FY 2005, to evaluate the potential decommissioning of 
MRGO for deep draft navigation. In addition to questions regarding the appropriateness of this 
particular project, its selection casts doubt on the rigor of the ranking and selection process. The 
selection of the restoration efforts of MRGO as one of the five major projects to be carried out as 
part of the LCA Study should be reconsidered in light of the limitations of expected benefits and 
the results of ongoing studies on the decommissioning of MRGO for deep draft navigation. If a 
decision is made to decommission MRGO, various options could be considered, including 
complete closure, that would significantly reduce the need to strengthen the levees along its 
route. If partial closure is chosen, perhaps maintaining MRGO for shallow draft vessels, some of 
the work along the outlet may still be required. Restoration efforts requiring planning would be 
more fully informed once a final decision has been made. 
Conflicting stakeholder interests represent one of the greatest barriers to robust coastal 
restoration efforts in Louisiana. A dominant human-related component of land loss is the 
constraint on the river system imposed by spoil banks and levees, but these features also provide 
benefits to a range of stakeholders. By minimizing the cost of dredging and reducing 
uncontrolled flooding in inhabited and agricultural areas, these features support important local 
economic activities. Many of Louisiana’s inhabited areas are located on natural levees formed by 
deposition on the floodplain during major floods. Valuable agricultural land was originally 
maintained at an elevation above water level through flood-derived sedimentation but is now 
protected by levees, which preclude new sediment introduction. Obviously, the prospects are low 
that sediment-rich water will be intentionally allowed to flood broad expanses of urban and 
agricultural land to maintain elevation with the pace of relative sea level rise. 
As discussed above, locating individual projects in an effort to maximize positive 
synergistic effects will tend to concentrate efforts into selected areas within coastal Louisiana. 
Although distributing individual projects, and the benefits associated with them, across the entire 
region may be less contentious, such an approach will either drive up the total cost or reduce the 
likelihood of success for a given amount of effort and expenditure. Successfully implementing a 
project selection strategy that maximizes synergistic effects of individual projects will require 
greater popular support for a comprehensive plan both from within the state and at the national 
level. Such support will likely come about only through greater public involvement in the 
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decision-making process of a comprehensive plan. Louisiana’s restoration goals should be better 
defined and more clearly communicated to the public. This means that maps of the region and 
projected land-use patterns with and without various restoration projects should be circulated. 
Without a clarified definition of the temporal and spatial dimensions of “restoration,” unrealistic 
expectations and disappointments are likely. The projections can be revised as additional data 
become available and a better understanding is developed through the adaptive management 
program and the science plan. 
Although some inhabited areas will require relocation in order to carry out some 
proposed wetland restoration efforts, it will be difficult to persuade those affected by local 
relative sea level rise to abandon their property without a program of financial compensation and 
a social plan to maintain the cultural integrity of the affected communities. It is important that 
decisions involving relocation and compensation following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, or in 
response to future events, be made in such a manner as to minimize the likelihood of additional 
relocation or disruption in response to future restoration efforts. The appropriate decisions and 
responses after major storms have to reflect a broad consensus about the future nature of coastal 
Louisiana and may have to include managed retreat. Managed retreat and various restoration 
strategies should include early and active stakeholder participation and concurrence. Relocation 
could occur either gradually with a few families at a time or at a much higher rate in areas 
severely affected by Katrina and Rita or future events. This is not intended to preclude 
reoccupation of the many areas affected by the recent hurricanes or similar events in the future. 
Rather, this approach is intended to minimize the potential for disrupting lives and property a 
second time as efforts to protect and restore Louisiana unfold in coming years. 
Finally, the LCA Study calls for a long-term study of the possibility of establishing a new 
lobe of active delta development through a diversion near Donaldsonville, Louisiana. Termed the 
Third Delta, this proposed restoration feature was among a group of possible features that was 
shown to yield limited benefits at a substantially higher cost than the projects identified for 
funding in the LCA Study. An alternative scenario for retention of sand and silt now lost beyond 
the shelf break would involve diverting the main flow of the Mississippi River toward the west 
of its present main channel somewhere between New Orleans and Head of Passes. An 
intermediate and long-term consequence of this action would be the abandonment of the active 
Birdsfoot Delta by the Mississippi River. A clear benefit would be the nourishment of eroding 
coastal reaches to the west. Although this alternative has been widely acknowledged as possible, 
its feasibility, for various reasons, has not been considered seriously by USACE. Therefore, it is 
not yet possible to assess the potential advantages and disadvantages of Birdsfoot Delta 
abandonment at this time. Obviously, implementation of such a strategy would have to be 
accompanied by the creation of a deep navigation access channel somewhere downstream of 
New Orleans but upstream of Head of Passes. Though the size of the area it would impact would 
still make it controversial, some consideration should be given to an alternative or companion to 
the planned Third Delta, such as a larger-scale diversion closer to the Gulf of Mexico, that would 
capture and deliver greater quantities of coarse and fine sediments for wetland and barrier island 
development and maintenance. 
The LCA Study states that “execution of the LCA [Study] would make significant 
progress towards achieving and sustaining a coastal ecosystem that can support and protect the 
environment, economy, and culture of southern Louisiana and thus contribute to the economy 
and well-being of the nation.” The economic analysis provided within the LCA Study and its 
supporting documents, however, includes only cost-benefit analyses of alternative approaches to 
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meet ecosystem restoration objectives, as is consistent with USACE policy for evaluating 
projects proposed as National Environmental Restoration efforts. Evaluating the benefits of 
restoring coastal Louisiana in terms of national economic interests, as implied by the statement 
of task, would have required USACE planners to carry out analyses more consistent with 
proposing the effort as a National Economic Development project. USACE officials appeared to 
view the efforts described within the LCA Study as falling under National Environmental 
Restoration as opposed to National Economic Development and, thus, did not attempt to identify 
and meaningfully quantify the contribution to the economy of the nation. Since the information 
necessary to evaluate proposed coastal Louisiana efforts in terms of the national economy is not 
provided in the LCA Study, there is insufficient information available for the committee to 
comment credibly. Carrying out such an analysis would require significant effort and resources 
beyond those available to the committee in the 10 months following the release of the LCA 
Study in November 2004. This said, some components of such an analysis can be articulated. 
The LCA Study presents sufficient information about the importance of some 
components of the natural and built environment in coastal Louisiana (e.g., system of deep water 
ports, oil and gas receiving and transmission facilities, complex and extensive urban landscape, 
robust commercial fishery) to demonstrate that substantial economic interests are at stake in 
coastal Louisiana and that these interests have national significance. The immediate impacts of 
Katrina underscore the importance of New Orleans, and adjacent areas of the Gulf Coast, to the 
national economy. Establishing the true, national economic significance of efforts to restore 
coastal wetlands in Louisiana as proposed in the LCA Study, however, must go beyond simply 
identifying and characterizing these components and should include an analysis of how specific 
restoration efforts will preserve or enhance the value of these components (i.e., some restoration 
efforts may have little influence on the vulnerabilities of specific components of the natural and 
built environment in coastal Louisiana) and should determine how the national economy would 
respond to the loss or degradation of components (e.g., what is the capacity for similar 
components in other regions to compensate for the loss and on what time scales?). If, as implied 
by the statement of task, greater emphasis is to be placed on the national economic benefits of 
restoring and protecting coastal Louisiana, future planning efforts should incorporate meaningful 
measures of the economic significance of these projects to the nation consistent with procedures 
normally employed to determine the value of a project or a suite of projects for National 
Economic Development. As a greater understanding of the short- and long-term economic 
impacts of Katrina and Rita becomes available, a more meaningful effort to evaluate the national 
economic significance of protecting the natural and built environment in coastal Louisiana will 
be possible. Such information would provide an important context for decision making; however, 
it will still be important to understand the role wetlands play in protecting specific components 
of the overall system and to determine how specific restoration efforts can enhance that 
protection. While wetlands and adjacent barrier islands and levees are known to reduce impacts 
from waves, their more complex role in reducing storm surge is less well known. Surges contain 
multiple components, including barometric tide effects, wind stress-induced setup, wave-induced 
setup, and Coriolis forces. As was pointed out repeatedly in the public media during Katrina and 
Rita, in the northern hemisphere the eastern side of a hurricane tends to drive water northward in 
a counterclockwise manner. If a storm stalls off a coast for a significant period of time, it will 
continue to drive water onshore for a prolonged period, regardless of the nature of any 
intervening wetland or barrier island. Thus, the potential for reducing risk due to storm surge 
from a particular storm is more difficult to predict. 
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Conversely, the significance of the coastal Louisiana wetlands to the nation in terms of 
both their inherent uniqueness and the ecosystem services they provide is more thoroughly 
documented in the LCA Study, its predecessor reports, and the scientific literature. Although 
efforts to restore and protect Louisiana’s wetlands will likely provide some unknown but 
potentially significant protection against coastal storms and hurricanes, those efforts should not 
be evaluated primarily on their significance for National Economic Development. 
The two major components of the LCA Study, a series of restoration and demonstration 
projects designed to be implemented over a 10-year time frame and the development of a robust 
intellectual infrastructure to inform future project design and implementation, are at the heart of 
the phased approach referred to in the statement of task. This approach has decided advantages 
and disadvantages. As is clear from the LCA Study, simply keeping pace with land loss in 
Louisiana will require an ongoing effort. Any substantial gains in the next few decades will 
require a robust effort, an effort that needs to be well informed by a thorough understanding of 
both the natural physical and ecological processes involved and the viability of various 
restoration techniques to address land loss at a massive scale. Establishing methods that allow 
projects to evolve in the face of increased understanding is prudent. Conversely, limiting project 
selection to those features where construction can be initiated in 5-10 years presents a significant 
handicap for laying the groundwork for a comprehensive, multidecadal effort. 
For example, the 10-year implementation criterion resulted in the selection of projects 
that already existed in the USACE and the CWPPRA planning process. This time constraint 
precluded consideration of projects with solid potential for long-term benefits that had not yet 
been fully designed (precluding the initiation of construction in 5-10 years). Similarly, this 
criterion and the need to demonstrate solid near-term success likely precluded large-scale and 
innovative projects that (1) affect significant sediment delivery to the system (such as 
abandonment of the Birdsfoot Delta), (2) maximize synergistic effects for reducing land loss 
over longer time scales by the selection of strategically located or larger-scale projects, or (3) 
address some of the difficult issues associated with stakeholder response. While the efforts 
preceding the LCA Study have achieved a laudable degree of unanimity among stakeholders on 
the conceptual restoration plan, this unanimity will be tested by the difficult decisions associated 
with implementation of the larger-scale projects designed to achieve a more effective delivery of 
sediment, water, and nutrients over a larger area. The project selection procedure requires more 
explicit accounting of the synergistic effects of various projects and improved transparency of 
project selection to sustain stakeholder support. Furthermore, beneficial, synergistic interaction 
among projects cannot be assumed but should be demonstrated through preconstruction analysis. 
It is important to note that, by definition, the activities proposed within the LCA Study 
are intended to lay a foundation for more effective and robust efforts to preserve and protect 
coastal Louisiana. By its own analysis, the LCA Study points out that constructing the five 
restoration features it proposes would reduce land loss by about 20 percent (from 26.7 km2 per yr 
[10.3 mi2 per yr] to 22.3 km2 per yr [8.6 mi2 per yr]) at an estimated total cost of roughly $864 
million (or $39,400 per hectare [$15,900 per acre]) over the 50-year life of the projects, not 
including maintenance and operational costs. 
Actual land building will be experienced only in areas adjacent to the implemented 
projects. The significant investment represented by these projects and the efforts to develop the 
tools and understanding necessary to support future restoration and protection efforts will yield a 
substantial return of benefits only if future projects are carried out in a comprehensive manner. 
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The funding required to carry out the activities described in the LCA Study should be recognized 
as the first of a funding continuum that will be required if substantial progress is to be made. A 
comprehensive plan to produce a more clearly articulated future distribution of land in coastal 
Louisiana is needed. Such a plan should identify clearly defined milestones to be achieved 
through a series of synergistic projects at a variety of scales. (While a comprehensive plan is 
needed, this does not necessarily imply endorsement of the draft LCA Comprehensive Study, 
which was not formally released or reviewed as part of this study.) The review detailed in this 
report found no instance where the proposed activities, if initiated, would preclude development 
and implementation of a more comprehensive approach. Conversely, many examples were 
identified where implementing the proposed activities would support a more comprehensive 
approach. Thus, the efforts proposed in the LCA Study should be implemented, except where 
specific recommendations for change have been made in this report and only in conjunction with 
the development of a comprehensive plan. 
As the State of Louisiana and the nation begin to recover from Katrina and Rita, efforts to 
restore wetlands in Louisiana will likely compete with reconstruction and levee maintenance or 
enhancement efforts. As this report and numerous other NRC reports have pointed out, efforts to 
design and implement water resource projects (including environmental restoration and flood 
control projects) should be carried out within a watershed and coastal system context. Ongoing 
discussion of long-term response to Katrina and Rita underscores the need to consider restoration 
and reconstruction as a seamless process that should be informed by a coherent, comprehensive 
plan that addresses the issues raised in this report. Therefore, efforts to rebuild the Gulf Coast 
and reduce coastal hazards in the area should be integral components of an effective and 
comprehensive strategy to restore and protect coastal Louisiana wetlands. 
 
G.2.13  Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning for the Louisiana Coast, A New 
Framework for Planning the Future of Coastal Louisiana after the Hurricanes of 
2005, University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, Cambridge, 
January 26, 2006. 
The principal messages abstracted from our report are the following: 
1. The large-scale deterioration of coastal landscapes, particularly during the past fifty years, 
threatens the sustainability (viability over this century) of both human habitation and the rich 
natural resource base of coastal Louisiana. Storm events such as hurricanes have both 
negative and positive effects on wetlands that dominate these landscapes, but deterioration of 
these wetlands is mostly caused by human activities that both disrupt natural processes 
building the coastal landscape (river inputs, sedimentation, tidal fluctuation, etc.) and 
accelerate destructive processes (altered hydrology, subsidence, etc.). In the long term, 
hurricane protection for larger population centers, including the New Orleans region, 
can only be secured with a combination of levees and a sustainable coastal landscape. 
This will require adapting to changing conditions by re-establishing the constructive 
processes associated with distributing Mississippi River water and sediments across the 
coastal landscape, as well as alleviating the other destructive effects of past or future human 
activities. 
2. The sustainable coastal landscape must include extensive marshes and swamps and the 
bayous, coastal barriers and ridges that characterize the Mississippi deltaic plain and the 
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Chenier plain in the southwest. If natural processes are not interrupted, coastal wetlands are 
able to sustain themselves over hundreds of years even where the land is subsiding or the sea 
level is rising. With presently observed subsidence rates and anticipated acceleration of 
sea-level rise, most - although not all - of the coastal landscape could be maintained 
through the 21st century. And with efficient management of the river’s resources, this 
landscape could be expanded in some places. However, this result can only be achieved 
with very aggressive, strategic, and well-informed restoration efforts, varying in size and 
objective but integrated within a landscape management plan. 
3. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita provide poignant evidence that no longer can coastal ecosystem 
management and restoration, flood protection, and navigation be planned, executed and 
maintained independently. We must integrate planning, investment and management 
decisions under a new framework in order to secure these multiple purposes, while 
recognizing: the forces of nature; the imperative to protect life, property and 
communities; the value of natural resources and ecosystem services; the environmental 
and economic sustainability of the solutions; and financial constraints. Furthermore, 
planning to support this integrated decision making must be an adaptive process that creates 
and uses new knowledge about this “working coast.” Integrated management requires that 
coastal landscape restoration alternatives be screened through a “storm damage reduction 
filter” (e.g., how might they reduce risks and how quickly might the result be realized?). 
Conversely, hurricane storm damage reduction or navigation alternatives should be screened 
through an “environmental consequences filter” (e.g., how might the elements affect 
ecosystem services and the sustainability of the landscape?). This does not mean that 
restoration features are justified only because they significantly reduce storm damages-many 
are required to sustain environmental resources or build landscapes away from population 
centers. It does mean that priorities must be determined by multiple benefits more than has 
been the case in past planning. 
4. The near-term critical restoration features selected by Louisiana Coastal Area 
Ecosystem Restoration Study should be reexamined and prioritized to assure that they 
provide environmentally and economically sustainable approaches that advance both 
ecosystem restoration goals and support storm damage reduction. While a truly 
integrated planning process has not yet been developed, there is sufficient understanding to 
prioritize near-term restoration features based on their likely contribution to the effectiveness 
of existing and intended storm damage reduction efforts, as well as advancing ecosystem 
restoration. Furthermore, long-term restoration strategies for the four geographic 
subprovinces should be refined by incorporating integrated objectives and framed around 
critical foundation features. 
5. Federal and State governments should engage scientists, economists, engineers, 
government officials, communities and stakeholders to develop a spatially explicit vision 
of a future coastal Louisiana that incorporates long-term challenges, opportunities and 
overarching goals. As recently stressed by the National Research Council, such a vision 
should guide integrated, multiobjective management within geomorphic subprovinces and 
along the entire coast throughout the planning and project implementation process. 
Stakeholders should participate in formulating and evaluating alternatives that recognize the 
opportunities and limitations associated with maintaining the status quo under the perilous, 
urgent and changing circumstances. The vision should anticipate future changes that may 
affect options, for example energy scarcity, climate change and demographic shifts. As 
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adaptations occur and new projects are realized, the vision for the coast can be revised in 
light of changing landscape and socioeconomic conditions, knowledge of the system, and 
social preferences. 
6. The President and Congress have mandated studies of potential supplements to the existing 
but strengthened storm protection works. Particular attention is being given to a continuous 
peripheral coastal defense (a hurricane barrier) similar to that used in the Netherlands. 
Although the systematic approach of the Dutch is commendable, substantial differences 
between the Netherlands and south Louisiana limit the applicability of their model, including 
contrasts in human settlement patterns, land uses, geology, hydrodynamics and coastal 
ecology. Maintaining functioning estuarine ecosystems and self-sustaining wetlands inside 
and adjacent to such peripheral defenses would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
because extended levees and floodgates would obstruct key hydrological processes that 
maintain the coastal landscape. The relatively dispersed populations and low intensity of land 
use may make investment in such a barrier difficult to justify. Rather than simply adopting 
the Dutch approach, the plan for Louisiana should recognize the different Louisiana setting 
and take advantage of its characteristic coastal landscape. Storm damage reduction should 
be achieved through a combination of stronger inner defenses around larger population 
centers; broader, self-sustaining wetland landscapes that reduce storm surge and wave 
fetch; restrictions along artificial channels to limit storm surge propagation; and 
maintaining barrier islands along selected areas of the coast. This may include lower 
elevation, semi-porous barriers placed between the levees protecting population centers and 
the open coast that attenuate storm surge but allow tidal exchange. However, any such 
barriers should be compatible with sustainable coastal landscapes. To the extent possible, 
extensive wetland areas should not be enclosed by levee systems. 
7. Navigation channels that cut across the coastal gradient have resulted in substantial 
degradation of wetland habitats, thus increasing hurricane surge vulnerability. Future 
integrated planning and decision making should recognize, account for and mitigate the 
disruption of coastal landscape dynamics when formulating and evaluating navigation 
channel expansion, maintenance or abandonment. One of these channels, the Mississippi 
River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), is likely to be decommissioned as a deep-draft navigation 
channel as a result of the risks it poses and its weak economic contribution. However, even if 
mostly closed it will remain a feature on the coastal landscape that has to be integrated into a 
coastal restoration and storm damage reduction strategy for the vulnerable east side of 
Greater New Orleans. 
8. A new management framework requires improved organizational arrangements for 
coordinating and integrating planning, decision making, implementation and evaluation. A 
joint Federal-State body should be given the responsibility and organizational and fiscal 
support for guiding the program. The Corps, or another appropriate agency, would 
continue to have the responsibility to design, construct and, if authorized, operate and 
maintain projects. An integrated assessment group and an engineering and science program 
focused on reducing decision-relevant uncertainties (scientific and otherwise) would support 
decision making in an adaptive management process. 
9. Authorization and financing should be separated from the Water Resources 
Development Act process. The integrated planning process, engineering and science 
program and smaller investment projects should be supported by a programmatic 
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authorization and a more reliable appropriation stream. Funding for larger projects should be 
provided through a Congressionally-chartered coastal investment corporation. 
10. Project planning should rely on innovative decision-support analyses that engage 
stakeholders and responsible agencies in resolution of conflicts and in identifying and 
synergies among projects. The analyses would formulate and evaluate project alternatives 
using performance measures derived from the policies, goals and objectives of the Nation 
and the region. Significant areas of risk and uncertainty will be highlighted for decision 
making, as well as for establishing monitoring and research priorities for the adaptive 
management program. 
Expanded Hurricane Protection 
As made clear by the President’s announcement, initial efforts to improve hurricane protection 
will focus on strengthening existing levees and floodwalls protecting urban areas. An in-depth 
analysis of the feasibility and environmental consequences of expanded hurricane protection 
(EHP) is beyond the scope of the framework developed here. The Corps of Engineers is currently 
assessing the feasibility of such an expanded and enhanced protection system, the details of 
which are not yet in the public domain. Based on general information made available to the 
working group we discuss four possible protection strategies and their implications for 
restoration and conservation of coastal ecosystems: 
Strategy 1: Protect only New Orleans and larger population centers by strengthening existing 
protection systems without providing additional flood protection farther out in the coastal zone. 
Restoration would focus on the same activities that were being planned before the hurricanes, but 
with more attention to the coastal landscapes adjacent to urban areas. 
Strategy 2: Construct storm surge barriers along the inner coastal zone between population 
centers and the outer coast. Openings in the system for water management could provide 
potential opportunities for restoration and conservation but altered hydrologic conditions inside 
the barrier could also have potential negative impacts (e.g., changes in salinity and tidal regimes 
and reductions in soil accretion due to sediment starvation) that should be considered. 
Opportunities would still exist for restoration outside the barrier system. 
Strategy 3: Establish a first line of defense along the existing coastline, e.g., by maintaining 
barrier islands, to dampen storm surges. This would potentially minimize the destructive impacts 
of hurricanes, but modeling should be conducted to quantify the likely benefits. These “speed 
bumps” would be far from the urban areas with extensive open water and wetlands behind them 
and, when overtopped, may not adequately reduce the storm surge to prevent extensive damage 
farther inland. A benefit of outer speed bumps is that they could provide opportunities for 
landward restoration and continue to allow for sediment deposition during storms. However, 
these barriers would be highly erosive features requiring long-term maintenance. 
Strategy 4: Combine elements of strategies 2 and 3. This would provide the greatest opportunity 
for both protection of populations and conservation of coastal landscapes. The outer ring of 
speed bumps limits hydrologic impacts to existing wetlands and also provides opportunities for 
additional restoration in areas behind the features. The inner series of partial barriers (scenario 2) 
would provide the same opportunities as described above but synergy between the two protection 
systems would potentially allow for additional restoration opportunities outside of the inner ring 
of barriers. 
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Organization and Funding 
The existing plans for strengthening storm damage reduction, initiating the LCA ecosystem 
restoration, and maintaining and improving navigation infrastructure provide a foundation for 
planning, but cannot be the only basis for future investments. As we have repeatedly stressed, 
future decisions on projects and their operations must be informed by an integrated assessment 
of contributions of these and other projects to the multiple economic, environmental, social and 
cultural objectives. Such integrated assessment will identify conflicts, synergies and 
opportunities for securing multiple purposes. The value of, and possibilities for, integrated 
assessment are illustrated by the preliminary analysis and evaluation included above. 
Importantly, a future integrated planning process should be structured and supported as an 
adaptive management program that recognizes and reduces uncertainties to improve the 
effectiveness of future decision making. Some of those decision-critical uncertainties have been 
highlighted earlier in this report. 
A complex of state and federal agencies already exists with missions, budgets and 
authorities affecting planning, investment and implementation. However, improvements to the 
existing organizational, funding and planning structures will be needed to meet planning needs 
and expedite project implementation by the Corps and the State. 
The organizational and funding barriers that have inhibited the adoption of an integrated 
planning and adaptive decision making process persist. Both new organization and funding 
reforms are needed to support coastal planning and project implementation by the Corps and the 
state. We recognize that there are many ways in which the government can organize to carry out 
integrated planning and decision making as long as the organization, funding and analytical 
needs for such a new process are served. To better illustrate these concepts, and organizational 
possibilities, the Working Group offers one such approach. 
Maritime Transportation Planning 
While the President and Congress have mandated the Corps to take actions and develop 
investment plans for hurricane protection and ecosystem restoration, they were silent on 
planning maritime transportation investments. Similarly, the scope of the Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Authority (CPRA) recently created by the Louisiana Legislature does not seem to 
encompass maritime transportation. However, a marine transportation network that will continue 
to be maintained and upgraded over time characterizes the Louisiana coast. Marine 
transportation interests are primarily concerned with: (1) the availability of a system of reliable 
channels; (2) transit time from to and from port to deep water; and (3) a minimization of cargo 
handling costs. These goals will continue to be advanced through new project proposals and 
maintenance of existing projects. As discussed earlier, some elements of the navigation network 
can be detrimental to hurricane protection and coastal landscapes. Moreover, innovatively 
conceived navigation realignments and utilization of existing channels could enhance sediment 
dispersal through the coastal wetlands or reduce storm damages. Therefore, consideration of plan 
formulation and evaluation for marine transportation investments should be incorporated into the 
more comprehensive study authorities and re-organization plans, such as those proposed below. 
A New Framework for Coastal Louisiana 
Federal Intragovernmental Coordination 
At present, the Federal program for coastal planning is led by the Corps of Engineers, but 
it is not clear how the responsibilities of the other federal agencies will be represented going 
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forward. The new integrated management framework would require tradeoffs that impact agency 
responsibilities and the streamlining of NEPA and other reviews. It requires the Federal 
government to speak with one voice. The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Program 
(CERP) has been working to overcome interagency coordination barriers and may offer useful 
experiences, if not a model. The Corps is the lead agency for CERP, but there is extensive 
involvement by other federal agencies. The federal agencies have joined a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) specifying a dispute resolution process and a time line for resolution. An 
interagency MOU, similar to that prepared for the CERP, should be signed by the federal 
agencies with significant participation in coastal Louisiana planning. 
The Corps itself is organized along “business lines” including (a) navigation, (b) flood and 
storm and flood hazard management and (c) ecosystem restoration. The business line 
organization can create organizational barriers to integrated planning and evaluation. These 
organization barriers exist both at the districts and headquarters. Also, Corps planning and 
funding mechanisms are currently not well structured to meet the challenge of integrated and 
adaptive management. The Corps headquarters should create a unit, led by a Senior Executive, 
charged with fostering innovations in the planning and assessment approaches required for the 
integrated management of the Louisiana coastal area, as well as for CERP, Missouri, Upper 
Mississippi, the Columbia River and other areas where the multiple missions of the Corps can be 
best achieved through more integrated management. 
Coastal Louisiana Authority 
The Corps and the state, as well as partner federal agencies, have developed working 
relationships through the LCA, the CWPPRA, and as cost-share partners on local navigation and 
storm damage reduction projects. However, differences persist in viewpoint, ranging from 
cost-sharing responsibilities to project priorities. For example, project selection through the 
CWPPRA Task Force sometimes led to individual agency advocacy and agreements that 
accommodated the different agencies demands, rather than true integration. 
Louisiana has created a new Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) to 
centralize and integrate its coastal efforts and the Legislature will shortly be considering 
additional legislation for consolidation of the numerous levee districts. However, there is still a 
need in coastal Louisiana to clarify the federal-state responsibilities for planning, to make and 
implement joint decisions, and in so doing to expedite outcomes and ensure coordination with 
water resource and other activities of the federal and state governments. A Federal-State body, 
which we will for convenience refer to as the “Coastal Louisiana Authority” (it could alternately 
be a “board” or 64 commission”), should be established to fulfill this role. The CLA would be 
comprised of a small number of members with appointments made by the President and the 
Governor of Louisiana. The group would have a small administrative staff and an executive 
director, as necessary to execute its functions. Its authorization should be subject to periodic 
review and renewal by the Congress and the state. The CLA could report to the President and 
Governor or operate under the administrative jurisdiction and support of an appropriate federal 
agency to ensure coordination with the water resources and other activities of the federal 
government. 
The CLA’s responsibilities and powers would be limited to three areas. First, it would be 
responsible for leading the development of joint federal-state policies that govern an integrated 
investment and management program (discussed later in this section) and for revising those 
policies over time as new knowledge emerges, and social, economic and environmental 
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conditions change. Second, the CLA would review and approve the use of the programmatic 
funds (see discussion of authorization and funding, below) allocated for adaptive management 
and the science and technology program, as well as other uses discussed below. Third, the CLA 
would direct, receive and use analyses of its Coastal Assessment Group (CAG) and, based on 
those analyses, stakeholder input and coordination with the Mississippi River Commission and 
the Louisiana CPRA, would make funding recommendations for significant investments (those 
that exceed a defined threshold). The recommendations of the CLA would be an affirmation that 
the proposed project has been formulated and evaluated in full consideration of the agreed 
policies. Based on such recommendations the Corps, or another appropriate agency, would have 
the responsibility to design, construct and, if authorized, operate and maintain the recommended 
project. 
  Coastal Assessment Group 
The CLA would base its advice on analyses conducted under the direction of a Coastal 
Assessment Group (CAG). The CAG should have a professional staff with a full range of skills 
and perspectives (multiple purposes and multiple disciplines including natural science, social 
science, economics, and engineering). However, the staff would remain small, but could be 
expanded to address specific tasks with personnel from the state and federal agencies on 
temporary assignment. 
The CAG would have two roles. First, the CAG would be responsible for executing the 
integrated assessment to assure that each proposed project investment in storm protection, 
navigation and coastal restoration takes advantage of synergies and avoids and mitigates 
conflicts among purposes. Also the CAG would report whether and to what extent different 
economic, environmental and social objectives are served. The integrated planning process 
would be led by the CAG, however detailed project design, basic data acquisition and modeling, 
and other tasks contributing to project execution would be done in the existing agencies, 
principally the Corps and the state. Second, the CAG would be responsible for the direction and 
oversight of the Coastal Engineering and Science Program (CESP) in order to assure that the 
work of that program is targeted to the decision making needs of the CLA. 
  Coastal Engineering and Science Program 
A Coastal Engineering and Science Program office would build on the concepts developed 
for the LCA Science and Technology Program, but would be broadened to address storm 
damage reduction and maritime transportation, encompassing the natural science, engineering, 
social science and economics applications deemed relevant to the integrated management 
framework. In particular, it would be responsible and accountable for supporting adaptive 
management, including participatory decision making, and ensuring rigorous, independent peer 
review. A key responsibility of the managers of the CESP is to respond to the oversight of the 
CAG and assure that the scientific uncertainties deemed relevant to decision making are 
addressed through the program. The CESP would rely on scientists and engineers in agencies, 
universities and the private sector to perform most of the required research, modeling, and 
monitoring. Consequently, the office staff would remain small. 
Programmatic Authorization and Funding 
While the total composition and costs of the integrated planning and investment program 
can not be determined at present, it is necessary for the Administration and the Congress to make 
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a significant and certain up-front commitment of funds and establish new procedures for 
expeditiously funding this program over time. 
No less than two hundred million dollars per year, for a 10year period, should be 
authorized by the Congress to support the CLA and the CAG. Appropriations should follow that 
authorization. The agencies receiving the appropriations would manage those funds consistent 
with the guidance of the CLA for: (a) the integrated systems planning program; (b) the CESP 
research on decision-critical technical uncertainties, including funding pilot projects to test 
project design concepts; and (c) comprehensive post-implementation monitoring and assessment. 
Also, the CLA would be authorized to allocate funds for projects costing less than some 
threshold, e.g. $25 million, with project execution being the responsibility of the Corps and the 
State. In the future, consideration should be given to administering the existing CWPPRA 
program through the CLA some time after the efficacy of the CLA has been established. 
Programmatic funding would loosen the restrictions on adaptive management costs as a 
percentage of total project costs, as well as the requirements for separate authorization for each 
component project. With a certain funding stream there could be a continuity of programs and 
staff, an adequately funded and reasonably managed engineering and science support program, 
and accelerated planning for implementation of smaller projects. 
Louisiana Coastal Investment Corporation. The CLA could recommend authorization 
and appropriations for Corps projects that exceed the thresholds in the programmatic authority, 
or for project maintenance, through the existing WRDA and appropriations processes. However, 
reliance on authorization through the uncertain WRDA process (the last WRDA was passed in 
2000) seriously risks delay and programmatic incoherence. A more predictable and flexible 
alternative approach would be to legislatively create an entity, for convenience referred to as the 
Louisiana Coastal Investment Corporation 60 (LCIC), as an independent funding authority for 
new projects and their maintenance. The LCIC would receive recommendations from the CLA 
and would fund projects meeting investment criteria established by Congress when it authorizes 
the LCIC policies. The corporation would be given the authorization to issue bonds with 
maturities of up to 50 years to finance investment projects to meet the three purposes of storm 
protection, marine transportation and coastal landscape restoration. An initial bonding authority 
of $5-10 billion appears to be justified by the extensive storm protection, navigation and 
restoration needs of the region. 
The long-term bonding authority aligns the financing of the new investments with the 
long-term benefits they provide. The federal government would guarantee the bonds. In addition 
the Congress could set a financial limit on the bonding authority when the corporation is 
chartered. The Congress could review the LCIC on a five-year basis, could dissolve the 
corporation at those times or choose to raise or lower the bonding authority. The bonds could be 
repaid with a combination of funding sources that may include, but would not be limited to: 
future federal appropriations; fees on port, waterway or pipeline users; wetlands permitting fees; 
receipts from Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) mineral revenues; and non-federal cost sharing 
payments. Intergovernmental cost-sharing requirements would be established by a Congressional 
formula and a legally binding agreement to make payments that contribute to retiring the bonds 
would be required before issuing any bond. 
Professional Staffing 
An essential element in enhancing the credibility and soundness of planning and 
implementation is an agency’s internal staff capabilities. The Corps of Engineers is facing a 
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significant loss of staff numbers and capability through retirement, just at the time that the 
demands for its skills are increasing. Indeed, the integrated planning process will demand a 
wider array of skills from the engineering, hydrologic, geological, biological and social sciences 
than is currently available in the agency or in federal or state agencies generally. Also, the 
effectiveness of the long-term program requires the institutional memory that develops within a 
permanent and professional staff. This is not to suggest that all the work needs to be done by 
agency staff. However, if much of the work is done by contract, agency professionalism and 
competence are essential for comprehending advice from outside experts and translating it into 
useful information to support decision making. The Corps and the bodies recommended here 
must have the ability to recruit and the ability to retain talented personnel. 
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APPENDIX H: HOW SAFE IS SAFE? 
Appendix H: How Safe is Safe? 
Coping with Mother Nature, Human Nature and Technology's 
Unintended Consequences 
by 
Dr. Edward Wenk, Jr. 
H.1 Preface 
This treatise on risk was prepared a backdrop for the analysis of the cause and cure of 
massive flooding of New Orleans associated with the hurricane Katrina. I do not regard myself 
as a theorist in the field of risk management. Instead, I have led a professional life of exposure to 
elevated risks, of managing risks to which others were exposed, and of advising public officials 
at the highest levels of government on strategies of risk abatement. From extended observations 
at ringside, I have down-loaded and sorted memories so as to share experiences that define 
fundamental properties of all risk environments created by acts of nature, from human frailty and 
from unintended consequences of technology. 
The product is not an encyclopedia of risky situations, nor a how-to handbook on risk 
management. It is not a post-crisis analysis of Katrina nor of its calamity twins. It is not a check 
off list of what parameters to think about in the risk equation, but rather a tool on how to think 
about the quintessential questions of “How safe is safe” and of the exercise of social 
responsibility to limit harm. 
This treatise has been prepared for readers ranging from professionals in risk 
management to non-specialists with heavy portfolios to adopt and implement policies to shield 
citizens from threats of bodily harm or of property damage. Finally, it is directed toward citizens 
exposed to involuntary risks who feel responsible for participating in civil decisions that affect 
their safety and security and that of the community. 
This survey, suggested methodologies of assessment, and conclusions related to Katrina 
are based on case studies starting with the wreck of the Exxon Valdez where the author was 
directly involved with the post-mortem analysis. Other cases include the spacecraft Challenger, 
the eruption of Mt. St Helens volcano, the Bhopal, India, chemical spill, the air attack on the twin 
towers, 9/11, the failure of intelligence for opening the war on Iraq, and about 100 artificial cases 
prepared over two decades by graduate students in the Program for Social Management of 
Technology at the University of Washington. The perspective for analysis is systems based and 
interdisciplinary, elaborated in Tradeoffs: Imperatives of Choice in a High Tech World (1986).  
The contributions of others with whom I studied and worked deserves emphatic 
acknowledgement. Indeed, virtually all my bosses over a lifetime deserve accolades as teachers. 
To the point of this treatise, I want to thank those who read the manuscript and followed my 
entreaty for robust criticism: Profesors Robert Bea, Naj Meshkati, Robb Moss, Mary Raum, and 
Karlene Roberts, Dr. Anita Auerbach, George Lindamood, Flo Broussard and Kofi Inkabi. 
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I especially want to thank Naomi Pascal for her gifted editing that raised the stature of the 
essay to the highest professional standards, and Professor Robert Bea for inviting my 
participation in the Katrina project. It has been an exciting experience. 
H.2 Introduction 
H.2.1. How Safe is Safe?  
The Katrina Hurricane disaster in 2005 exposed a technological failure of inadequate 
defense against a predictable, risky and potentially lethal event. Recent studies, including this 
latest one from the University of California at Berkeley, focus on death and destruction from 
flood waters that were released by collapse of levees. Studies of cause acknowledge the extreme 
forces of nature but also cite the human and organizational errors (HOE) that now occur more 
conspicuously because the engineering of physical parameters has been refined. HOE failures 
now exceed mechanical sources.   
Because protection against human weaknesses is more art than science, the study of cause 
and of remediation requires a context for risk analysis. As systems based and interdisciplinary, 
that depiction should be of   help to non-specialists with policy and management responsibilities 
so as to understand the enigmatic question of “How safe is safe?” In other words, what level of 
risk is acceptable when making decisions on public safety and security.            
Risk is usually defined as a condition where either an action or its absence poses threats 
of socially adverse consequences, sometimes extreme. Risk happens from acts of nature, from 
weaknesses of human nature, and from side effects of technology, all situations that mix complex 
technical parameters with the variables of social behavior. Although each risk event is unique, all 
display commonalities that permit systemic analysis and management. These recurring properties 
lead to certain principles. 
To begin, the acceptability of risk cannot be extracted from science or mathematics; it is a 
social judgment. The spectrum of risk thus embraces both the physical world defined by natural 
laws, and the human world loaded with beliefs instead of facts, values, ambiguities and 
uncertainties. Among other features, the physical world may be thought of as a mechanism 
whose behavior follows principles of cause-and-effect because each internal element has fixed 
properties regardless of which function it is expected to perform. On the other hand, the human 
world performs more like an organism whose components are not fixed but may grow, be altered 
by the thrust of external events and by interplay with other internal elements. 
 Following a notion that what you can’t model you can’t manage, a systems model 
is needed to represent the processes by which both physical and societal factors are defined, 
interconnected and interact. Such technology-based human support  systems are labeled by their 
intended social functions-----food production, shelter, military and homeland security, 
communications, transportation, health care, energy production, conservation of natural 
resources, water supply and sanitation, education and even entertainment. In our modern era, all 
these functions have been enormously strengthened by applications of scientific knowledge, then 
applied through engineering.  
It helps to think of technology as more than the hardware of planes, trains and computers. 
Rather, it is a social system comprising many organizations, synchronized by a web of 
communications for a common purpose. It is energized by forces of free market demand, of 
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popular demand for security and quality of life, and by forces of scientific discovery and 
innovation. It is best understood as a technological delivery system (TDS) that applies scientific 
knowledge to achieve society’s needs and wants     
Technology then acts like an amplifier of human performance. With water wheel, steam 
engine and bomb, it amplifies human muscle. With the computer it amplifies the human mind 
and memory. It also amplifies social activity, mobility, quality and length of life. 
A paradox arises when technologies introduced for specific benefits also spawn side 
effects. These can induce complexity, conflict and even chaos. Most of these are unwanted by 
some sector of stakeholders, now or in the future. This paradox is dramatized  when technologies 
are introduced to defend against violence of nature or against human and organizational error but 
themselves spring unintended and possibly dangerous consequences.    
The investigation of risk and of measures to contain it within safe limits requires both 
hindsight and foresight. The past can illuminate failures, their causes and their control as lessons 
for engaging new ventures and threats. The future commands the exercise of foresight, an 
imaginative preparation of scenarios stirred by such questions as, “what might happen, if,” or 
“what might happen, unless.” Those inquiries should then examine the timing of impacts 
(immediate or hibernating) and identity of players on the risk horizon who trigger risk, those 
parties responsible for risk abatement and those adversely affected now or in the future. 
Modeling then becomes essential to represent a full cast of stakeholders and their inter-
relationships, including both the private and the public sectors. The concept of a technology 
delivery system (TDS) discussed later is simply an attempt to model how the real world works. 
The responsibility to manage risk stems from the American Constitution, from custom , 
and from a growing body of public law. Federal, state, and local governments are heavily 
involved in all of the technologies itemized previously, contrary to popular belief that technology 
is private industry’s territory. With waterways, for example, the Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) has a predominant statutory responsibility. That accords with the historic federal 
stewardship of national infrastructure, from roads, shipping channels, harbors and canals to 
airplane routes and the Internet. 
That achievement carries significant but subtle implications. For one thing, safety costs 
money. The federal budget is constantly challenged to meet a rainbow of different demands, the 
total of which always exceeds Congressional appropriations. The mismatch must then be 
reconciled through tradeoffs at the highest policy levels stretching all the way to the President of 
the United States and the Congress. 
Indeed, the President becomes the nation’s systems manager because all agencies 
responsible for citizen security report to the Chief Executive, because he is arbiter of budget 
priorities and author of annual budget requests. He is held to account for quality of performance 
and for design of public policies if authority or performance is lacking. Serious threats of nature 
also require the mustering of resources that are available only through the armed services of 
which the President is Commander-in-Chief. 
Often, a focus on power of the Federal Government misses a major premise of 
democratic governance. As the Declaration of Independence states, those who govern should do 
so only with the consent of the governed; we would say the informed consent.  
This notion is reflected in such regulatory legislation as the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA). Section 102(2)c. It requires estimates of harm that could result from 
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technological initiatives, along with alternatives to accomplish the same goals but with less 
harm. After preparation, these environmental impact statements (EIS) are made available for 
public comment and possible amendment. The point is that this process makes every citizen a 
part of government to negotiate the question of how safe is safe and thus provide citizens the 
levels of safety and security that they desire. 
Implied is a prospective national policy that those put in harm’s way have a voice in what 
otherwise could be involuntary exposure to risk. This principle leaves implementation of the 
concept to the responsible federal agencies, subject to Constitutional safeguards. That doctrine of 
anticipation was the policy spine of NEPA and the 1972 legislation to create Congress’s Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA). 
That agency functioned as radar for the ship of state to estimate future effects of today’s 
decisions. It was killed in an overnight action by House Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1995. In one 
sense, OTA served as a risk manager for the Congress and the agency’s production of unbiased 
reports gained commendation, sufficient to WARRANT its rehabilitation in a new policy venue 
sharply focused on risk management. 
Managing risk demands attention to operational details. For example, informed consent 
assumes that every citizen has access to the facts, all the facts. And it assumes they are readily 
understood by individuals without specialized training.  Here the print and electronic media 
become conveyers of raw information to help citizens judge their exposure, but also to serve as 
watchdogs through investigatory journalism as an independent check on truth. This condition 
places a burden of responsibility on both the media and citizens to grasp the risk equation 
sufficiently to better understand their own risk exposure and their risk tolerance, thus to frame 
their informed consent. 
Despite a tendency to flare the sensational, the media can enrich understanding with a 
backstory because disasters so agitate a functioning system as to reveal the full cast of 
stakeholders, their roles in increasing or decreasing risk and their degree of injury.  Managing 
editors require that the subject “have legs” to justify time and space of repeated coverage. 
Even if this process works perfectly, the outcomes would not be free of conflict. An 
individual’s judgment on matters that threaten lives, property and the natural world is heavily 
colored by their portfolio of values. Moreover, different stakeholders have different interests to 
guard. In deciding how safe is safe, disparate views may require bargaining so as to reach a 
consensus.  
A serious problem then surfaces when all parties argue from their short-term self interest. 
Little attention is accorded the longer term. Left out of the bargaining process is our progeny, the 
future generations. It can then be argued that the federal government should not simply act as 
umpire but try to balance long- with short-term effects using foresight, to compare options that 
do not penalize children by harm or bankruptcy. 
The engineering profession has long practiced social responsibility by a technique of 
over-design, to compensate for uncertainties in loading, in materials, in quality of construction 
and maintenance, etc. This may be accomplished by adopting some multiple of loading as a 
margin of safety ranging from 1.4 to 5.0. How these margins are set and by whose authority is of 
critical importance, especially where tradeoffs with cost or other compelling factors such as 
deadlines may compromise the intended reduction of risk. 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 H-5  
This method of safety assurance is more applicable to design of mechanisms not subject 
to human and organizational errors. The term “errors,” incidentally, is shorthand for a broad 
spectrum of individual and societal weaknesses that include ignorance, blunder, folly, mischief, 
pride, greed and hubris. 
Protecting structures against violence of nature such as with earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, tsunamis, floods, landslides, hurricanes, pestilence, droughts and disease may utilize 
the concept of over-design, based on meteorological, hydrological, seismic and geophysical data 
of past extreme events; e.g. the highest flood or most severe seismic event in a century. Equally 
pertinent is the scale of losses. Beside the previous techniques of safety enhancement is one of 
redundancy where, for example, commercial airliners are required to have at least two engines, 
one of which may suffice to assure a soft landing. 
Protecting structures against violence of terrorists entails additional practices of a 
customized precautionary principle. This intervention may be adopted as a preventative measure 
or one of damage control. 
Learning from documented failures is a powerful method for reducing risks of repeated 
losses. Another is to learn from close shaves. Many dangerous events fortunately culminate in 
only an incident rather than an accident, but the repetition of similar incidents can serve as early 
warning of danger. Indeed, the logging and analysis of such events on the nation’s airways 
partially accounts for their impressive safety record.  A system for reporting close encounters 
was installed decades ago. Anticipating the possibility that perpetrators of high risk events might 
be reluctant to blow the whistle on themselves, the Federal Aviation Administration that has 
cognizance arranged for NASA to collect incident date and to sanitize it to protect privacy of the 
incident reporter. NASA also screens reports to identify patterns as early warning of a dangerous 
condition.  Similar systems are in place for reporting incidents with nuclear power plants. 
With the growing recognition of human factors in accidents or in failures to limit 
damage, a class of situations has been uncovered entailing uncommonly high risks but  
conspicuously good safety records. In the Navy, for example, high risks attend the crew on 
submarines and on carrier based aircraft. Yet accident rates are paradoxically low.  
Careful analysis has shown that certain qualities of leadership and organizational culture 
foster integrity, a sense of responsibility among all participants, a tolerance by authority figures 
for dissent, and consensus on common goals of safe performance.. Especially has high safety 
performance been correlated with an institutional culture that was bred from the top of the 
management pyramid. The most critical element of that culture was mutual trust among all 
parties in a technological delivery system. 
Long experience with military and paramilitary organizations such as first responders 
proves the value of rehearsals to reduce risks and control damage. Of special virtue is proof of 
satisfactory communications. Evaluation of dry runs has repeatedly turned up serious problems 
in communication. So has post-accident analysis of real events when delays or blunders in 
communication of warnings and rescue operations cost lives. 
This leads to recognition that successful management of risk depends ultimately on the 
prudent exercise of political power by leaders at every level. Deficiencies may still remain in 
political will, in fiscal resources, in vigilance, and in ethics. Hard to define and to measure, these 
elements may sadly define themselves in emergencies by their absence. 
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To sum up, the context for analyzing the levee failures from Hurricane Katrina illustrates 
several realities. The most compelling imperative of life is survival. Yet the experience of living 
teaches that there is no zero risk. Some exposures must be tolerated as “normal,” whether in rush 
hour traffic or coping with nature, with human nature or with unintended consequences of 
technology. 
In this modern era, society has demanded better protection against threats to life, to 
peace, justice, health, liberty, .life style, private property and to the natural environment. These 
challenges are not new, but two things have changed—the increased potency of technology and 
increased coverage by media. Technological factors are more robust in speed of delivery and in 
potential harm. Media covers events live, 24/7, and worldwide. Events anywhere have 
repercussions everywhere. The better informed public tends increasingly to be risk averse. 
Apprehension and fear peak after a calamity with demands for better protection through better 
governance. Higher expectations are legitimate because so many threats just itemized are due to 
human and organizational errors either in catering technologies to meet market demand or in 
guarding against hazards. This current study shows that the Katrina event fits that pattern. 
Government at all levels failed to provide security to citizens before and during the catastrophic 
flooding. Victims are justified in asking how did this pathology of a mundane levee technology 
develop? How can that knowledge be applied to prevent a reoccurrence? Then there is the 
quintessential question of “How safe is safe?” 
As said earlier, answers cannot be found only from natural laws of science. Safety is a 
social judgment. Those exposed to risk have a right to information about their exposure to danger 
and about the strategic issues of protection.  
Ultimately, these decisions are made by government, and that process entails wrestling 
for power. In that matrix of conflicting interests, in our democracy, this authority should flow 
from citizens taking responsibility to become informed on their exposure to risk and to assure the 
opportunity to express an informed consent. 
At the federal level, both the President and the Congress need objective, expert advice 
and counsel to fulfill their responsibilities under the Constitution. They also need to increase 
their respect for independent analysis of risks in order to restore citizen trust. 
The preceding situation analysis opens a window on a number of issues treated in more 
detail in subsequent sections: 
• The design of precautionary measures requires inspired foresight, to fantasy alternative 
futures: 
• Tradeoffs are inevitable between short- and long-range events and consequences, between 
safety and cost, between special interests and social  interests, between who wins and who 
loses and who decides. 
• All human support systems entail technology, and all technologies project unintended 
consequences. 
• Society embraces a spectrum of values that often conflict, as with the goals of  efficiency in 
the private sector and of sustainability and social justice in the public 
• Key decisions regarding citizen safety and security are made by government  through public 
policies to manage risk. These policies dominate the legislative agenda. 
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• This mandate imposes a heavy burden on the President and on the Congress,  both bodies 
requiring access to authentic and immediate information. 
• Making decisions and assuring implementation draws on political capital in the 
 structure of authority by the exercise of political power and political will.  
• In our democracy, this authority should flow from citizens following the principle that those 
who govern do so at the informed consent of the governed. 
• The quality of risk management can best be judged by the effects on future generations. 
• The geography of risk crosses boundaries as between federal, state and local entities, and 
between the United States and other nations. 
• Different cultures have different risk tolerances, including attitudes distinguishing voluntary 
from involuntary risk. 
• Analysis of risk and its control extracts lessons from past failures, although the most 
catastrophic events are so rare as to frustrate projections. 
This portfolio of issues illustrates the anatomy of risk and the complexity of its 
management. They sound a wake-up call for deeper understanding by those responsible for risk 
management and by those attentive citizens who are exposed and are entitled to a voice in the 
decision process. 
H.2.2. Risk Analysis as a Survival Skill 
Humans have always lived at risk. From early times, we experienced threats of hunger, 
natural disasters and extremes of weather, dangers of accident and violence at the hands of other 
people. Brutality wasn’t just physical. Some threats were psychological and emotional as by 
deprivation of human rights, freedom and dignity, of equitable access to resources and of 
opportunities for self-expression. Only a tiny elite lived with reasonable security; others were 
dominated, exploited and enslaved. 
A big bang of change occurred with a twin enlightenment of democracy and of modern 
technologies. People live longer. Quality of life is higher and more widely and evenly spread. 
Everywhere, citizens expect government to provide overarching security.  
With progress, however, have come new risks. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
expose every human to extinction, and weapon delivery systems can be so distributed and hidden 
as to make total safety pure fantasy.. On the other hand, arms control treaties of 1963 on non-
proliferation and limits to testing demonstrated how nations can negotiate risk reduction for 
common survival, even in a hot atmosphere of a cold war. That same ingenuity is required to 
manage twenty-first century risks. 
Periodically, philosophers and theologians have peered into that future, some with lenses 
colored by optimism, others by the obverse. By the 1930s, a literature emerged of pure 
speculation and conjecture. Some promised only entertainment; some was serious and usually 
pessimistic. By the 1960s, risks were being charted by scientists and engineers..  
In 1962, for example, Rachel Carson wrote in Silent Spring about the loss of bird song 
because DDT sprayed to wipe out malaria laden mosquitoes had side effects. Egg shells of birds 
were thinned enough to halt reproduction. That wigwag captured public attention that echoed in 
the chambers of policy making. In 1970, the United States adopted the National Environmental 
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Policy Act  to protect the environment broadly. It required analysis of ecological, economic, and 
social impacts triggered by technological initiatives. It also required their publication and 
opportunities for citizen reaction.  
This achievement challenged the public process as to whether society was prepared to 
deal with the new information on which to form judgments of safety.  
In 1972, two related events occurred. First, the United States Congress awakened to the 
unintended consequences of technology and founded a new advisory agency, the Office of 
Technology Assessment, the OTA. It was mandated to look ahead and unpeel the ubiquitous side 
effects of almost every technology. The Act brought the future into the decision process in a 
vigorous spirit of early warning.  
Second, a group of European corporate executives (called the Club of Rome) took time 
away from their internal management to study and publicize extreme pathological trends in the 
world at large. Interactions were examined among spiraling population, rising insults to the 
environment, limits on food production, on such natural resources as energy, and on effects of 
urbanization. The study, Limits to Growth,  sounded an alarm that in perhaps 75 years, dangerous 
trends would become irreversible. Although the study’s methodology was questioned, its 
warnings attracted world wide, policy level attention. 
As the public became aware of the two faces of technology, the future was probed not 
only of physical limits to the carrying capacity of the planet, but limits to human knowledge, 
ingenuity, judgment, objectivity, and mastery of problem solving. My contribution to the inquiry 
was to test a portfolio of dangers from unintended consequences of technology against two 
measures of risk reduction. One lay in defensive technology. The other lay in the muscular 
practice of politics! 
Table H.1 summarizes conclusions reached in 1977, almost 30 years ago and published in 
Margins for Survival, 1979. The different forms of menace have all happened at one or another 
scale, including  terrorists with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Japan. The most 
effective pre-crisis intervention still seems to be through politics, not new techniques. The 
poorest guesses were on imminence. Perhaps the author was spooked by total immersion in 
doomsday subject matter of that era and a close shave with the Cuban missile crisis. 
These projections are interesting but not as important as planning a risk analysis strategy 
for survival. While government has that responsibility, a post-mortem of Katrina may reveal 
endemic malfunctioning and the need for broader awareness and involvement of  citizens. 
Lessons From Disasters and Close Shaves 
Engineers remember that until two centuries ago, they learned mostly from failures, 
Occasionally, they still do. Katrina and 9/11 have been cruel teachers.. With a global span of 
high-speed communications, we can study catastrophes at great distances. We can construct a 
rich case book to extract patterns of risk that are universal because natural phenomena are global 
and new technologies no longer have geographical, national, economic or cultural boundaries. 
Even our humanitarian concerns encompass people everywhere.  
The short compendium that follows is not intended to be comprehensive. It is only a 
sample of events selected from a swarm of news stories where media editors and TV producers 
thought them important enough to earn repeated headlines. As the media jargon goes, “the stories 
had legs.” The initial story had many sequels. That publicity was justified by the scale of impact 
in lives or property lost, by the surprise lack of early warning, by the likelihood of the pattern 
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being repeated so as to deserve hyper vigilance, and by effectiveness or its failure with damage 
control.   
Table H.1: Menaces, Outcomes, Probabilities, and Interventions 
Pre-Crisis Intervention 
Successful Means 
(scale 1 - 10) 
 
 
Menace 
 
Worst Case 
Casualties 
(millions) 
 
Worst Case 
Imminence 
(years) 
 
Probabilities 
and Trends 
Minimum 
Time 
(years) Technical Political 
WMD, 
Terrorism 
30 0 High ⇑ 10 8 2 
Famine, 
Natural 
Disasters 
1,000 10 High ⇑ 15 8 5 
Environmental 
Accidents 
2,000 25 Medium ⇑ 15 8 7 
Climate 
Change 
1,500 75 Low ⇑ 50 3 7 
Urban Chaos 500 15 High ⇑ 30 5 3 
Resource 
Depletion 
1,500 30 High ⇑ 20 7 4 
Economic 
Collapse 
1,000 15 Medium ⇑ 15 6 5 
Institutional 
Collapse 
500 15 Medium ⇑ 25 5 5 
Decline in 
Values 
2,000 25 Medium ⇒ 20 7 3 
 
Consider these large scale disasters, perceived threats, or close shaves: 
1) Hostile Military or Diplomatic Actions 
A-Bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1945 
Soviet Space Shot, 1957 
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 
Capture of U.S. naval vessel in Tonkin Gulf, 1967  
Actions by Terrorists 
Truck bomb damages New York’s World Trade Center, 1992 
Bombing of Oklahoma City federal building, 1995 
Bombing of U.S. Marine Barracks in Lebanon, 1983 
Bombing of U.S. embassy in Kuwait, 1983 
Bombing of U.S. naval vessel in Yemen, 2000 
PanAm #103 exploded over Scotland, 1988  
Airplanes crash into World Trade Center and Pentagon, 9/11/2001 
Violations of the Environment 
Torrey Canyon tanker spill, 1967 
Exxon Valdez tanker spill, 1989 
Gas emissions damaging the atmosphere’s ozone layer 
Greenhouse Gas emissions triggering global warming 
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DDT and PCBs distributed in waters, worldwide 
Technology-related Disasters 
Rash of steamboat boiler explosions, 1830s 
Explosion of chemical plant in Bhopal, India, 1984 
Nuclear power accident at Chernobyl, Ukraine, 1986 
Challenger spacecraft failed on reentry, 1986 
Infrastructure lags behind urban growth  
Long outages of electricity, phones, water and waste disposal 
Failure of whole systems  
One thousand Savings and Loan Bankruptcies, 1980s 
Health care fraud and lack of coverage 
Continued shrinkage of passenger railroads in U.S. 
Acts of Nature 
Tsunami in Indonesia, 2005 
Earthquake in Kashmir, 2005 
Katrina Hurricane on U.S. Gulf Coast, 2005 
Global flu epidemic, 1918 
Drought and famine, Africa 
Evolution of Avian Flu to threaten humans, 2005 
Resource Depletion 
Increase in energy demand not matched by new supplies 
Depletion of ground water resources 
Pathological Violence by People 
Holocaust, Germany and occupied Europe 1939 
Genocide, Sudan, 2001 
Genocide, Uganda, 1985  
Genocide, Iraq, 1996 
Suicide bombers in Israel 
Loss of freedom by concentration and control of media 
All these threats share common elements: hazards potentially affecting greater numbers 
of people than ever before, risks extended geographically and through the future. All involve 
technology and require human intervention in both prevention and mitigation. In most cases, this 
depends on government, through legislation, specifically tighter regulation. 
Each threat has three back stories: the history and immediate context for the main event, 
the event and its effects, and the post event consequences and application of lessons learned.. 
Present at every stage are challenges to decision making, mainly by public officials. The political 
stage is tense: anxiety, frustration and stress rise over lack of crisis prevention and of damage 
control plans, over weak communication networks, over conflicts among parties at interest, over 
threats to the status of the decision makers themselves. Spotlights focus on first responders, but 
ultimately on the nation’s Commander in Chief. The President is functionally the nation’s system 
manager!  
This inventory demonstrates the close bond between technology and government, the 
centerpiece of a book by this author, The Double Helix: Technology and Democracy in the 
American Future. As these examples are tweaked in the following sections, the reader should  
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focus on a particular class of technologies, those installed to deal with extreme violence of nature 
or of terrorists, either to prevent disasters or to limit and ameliorate damage. 
H.2.3. Tradeoffs Between Risks, Cost of Mitigation and Performance 
Safety costs money. That unwelcome truth creates dilemmas in the social management of 
all technologies as demonstrated in trends of safety measures for  automobiles. Here is a sketch 
of that evolution 
Looking back, during World War II, the production lines of cars gave way to production 
of armaments; fuel was strictly rationed. With peace, the pent-up consumer demand exploded.  
One unintended consequence was a sharp rise in highway fatalities. As a creature of auto 
manufacturers, the National Safety Council opened a publicity campaign to reduce accidents, 
pointed at “the nut behind the steering wheel.” The industry blamed crashes entirely on driver 
error. Up until then, the most significant improvement in auto safety had been a requirement for 
brake lights. The public bought that rationale and began training drivers in high schools but 
ignored safety measures for vehicles themselves.  
As fatalities continued to rise, newspapers featured weekend carnage, for example on 
Route 1 between Baltimore and Washington, D.C. The public became agitated but it lacked 
mechanisms for protest other than the AAA. Even insurance companies were silent. Safety 
advocacy then grew following Ralph Nader’s model of credible documentation. Things 
happened. 
State and federal governments mandated turn signals, shatter proof windshields, rear 
view mirrors, tubeless tires, winter treads, emission controls, seat belts, and stiff penalties for 
DWI. In most cases, the industry resisted initiatives on grounds that improving safety would 
boost cost and, following elementary economics, would shrink the customer base. Battling the 
industry were national leaders in engineering, in public health and in consumer rights. The era of 
citizen activists and responsive government was just dawning and industry had to be dragged, 
screaming and kicking, toward safer cars. 
Albeit not with mathematical equations, the public asserted how safe is safe. Their 
tolerance for fatalities in the U.S. hovered around 50,000 per year. Beyond that mortality rate, 
drivers demanded improvements and were willing to pay the added costs.  
This story echoes earlier advances in railroad safety and then air transportation. It is also 
a model of what has happened over the last century regarding citizen protection by 
immunization, requirements for pure food and drugs, and by preservation of such common 
property as air and fresh water. Apart from these tangible measures, similar interventions by 
government were demanded for the less visible harm of monopoly pricing, security trading 
fraud, etc. 
Before elaborating further on the concept of tradeoffs, it is useful to extract further 
lessons from the case of transportation. Here are some: 
First, the public began to say “how safe is safe.” Until after World War II, the cast of 
inventors, entrepreneurs and manufacturers soft-pedaled the issue of auto safety and targeted 
most research on fatigue failure of axles. Protection was expected by regulatory processes of 
government, but in the contest between sources of risk and victims, the most vigorous lobbying 
came from industry, not drivers.  
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That changed dramatically by the 1960s. For one thing, the love affair with cars made 
imperative more and safer highways. Federal support of farm-to-market roads underwent a 
quantum leap with1956 legislation to build a national network of superhighways that had been 
sketched first in 1923 by General Pershing. The breakthrough was intense public support, 
inflamed by advocacy of the Hearst newspaper empire. The Public Roads Administration set 
higher standards for states to follow in highway design and construction, on sight distance by 
limits on grades, curvature, width, lane separation and freedom from intersections.  
The public had found its voice for safer roadbeds to be funded through taxes, and that 
imperative of risk management slowly leaked over to the cars themselves.  
A second lesson was that with safety awareness and education, the public would  pay 
higher car prices for greater safety. Note that the issue was pressed not by car companies or by 
government but by the public, media and public-interest associations. Then insurance companies 
reacted to the suits for negligence brought successfully against manufacturers, highlighted by 
evidence that risks were known to the companies but not mitigated voluntarily. That pattern 
improved with legislation mandating recalls. Today, safety sells cars. What a switch! 
A third lesson lies in how the growth in public appetite for technology required growth in 
public services to manage risk. A corollary is that government stepped in only after the fact, 
practically never in the spirit of preventive medicine. That stance of reaction rather than 
proaction as a doctrine of anticipation stems from historical American antipathy to big 
government, and partly from the power of lobbies to influence political leadership. As elaborated 
later, technology has become more political and politics more technological. Sometimes, that 
reality stings.. 
A fourth lesson is that the government’s role in modern life has greatly increased simply 
to manage risk. Most of the recent (and not just reorganized) agencies of government were 
created for the troublesome purpose of regulation. That theme harmonizes with the 
Constitutional mandate, among others, “to promote the general welfare.” 
One problem is that each risk is managed by different criteria and different agencies with 
different cultures, vertically through federal, state and local bodies, and horizontally within each 
layer.  The first broad attempt to improve the risk management process was  Section 102(2)c of 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 requiring environmental impact statements. With 
a ground swell of popular support, it capped the 1968 presidential election with all candidates 
driven by public sentiment to stand for environmental protection. The courts later stretched the 
scope of the act to encompass social and economic dimensions of the human environment and 
not just those to preserve nature. 
That breadth was sharpened by 1972 legislation to create the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA). Its purpose was to provide radar for the ship of state, an early warning 
system for Congress that required every technological initiative of the federal government to 
postpone implementation until an assessment was completed focused on questions of, “what 
might happen, if, or what might happen, unless.” This gave public advocates a handle to dig out 
potentially harmful consequences and through the political process gain mitigation. OTA was 
killed in 1995. A similar provision for foresight was mandated in the 1976 mandate creating the 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy; it has been ignored. 
The preceding brief that was concerned with tradeoffs between safety and cost used auto 
safety as an example. Similar patterns are present in other modes of transportation, by sea, by air 
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and by railroad. A second mode of tradeoff is present when  independent  parameters of design 
performance interact with both safety and cost. The most compelling example is with combat 
submarines.  
As context for this case study, recall that submarine hulls must be designed to withstand 
the intense hydrostatic pressure of surrounding sea water when submerged to operating  depth. 
Given the catastrophic nature of hull failure and the exposure of crew to such risks, precautions 
are taken to compensate for uncertainties in design theories, in materials, workmanship, aging, or 
from operating error. This additional strength usually entails additional weight and that poses a 
dilemma..  
Submarines operate close to neutral buoyancy. This affords diving simply by admitting 
sea water to external ballast tanks. Surfacing then entails blowing the ballast tanks with 
compressed air carried on board. With such a delicate balance of weights between the sub’s hull, 
propulsion, weapons, life-support functions, crew and sustenance.  the incentive for adding 
strength to reduce risk to crew and sub itself carries a serious penalty. The weight for additional 
strength must be traded with weights of other components  required for combat. 
The design process requires serial trial-and-error calculations, varying the safety margin. 
For civil construction, the building codes dictate a factor of four. For special boilers, it may be as 
small as three. For submarines, that high a margin would prejudice war fighting characteristics, 
and practice for naval subs has been as small as 1.7. For research subs, it has been set as low as 
1.4. For sightseeing subs, it has been set at 4. The 1.7 level means that for a sub designed to 
operate safely at 700 feet, its crushing strength would be about 1100 feet.    
The risk of such a small margin is accepted because for each new class of subs, complex 
calculations are refined, confirmed by tests of small scale models in a pressure tank, then 
warranted by a heavily instrumented deep submergence trial of the first one operating. Other 
assurances lie in superior workmanship in hull assembly with x-ray examination of welds and 
close tolerances on shape. Operation at sea assumes high competence of crew. 
In other ways, similar margins are introduced in all technologies as an act of social 
responsibility. The public exposed to risk is seldom consulted, and this raises a major issue in 
risk management that is epitomized by the familiar notion of “Informed Consent.” 
H.2.4. Voluntary versus Involuntary Risk 
Exposure to risk may be voluntary or involuntary. The two types differ in definition in 
the acceptable levels of risk and in the degree to which the public expects government to regulate 
safety. When citizens believe they are in danger with limited options to escape, and when a large 
number of people is simultaneously exposed, the public demands greater protection. Here are 
some examples. 
When planes became more numerous and larger, there were more crashes and more 
passengers lost. The public demanded more stringent regulation and enforcement.. Commercial 
airlines were regarded as common carriers in which people lose control over costs, comfort, 
privacy, schedules, routes, intermediate stops, destinations and risk.. Except for short flights, 
other modes could not compete in speed so that the primary tradeoff was in cost of tickets. As in 
all common carriers, by air, rail or sea, people felt at involuntary risk and demanded more 
protection. With encouragement by members of Congress, most of whom fly home every 
weekend, intense oversight has been mandated regarding equipment, pilot training, traffic rules, 
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maintenance, etc. The annual death rate peaked at about 200 per year and is now much lower, far 
lower than for travel by car. 
In contrast, passengers in private planes--termed “general aviation,”--enjoy all the  
previous options but at a higher transportation cost  To keep that within bounds, this class of 
passenger tacitly accepts higher risks revealed by more fatalities per million passenger- miles 
compared to commercial aviation. Because these passengers usually have options to fly by safer 
commercial aircraft, FAA risk analysis deems the higher risk acceptable because general aviation 
risk is voluntary rather than involuntary. 
A more mundane example lies in skiing. Cable lifts are regulated by local authorities as 
common carriers because the clientele are regarded as at involuntary risk in having no options to 
gain the top and no options to exit at intermediate elevations. Lift safety is carefully regulated. 
Coming down, however, skiers are on their own, at voluntary risk. If the number of accidents 
going up were as numerous as those coming down, there would be hell to pay from public 
complaints and from lift operators hit with higher insurance premiums and possibly more 
liability suits. 
This question of voluntary versus involuntary risk gets blurred in consumer protection, 
especially with pharmaceuticals and medical apparatus. Both in liability jurisprudence and in 
safety standards, a major issue arises on which type of risk is present, and for each type, how 
does the public decide on acceptable limits.  
That enigma is further strengthened because of a growing public distrust of 
manufacturers. Statistics from drug trials have been faulty (Merck) and short circuits in heart 
rejuvenators have been concealed (Guidant). This malfeasance injects another uncertainty in the 
calculus of risk---- the pressures of the health industry on Congress to let free market forces 
control safety with a minimum of government interference. That could work only if the public is 
literate on drug therapy; that is unrealistic. 
The situation is further tangled by paradoxes in health affairs on the virtues and penalties 
of single payer health delivery and by advances in technology teasing consumers to believe there 
is a cure for every ailment, at diminishing risk. 
Regulation of safety for miners at involuntary risk under ground began 100 years ago 
after annual fatalities exceeded 2,000. Occupational safety is now broadly regulated by OSHA  
H.2.5. Coping with Threats to Life, Liberty, Property and the Environment 
Restated for emphasis, the most compelling imperative of life is survival. For most 
humans, that condition is more than biological. It means being both alive and free. Toward that 
end, living teaches that there is no zero risk, that some exposures must be tolerated as “normal.” 
In the last two technological centuries, however, society has demanded that threats to life, to 
peace, justice, health, property, liberty, life style, sustainability and the natural environment be 
minimized. Such stewardship was anticipated in a preface to the Constitution whereby founders 
of the nation committed our fedewral government to assume responsibility to tame these risks. 
Life also teaches that threats to survival are episodic, that citizen and media sensitivity to 
both threats and appropriate response waxes and wanes. Apprehension and fear peak 
immediately after a calamity, then subside to a stable level that depends on pain of the 
consequences and proximity to the event, chronological and geographic. The size and continuity 
of news headlines mirrors and often arouses public awareness. With Hurricane Katrina, chagrin 
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was triggered over impacts of a natural and recurring phenomenon that exposed failure of 
government at all levels to take precautionary steps for safety and security. The loss of life and 
property and the subsequent neglect of victims then led to outrage. People ask, Why did a 
tragedy on this grand scale occur? How can it be prevented from happening again? 
This essay is not a post-crisis analysis of Katrina or of its disaster kin. For one thing, 
critical data are still being evaluated. However, it is clear from a number of interim reports 
already issued by other bodies that the failure can be  attributed to human and organizational 
error. This source of calamity has also been found in a wide spectrum of disasters,: the nuclear 
accident at Chernobyl, the oil spill by the Exxon Valdez discussed later, Human factors lie behind 
the failure of intelligence and initiation of the Iraq war, sinking of the Titanic, terrorists crashing 
planes into New York’s twin towers , 9/11, loss of the spacecraft Challenger, and the chemical 
spill at Bhopal, India. This source, incidentally, includes failure to anticipate potential disasters, 
make damage control plans, take accident avoidance measures, or make prudent choices as 
between safety and cost. 
It is worth reiterating that the answer to “How safe is safe” cannot be deduced from 
natural laws of science and mathematics. It is a social judgment. Assuming people comprehend 
that there is no zero risk, what level do citizens accept or at least tolerate?  
This inquiry is most often left to experts because the public thinks risk analysis is 
accessible only to professionals. Yet, individuals make many decisions each day without 
consulting authority. Ponder the close shaves in highway traffic, the choices of home remedies 
for illness, the strenuous avoidance by those allergic to nuts, the tradeoffs in investments 
between return and risk. Albeit in new forms, modern risks have antecedents. 
Always, there have been accidents from ignorance, error, blunder, folly, greed and hubris.  
One new reality is that powerful technologies add to the risk portfolio. The public and 
policy makers need to understand that technology is more than a technique, more than palpable 
hardware. It is a social system of organizations interconnected and animated for all life support 
functions.. Clearly, technology has a huge effect on all human affairs, not only for what it can do 
for us, but also what technology can do to us.  
Every technology, however, has unintended consequences. Many increase complexity, 
conflict, personal stress and socio-economic strains. To the point of this discourse, technology 
such as in health care can ameliorate risks but it can also trigger risks. With many medical 
procedures the patient must sign “informed consent” acknowledging awareness of threats to life 
and function. Parenthetically, that practice deserves refinement because simply listing potential 
injuries does not illuminate the probabilities. 
Because of modern information technology, events anywhere have effects everywhere 
and immediately. The village has morphed into an inhabited planet. While technology has 
historically driven weapons development of the spear and chariot, nuclear devices now spin a 
risk of mass extermination. Perpetrators may not be nations but anonymous and ubiquitous 
terrorists. We have also advanced the risk of a slow tsunami by global warming that melts the ice 
cap so that the oceans flood low lying habitation in coastal wetlands and alter agricultural 
seasons. 
As context to the strategic issues in risk management, consider these features: 
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• Dangers can be grouped according to origin, from natural causes, from human behavior, and 
from unintended consequences of technology such as environmental damage from mining 
runoff.  
• The design of precautionary measures requires inspired and vigorous foresight—to fantasy 
what might happen, if, or unless, and a comparison of options to identify those that minimize 
harm. 
• Foresight mandates tradeoffs as between short and long range events and consequences, as 
between safety and cost, between special interests and social interests, between who wins and 
who loses and who decides. 
• Technology can best be understood as a “Technological Delivery System,” that applies 
scientific knowledge to achieve society’s needs and wants. A TDS models reality with inputs 
of knowledge, fiscal, natural and human resources synchronized by a network of 
communications. Outputs are both intended and unintended. The system is driven and steered 
by three operating instructions---market place economics, public policies, and social norms.  
• Technology lies at the core of all human support systems. 
• Conflicts arise from different values in the private sector as compared with the public. 
Strategies to achieve desired goals contrast efficiency against sustainability and social justice 
• All technologies trigger side effects; most are harmful to some community of         
specified or accidental stakeholders, now or in the future. 
• Key decisions regarding technology in terms of outcomes are not made by scientists or 
engineers, or by executives in the private sector. Rather they are made through the public 
policy process, in the U.S. as defined by the Constitution, the President, the Congress and the 
Courts. 
• The decision process inevitably entails wrestling for power; its intensity depends upon what 
is at stake as between winners and losers. 
• The most compelling decisions are negotiated as “politics,” here defined as the legitimate 
process by which stakeholders negotiate their individual interests against collective interest 
within a structure of authority. 
• In our democracy, this authority should flow from citizens following the doctrine that those 
who govern do so with the informed consent of the governed. 
• Decisions in this class can be judged by their impacts on future generations. 
• Technology has also shrunk time and distance so that isolation is no longer dictated by 
geography. We live in “one world.” 
• The management of risk should be based on lessons from failures. However, data may be 
sparse with rare events of catastrophic scale. 
• Different cultures have different risk tolerances. Moreover, there are significant distinctions 
as between voluntary and involuntary risk. 
• Once there is agreement on “how safe is safe,” tension is likely to continue between the 
sources of risk and those harmed. In the interest of social and economic justice, all three 
branches of government play pivotal roles. 
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• Since enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1970, a process of impact 
analysis has been required of all federal technology initiatives. It applies to other classes of 
threat extended by legislation in 1972 that created the Office of Technology Assessment to 
serve Congress as a system of early warning of dangers from new technological initiatives. 
• The media plays a critically important role as a source of information to all citizens and 
parties at interest about threats and public safety, about failures of institutions responsible for 
precautions, and as an editorial source of advocacy for citizens marginalized in the power 
structure. 
H.3 Government's Responsibility for Security 
H.3.1. Risk Management: Our Constitution, Public Policy, and our Culture  
Restated, the TDS is a symbolic network assembled for a specific purpose with socially 
desirable outcomes. It incorporates customized organizational components, internally 
differentiated, hierarchically interrelated, and interconnected by a lacework of communications. 
While this production function is generally the territory of private enterprise, all elements of the 
system influence decisions by business management; the most powerful signals link government 
to the enterprise managers. .In eight different ways, public policies hammered through 
government shape strategic decisions in the private sector as much as the market place of all 
citizens. Consider these categories:  
• Providing an umbrella of security for citizens as set forth in the preamble to the 
Constitution.  Translated to “normal risks,” providing security is the core of  managed   risk  
It is exemplified by preparing for the common defense. That priority for federal funding in 
2005 exceeded support for all other federal functions, combined. Beyond threats from 
organized national states and from terrorists, security also relates to domestic tranquility, 
social and economic justice, and especially promotion of the general welfare when life, 
health and property are threatened by natural calamities. Civic responsibilities now include 
preserving health of the environment and natural species.   
• Purchasing technology for national defense that also generates full employment and 
technology spin-off whereby military innovations cater to the civilian market, e.g.,  satellite 
assisted global positioning devices (GPSS). 
• Directing economic assistance to private enterprise has been accepted as a tradition to 
foster prosperity and social satisfaction, not to mention economic vitality to assure a healthy 
tax base. In 1845, the government granted railroads a ribbon of land for trans-continental 
service.  Wider than needed for track, these grants let rail lines profit from sales of excess 
land to track-side factories. The Corps of Engineers surveyed most of the mountain route at 
no cost to the companies, following a maritime subsidy of charting coastal waters for safety 
of commercial shipping  Other subventions include a rainbow of tax breaks, import quotas 
and market guarantees.   
• Providing indirect economic assistance to private enterprise through  support for higher 
education, for most of the nation’s basic and applied research, for such services as the 
Export-Import bank, launching of commercial communications satellites, weather 
forecasting, and guidance for American companies doing business overseas. In short, 
government funds our social overhead. 
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• Influencing the capital market by deficit borrowing, fiscal and tax policies, by 
manipulation of interest rates, balance of payments and facilitation of venture capital for new 
starts and ability to meet foreign competition. 
• Functioning as steward of common property resources such as fresh water, forests, 
fisheries minerals and pasture on federal property that includes petroleum reserves on the 
outer continental shelf, and the radio frequency spectrum. 
• Building or financing  infrastructure such as of shipping channels, highways, airways, 
Amtrak, intangibles of the radio frequency spectrum, and the Internet. 
• Regulating private technological activities that may be inimical to the public interest. These 
interventions range from anti-trust legislation, abolition of child labor, safety of 
transportation and mining, to purity of food, air and water, occupational health, effectiveness 
and safety of drugs, toxic waste disposal and other measures attending hazards of powerful 
new technologies. 
These functions led to growth in government size and scope, the unintended 
consequences of greater dependence on high technology.  All trigger conflicts, especially on the 
issue of the appropriate role of government in a society that considers itself a capitalist 
democracy. History teaches that regulatory legislation was consistent with Constitutional law and 
later of custom. The courts expect government to make the most fundamental and influential 
decisions contributing to security. Beyond “national security” that justified our attack on Iraq, 
government regulates by ranking social priorities, allocating resources, helping to organize 
economic, social and political activity, and tries to resolve conflicts among contending parties. 
That menu carries no warranty, however,  on performance. 
Some conflicts arise, incidentally, from ideology: when those asserting conservative 
doctrine believe that the best government is the least government. Some conflict arises from the 
concept of federalism, the cyclic tension between state and federal governments. Some arises 
because claims on the public purse are not matched to resources so that losers perceive 
themselves as victims of a game for winners. 
Persistent conflict arises because most hardware of technology is produced by the private 
sector and its Wall Street performance balances only direct costs against profit but not the 
indirect costs, the externalities, the unintended consequences. Because citizens have only limited 
opportunities to voice the pain of side effects, government is expected to act as a surrogate. Even 
when represented by public interest bodies, remedies can only be enforced by government 
operating under legislative mandates. That damage control, however, is not guaranteed..            
The act of governing begins with identification of issues, dramatized by political actors to 
focus political energies on the choices ahead. Often that process sounds exclusively like 
wrestling by special interests for influence on the outcome. At some point, differences are 
negotiated for a consensus on public policies as to become laws..    
In other words, public policies are what governments do or what they may not do. They 
are the primary guidance signals by which a pluralistic society sets the course for the future. 
These policies should also set the ground rules, for example, of opportunities to express a 
collective judgment on “How safe is safe.”   
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Public policies deal with both ends and means. Two legislative steps are required, of 
authorization and of appropriations. Ultimately, all policies require the President’s signature, 
making the incumbent the nation’s uncertified systems manager.      
Evidence is clear that government has grown because of technology, and technology 
blossomed because of government. As uncomfortable as is this trend for some, especially around 
April 15, one way to look at the new or growing functions is to test their content against a 
concept of “enhancing security by managing risk.”  
H.3.2. Resolution by Political Power and Political Will 
The word, “Politics,” suffers from erosion of its high status in Greek culture, 2500 years 
ago. It was meant to define a social process by which individuals with differing opinions could 
argue and try to persuade contrarians of their preferred course of action. This was the grist of 
democracy, the honorable steps to generate consensus.  
Now, the word, politics, is often modified by a second one, “dirty.” That derogation 
implies that tactics of argument violate social norms of truth and fair play. Indeed, the phrase has 
been stretched to imply that all political actions are contaminated, either by distortions of content 
or by foul play.  
In the political arena when stakes are high, there are many temptations to stray from a 
moral ideal. However, the historic definition still works. Simply put, politics is the mechanism 
by which the parties at risk with divergent opinions reach agreement on what risk level is 
acceptable. The political process, however, goes beyond argumentation.  It offers a structure of 
power to resolve differences, then to enforce an action plan to achieve the goals about which 
there was debate. In the United States, while that power lies in the three branches of government, 
from earlier disclosures and discussion, in the present era, the President and Executive Branch 
dominate the stage.  
Presumably, voices of different constituencies have been heard and the Chief Executive 
has determined the degree of popular support essential for success of a particular course. 
Penalties are assessed for having to use political capital to win a preferred alternative. Since a 
president’s political capital ebbs and flows, each decision event imposes a political risk. As with 
risks to security, in politics there is hardly ever zero risk.  
Indeed, all the stakeholders are at political risk before, during and after a quest for 
consensus. Each must choose how much existing political capital they can risk. That strategic 
reality colors the entire context of risk management because the outcome can seldom be settled 
on rational grounds alone. Risk managers understand distinctions between the desirable against 
the feasible. 
At policy levels, all players have access to varying amounts of power. The party with the 
most may not prevail, however, unless there is a conscious decision to exercise political will as 
well as power.  
In a democracy, the media have a major role similar to that in the economic operations of 
the free market. For it to work best, there is a tacit assumption that all parties have ready access 
to the same base of information. That assumption also applies in political warfare.  
In the theater of risk, that principle may not hold. Parties at risk seldom have the same 
information as those managing risk. We also must distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
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risk because social judgments for these two cases are vastly different. It is one thing if the parties 
at risk are advised in advance which mode they are subject to. It is another thing to be subject to 
involuntary risk surreptitiously. 
In an age when small disturbances can have disproportionate effects, integrity of all 
negotiating parties may be more important to risk management than technical virtuosity. .  
Human nature, however, may shatter this ambition. As suggested earlier, the term politics 
snaps the mind to electoral politics. Included are the strategies and tactics of ethical lobbying,  
electioneering, and legislative horse-trading, Still, the politics of   public life, as the TDS 
suggests, is more than about governmental structure and process. Indeed, deciding how safe is 
safe is what democracy is all about. 
Democracy is not a spectator sport. Citizens should regard themselves as part of 
government. This role requires civic literacy and commitment to shared values. Civic discourse 
should avoid intense partisanship and hidden influences of campaign funding. Values, 
unobtrusive and subtle, lie at the heart of political process,. thus connecting more and more dots 
on the TDS. 
This focus on ethics applies to other venues---corporate board rooms, academia’s 
cloistered walls, and religious institutions. They differ greatly with regard to what is at stake, to 
measures of integrity, to an organization’s culture, its ethical standards and its style of conflict 
resolution, the degrees of coercion exerted by management’s power to control its environment.  
In the interest of earning public esteem or minimizing exposure to liability claims, 
organizations and individuals must balance temptations to conceal, distort, exaggerate or lie 
about facts against the harm they may do. The public interest is all too often sacrificed for private 
benefit, tempered only by the self-conscious exercise of social responsibility.  
Building trust takes time, especially in an electronic era when participants in a transaction 
may be strangers. Personal contact to test integrity by intuition may be squeezed out.  
The issue of trust has always been with us, but recent polls uncloak a new low in public 
confidence in all our institutions. This is not surprising. Innumerable business executives have 
been indicted or jailed for misbehavior, for which the 2006 Enron trials serve as a poster child. 
Simultaneously, charges have been brought against Abramoff, the best known of Washington’s 
lobbyists. Several members of Congress face felony charges, have left office, resigned or are 
awaiting trial. In both public business and private business, many display an inordinate appetite 
for wealth as well as power.  
Although not subject to proof, the public seems to demand higher ethical standards in 
public service than in commerce. There may be a danger, however, that the distinctions have 
been blurred. Social indicators as well as economic indicators suggest a weakening of all the 
nation’s vital signs. The future for children is less promising than for their parents.  
This theme has been examined by a growing chorus of public interest bodies such as 
Common Cause, Move On, ACLU, Natural Resources Defense Council,  Interfaith Alliance, etc. 
Over a broad spectrum of predicaments that seed new or more threatening risks, there is neglect 
of harmful long term costs balanced against short term benefits. The fault lies in limits to 
foresight blended with inflated political and corporate ambitions, hubris and greed.  
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H.3.3. The President and the Congress:  Needs for Advice and Counsel 
Given society’s encounter with different and more threatening risks over the last half 
century, the burden of responsibilities on the Chief Executive and the Legislature has grown 
enormously. Risk management is not a function that can be outsourced. At the same time, it is 
difficult to shoehorn all risk-related functions into a single aunit. Consolidation of homeland 
security functions into a megasize cabinet-level agency still requires coordination with such 
other departments as State, Defense, Commerce, Interior, Labor and so on. Only the President 
and Vice President have the Constitutional authority and the operational centrality to effect a 
seamless integration of bureaucratic resources each exposure to danger requires. 
The problem is that both the President and the Congress are suffocating under workloads 
that drain energy because new threats arise without relief from earlier ones, and because the 
technical management of risk requires expertise that is in short supply. Especially lacking is an 
independent staff for both branches of government to provide advice and counsel in a modus 
operandi committed to a doctrine of anticipation.  
To be sure, both branches have sensed a need for professional expertise related to other 
complex, even arcane, functions. Both branches have responded by creation of specialty staff 
arms. The Executive Office of the President was created in 1939 and has added numerous special 
subdivisions as circumstances dictated. These include the National Security ouncil, the CIA, the 
Office of Management and Budget, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, even FEMA at one time. Congress has created for itself the General 
Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research Service. 
These latter three have earned a high reputation for integrity, non partisanship and insulation 
from political pressures to tweak facts to fit ideology. 
This issue of staffing to deal with catastrophic risk is raised here to alert the reader to 
arguments arising from substantive issues that may suggest a review of staff capabilities to match 
the challenge of security in a more dangerous and complex world. 
As detailed elsewhere, a small staff could follow methods of impact analysis developed 
over 25 years of experience with the National Environmental Policy Act and be available in a 
dire emergency to keep the President well informed. Experience of the Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment could also be resuscitated..  
H.4 Technology and Its Side Effects 
H.4.1. Beyond Technique, Technology as Social Process  
The term, “technology” has a rainbow of definitions and deserves clarification on usage 
here. Very simply, technology is considered a social process by which specialized knowledge 
from science and empirical experience is employed through engineering to deliver a system to 
meet specific human needs and wants. But not just through engineering. Other fields of 
knowledge such as economics, social and political science, psychology and even philosophy 
must be tapped and synthesized with technique. 
This concept carries virtues and problems. One virtue is the distinction thus drawn 
between the notions of “engineering” and “technology.” Confusion arises because institutions of 
higher learning have used both words as equivalents in their titles [MIT, CIT, GIT, RPI, etc.] 
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The problem triggered by technology’s broader definition is the mixture of disciplines that are 
not familiar to engineering practitioners. I have joked with colleagues about engineers treating 
the world as though it were uninhabited except by Newton’s laws and their kin. Students in Civil 
Engineering learn how to design bridges for specified traffic over a specified span, but are 
generally unable to answer questions of why build the bridge at all, and if so, why there?  
In 1970, I clarified the definition with a mental model of a delivery system, a 
”Technological Delivery System.” As shown in Figure H.1, the TDS meets a standard definition 
of  a “system” in having inputs, outputs, organizational components and information linkages. 
The inputs comprise knowledge plus human, natural, and fiscal resources. The outputs are of two 
kinds, the desired goods or services plus unintended consequences, most of which are harmful to 
some people or to the natural environment, immediately or in the future. 
 
Figure H.1: Technology Delivery System 
To tour the diagram, we start with technological enterprise, what the economist, John 
Kenneth Galbraith termed a “technostructure.” It is assembled by entrepreneurial leadership, 
motivated by the push of innovation or by the pull of external market demand. Under resourceful 
management, the enterprise feeds on capital, human resources, natural resources including 
energy and on knowledge. These are inputs. 
The system then spins two kinds of output, the intended goods and services and the 
unintended and often unwelcome.. Such  powerful processes  fuse technical,  economic, social, 
political and cultural factors.  
There are two instruments of these influences, (1)the institutions of government reflecting 
structure and processes specified in the Constitution, and (2)faith based institutions following a 
wide range of value-oriented doctrines. 
All of these functions and their vehicles are portrayed in the TDS diagram. Their 
communication linkages are portrayed by solid lines. There are, however, other powerful 
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influences that cannot be encapsulated because their influences are spread throughout the system. 
These are impacts of external events and messages from the media. 
Metaphorically speaking, the TDS is like a wiring diagram for a stereo set. The system 
not static, however, but is animated. The TDS equivalent to music coming through a stereo is the 
communication traffic leading to public policy..   
The message content is shaped and steered by three operating instructions, the invisible 
hand of the free market place, public policy, and values embedded in the culture that ignite moral 
vision and mold conduct. 
Validity of this analytical model was tested over two decades by graduate students who 
applied it to nearly 100 different technologies. The purpose over many years was to capture 
commonalities, that is, patterns of performance. They are condensed to 12 axioms, some 
mentioned previously: 
• Technology empowers all life support systems---food production, transportation, 
communications, military security, shelter, urban infrastructure, health affairs, environmental 
management, energy production, banking, criminal justice, education, entertainment, even 
religious institutions. 
• While manifest as hardware--planes, trains and automobiles--technology is best understood 
as just described, as a purposeful arrangement of  public and private organizations 
synchronized by information networks. 
• Most hardware is conceived, designed, produced, and marketed by private enterprise in a 
capitalist industrial economy under a mantra of “efficiency.” 
• All technologies spawn surprise side effects, most unwanted by some sector now or in the 
future.. 
• All technologies pose risks from accidents triggered by human or organizational error with 
unprecedented scale and geographical distribution. .Accident prevention must thus be 
integrated with engineering design. 
• Technology generates wealth and enhances living standards, but it also fosters materialism, 
concentrates rewards, and increases appetites for both.. 
• Major decisions about technology are not made by scientists, engineers or business 
executives. The most salient are in the design of public policies. 
Technology thus tends to concentrate political power, just as power tends to concentrate 
technologies as corporate structures. 
• We enjoy what technology does for us, ignoring what it can do to us. One counter trend is 
shifting from “Can we do it?” to “Ought we do it?” and “Can we afford it?” 
• These cultural impacts appear as paradoxes: more communications but less sense of 
community, more information but less understanding, more machines for living but less 
leisure. Technology distorts perceptions of time and tends to focus on the short run at the 
expense of longer term costs and benefits. It also distorts perceptions of space because the 
entire planet is wired, 
• Technology tends to weaken human relationships and to foster self-indulgence and isolation. 
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• In an age glorifying information, we neglect its transformation into knowledge and then into 
understanding. These steps require time for cogitation and for preparing the mind. 
• Despite its material benefits, technology induces anxieties and stress because  the pace of 
change seems to exceed natural human rhythms, and because of greater complexity, multiple 
information feedback loops, and uncertainties about the future. 
H.4.2. Technology’s Unintended Consequences 
One of the three classes of risk deals with unintended consequences of technology. As 
with hurricane Katrina, there may be combinations of forces by nature, by human error and by 
technology’s side effects. This drama entails machines whose function is valued for its benefits, 
but which spontaneously also birth serious disadvantages.. To define this phenomenon more 
emphatically, I argue that all technologies have unintended consequences, most but not all of 
which pose surprise costs on innocent victims, to the extreme of lethality. Even when 
catastrophes are foreseen, they may not be preventable because intervention is too impracticable, 
too costly or too unpopular.  
Once I thought the technology of immunization was an exception because the number of 
lives saved far exceeds the tiny number of people injured by this prophylaxis. Then I was 
reminded that this benefit partly accounts for the planet’s overpopulation and hunger. Even life-
saving measures have malignant side effects. Incidentally, the technology of prevention is more 
than a needle or a spray; it includes all elements of a TDS, especially many layers of 
government.. 
Economists call these subsidiary features “externalities,” a characterization of costs that 
implies a studied neglect in the calculus of economic performance by shifting  the burden to 
other actors beyond the boundary of a particular organization... 
Another euphemism reborn during the recent Iraqi wars is “collateral damage.” Whatever 
the term, risk analysis carries a premise that every technology plays “Jekyll and Hyde.” So we 
must learn to live with ubiquitous risk. Risk happens. 
Consider these concrete examples. Nuclear weapons at the pinnacle of national defense 
left hazardous waste at the manufacturing plants, with long radioactive half lives. At the 
Hanford, Washington, weapons plant, leakage of single shell underground tanks is migrating 
toward the Columbia River to threaten drinking water down stream. Civilian nuclear power has 
dangerous byproducts that, 30 years after pledges of safe disposal at Yucca Flats, Nevada, 
continue to fuel debate. 
Automobile transportation discussed earlier for its evolution of safety has had enormous 
consequences besides people killed or maimed. There are air pollution, noise, stress, lost time 
and wasted fuel from dense traffic, superhighways puncturing urban centers, disruption of rural 
life by housing developments, and an insatiable thirst for fuel that shapes geopolitics with oil 
producing states. The American system for health care entails costs of 16 percent of the nation’s 
GDP, or in other terms, $1,500 per GM vehicle, almost ten percent of the sticker price.. 
As we struggle with these relentless gremlins of high-tech society, the public that ordains 
how safe is safe has become more sensitive to involuntary exposure to risk and seeks protection 
from the perpetrators through political action.. Citizens demand governmental action.  
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The management of risk is perhaps the greatest challenge of the modern world-- risks of 
terrorist nuclear bombs, risks of global warming, risks of corporate or national bankruptcy, 
indeed risks across the portfolio catered earlier. The dilemmas are intensified because society 
looks neither sideways nor ahead. At best, vision stretches to Monday morning.  
That cost of being nearsighted is widely understood. The commercial world took 
precautions against losses of ships and cargo through insurance companies hundreds of years 
ago. When these costs mounted, reinsurance was invented to share risks. Now, we seek 
protection against the full repertoire of hazards, partly out of greater literacy about risk through 
the media, , partly because we have become a litigious society, partly because the insurance 
business can be quite profitable. 
Government is a reluctant partner of the private sector in dealing with risk by a wide 
range of instruments. Farmers depend on price supports for their products in the face of crop 
uncertainties and on tariffs to blunt foreign competition. Flood insurance was offered when 
corporate America chose not to indemnify the vulnerable. The nuclear power industry was 
protected by a powerful cap on liability, and a swarm of federal and state measures have been 
proposed or enacted to cap liability with suits on medical malpractice. 
For all parties in technological delivery systems, consciousness has risen on the 
imperative of foresight. Now a different question arises: If all technologies trigger side effects, 
why? Was this always true?  
Consider the TDS of farming 150 years ago. The family farmer took title to some land, 
planted and reaped with steam propelled tractors, chewed fingernails when weather turned 
hostile with drought or freezing or a late, wet spring. At harvest time, farmers took produce 
directly to market and often sold directly to the local  consumer without any middle men. The 
farmer took all the risks of crop failure. The TDS was a primitive combination of only three 
entities, the land owner, the farmer and the customer. 
In 1878, the Hatch Act created the Department of Agriculture with  the objective of 
producing more food of superior quality at lower cost. With federal assistance,  science and 
technology began to replace tradition and folk lore. Government funded an education system of 
agriculture colleges and research laboratories, and extension services translate academic findings 
for field hands. Then with the 1930s depression, government sponsored numerous subventions to 
hedge against soil blowing away and creating a dust bowl and against other disabilities.. 
With these advances, the private sector found new and profitable enterprises, 
manufacturing farm machinery and trucks, distilling fuel and chemicals, contracting to build 
farm-to-market roads, harvesting seed, selling pumps for artificial irrigation. And the private 
sector lent farmers money to buy seed and fertilizer for the next season, and to expand acreage as 
machinery made larger plots amenable to management. In a perspective of the economy,  the Ag-
business blossomed as organizational size and heft offered efficiencies not available to the 
family farmer. Their demise as a side effect has become a topic for concern.  
In recent decades, transportation by sea, land and air made possible the sale and 
consumption of food far from the producer, and at reasonable cost. That condition had a 
downside also in turning the entire planet into a single market place. Try to trace where the tuna 
fish were caught that you find locally in cans. 
This story is dramatized by comparing the simple TDS of 1900 with that today. The 
increase in number of components in the TDS, information circuits, speed of transportation, 
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sophistication and complexity of modern farming, the need to follow world prices, supply and 
demand, spread of blight and disease, the cost of money, and possible climate change adds to 
complexity and challenge. These influences also add to risk, especially as the system engages a 
highly decentralized cast of uncontrollable characters. Each element of a TDS introduces some 
market advantage but also some additional risk of uncertainty depending on which political force 
is strongest and has access to the policy apparatus. 
In the calculus of risk, the most compelling requirement in a TDS is a viable information 
system. That technology is necessary but not sufficient. To produce desired outcomes, 
information must be transformed to knowledge, then to understanding, and finally to the exercise 
of foresight so as to minimize unintended consequences.. That  motivation and capability to look 
ahead may be more important in managing risk than new scientific discoveries and technological 
techniques.  
Parenthetically, humans have always been curious about the future, especially regarding 
the role of fate. The Hebrew Bible tells a story of rewards for forecasting years of famine and 
years of plenty. Astrological calendars to read portents from the planets and stars dates back 
5,000 years and is still found in today’s newspapers. Individuals who claimed to divine the future 
held honored posts in many societies. Some still inhabit stock brokerages. Games of GO, 
checkers and chess are won by plotting several moves ahead. 
Looking ahead assumes greater significance in modern cultures that treasure speed. 
Progress in computer science hinges on speed of chips, modems and services.. Autos are rated by 
the shortest time to reach 60 miles per hour. Failing to look ahead more attentively has higher 
costs. A clean windshield and an unimpaired driver may be the metaphor for safety. In 
atmospheric fog, we slow down. In social fog, we complain. 
That conditioning has its rewards and we need to seek this kind of analogy when dealing 
with other situations to probe ahead so that glittering benefits do not blind us to their dangers.  
In that respect, society shifted gears in the 1960s regarding insults to the environment. 
The public acted through the political process to look ahead through environmental impact 
analysis at what might happen, if, and the tradeoffs for perceived long term benefits against 
costs, and for finding the optimum delivery system. 
This concern for the future of our children was broadened by the concept of technology 
assessment in the Congressional Research Service in 1964 that systemized a doctrine of 
anticipation. It has nine steps: 
• Define the technology delivery system in terms of purpose (ends) and content (means) of 
hardware and operating systems. 
• Define the economic, political, ecological and social context, and the institutions comprising 
the TDS and their behaviors. 
• Establish a base of facts, uncertainties and conditional consequences. 
• Forecast what is foreseeable with awareness of how the hardware and software advance, how 
public attitudes change and how management learns. 
• Imagine action alternatives to mitigate risk and  trace impacts of side effects 
• Identify impacted parties, including future generations  
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• For each option, compare positive and negative impacts 
• Design a policy and implementation plan that has the best promise of reconciling 
achievement of goals with satisfactions of different stakeholders. 
• Monitor and report  post-implementation performance 
The Congress deserves praise for adopting this legislative remedy to near sightwedness 
and tunnel vision. It is unfortunate that the Congress didn’t peer ahead at what the longer term 
penalties could be for zeroing out the OTA  
H.4.3. What You Can’t Model You Can’t Manage 
This section’s title is an aphorism that states, unless you can build a mental model to 
represent reality attempts to manage will fail. On the principle of linkage between cause and 
effect, it may be possible to examine an event and describe what happened, but not why. 
Measures to reduce risk may end in futility. 
Toward using the TDS as that generic model to conduct  analyses,  managing risk entails 
mapping the interaction of people, politics and technology. Across a spectrum of multiple 
stakeholders with different cultures and conflicting purposes, the universal goal is to achieve 
socially satisfactory outcomes. The TDS architecture combines seventeen components 
diagrammed on page 26. That static map can be switched on by discerning  system dynamics. 
To explain, for each life support system, a TDS is assembled by entrepreneurial 
leadership in response to market demand or to the opportunity created by invention and 
innovation. Aware of requisite inputs of human, natural, capital and information resources to 
spin out the desired outcomes, management acts. In the investors’ expectation of  profit, the free 
market mechanism spins to do its thing. 
Citizens also use the market mechanism to signal their displeasure with unintentional and 
undesirable outcomes. For over a century, however,  experience has taught that market forces 
don’t suffice. Government is obliged post facto to enter the arena with a pallet of regulations for 
reward and punishment. The TDS shows these dual avenues for people to express their 
preferences, one by purchases directly in a mall and one by public policies hosted by political 
process All three branches of government participate. 
In our democracy, the political process serves as a steering system. Thus the earlier 
appellation of the President as the nation’s system manager. 
From analysis of decisions generated in the TDS case studies, we observe that both 
society and its political apparatus are strongly shaped by values of society as a whole and of key 
individuals in the decision chain. In a sense, the primary sources of values are the U.S. 
Constitution and indelible influences of early education in a variety of faith based institutions.  
Two other conditions drive policy design, external circumstances and the media. . 
Consider this sequence of events: the Great Depression of the 1930s, the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
the Marshall Plan, the Soviet space shot in 1957, assassinations of President Kennedy, Robert 
Kennedy and Martin Luther King, the resignation of Richard M. Nixon, the multiple bombings 
by terrorists and the Iraqi war. All left scars on individual citizens and the national psyche. 
As to the media, a revolution has occurred in techniques within information technology. 
Both the geographic span and the speed of communications grew rapidly in text and graphics, in 
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both print and electronic media. Within the technology of electoral politics, in campaigning since 
the 1960 election, the purchase of TV time has become imperative. As Marshall McLuhan 
predicted, the medium has become the message 
Yet another recent development is the concentration of media ownership. Objectivity 
became vulnerable to manipulation by lies and misuse of news as propaganda. On the positive 
side, however, the press continues as the “fourth branch “ of government. From the birth of the 
nation with the Declaration of Independence the backbone of power is said to lie with “we, the 
people.” That social process is exercised only if “those who govern do so at the consent of the 
governed.” That famous expression should be modified to say “informed consent of the 
governed,” informed by the media that can also double as advocates for citizen rights. 
Beyond aiding political literacy of the electorate, the media facilitate all internal elements 
in the TDS having access to the same base of information. That faculty is crucial to 
synchronizing all elements of the TDS to achieve outcomes that have been negotiated by 
bargaining among stakeholders. Given society’s fractionation by geography, by wealth and 
income, by urban vs. rural, native vs. immigrant, white collar vs. blue, by religious faith and 
tradition, by aesthetic preferences, etc., without a free and talented press, there is no way the 
TDS could perform as intended   
This reservoir of constantly changing information is now widely available, 24 hours 
every day. Stock prices change daily. However, public policies take longer to germinate, a trial 
of patience but also a salvation against impetuosity, secret deals and hysteria. Social norms 
change more slowly, usually no faster than in one generation. The sociologist Margaret Meade 
argued that, in her time, it took three. 
Again, the media portray the instant situation, but with few exceptions, the client is 
expected to place current events in historical perspective, a process noted more for its absence 
than its presence.       
The two TDS elements of external events and media content are in a constant state of 
turmoil. This is what animates the system of otherwise relatively fixed components.  
In short, coping with risks from acts of Nature, of Human Nature and from unintended 
influences of technology requires understanding of the statics and the dynamics of the socio-
technical process. With an operating model and assuming a consensus on goals and 
implementation processes, all of the stakeholders can separately contribute to the system design 
to deliver satisfactory life support systems.  
Risk analysis starts with mapping the enterprises introduced either to further human 
progress or to shield it from harm.    
H.4.4. Over-Design as a Safety Margin 
Engineers learn from failures. By post-mortems, most are found due to inadequate 
knowledge of variables: the service loading, the service life, properties of materials, quality of 
materials, metal fatigue, quality control in fabrication, vulnerability to deterioration, operator 
error, poor maintenance, application of design theory beyond known limits, even human 
mischief. Beyond uncertainties with novel designs, we must acknowledge human and 
organizational error. 
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Several empirical techniques have been adopted to enhance safety. One is the principle of 
redundancy. Hospitals and high rise buildings typically have independent backup electrical 
systems if primary sources power fail. 
The second mode of risk management in engineering is to practice over-design. The 
simplest examples can be found with buildings where structures intended to carry a certain floor , 
wind or earthquake loading are designed instead with some multiple like four as mandated by a 
local building code. 
That multiplier is termed the “safety margin.” Its size is arbitrary, a matter of judgment in 
order to exercise social responsibility by groups of professionals who act as surrogates for the 
public. 
When I was with the U.S. Navy and responsible for strength design of submarine hulls, I 
learned that the safety margin for decades had been a low 1.7, with no structural weaknesses The 
submarines Thresher and Scorpion have been lost subsequently but not believed from hull 
collapse. This margin was in the same range as that for aircraft and for the same reason, to 
minimize weight of the hull. Otherwise, in a delicate balance with buoyancy, equipment to meet 
specified ship performance of speed, endurance, armament, etc. might have to be limited and 
thus penalize war fighting capability. The design solution, however, generates a paradox. 
Operating submerged is highly dangerous because of vulnerability to enemy action and the 
tendency of structural failure to be instantaneous, catastrophic, and without early warning. To 
reduce that risk to crew, the margins should be high. That desideratum has a cost, however. 
Inordinate safety is at the sacrifice of function. 
I also recognized that the prospect of nuclear propulsion required a step increase in hull 
diameter. That raised doubts as to whether past structural design methods were valid with the 
larger boats.. A further growth in diameter was anticipated as subs became missile launching 
platforms. Past design methods thus warranted reevaluation by both theoretical and experimental 
techniques. Research involved complex mathematical analysis of ring stiffened cylinders, and 
the theoretical strength compared with structural response of models in a pressure chamber to 
simulate hydrostatic loading when submerged. The research was extended beyond contemporary 
requirements. Traditional design methods were found inadequate and thus were upgraded.   
The low safety margin was also reviewed and was deemed valid because of these 
considerations: high confidence in quality control during fabrication: in materials being carefully 
screened to meet specifications; in the X-rays of all welds; in careful control of tolerances for 
out-of-roundness; and in inspections for deterioration after extended service at sea. There was 
also high confidence in responsible operators, especially confidence that they would not dive 
below the approved maximum depth for each class..  
With these precautions, there was a history of submarine structures never failing from 
design errors. The 1.7 margin was continued. Subsequently I raised questions on validity of my 
analysis because nuclear propulsion promised higher speed and unprecedented frequency of 
dives. With the sea pressure then fluctuating more often, hull components were subject to metal 
fatigue, especially those experiencing unprecedented tension rather than compression. 
Precautions to limit risk were adopted, in effect increasing the safety margin. 
A somewhat different issue arose in the design of nuclear boilers, here subject to constant 
internal rather than fluctuating external pressure. The universally adopted boiler code of the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers called for a design with a margin of 5 over the 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 H-30  
operating pressure. The thick shell selected to enhance safety could, paradoxically, have an 
opposite effect. Radiation from nuclear fuel tends to weaken steel with extended exposure. 
Thicker would not necessarily be stronger. The safety margin for nuclear service was first 
reduced to 4, then to 3, expecting special care in fabrication and operation as with. 
There are other ways to over-design. In civil engineering, dams must sustain hydrostatic 
pressure on the upstream face corresponding to the height of water impounded. With severe 
storms, stream runoff could increase the water level above that of the spillway and raise 
hydrostatic pressure substantially. Strength design of dams thus requires an assumption as to the 
height of water above the spillway, and this is selected on the basis of stream flow statistics 
measured over an arbitrary period of time. The longer the interval selected for severe storms, the 
greater the height of runoff and thus the greater the pressure used in the design calculations. The 
pressure assumed with the “perfect storm” is further increased by a safety margin to 
accommodate all of the uncertainties mentioned earlier for metal structures. 
Of passing interest may be historical learning from failure. Early Gothic cathedrals with 
the airy flying buttresses fell down after a few years and led to pragmatic studies of cause. 
Mostly, it was due to uneven settlement of the foundation soil under the weight of the rock walls. 
Cracks in masonry followed, then total collapse.  The solution was not to make the structure 
stronger and degrade its aesthetic appeal but to pile building materials on the site for gravity to 
compact the soil before construction began.. 
There is a further example of learning in the emerging age of science. In the 1820’s when 
steam propulsion began to replace sails, boiler explosions on Mississippi River vessels began to 
take a large toll of human life. Skippers would race each other. The reckless and ruthless ones, 
bribed by gamblers to try and win, extracted additional propulsion by disabling safety valves. 
Explosions followed killing scores. Outraged by these losses, citizens demanded that government 
intervene. 
The first research on boiler strength was sponsored in 1830 by the federal government at 
Franklin Institute, Philadelphia.  No doubt, the investigation extended the engineering of boilers 
to employ safety margins sufficient to accommodate material deficiencies and also consequences 
of human blunder and folly. 
That risky practice of pushing the performance envelope continues to this day, often in 
tradeoffs of safety for cost. Consider this personal experience of a tradeoff for hubris.  
Immediately after a sub completed its deep submergence trial, I watched in astonishment as the 
skipper took over command and ordered a crash dive at about 30 degrees. Here was the 
background. Two identical vessels  had been built in different shipyards and both were 
instrumented for their deep dives so as to compare dive-induced stresses as indicators of 
comparative construction quality. The skipper had my permission for the second, crash dive, 
except on this one he deliberately skidded below the certified maximum depth. Why? So he 
could boast at diving the deepest of all subs in the fleet.  
Skippers of Mississippi River boats and hot combat pilots and submarine skippers have 
juvenile counterparts on the nation’s highways. Managing these risks goes beyond the control of 
any engineering designer. Additional precautions are demanded by challenges beyond the laws 
of nature, the laws of human nature. These  concern the ethics of safety. 
In a high tech world the complexity of technological delivery systems denies to those 
exposed to risk the opportunity to participate in decisions as to what levels are acceptable. Initial 
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decisions are made by engineers at the design stage, where practice is guided by law, by 
licensing and by professional codes of practice.  
Such protocols have been published, for example, by the National Society of Professional 
Engineers and the American Society of Mechanical Engineer. Consider these interpretations: 
• Hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public. 
• Uphold the law, beginning with the Constitution. 
• Be honest; serve the public, customers, clientele and staff with fidelity. 
• Be vigilant of malfeasance and corruption; do not punish dissent and legitimate whistle-
blowing. 
• Recall that all technologies have unintended consequences, many harmful, so make a practice 
of looking ahead to anticipate and prevent loss in human life, health, property, intended 
function or the natural environment. 
• In daily operations, demonstrate from the highest levels of internal management respect for 
truth, openness and equity in benefits when making tradeoffs.  
• Counter one-way communication and loss of personal relationships by the growing reliance 
on electronic apparatus. 
Sadly, these principles sound like a farce when one tracks the trends from media reports 
of indictments and jail of corporate executives convicted of felonies. Elected members of 
Congress are not totally immune to charges of corruption, of lying, and of fraud. Decisions on 
involuntary risk must earn trust of all exposed. 
H.5 Bed Rock Values in Public Policy 
H.5.1. The Rainbow of Stakeholders 
Some readers may be discombobulated by a discourse on values in a treatise about  risk. 
At the least, it may seem inappropriate. In defense, I draw on experience in the policy milieu, 
with both the Congress and the White House. As a science and technology advisor, I endeavored 
to collect and analyze facts and report their role in the design of policy.. My clients, however, 
based their decisions on more than the facts. Directly or unselfconsciously, they listened to 
values of their constituents and their own.  
 Consider these two loaded questions---“what role, if any, should philosophy of life play 
in risk assessment?” and “Whose values dictate choice?”  These values may be as stark as that of 
human life, or as subtle as truth, the whole truth. I would argue that the dominant issues of our 
times are harshly ethical and beyond guidance by science, market place economics, by public 
law or their combination. Unintended consequences of technologically rich activities threaten 
innocent victims with repercussions more intense, more far reaching, more swiftly injected and 
potentially irreversible than in the past. Hard edged and hard wired innovations seduce us with 
clear benefits, but their side effects often stretch the risk horizon beyond accessible technological 
fixes.  
The disaster in New Orleans spawned by hurricane Katrina is a case in point. The 
technology of levee protection is reported to have failed because in design a safety margin of 1.3 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 H-32  
did not accommodate the uncertain integrity of underlying layers of soil. The resulting flood 
wiped out people and property.    
So with dangers that result from choice and not chance, we seek protection by doctrines 
of anticipation, of foresight to deal with the reality of uncertainty. The point is that these choices 
are not just choices of technique. They are tough moral choices that require moral vision. How 
many lives must be lost at a dangerous intersection before  costly traffic signals are installed? 
How do we decide? 
Basic principles lie in lessons from history, from philosophy, from Shakespeare and from 
spiritual values of sacred texts. People must decide how safe is safe, and establish social norms 
on degrees of tolerance for risk, This process is especially vital if lives, liberty or the pursuit of 
happiness are threatened and  if risks have human origins, escalate because of human failings 
with extreme consequences. 
Two scales of consequences need review, those which occur immediately and those 
which may hibernate and explode decades later as a bitter legacy for our children. Leakage of 
radioactive waste stored since the 1940s at the nuclear weapons factory at Hanford, Washington 
is a poster child of negligence. Indeed, how actions or inactions threaten our children can be a 
yardstick of successful risk management.  
Introducing this longer term perspective exposes limits in the process of risk 
management. At policy levels, acceptable risk is usually negotiated by opposing parties. Often, 
both argue from their estimates of short term self interest. Surrogates for children are not present 
at the bargaining table except when society mandates the government to play that surrogate role 
and not simply be an umpire. 
Dimensions of the future shine in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 and the 
Technology Assessment Act creating the OTA in 1972. A blanket policy with global reach was 
drafted in 1980 as a Bill of Rights for Future Generations by Jacques Yves Cousteau and has 
been considered by the United Nations. Beyond an abstraction, this concept would require 
impact assessments beyond  cost/benefit analyses, to test risk-centered choice by imperatives of 
social responsibility. This ingredient of public policy was punched into public awareness with a 
paradigm shift in the 1970s. In what was a vigorous technology-driven culture, the question, 
“Can we do it?” was balanced with “Ought we?” 
Questions of moral vision pivot on the exercise of foresight. This does not mean claiming 
to predict the future as does astrology. As a vehicle of early warning, it means asking, “What, 
if?” This powerful tool exposes a surprise.  
Whoever controls technology controls the future. That axiom has a twin. Whoever 
controls technology in effect raises our children. Perhaps that is already happening. The media, 
electronic games and cell phones, popular musicians, advertisers and their agencies may have 
more influence on our children than do parents or religious faith. 
If this situation accurately maps reality, and society really does care about its  progeny, 
then risk management must balance the short and long term interests by more than commercial 
values. Without abandoning rights of private property and canons of capitalism, decisions must 
be tested by norms of social and economic justice.  
While American society may commit to high ethical standards, an objective survey of 
print media of record reveals the frequency of breaches not only of ethics but also of law. 
Powerful members of Congress have been indicted and sentenced for a wide range of 
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transgressions. So have corporate officers as with the Savings and Loan scandals of the 1980s 
and extending to  trials of Enron executives in 2006. 
Part of the problem is bare faced corruption. But another part of the problem lies in our 
heterogeneous population. We don’t have one public but many different publics, and when 
polled on their preference as to acceptable levels of risk they show major variations. These may 
be differentiated by wealth, by proximity to the source of danger, by social, religious, and 
political ideology, by urban vs. rural, by regional cultures, parental counseling and by ethnic 
origins, The point is that reconciling diversity in risk tolerance challenges the mustering of 
consensus.  
On that issue, we in a democracy have rich  experience from practicing the thesis that 
those who govern do so by the consent of the governed. Implied is “informed “ consent. Then the 
question rises as to who does the informing; is the source objective and do citizens have minds 
prepared to interpret information they receive, for example to understand the critical tradeoffs of 
safety for cost.  
Polls on citizen perceptions of comparative risks are not encouraging. One overarching 
conclusion to the medley of issues raised is the intense complexity of our technological delivery 
systems.  
The reader might now be convinced that the design of technological systems must meet 
the social needs and safety preferences of a broad spectrum of stakeholders. That achievement is 
a political act. Once again, we must look to the nation’s systems manager, the President, to 
muster credibility, coherence and consensus. 
H.5.2. Conflict Management to Balance Benefits and Costs 
Three premises condition this analysis. All the support systems of our society have a core 
of technology that we depend on, first, to the degree that we are totally dependent on it as the 
Zeitgeist of modern life. Second, technology blends technical systems with social systems. Third, 
benefits and costs may not be balanced. We applaud mounting living standards but overlook 
technology’s cultural impacts greater than those of religion, philosophy, ethnic traditions, social 
mores and a growing body of law..   
Technology sows complexity not just in hardware but also in delivery systems. In less 
than two centuries what began as small, orderly and predictable systems and at a human scale 
have become large, remote and incomprehensible, sometimes hazardous and even catastrophic. 
In that vulnerability, social performance demands virtuoso intelligence (both kinds) and striking 
leadership. Modern communications facilitate achievement but a convenient capability can 
overload human resources by more transmissions, more invisible actors, and more actions, 
reactions and overreactions. 
Decision making at all levels suffers from ambiguity of facts, commercial pressures from 
muscular lobbies, a noisy public forum for serial conflicts  and personal idiosyncrasies. Add 
duplicity, lying, fraud and other crimes  to recognize that the key issues are ethical and both 
business and government suffer from gross violations of trust. Moreover, familiar relationships 
of cause and effect yield to confusion and incoherence. As said before, we cheer what 
technology does for us while neglecting what it does to us. The challenge to the engineer cum 
problem solver is reconciling direct benefits against hidden surprises of unwanted impacts. 
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Achieving a compromise between benefits and penalties entails reconciling goals, values and 
organizational cultures as between business and government, and within both sectors. 
In essence, risk management requires a social strategy of foresight that does not come 
naturally either to individuals or to society. Parsing the concept, foresight entails strategic vision, 
pre-crisis planning, contingency resources, fixing what is broken and entrepreneurship to explore 
new opportunities. Finally, there must be political will to do the people’s business and not solely 
that of vested interests and political supporters. And there must be respect for high integrity. 
Neither market economics nor public law suffices to frame protection for future 
generations. Both societal steering and propulsion depend on the human psyche, on courage, 
integrity, resilience, ingenuity, free will, self-sacrifice and hope for a better future for all people. 
These constitute humanity’s survival kit in a technological world. 
In short, user-friendly technology with its harmful gremlins must be visualized as a social 
rather than technical enterprise. It acts like an amplifier.  With lever and wheel, and the bomb, it 
amplifies human muscle. With the computer, it amplifies the human mind, its memory and speed 
of calculation. Technology is also a social amplifier. With modern banking, communications and 
transportation, catastrophes anywhere have effects everywhere. Two minutes after President 
Reagan was shot in 1981, the gold market in Zurich began to twitch. In 2005, the Katrina 
hurricane induced a similar shock to the price of crude oil. 
This reality of an interconnected world—what columnist, Thomas Friedman, deems a 
flattening of a world with metaphoric mountain ranges stems from the gift of electronic 
communications, what we identify as information technology, IT.  Telegraph wires morphed to 
telephony, vacuum tubes in radios and television to silicon chips. Add satellites and fiber optics. 
With such innovations, it became feasible to assemble highly complex TDSs to meet more 
strenuous demands.  
In short, information constitutes the TDS’s nervous system. As visualized in the earlier 
diagram, information channels are crucial to synchronize all of the 17 normal components of 
every TDS. The information age displays a ballooning of traffic over greater distances and 
moving faster. Security is enhanced by early warnings of tsunamis, hurricanes or degraded by 
mischief  by spam artists and terrorists.  
There are, however, unintended side effects. Every morning on bringing up Windows, 
many people suffer an information explosion, or perhaps implosion. Beyond junk and spam, the 
volume suffocates priority messages. The firehose of bytes lacks any warranty as to truth. 
Paradoxically, wider access to information is not necessarily accompanied by deeper 
understanding. Technologies introduced to reduce risk can inadvertently increase them.                  
For example, information overload induces stress, especially when making decisions. 
Outcomes may be uncertain and errors threaten punishment. We have the luxury of more choices 
but less time to choose. In a frantic search for truth, facts may be elusive or laden with the mists 
of probability. The social context and preferences shift unpredictably. When the technological 
delivery system engages competing players, each with a self-interested economic or political 
agenda, no actor has the comfort of ever being in control.  
That shock is dramatized when adding to the TDS diagram a suit of feedback loops that 
exist in the social process. My own research efforts to accommodate that reality and explore 
repercussions totally failed. 
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Suffice it so say that the culture of modern society is the 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
our culture has not spawned a guidance system to harmonize with technology propelled change. 
Since it is unproductive to speculate on where the culture may be going, we must focus instead 
on how to cope with the role of culture in designing technologies with concern for costs as well 
as benefits but measured by parameters well beyond the narrow incentive of economic self-
interest.  
Confusion engendered by complexity and interdependence makes all the more relevant 
the earlier aphorism on modeling. 
H.5.3. Tensions Between Industry and Government 
Two major components of technological delivery systems, industry and government, 
have a paradoxical relationship. Neither can get along without the other, yet their relationship is 
marked by enduring tension. Government depends on a vigorous, healthy industry to drive the 
economy, from which to create jobs and extract a tax base. Industry thus depends on government 
to create a favorable economic climate, including direct financial assistance. That congenial 
partnership, however, is accompanied by an adversarial stance with government’s obligation to 
serve as regulator. Industry, in its boisterous role as innovator and entrepreneur, acts in its profit-
driven self interest which  often collides with social interest. Corporations are expected to turn a 
profit, but in this era equal emphasis is placed by Wall Street on the creation of wealth. The so-
called free market fails by various distortions and excesses that violate norms of economic 
justice or have severely harmful consequences. With government mandated to protect citizens 
from harm--physical, economic and psychological--we observe a muscular wrestling match. 
Merging corporate and public purposes to nourish a vigorous economy is strained when 
industry fails to get its way. Government is accused of blocking “free enterprise.” Industry then 
adopts defensive measure to weaken or block the legislative process or administration of laws 
already passed. It has been so since the nation’s birth. 
Tired of pressures to ease constraints, Congress invented special regulatory bodies to act 
on its behalf and set the rules and penalties for violations. Thus were created agencies to regulate 
the economic life of railroads, buses and trucks, merchant shipping and airlines, and later 
regulation for passenger safety. Soon other independent agencies were founded to deal with 
safety of food, drugs, water and air, of the mining industry, of the workplace, and with 
preservation of the environment. Private enterprise countered by seeking to corrupt regulatory 
bodies by urging appointments of individuals known to be favorably disposed to their interests, 
thus undermining the regulatory process from within. Headlines single out the FCC, FDA, EPA, 
NRA, FTC and others. 
In recent years, industry has adopted two other tactics. In this television age, the 
influence of that medium on public opinion is essential to political campaigning. Candidates for 
election and reelection raise funds to purchase broadcast time. Industry found a potent avenue to 
grease access to policy makers.  
A second tactic is for lobbyists to be present at what used to be off limits to outsiders, 
closed sessions when members of Congress negotiate final wording in a bill or final agreement 
on budgets. Midnight conferences are opportunities to insert clever loopholes or pork barrel 
bridges to nowhere to benefit a community and facilitate reelection. Today, there are 34,000 
registered lobbyists in the nation’s capital, roughly sixty-five for each member of Congress.  
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This phenomenon caught the public’s ear for the first time with President Eisenhower’s 
complaint in his farewell address about the self serving greed of the military industrial complex. 
That was almost a half century ago. The iron triangles of industry, a government agency and 
senior members of Congress on appropriations committees are today even more powerful. 
Perpetuation of what President Dwight Eisenhower called the war machine, the “military 
industrial complex,” regained public attention in the 2006 movie, “Why We Fight.” 
The central problem is clear. Industry cannot regulate itself. Self interest always trumps 
public interest. In the context of risk management, this history is important because the 
avalanche of new technologies has opened more risks from side effects. When industry fails in 
exercising social responsibility, conscientious government is obliged to intervene.  
That condition complicates the management of risk. A contest erupts between the sources 
of risk and those who are the victims. Thus is exposed a cultural contradiction of capitalism in 
that it works best under an umbrella of social norms. 
Contrary to popular belief that government is too zealous a regulator, the reality is that it 
has been diffident. Very rarely does it act in anticipation of harm; almost always government 
reacts when the severity of impacts has aroused public opinion to a boiling point that political 
leaders cannot ignore. Even then, industry fumes at fiscal and social accountability and seeks 
new avenues to get its way, fair or foul. Take the case of Boeing aircraft now challenged by 
government charges ranging from theft of a competitor’s papers to complicity in hiring a former 
government contract officer. 
In many respects, the tension between government and industry is a sign of health of 
both. Too much friction can distract both parties from their optimum performance. On the other 
hand, too little tension could lead to or be a signature of a corporate state.  
In the context of risk management, such an evolution of governance would trigger two 
problems. Business and government have vastly different values. Commerce measures success 
by short-run profit, growth in size and market share, and respect by Wall Street brokers. Its legal 
concerns center on protection of property rights and against accountability. Its culture is strongly 
task oriented and its management style that of an independent CEO with a tame board of 
directors. Government, on the other hand, is concerned with freedom and human rights, social 
and economic justice, including concern for future generations. The structure of government 
mandates principles of building consensus and of accountability. 
The second problem arises from a tendency of technology to concentrate wealth and 
power. In just the recent decade, acquisitions to morph into mega-corporations have been 
conspicuous in military-space technology, in petroleum operations, in both print and electronic 
media, in air transportation, and other areas with questionable benefits to all but shareholders. 
Violations of corporate ethics have earned serial headlines. 
Government is not immune to sleazy and even illegal activities. Members of Congress 
from both major parties have been indicted and jailed. Others have resigned. A major fuss has 
been raised because White House officials are alleged to have leaked the identity of a CIA agent 
in a crude attempt to intimidate the role of the agent’s spouse in contradicting President Bush’s 
assertion that Saddam Hussein sought nuclear weapons.  
While this unhealthy situation may seem foreign to risk management, the effective 
functioning of democracy and of technological delivery systems depends not only on the 
discipline of law but on mutual trust. Citizens cannot be expected to master all of the facts and 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 H-37  
analysis dealing with complex technical issues. In the main, citizens must depend on government 
to provide protection against the ultra-violet rays of the sun, from the exaggerated claims of 
pharmaceuticals, from terrorists bent on torching a calamity or from their holding a nation 
hostage with threats to detonate a nuclear device. 
It is in this situation that we observe a confluence of science and engineering with 
disciplines of public administration, business administration, economics, psychology, sociology, 
history, communications, law and even theology.    
H.6 The Ethics of Informed Consent 
H.6.1. The Role of Media in Exposing Risks  
On the earlier sketch of a standard TDS, the media were shown as a blurred image. That 
representation is intended to reflect the ubiquity of media as a source of vital information to all 
TDS constituents. For those potentially exposed to risk, this capacity serves either as early 
warning for slowly evolving events or as instruction from another’s harmful experience on how 
to offer informed consent when it is invited. 
This critical role carries a burden of social responsibility for the media... Information 
should obviously be accurate, based on authoritative sources, even handed, timely and accessible 
to non-technical stakeholders. The year 2005 is overloaded with  natural disasters that could not 
be prevented, where vulnerability was not heeded, and where media played a crucial role. With 
the tsunami in Indonesia and the earthquake in Pakistan, the number of deaths and injuries and 
extent of property losses exemplify inept emergency preparedness. The situation along the Gulf 
coast with hurricane Katrina reveals in post-mortems similar painful deficiencies, but there is 
also evidence of miscalculation by government stewards who had a mandate to protect lives and 
property under recurring circumstances. 
Earlier we noted that government’s style is more one of reacting to a threat in some 
proportion to public demands for protection. Silence gives consent. The authority responsible for 
designing and building levees to contain the New Orleans’ flood waters, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, balanced their estimates of safety versus cost. Because of limitations on 
appropriations by the Congress in the final moments of bargaining over pork barrel allotments to 
competing claimants, they took precautions for a hurricane of intensity 3 rather than 4 or 5. Still 
to be determined is the fine detail of negotiations in Appropriation Committees of both Houses, 
as to whether information was available on the relationship of costs to the degree of flood 
protection.  
Consultation with the public through levee boards was apparently not effective in the 
power structure. In that chain of political activity, citizens and local officials seemed unaware of 
the tradeoffs that put the city’s safety at risk.  
It can be argued that those at risk should have a say in decisions vital to their safety. 
Because of secrecy surrounding funding decisions, the consequences are unlikely to be known in 
advance except by zealous probing of reporters. Even that expectation may not be met where 
news organizations or reporters have cozy relationships with decision authorities in both 
government and commerce. Both parties thrive on leaks.       
There are other challenges to investigative journalism. Probing too aggressively may 
violate cannons of national security or personal privacy. The pace of information may exceed the 
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human capacity for information processing. Objectivity may be subverted by news organs with 
self interest threatened. Mega-corporations that own the broadcast networks also own 
subsidiaries that may be the subject of unwanted publicity over their failures to protect citizens 
adequately. 
That dilemma of self- versus public interest also applies with individual stakeholders. 
Copper smelters in the Puget Sound area emitted smokestack fumes of arsenic and lead that 
poisoned nearby soils in which children played. The plant’s owner asked affected citizens to 
choose between continued emissions versus correction so costly as to jeopardize the plant  and 
sacrifice jobs. Jobs won the contest until the plant was shut down by bankruptcy. By themselves, 
accurate information and positing options did not alone lead to a socially responsible outcome. 
Often, stakeholders face information overload that includes unreliable sources. Moreover, 
transmission speeds overtake a natural cadences in human affairs, Add  frustration when an 
inquiry is funneled through a chain of telephone button pushing, perhaps to lead to an ominous 
and anonymous, “The computer is down.” When  a voice is reached, its artificiality drains away 
any sense of communication with another resident of the planet. Some prefer to be safely 
uninvolved even at the expense of losing control to an invisible authority structure. Squeezed out 
by information technology (IT) is a dialectic process wherein after each conversation, live 
participants may change.  
A similar effect occurs with emotionally loaded information as, for example, live TV 
reporting of battles in Iraq or of destruction of New Orleans. Pictures have greater punch than 
prose. Intense images brand our minds, injecting content without context. Revised patterns of 
belief structures alter our perception of reality, even our sense of time. The medium has become 
the message.  
Even the content suffers mutation because of techniques exploiting volume and speed of 
transmission. Side effects are shorter attention spans and subversion of purpose from education 
to persuasion, to market a brand of politics or of faith like a soap product.   
If the premise is adopted that safety is a social judgment, society must have both timely 
information and objective analysis to convert that bundle to a state of knowledge. The treasured 
jewel of understanding emerges amidst a further stage of discourse and debate and mulling 
where individuals hear many sides of an argument, consult their memory and critical thinking, 
then make up their mind and join with others of like mind.    
That stage occurs last when public preferences reach decision authority, a member of 
Congress for example. Voices of we, the people, may best be heard if an individual finds and 
helps fund a public interest organization to serve as collective advocate. On the TDS, that 
process can be visualized as a lump in the box of citizen preferences. 
As footnotes, we have to understand that information flowing in a TDS is both 
substantive in the process, and administrative about the process. That is, participants need a 
mental model of the particular case to learn the cast of actors on the political stage, their culture, 
interests they guard, avenues of access, and the timetable of action.  
Whatever the dynamics of a particular issue, seldom does it gain attention in isolation.  
Environmental policy interacts with fiscal policy. Farm policy is affected by foreign policy, and 
U.S. policies have to be weighed in the context of free trade, globalization and outsourcing, and 
now the uncertainties of terrorism.  
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There are further complications. Incoming information must pierce a garment of emotion. 
What I may say is not necessarily what you hear. As a metaphor, assume that every one wears a 
helmet. This is a screen of past learning, biases, attitudes about change, conflict,  and especially 
experiences that leave scars. In penetrating the helmet, the new information is distorted, 
attenuated, or filtered out completely. This is especially dangerous in political leaders. 
Most  pathologies of information processing have counterparts in the media itself, the 
merchant communicators of common information. Given that the media is an intelligence 
function serving business, citizens and government officials equally they are often considered a 
fourth branch of government. The integrity of the press is thus at least as critical as that of public 
institutions. Confidence in that process can be shaken with revelations of media on corporate or 
government payrolls. One wonders what Orwell had in mind as the precursor to the central 
control of information in his metaphoric “1984.”. 
Now the media encounter new stresses of deadlines with 24/7 reporting, of  penalties they 
pay if found in error or, worse, treating handouts as news. They are trapped by an appetite for 
leaks while facing the risk of spilling classified beans.   
Business depends on the media regarding equity markets, indicators of future profits or 
losses, shifts in tax and fiscal policies, investor confidence, threats to oil supplies, and stability of 
foreign governments. What happens in Washington must be followed carefully 
Even elected leaders sift the news, polls, editorial feedback on political performance. 
President Bush seems to be an exception, proud to receive news only through trusted staff 
messengers.. Scholars who follow world and domestic affairs feast on media reports, perhaps 
alone in subjecting them to close scrutiny for accuracy, objectivity and balance. Several privately 
financed foundations engage in the same watchdog function. 
Of all the organs of a TDS, the press has the most seminal responsibility for facts and 
their understanding so as to what is at stake and in time to practice democracy. In a complex, 
confusing and noisy world, that’s a high expectation. 
As newspaper advertising shrinks, more daily papers feel threatened and seek defensive 
measures to stay alive. TV as increasingly the media of choice forces producers and anchors to 
mix in entertainment at the expense of analysis in depth. Text is dumbed down, and the flash 
card style of ads causes viewers to be numbed down. 
Most telling about the media is its strategic influence in every TDS. It is the prime source 
of facts and their future implications;  they play a legitimate role as a Greek Chorus of early 
warning about a rainbow of threats and loss of a shared vision; through editorials, they can serve 
as advocates for victims, as did the New Orleans Times Picayune,. Sometimes that zealousness is 
overdone. Coverage of Clinton’s sexual encounter with an intern played to a prurient interest in 
body fluids and DNA confirmation. In a feeding frenzy led by Republicans in Congress, the 
media were willing partners in this American tragedy. 
McLuhan had it right four decades ago. The medium not only morphs the message; it 
morphs the messenger. The lesson to be learned again and again is that democracy depends on 
truth. In his fictional 1948 account, Orwell projected a nation’s slide toward  being  a corporate 
state.  It happened when partners in business and government gained control of the media. 
Perhaps his scenario was a metaphor, accurate except with regard to timing.     
In this author’s view, there is no more critical role for media than reporting the facts on 
national security, the validity of perceived threat and response, the compromise of truth in the 
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interest of political victory, and the tradeoffs of national treasure and honor negotiated out of 
sight. 
H.6.2. The Power of Informed Consent  
First, reader, take time for a deep breath.. Some who have progressed this far may feel 
frustrated in not finding a handbook on risk management. The author promised none but 
apologizes if he inadvertently raised such expectations. This exploration focuses on the context, 
not on what to think about but how to think about “how safe is safe.” 
That question triggers as many as 20 issues that characterize operations of a standard 
technological delivery system. With each having 17 major components, I focus here on 
information networks that connect organizations and function as their nervous system to detect 
the external world and to synchronize the internal parts.   
One role is to assure that the tacit consent of those at risk is an informed consent.  People 
cannot feel safe if they are left in the dark. From very early childhood, humans want to know, 
and it is the obligation both of sources of risk and the security conscious government (which can 
also double as a source of risk) to assure that satisfaction. 
That process, however, has several impediments.  As explained before, history teaches 
that all technologies have side effect, many harmful. And it teaches that the vendors of 
technology are not always forthcoming about the unwanted and possibly lethal consequences. To 
counter that secrecy, for example, the FDA requires pharmaceutical houses to embroider their 
advertising with cautions about abstaining with some existing health conditions, and about 
physiological effects of hyper sensitivity. Parenthetically, these catalogues of possible risks are 
silent on the frequency with which products pose particular threats. If very rare, the risks are 
ignored. There are no warnings on peanut butter because those who are ultra sensitive are 
assumed to have had close shaves and practice risk avoidance.  
This example illustrates how potential victims need to face risk with a prepared mind. 
Otherwise, they might not understand a label that warns that, even though a food product 
contains no peanuts, it was processed in a plant that also handled peanut confections. This act of 
social responsibility by the vendor reflects on the ubiquity of threats and also the heightened 
awareness in our culture that risks of human origin could and should be minimized.    
That scenario is played out in news headlines almost daily. Consider the wrangle over 
proposed wind farms in Nantucket Sound off Cape Cod. Assessment of environmental impact 
mandates that all side effects be publicized and evaluated by the public and by a government 
agency. These side effects constitute hazards to navigation where traffic is dense, disruption of 
fisheries, and visual pollution of waterfront property. These costs are weighed against benefits of 
generating non-polluting energy, even if more costly. Public commentary at hearings will be 
considered before a policy is set. 
One problem is that individual stakeholders do not often attend these sessions. Some who 
do attend often fail to do their homework to explain concerns and also fail to consider tradeoffs 
that require compromise. Others, however, may be effectively represented by public interest 
organizations that buttress their arguments with facts and importance of transforming 
information to knowledge and then to understanding.  
Converting information to knowledge requires assessing the credibility of source, the 
consistency with other sources, an explanation of contradictions, and finally an enrichment of 
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initial basic information with vital context. A final stage of understanding occurs when 
knowledge is squeezed to identify implications for the issue at hand. Content is merged with 
context.  For example, recognizing that a particular technology can be harmful is elaborated by 
identifying the full rainbow of parties at risk, including the virtual stakeholders, the future 
generations.   
In a next step, all elements of risk analysis are mustered, especially the distillation from 
history of past failures, of the frequency of the threat (probability) and the scale of consequences 
if not prevented or damage controlled..  That history is especially important to rank interventions 
by degrees of their success and the tradeoffs entailed, especially of   benefits versus cost. A 
further challenge arises in converting all benefits and all costs to a common currency because 
both have intangible as well as tangible elements. Both have a combination of immediate versus 
long term effects. 
Illumination of context requires description of the political process by which the threat 
and response is mediated. The TDS can serve as a generic model to identify organizational 
participants, from perpetrators of risk to its amelioration. 
All the desired information may not be readily available. In the political theater, 
complexities of the facts and the confetti of ethics leads participants to put a premium on 
confidence in the authority and objectivity of the information source. 
Consider these realities. First, in the frenetic atmosphere of policy making, those 
responsible for decisions rely more on verbal rather than written material, especially if it is 
boiled down. Who talks to whom is highly significant. Lobbyists know that members of 
Congress cogitate over an upcoming vote as they walk from their office building to the Capitol. 
On that trek, advocates would like to be the escort and have the last word. 
These intricacies are of great importance. Recall the two-year, continuing investigation 
by a special counsel of who leaked the name of a female CIA operative to intimidate her spouse 
who was charging administration malfeasance. In political maneuvering, most information is 
tainted by self interest of the source. This is rare but not unknown in the technical community as 
well. Congress has access to such credible facts and analysis in the Government Accountability 
Office, the Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research Service.   
In his Executive Office, the president also has access to presumably objective 
information, but such support may be distorted by incompetent appointees. 
In short, the paramount role of information in risk assessment is to help those exposed to 
risk understand their predicament and have an opportunity to express their consent or dissent. 
That critical comprehension demands a preparation of mind so as to distill information 
effectively to knowledge and then to understanding. 
I was involved with risks of oil spills by tankers from a 1971 filing of omissions in the 
Environmental Impact Statement regarding the marine extension of the pipeline to  the 1989 
investigation of the Exxon Valdez disaster. In 2006, there are still repercussions from boisterous 
complaints of fishermen and indigenous peoples whose livelihood was hurt. They won a 
legislative provision for government supported citizen watchdogs to reduce future risks. That 
safety measure is relevant to the study of Katrina. 
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H.7 Lessons From The Past 
H.7.1. The Exxon Valdez as a Metaphor for System Failure 
The 2005 hurricane Katrina and its melancholy aftermath of death and economic havoc 
have been reported in American media in great detail, sufficient to illuminate the imperative of 
foresight and damage control measures to prevent a nightmare recurrence. Similar data were 
generated by a massive tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and an earthquake in Pakistan. All 
three were extremes of rare natural phenomena that could not have been prevented but deserved 
better emergency preparedness. History records similar disasters caused by human or 
organizational error.(HOE) that could have been prevented and the adversity minimized. In what 
follows, the oil spill of the tanker Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska, is summarized 
as a metaphor for system failure, of an accident waiting to happen. 
On March 24, 1989, the tanker loaded with 50 million gallons of Alaskan crude fetched 
up on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound and spilled 11 million. Oil leaked for four hours at a 
rate of 1,000 gallons per second! With the slick staining a spectacular wilderness, damaging 
habitat, fishing and tourism, blame was immediately focused on blunders by the ship’s operators. 
Given the calm sea and clear night, how could this have happened? Were there no lessons on 
safety measures from the first supertanker spill off Land’s End, England in 1967 and others 
worldwide. 
The spill animated intense media coverage focused both on the harm to the environment 
and wildlife and on the frenzied efforts to contain and cleanup the oil. Less photogenic but 
equally vital were revelations of almost total system failure in terms of accident prevention and 
emergency preparedness. 
As with every shock to routine human affairs, the curtain was opened on the stakeholders 
impacted by the accident and others responsible for cause, for prevention or  for limiting 
damage. Investigations were mounted by several federal agencies as well as by Exxon, and by a 
citizens’ commission appointed by Alaska Governor Steve Cowper, which included the author of 
this treatise. 
That probe attacked questions of what happened and why, and how to keep such a 
calamity from recurring. The commission’s report issued in January 1990 told some alarming 
stories. In applying the TDS concept to map the oil delivery system, we find almost every entity 
contributed to the disaster. 
Obviously, the ship operators were the immediate cause of the accident. The master was 
in his cabin; a mate was steering; and a lookout presumably at the bow who should have spotted 
a navigation light on the wrong side of the ship except that she was at the pilot house chatting. 
By their negligence, many others contributed to the disaster. 
For example, to limit first costs, the Exxon Corporation chose to build the largest possible 
ship with the thinnest permissible plating, the least compartmentation, and single hull rather than 
double hull construction except under the engine room. There was no redundancy in propulsion 
or steering. None of these steps to enhance safety would have prevented the accident but a 
double hull could have reduced the volume of spill. 
Human error was obvious. Exxon had retained a master with a history of alcohol abuse, 
ran the ship with the smallest possible crew (reduced twice with Coast Guard approval) on the 
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assumption of an uneventful voyage and immunity to sleep deprivation. Both these corporate 
policies reveal a classical tradeoff of safety for profit. 
The Commission also faulted Alyeska, the operator of the Valdez loading terminal and 
responsible for spill prevention and emergency response. Exposed were apathy, incompetence, 
and carelessness. That company proved incapable of reacting during the short window of 
opportunity for containment before the spill spread widely and irretrievably. The U.S. Coast 
Guard was also faulted for reducing power of their radar monitoring the inlet in order to cut 
expenses, such that their human operator did not provide continuous surveillance. Moreover, the 
Coast Guard had approved the disembarking of a pilot short of Bligh Reef where the accident 
occurred. After the spill, the agency found that its containment and cleanup fund was depleted 
and not refreshed from penalty fines so that contractors couldn’t be hired on the spot to limit 
damage.   
The State of Alaska had anticipated the possibility of the Exxon Valdez type of accident 
but their environmental watchdogs neither barked nor bit. An accident of  this scale had not  
happened during the 12 years of shipping oil, complacency had set in, and legislators under 
pressure from Alyeska had eased contingency safety requirements. 
From this snapshot, several lessons emerge. When serious consequences follow acts of 
nature or of human failures, the mind becomes aware of the large number of constituents and 
stakeholders in the TDS and their complex linkages. Paradoxically, many functions were 
installed for redundancy in navigation to prevent such grounding. .  
This leads to the surprise concept of “organizational error,” a pathology identified by 
Sociologist Charles Perrow in 1985. He characterized oil delivery systems as error-inducing 
rather than safety-promoting. This idiosyncrasy accompanies organizational cultures that 
implicitly accept untoward levels of risk in conscious tradeoffs. Such organizations are not the 
direct source of accident but they set the stage for human error to occur at lower levels. Indeed, 
80 percent of accidents are found due to human factors, most attributed to organizational culture. 
Research confirms that the imperative of safety begins at an organization’s top management with 
explicit or implicit penalties of reward and punishment for subordinates. 
Even when top management signals priority for safety, other subtle influences undermine 
the delivery system. TDS’s entail so many components that functional coherence is destroyed by 
complexity. Moreover, in the chain of command, each level is expected to make choices that 
unfortunately may prove to be parochial and short term, indifferent to conflicts with a master 
policy or plan, and focused on shielding higher authority. Financial considerations rule, and 
public relations are used to minimize corporate liability rather than risk to the public. In 1989, 
the oil transportation industry suffered more than most delivery systems from all these 
deficiencies. 
The Alaska Commission filed 58 recommendations to reduce risks of a spill and enhance 
containment and cleanup response. The 15 most relevant are summarized below: 
• Prevention of oil spills must be the keystone policy of all in oil shipping. 
• Because many individuals and communities are at risk, citizens should be involved in 
oversight. This echoes the notions that safety is a social judgment, that those exposed to risk 
should have a say  on protection. 
• The nation and states need strong, alert and fully funded regulatory authorities. 
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• Top management of private oil transportation must be committed to safety 
• Citizens in a democracy have a role in all aspects of risk management. 
• Federal technical standards and safety requirements should not preclude more stringent 
measurers by states for prevention and spill response..  
• Double hulls and other advances in tanker design should be required at an accelerated time 
table. 
• Traffic control systems should be mandatory, not voluntary 
• Crew levels should reflect the need to avoid fatigue and additional crew required by 
emergency conditions.  
• The role of insurance companies to reduce risk should be revisited 
• Corporations transporting hazardous materials should be required by the SEC to file safety 
reports along with the fiscal data of quarterly reports. 
• A report should be prepared annually by federal authorities to track progress 
• The state should empower itself to take over response to a spill in the absence of swift and 
effective federal action (again, redundancy) 
• An available funding mechanism is needed to facilitate immediate response  
• The state should fund a system of emergency economic assistance to fill holes in citizen 
safety nets  
Some of these recommendations were swiftly adopted, especially those aimed at state 
responsibility. Based on the Commission report, the State of Alaska instituted stricter safety 
measures, including the requirement for each loaded tanker to be escorted by two large tugs, thus 
providing more assured redundancy in navigation and power to intercept a disabled tanker 
swiftly. 
Similar recommendations were made by the author in a 1982 study of tanker safety in 
Puget Sound  and were initially ignored. In 1990, however, the the federal government acted; but 
under pressure from the oil industry, Congress extended the date to replace single hull tankers 
with double hulls. Some companies, however, acted immediately, especially with the success of 
liability suits against Exxon by native populations whose businesses were injured by the spill.  
Corporate response has been spotty, with litigation over damages on the order of one 
billion dollars long in the courts. Other observations can be sifted from the Commission report. 
With engineering improvements in machinery and electronics, the proportion of accidents 
attributed to human factors has increased; the Norwegian safety authority for shipping states up 
to 80 percent of the total. The Intergovernmental Maritime Organization of the U.N. emphasizes 
that corporate commitment to safety begins at the top. Accidents often expose corporate cultures 
that bond staff and management to a common set of values that conflict with those of society as a 
whole. Implications are treated later on social responsibility of the firm    
This anatomy of an accident illustrates in a modern, interconnected society that an error 
by a single individual led to damages of over $3 billion. Other examples have been widely cited 
such as the failure of a chemical plant in Bhopal, India, and the nuclear power station at 
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Chernobyl. In retrospect, most long-term and persistent  dangers arise from weaknesses in people 
and in their institutions.   
On a personal note, for this author being appointed to the Exxon Valdez Commission was 
a depressing irony. In a sense, I was there at the beginning. In 1967, I was in England when the 
Torry Canyon went on the rocks at Land’s End as a result of human error. It was the first major 
spill by a supertanker. On return to my post at the White House, I instituted an Executive Order 
for President Johnson of a national contingency plan of containment and cleanup.  
When I moved to Seattle in 1970, I witnessed the vulnerability of Puget Sound that would 
serve as a port for oil to be shipped by pipeline and tanker from the Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. 
Although an environmental impact statement had been required for safety of the pipeline, the 
filing ignored the hazards of spills along both the Alaskan and Washington coasts. At a hearing 
in Washington, D.C., I delivered a risk analysis to amend the EIS. The second version nodded at 
maritime hazards but was weak enough to justify publication of a second alarm, this time in a 
journal of the ASCE. In 1975, I chaired a study committee for the state legislature that led to 
federal regulations for Puget Sound requiring a tug escort and limits to tanker size. In 1982, a 
comprehensive report on navigation safety was published with additional analysis of risks with 
tanker traffic and the need to strengthen Coast Guard surveillance.  
With the appointment to the Alaska Commission, I felt like the fabled tar baby, stuck 
forever to studies of tanker accidents. 
H.7.2. Deficits of Foresight, Vigilance, Contingency Resources, Political Will, and Trust 
Contemplating their survival leads most citizens to feel secure when risks are known and 
convincingly held to acceptable limits. While that accomplishment may be an impossible dream, 
the human family has advanced in comprehending that threats to survival are not inescapable 
whims of fate. While many believe, like the ancient Greeks and Romans, that the gods punish 
human transgressions with disasters, society presently believes risks can and must be controlled. 
This protection is especially demanded with risks of human origin. Thus, society has 
boot-strapped its understanding of cause-and-effect so as to prevent many malignant 
consequences or at least to act defensively to contain the degree of harm.  
Within that abstraction is a chain of understandings, some with ancient roots. The time is 
long past for people anywhere to achieve the desired security as individuals. For better or worse, 
each of us is imbedded in a distinctive culture and subculture on which we must depend to be 
alive and free. The most critical element of that society is trust.   
The problem with trust is its undependability, notwithstanding its prominent role in a 
democracy. Connections between trust, lying and ethics earned attention as far back as Aristotle. 
The subject has gained distinguished analysis ever since, recently in the book on “Lying” by 
Sissela Bok and sermons by Solzhenitzen. Consider the following headlines in the New York 
Times for a single day, January 4, 2006:  
• Lobbyist Abramoff Accepts Plea Deal in a Corruption Case 
• Bribery Investigation to Reach into Congress(Rep. Nye and others) 
• The National Security Agency(NSA) first Acted on its Own to Broaden Spying 
• on the Subject of Leaks (on domestic spying) 
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• U.S. not Told of 2 Deaths during Study of Heart Drug (Johnson and Johnson) 
• 6 Ex-Putnam Officials Accused of Fraud 
• Judge Orders Ex-HealthSouth Chief to Repay $48 Million 
• Windows Patch not Ready (Microsoft vulnerability) 
That same day, a tragedy unfolded in West Virginia with the deaths of 12 men in a mine 
that had been cited with over 200 safety violations in the last two years. The coal company bears 
responsibility, but so does the federal government which discovered the violations but failed to 
act. Pressures on members of Congress and the Bush White House led to reduced budgets for 
mine inspectors and to allow dangerous mines to remain open.  
A week earlier, the headlines exposed fraud in scientific results announced by a stem-cell 
scientist in South Korea. In four books published between 1979 and 1999, I listed similar 
breeches with examples of Boeing (Bribing contract officials), General Motors hiding dangers of 
the rear engine Corvair, Ford concealing a vulnerable fuel tank on the Pinto, the unresolved 
super scandals of ENRON and World Com currently in the courts. 
These observations lead to the melancholy conclusion, that key organizations are as 
lacking in moral principles as are individuals whose human nature has uncorrected flaws. 
Compared with that of individuals, however the scale of corporate malfeasance  is far greater.  
Experience reveals that it takes a spectacular accident or crisis to so agitate a quietly 
humming TDS as to expose the institutions involved, their communications networks as well as 
their life style.  
Some organizations demonstrate solid integrity, revealed by a concern for safety, 
doctrinal foresight, a tolerance for dissent, alacrity in damage control, self discipline and 
acceptance of responsibility. Many do not. They engage in cover-ups, deflection of blame and 
substitution of public relations for problem solving. 
The pathologies of ethics are not limited to the private sector. We still remember the 
Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals germinating in the White House. Much more recently, these 
negative and positive aspects were conspicuous in reports of Katrina-related flooding and its 
aftermath of system failures..  
Public and private organizations differ, however, regarding their attitudes toward ethical 
lapses. The public expects a high level of moral vision in public servants, and so feels more 
justified in publicizing their weaknesses as in the case of  President Clinton and Monica 
Lewinsky than with private enterprise.  
The public cherishes privacy and, given the corporations’ legal status in protection of its 
officers from liability, is more inclined to accept the secret life of corporate officers and boards. 
Compared to fifty years ago, consider how obscure names of corporate officers have become.  
To explain, organizations have personalities, cultural attributes and values similar to 
those of individuals. When public safety is at stake, the public has a right to expect the same 
standards of values for corporate officers as they do for officials of government. These personal 
qualities include intelligence, integrity, respect for the law, common sense and compassion, 
capacity to listen and learn, emotional stability under stress and deep understanding of the social 
contract of America.  
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President Calvin Coolidge tried to epitomize that focus with the statement, “The business 
of America is business.” In terms of function, a more appropriate term would be, “The business 
of America is technology.” If technology was defined as the social process mapped by the TDS, 
the significance of values would be clear in their shaping ethical qualities of all system 
components.  
The earlier headlines make clear that our society has serious gaps in the practice of ethics. 
It follows that every brand of risk is intensified where integrity is compromised; instead, it 
should be the keystone of every organization’s culture. 
Not all news is bad. There are striking examples of courageous integrity. After 
completion of New York’s City Service skyscraper, design engineers found that  the 
specifications for  strength of structural steel were in error and not reported until after 
completion. Apart from bruised pride, the admission opened the hazard of powerful lawsuits. Yet 
the social responsibility to protect the public prevailed; additional structural elements were 
installed. There is heroic power in doing the right thing. 
Attention to ethics has not been sufficiently emphasized in our schools of business, and 
this is reflected in the behavior of graduates. Most believe that evidence of sound management 
lies in external rewards through rise in stock prices, and internal kudos for maintaining tight 
control. Here is where fault lines appear in our basic values.  
Missing is an awareness that human organizations are organisms and not mechanisms. 
With mechanisms, cause and effect are coupled predictably. Not so with organisms. Their 
behaviors are less certain, cause and effect blurred. External influences such as terrorism, intense 
global competition, or occulted fate undermine certainty, 
One thing, however, is fairly certain----whoever controls technology controls the future. 
No wonder Orwell’s speculations regarding the corporate state have been resurrected. That 
reality would be less likely in a society that honors diversity rather than central control. Diversity 
works only with a shared set of values that nurture trust. Without trust, the system of governance 
works only by coercion. 
The nation’s founders surely recognized that truth but did not incorporate their moral 
vision in the Constitution. Some elements were added by amendments, the Bill of Rights.. 
History reveals, however a strong moral climate was suffused in the population through  
religious doctrines. They may have assumed that such discipline would be permanent despite 
acknowledging that democracy was an unproven experiment. 
In the aftermath of Katrina, it was clear that systemic shortages other than in ethics were 
present and these are being dissected by the media. Shortfalls include the effects of human and 
organizational errors, of shortages in foresight, in vigilance to detect early warnings of danger, in 
contingency resources to limit damage and then to repair what’s broken, and finally a shortage of 
political will to exercise the leverage of power to get the right things done and done urgently, and 
then to do these things right. Today, most failures do not involve hard-edged technology but 
rather human ware.   
Here lies another contradiction. In our democracy that underlines egalitarianism, power is 
thought of as suspect and even malign. There are, however, benign purposes for the exercise of 
power, and these need honoring in the human ambition for survival. 
To be emphasized is the imperative role of citizens as a part of government. They should 
be part of the power structure as suggested in the TDS. Only then will those who govern do so 
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with the informed consent of the governed. This was the perspective of the nation’s founders and 
it could be lost amidst the buzz of intricate social processes, especially cases of unprincipled 
advocacy by society’s powerful economic interests. The antidote to the disproportionate 
influence by special interests starts with more transparency of policy affairs. 
One way to understand the web of influences on risk management is to think of our high-
tech society as steered by three sets of IT operating instructions. One set is the free hand of the 
economic market place.  A second is public policy, much of it regulation to manage risk. The 
third set is values that animate the moral parameters of the other two. . Underpinning these 
arguments is an implicit assumption that citizens realize government is not the only machinery of 
governance. We, the people, have a critical role.   Most urgent is to meet the deficiencies 
exposed by the case studies---the lack of foresight, vigilance, contingency resources, time, 
political will and trust. 
Most essential is foresight. Government officials and citizens can then focus on emerging 
issues of security, seek the facts, compare remedial alternatives, and unintended consequences of 
each. With information and trust, citizens could make their views known on acceptable levels of 
risk in the spirit of catastrophe avoidance. Officials should recognize this citizen role in a 
participatory democracy and welcome an informed and concerned electorate. 
H.8 Thinking About The Future 
H.8.1. Evaluating Social Choice by Outcomes for the Children 
For many centuries, philosophers have taught that the quality of a civilization can be 
judged by how it treats its children. With that rationale, the quality of decisions made today for 
managing risk can be judged by consequences observed tomorrow as outcomes for our children. 
In other words, today’s decisions on acceptable risk can best be judged by results observed 10 to 
20 years hence. These results become legacies for future generations-- social, political, economic 
and ecological. With such criteria for success, those responsible for risk assessment must look 
ahead in order to make operational the questions, “What might happen, if, or What might 
happen, unless?” 
Imaginative analysts might nominate answers, but trouble may still occur when the issue 
requires a policy decision that spins winners and losers. Assuming that all stakeholders are 
represented at a bargaining session, it is likely that compromises are reached among different 
advocates. Almost all will argue from their short term advantage, with no advocate for 
hypothetical children. The short term triumphs because  society chooses to lock its barn door too 
late.  
This vulnerability in public policy was sketched for the U.S. Congress in 1965 by its CRS 
Science Policy Research group, leading to creation of the Office of Technology Assessment in 
1972. Requests from members and committees led to roughly 50 reports a year until the agency 
was zero budgeted by House speaker Newt Gingrich in 1995. The OTA left a valuable library of 
risk assessments that permit comparison of different methodologies. All were endowed with a 
futures perspective. 
That resource also demonstrates the importance of values in every society.. For example, 
studies reveal a paradigm shift in the 1970’s regarding technology’s wrenching of social norms. 
The question about potent innovation and asked with pride, “Can we do it?  shifted to the 
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questions of “Should we?” In simple terms, this requires a look at the medical mandate to “do no 
harm.” 
If my earlier contention is true that whoever controls technology controls the future, and 
if we judge the acceptability of a technological development (or its misguided absence) by the 
effects on the children, we can conclude that whoever controls technology in effect is raising our 
children. That shocking characterization of shifts in our  values may already be happening.. 
That prospect can be a useful wedge to understand the impact of values on today’s 
decisions and thus on the future for our progeny. This leads to an inescapable question on which 
values dominate our culture and that of the deciders who extract from our circumstances answers 
to “How safe is safe?” 
In America’s diverse population, one size answer doesn’t fit us all. Each brand of risk 
and its stadium of different interests is likely to generate a different outcome. Therein lies 
another level of perplexity in dealing with risk. There is no standard pattern. Today’s solutions 
are unlikely to be suitable tomorrow. Living with risk isn’t easy. 
H.8.2. Foresight as an Imperative in Risk Management 
Safety and security depend on fantasy, on imagining what might happen and then how to 
prevent harm or at least minimize the event’s impact. Risk management demands  a mind set of 
looking ahead, practicing a doctrine of anticipation. That notion can be sampled in a series of 
books on Science Policy by the most frequent citations in the indices. It is also possible to track 
changes in what one author (Wenk) emphasized as important over a span of 22 years, 1979 to 
1999, in connecting technology and the future to people and to politics: 
*Margins for Survival: Overcoming Political Limits in Steering Technology, 1979 
*Tradeoffs: Imperatives of Choice in a High-Tech World---1986 
*Making Waves: Engineering, Politics and the Social Management of Technology---1995 
*The Double Helix: Technology and Democracy in the American Future---1999 
For each book, the most often cited index terms were: 
Margins for Survival, 1979: Anticipation, [Foresight, Early Warning, Future, Long-term,]  
Behavior of political leaders, Cultural values, Decision processes, Government, Information, 
Nuclear hazards, Technology and Society, Threat and response, Time. 
Tradeoffs, 1986: Citizen Participation, Congress, Decision processes, Ethics, Foresight 
[Anticipation, Future, Long range,] Government, Industry, Information, Media, Political 
processes, Risk assessment, Technology  
Making Waves, 1995 Accidents, Business, Coordination, Economics, Engineering, 
Ethics, Foresight, Government [Congress, President, Policy,] Organizational behavior, Risk, 
Technology, Values 
The Double Helix,1999:: Business, Economics, Ethics, Foresight, Government, 
Information, Media, Safety and Risk, Technology, Time  
A fast scan of these citations unlocks two paradoxes. The featured topics sound more like 
books in the behavioral sciences than in engineering. That slant was rationalized in a 1995 paper, 
“Teaching Engineering as a Social Science.” published by the American Society for Engineering 
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Education. Its thesis was simple, that everything engineers do is to meet needs and wants of 
people. That suggests learning about human nature as well as laws of nature. 
The second enigma was the power of some topics to command attention over a long 
period when the interaction of technology and society was in flux. The concept of foresight 
deserves special attention. 
Many people meet this concept as children when taught to pass a football to where the 
receiver is perceived to be when the ball arrives. Boy Scouts are engraved with the motto, “Be 
Prepared.”  Many young people encounter the future pragmatically in the quest for a college 
scholarship that depends heavily on high school grades and recognition of leadership earned 
years before. . Those studies, incidentally, seldom focused on the way ahead; History and 
English Lit necessarily looked backward. Students met futurist Jules Verne through their 
vicarious curiosity to explore both the geographical and the scientific frontiers. Beginning in 
1933, a series of world’s fairs were held in North America, speculating on the future in exhibits 
and programs: in Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Seattle, Montreal, Spokane and Vancouver. 
Not until the October 4, 1957 Soviet space spectacular did the entire nation engage the future as 
the meshing of technology with society and public policy for safety and survival.  
It bears repeating that the importance of foresight follows from a reality that all 
technologies have unintended consequences, some potentially lethal. Shrinking these risks is the 
core of social responsibility of professional engineers. Practice entailed two different strategies. 
One is to coral information as to what might happen (in the future), if, or unless. Skillful probing 
should then lead to stages of care in design to reduce risks. The second strategy was to take 
precautions against a range of uncertainties by over-design, the use of safety margins.  
Both strategies, however, encounter potholes, tradeoffs with other design parameters such 
as cost, reliability, weight or delivery schedules, and thus with performance. Both strategies 
stumble for yet another reason. By our culture and possibly by our genes, modern humans have 
difficulty looking ahead. Anthropologists assert that humans are the only mammals even capable 
of imagining the future. Seasonal migrations of birds and animals seem spun by instinct, not 
fantasy. Moreover, early humans were compelled to satisfy immediate needs of food, water and 
safety so that the longer range perspectives were irrelevant.  
Modern humans still suffer from pathologies of the short run. The monograph, Margins 
for Survival, lists sixteen, all dealing with human behavior. That discovery should teach that 
managing risk crashes into a type of sound barrier that challenges a way of thinking beyond 
equations and number crunching. Practicing foresight depends on individual and group behavior, 
what we call social process. Only with this far horizon can risk managers accommodate and 
compensate for individual and organizational error and its siblings. The three operating 
instructions for the process were mentioned earlier. Foresight has one other critical product. It 
instructs us on how to achieve our greatest challenge, making the world a better and safer place 
for our progeny. Indeed, how a society treats its children is a measure of civilization. In policy 
terms, that idea stretches back to drafting of the American Constitution. 
With the dilemmas of our time, it would be tempting to draft a cook book on foresight, a 
universal method of forecasting what might happen, if. That quest is fruitless because every case 
is different. Some dangers, however, repeat themselves such that projections of the future follow 
trajectories of the past. We learn from failures.  
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That aphorism puts a premium on history, not just a chronology of key events but also an 
understanding of different layers of individual and organizational functions, responsibilities, 
leadership patterns, institutional cultures, communications, resources available, etc.              
The past can be prologue. 
 
H.8.3. Pathologies of the Short Run 
All risks and measures to enhance safety embody dimensions of time. These intervals 
range from nanoseconds in computer chips to decades of human longevity, to centuries of 
tectonic movements. In the context of risk management, the most crucial  interval lies ahead, in 
the immediate future and the distant. Survival is the imperative of the future, both short and long 
term. Common sense dictates looking ahead, but we are so conditioned to seek immediate 
gratification that short term goals and strategies trump the longer term, regardless of how much 
more significant they are. The culture seems indifferent to future penalties of current choice. 
This exercise of foresight should be distinguished from prediction, the attempt to satisfy 
human curiosity about tomorrow’s weather, the longevity of a family member, the performance 
of the stock market. Daily newspapers still carry horoscopes and astrologers still practice an 
ancient art that extends back to pre-Biblical times. The sagacity of foresight lies in asking 
questions about alternative,  conditional futures--- what might happen, if or unless in relation to 
acts of nature or acts of people.   
There are many pathologies of the short run. Consider the reward structure in commerce. 
In their narrow self-interest, CEO’s are torn between boosting long-term performance of a firm 
against winning the Wall Street beauty contest next Monday. Shareholders lack patience; so do 
money managers of mutual funds. Executives also lack incentives for long term strategies 
because they expect to move on and prudent foresight may bring credit to their successors. 
The reward structure in politics is similar. Incumbents sense what earns voter esteem and 
promise rewards in the next election. Shorter term issues, especially if paraded in headlines, are 
more rewarding. Seldom are elected officials bold enough to inform an electorate of the 
distinction between the long and the short run consequences.    
To be sure, the future is clouded with uncertainty. In our technological era, we are 
confounded with complexity of both machines and social processes. Linkages of effect with 
cause are frustrated because human systems do not have the fixed properties of mechanisms. 
They are organisms. 
In smaller communities of the past, everyone shared information about how their local 
TDS worked. The social contract was more transparent. Now in large and complex communities, 
early warnings may be weak. Fretting over the unknown carries emotional burdens eased by 
ignoring the future. That pattern can explain the unwitting storage of radioactive waste 50 years 
ago at a weapons factory where it is leaking. Residents knew of the danger since it began, but 
good jobs drowned out a faint and sporadic protest until very recently.  
In general, the public seems indifferent to these longer term issues, partly out of feelings 
of incompetence and powerlessness. The perceived loss in control leads to weary acceptance of 
political decisions that are “piecemeal, provisional, parochial, uncoordinated, insubstantial and 
lacking in prophetic moral vision.”  
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Organizations are known for their resistance to change, for their aging in such a way as to 
lose alacrity in response to threats (as in New Orleans with Katrina). Energies are directed to self 
preservation by combating forces uncongenial to well entrenched beliefs. Change can be 
threatening When dilemmas lack clear solutions, it is more comfortable to avoid action or change 
in direction. Leaders find bliss by selective ignorance. Such escapes are irresponsible but they 
are especially attractive when the queue of problems is relentless and new ones erupt before 
earlier ones have been resolved. Avoiding the future also reduces the risk that a look ahead may 
uncover mistakes of the past. 
In this inventory of pathologies, there is also a perceived shortage of time. That seems 
anomalous in an era when technology promised to save time and permit mulling over options in 
the decision theater. Yet the tyranny of a backlog and the frenetic atmosphere of policy making 
blocks both rational choice and conflict resolution. 
Caught in the crossfire, leaders get nervous and either seek immediate relief by 
impetuosity or are paralyzed by a commitment to the past. Under stress, once again the short 
term wins. Society leans to a conservative stance because it has lost confidence in itself to 
manage technology.   
This catalogue of pathologies should sound familiar. It exposes how inimical they are to 
democratic process. Nominating and comparing options takes time, as does an honest debate on 
who wins and who loses. With unsettled issues accumulating, none receive adequate attention in 
the policy theater, even less in the media to help inform citizenry to do their duty. When these 
issues are covered, the media demand instant accountability, live on TV, leaving no time to deal 
with complexity and context. 
When debates are held, advocates argue from their parochial, short term perspectives. No 
one in the decision pyramid has the patience or energy to look through the mists ahead to 
practice prophylaxis or take collision avoidance action. 
Add problems of information overload, stress of uncertainty, imperatives of reelection, 
new crises world wide, many beyond remediation. Loss in virtues of foresight and character can 
lead to exhaustion of stamina and to impetuous judgment. 
The operating directions I proposed almost a half century ago came from an innovative 
concept of technology assessment. Simply put, TA is a method for looking ahead. The OTA’s 
organic legislation spelled out these paraphrased details: 
• Define the TDS, its purposes, its stakeholders, its organizational components and information 
links. 
• Define the technical, social, economic, political and ecological context and the estimated 
behavior of different system participants. 
• Establish a base of hard facts and of uncertainties. 
• Forecast what is foreseeable about impacts and about evolution of hardware, software and 
social ware. 
• Generate alternatives of policy and implementation plans including doing nothing, and trace 
consequences, both desired and unwanted. 
• Identify impacted parties, including future generations and effects on each.     
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• by asking, “What might happen, if, to whom, and when?” Incidentally, this methodology has 
a mirror image in environmental impact analysis.  
Imagine the prize of successful performance of public policies if all initiatives were 
subject to this mode of analysis. 
H.8.4. Early Warning of Close Encounters. 
Early risk management drew on common sense, imagination, familiarity with human 
nature and with contemporary cultures rather than science. Now it also draws on science and 
engineering, and on learning from failure. For threats that recur frequently, impact statistics are a 
great help. For threats that occur rarely and especially those with extreme consequences, data are 
too sparse to extract probabilities for numerical risk analysis as defined previously. That 
condition springs a paradox. 
Admitting there are limits to available information, foresight is still essential. Beyond 
infrequent accidents or natural catastrophes, we learn from incidents, “close encounters.” These 
events would be similar in patterns of cause and effect to those having severe impact, but in these 
cases the trajectory to tragedy was arrested either by the lucky tapering of circumstances or by 
timely and effective accident avoidance maneuvers.. 
Everyone lives with dangers. Repeated close shaves, however, serve as early warning of a 
hazardous environment, a hazardous situation or our own impaired judgment. Projected to the 
future, this store of experience is a survival tool. It doesn’t work with slow learners or fools. It 
does work, however, on an institutional basis where data on close shaves are collected and 
analyzed in real time in the spirit of prevention or damage control. 
The collective benefit of that monitoring is dramatically illustrated by the case of airline 
safety. For several decades, the FAA has required operating personnel to report close shaves.  
Analysis of events that were often repeated served as early warning of danger. Participants 
included pilots, traffic controllers, maintenance inspectors and occasionally passengers.  
Because the FAA has authority to punish violators of rules, it was aware that those 
committing errors might be reluctant to report themselves. As a precaution, FAA contracted with 
a neutral government agency, NASA, to collect and analyze data, preserving their anonymity but 
reporting the “hot spot” patterns that deserve immediate risk reduction measures. As a result, 
accidents on the nation’s airways have been conspicuously limited over a period when air traffic 
sharply increased.  
The same reporting system was proposed by the author in a 1982 report on navigation 
safety in Puget Sound where newly operating tankers carrying crude oil posed a serious 
environmental hazard.. The Department of Transportation adopted the proposal, issued reporting 
rules and forms, and selected its laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts as the neutral, data 
collection agent rather than the U.S. Coast Guard which has regulatory authority. 
Communication of this risk management technique to ship operators was so poor, however, that 
few reports were filed and the DOT abandoned the system.     
The virtue of close encounter reporting remains and has been adopted in other risky 
situations. Operators of nuclear power plants are required by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to file such reports, even using telephony to warn operators of similar plants of 
similar vulnerabilities. 
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The public is well aware of product recalls mandated by various agencies where 
intervention is based on the frequency of identical hazards, some creating accidents, some only 
incidents, the close shaves. Broader applications are obvious.   
H.9 The Anatomy of Risk - A Summary 
In virtually all human affairs, some risk is normal. The consequences of neglect may be 
grave, if not now then in the future. There follows a distillation of points raised earlier on how to 
think about the risk situation as a prelude to risk management. 
• Risk is a highly complex condition, especially challenging because it combines abstruse 
technical factors with diverse and uncertain elements of societal behavior; and because the 
consequences may cause great harm. 
• Three frontiers of risk pose threats, extremes of nature, weaknesses in human nature, and the 
unintended consequences of technology 
• All technologies spawn side effects, most unwanted by some sector of the population, now or 
in the future 
• .Each risk condition is unique, but two theorems for analysis have found wide application to 
facilitate understanding 
• The first is based on the notion that what you can’t model you can’t manage. 
• This leads to a generic framework to structure intertwined laws of nature and of human 
nature, what is termed a Technological Delivery System, a TDS. 
• The second tool is based on the notion that risk does not yield to rigorous technical analysis 
because acceptable risk is a social judgment.  
• Risk analysis using a TDS depends on three premises of governance. 
• The first is that those exposed to involuntary risk should have a say in their intensity of risk 
exposure.  
• The second is that when economics of the free market, existing laws and local governments 
fail to meet that level of safety, the federal government is charged to assume responsibility to 
lower the threshold of threat to levels that citizens demand. 
• That achievement, however, has both direct and indirect costs, so that significant tradeoffs 
are necessary between safety and expense. 
• Because of cultural diversity in America, achieving consensus on acceptable risk releases a 
fog of conflict and uncertainty  
• .Bargaining develops among stakeholders; lobbying becomes endemic. 
•  Typically, each argues from their immediate, short-term self-interest such that little attention 
is paid to long-term effects, including on future generations. 
• The third precept is that the federal government not just serve as umpire, but balance long- 
with short-term factors, thus serving as a surrogate for progeny 
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• In this chain of argument, a question arises as to whether the public that is to be consulted as 
to risk tolerance has adequate factual information and grasp of the risk equation so as to 
render not just consent but informed consent. 
• Two TDS elements help with that illumination, the print and electronic media, and past or 
recent events. Those so agitate a TDS that the full cast of stakeholders is revealed, their roles 
in posing a threat, in preventing or limiting the damage or in their capture as victims. 
• Study of past and recent events offers a rich opportunity to learn from failure. Most of these 
failures can be traced to human and organizational errors. 
• Those lessons should tutor emergency preparedness through the self-conscious exercise of 
foresight, to limit impacts to choice and not chance 
• Potent levers of foresight are the questions, “What, if or unless; when and to whom.” This is 
the spine of technology assessment that was institutionalized in 1972 for Congress as radar 
for the ship of state. That capability was lost in 1995. Perhaps it needs rethinking for both 
branches of government. 
• Engineering practice treats uncertainties by over-design with safety margins  
•  How these are set and by whom are critical. 
• The role and performance of the federal government can be evaluated to ascertain 
effectiveness of regulation for risk reduction and damage control     
• Dissection of these events should reveal the strength and weaknesses of existing legislative 
authority, the match between appropriations and need, the identification of leadership to 
integrate and activate emergency preparedness and crisis response among federal and lower 
authorities. 
•  A customized TDS should help illuminate who is responsible for what among organizational 
components, but a critical element is the quality of communications to assure that basic 
information is shared and that otherwise piecemeal actions are synchronized to assure 
systemic functioning.. 
• As to federal involvement, the President becomes the nation’s uncertified systems manager 
because all agencies responsible for citizen safety and security report to the Chief Executive, 
because he is held to account for their satisfactory performance and must initiate new public 
policies if authority or performance is weak, because many dangerous natural phenomena 
entail common property of air, land or water, and because in extreme cases the military arm 
of which he is Commander in Chief must be mustered.  
• Ultimately, the President is responsible for protection from terrorism, extremes of nature, 
from dangers of technology’s side effects and from human frailties of ignorance, error, 
blunder, folly, mischief, greed and hubris. 
• This burden must be processed with foresight to exercise political power and political will, 
especially to meet shortages of vigilance, resources and trust. 
• Government is both mandated and constrained by public policies, and these are rooted in 
values that differ widely among stakeholders. 
• One source of conflict arises between industry and government because there are sharp 
differences between these entities in goals and in tactics based on their internal values. 
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Industry honors efficiency and measures success by profit and generation of wealth. 
Government honors sustainability and measures success by economic and social justice.  
• Some tension between these two power centers is healthy but excessive tension can be 
corrosive 
•  The quality of social and political choice is revealed by the heritage each generation leaves 
its children    
• Citizens need to realize that government is “We, the People!” that democracy is not a 
spectator sport and that each citizen has responsibility for risk management through public 
policies and citizen watchdogs.      
• The risk management process depends critically on mutual trust of all parties.  
H.9.1. Applying These Concepts to Katrina  
This treatise was prepared for  this study of the Katrina disaster. The diagnosis of causes 
for the calamity demanded a sifting of the foregoing issues for steps to meet the federal 
government’s responsibilities and accountability to anticipate threats and to prevent and to 
mitigate losses of life and property. 
Three measures emerged from the most salient lessons and the most potent interventions 
to avert a repetition of the flooding disaster. 
• To enhance the management of all modes of risk, the responsibilities for vigilance and 
decision making at the tip of the authority structure should be clarified and strengthened, 
perhaps with a new unit in the Executive Office of the President. 
• To buttress the legislative responsibilities of the Congress, additional technical staff should 
be appointed to assure adequate revenues to manage risk and to monitor performance of the 
Executive Branch in its duties of care. 
• To reflect that citizens at risk are entitled to information regarding their exposure and 
opportunities to participate in governance, new processes should be authorized at a local 
level to foster informed consent and dissent and to function early warning in disaster-prone 
areas. 
Such measures have great promise in the spirit of preventing another lethal flood in New 
Orleans. They present opportunities to deal with a much broader array of threats—to life, peace, 
justice, health, liberty, private and common property  
These cardinal recommendations arise from Constitutional law and from a history of 
public policies that establish the Federal Government as the most senior authority for providing 
safety and security. Moreover, the technological engines of the last century have added to natural 
causes a new class of dangers arising from human and organizational errors and from unintended 
consequences of technologies switched on for their benefits. 
This double helix of technology and governance leads to awareness that the President is 
the nation’s uncertified systems manager. Responsibilities accrue from the President being the 
Chief Executive supervising all federal departments and agencies and responsible for their 
disaster preparedness, their exercise of foresight and for adequacy of their funding. As 
Commander in Chief of the armed services, he has direct and immediate access to potent 
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physical and human resources both to prepare for emergencies and to offer rescue and salvage 
assistance after a disaster. 
.The age of electronic communications has heavily affected the functioning of the White 
House in its connections to the outside world. Events anywhere have repercussions everywhere. 
Message traffic is more complex, demands faster analysis and response, and entails a denser web 
of possibly differing participants.  
One psychological effect is to force attention to immediate issues rather than the 
important. Pressures to deal with the unremitting queue of short-term dilemmas squeezes out 
attention to longer-term challenges. The future is neglected, thus seeding an enormous penalty 
for future generations, including the burden of public debt.  
Decision making in every White House has other impediments. Apart from the standard 
approach of framing issues and options, the incumbent has to assess the impact of choice on 
political power and political will. Each quandary imposes stresses on political capital. With a 
press intent on not becoming a sycophant and losing their role as the fourth estate, that Greek 
chorus is noisy and distracting, and in a democracy, not centrally controlled. So the President 
must be aware of the public perception of issues at hand and their intertwining with unresolved 
preceding issues. 
That latter condition is reflected in a new reality of government organization. There was a 
time when the missions and roles of individual departments were highly specialized and 
compartmented. Today, issues leak well beyond the province of single agency. This imposes a 
more intense requirement at the top for coordination and integration of functions of several 
agencies. Only the President and the Vice President have the authority of being elected and 
occupy a central position of leadership of all departments and agencies. 
In a nutshell, the President needs help of a special cadre of advisors experienced in and 
focused on catastrophic risks of all kinds. Organizationally, they should not become a layer 
between him and agency heads. This staff should be mandated to look ahead, to think in the 
future tense, to adopt a stance of being proactive in the sense of preventative medicine rather 
than reactive, to balance long- with short-range factors free of partisan politics. 
The staff director should have direct access to the President at all times to offer early 
warnings such as intelligence agencies do for military security, to share urgent information 
without its filtering in the White House chain of command. In addition, the director should have 
the authority to convene emergency sessions of appropriate cabinet officers to gain their inputs 
and cooperation when circumstances demand immediate collaboration and to serve as a monitor 
of disparate and incoherent responses. 
This new capability could be a Council for Catastrophic Risk Management in the 
Executive Office of the President  The interim Council on Marine Resources and Engineering 
Development, PL89-454, could be a model.      
The Congress needs a symmetrical capability, especially in its orientation to the future. 
Such a resource existed between 1973 and 1995 in its Office of Technology Assessment. That 
organic legislation should be revisited to see if its engines need restarting but with a more 
specific focus on risk management. The procedural methodology is sketched on pages 30 and 31. 
Finally, there is a major and unprecedented role for citizens who should be considered 
part of governance in the spirit that those who govern do so at the informed consent of the 
governed. This is the population exposed to risk. Authorities for risk management should make 
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sure that those vulnerable have information regarding their condition and a reciprocal ability to 
respond to requests for their informed consent especially regarding tradeoffs, say safety for cost. 
In addition they could function as watchdogs to serve as early warning on the ground of 
disasters waiting to happen as well as monitors of agencies charged with prevention, containment 
and remediation. This function was deemed essential to help protect Prince William Sound from 
another disastrous oil spill.  
One central purpose should animate all three of these entities, separately and in tandem. 
They should address the question, “How Safe is Safe?” That investigation demands foresight in 
the spirit of the injunction, “Without vision, the people perish.” 
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APPENDIX I:  EROSION TEST RESULTS ON 
NEW ORLEANS LEVEE SAMPLES 
 
I.1  THE EFA: EROSION FUNCTION APPARATUS 
 
The EFA (Briaud et al. 1999, Briaud et al., 2001a) was conceived by Dr. Briaud in 1991, 
designed in 1992, and built in 1993 (Fig. 1). The sample of soil, fine-grained or not, is 
taken in the field by pushing an ASTM standard Shelby tube with a 76.2 mm outside 
diameter(ASTMD1587). One end of the Shelby tube full of soil is placed through a 
circular opening in the bottom of a rectangular cross section pipe. A snug fit and an O-
ring establish a leak proof connection. The cross section of the rectangular pipe is 101.6 
mm by 50.8 mm. The pipe is 1.22 m long and has a flow straightener at one end. The 
water is driven through the pipe by a pump. A valve regulates the flow and a flow meter 
is used to measure the flow rate. The range of mean flow velocities is 0.1 m/s to 6 m/s. 
The end of the Shelby tube is held flush with the bottom of the rectangular pipe. A piston 
at the bottom end of the sampling tube pushes the soil until it protrudes 1 mm into the 
rectangular pipe at the other end. This 1 mm protrusion of soil is eroded by the water 
flowing over it. 
 
I.1.1  EFA test procedure 
 
The procedure for the EFA test consists of 
1. Place the sample in the EFA, fill the pipe with water, and wait one hour. 
2. Set the velocity to 0.3 m/s. 
3. Push the soil 1 mm into the flow. 
4. Record how much time it takes for the 1 mm soil to erode (visual inspection) 
5. When the 1 mm of soil is eroded or after 30 minutes of flow whichever comes 
first, increase the velocity to 0.6 m/s and bring the soil back to a 1 mm protrusion. 
6. Repeat step 4. 
7. Then repeat steps 5 and 6 for velocities equal to 1.0 m/s, 1.5 m/s, 2 m/s, 3 m/s, 4.5 
m/s, and 6 m/s. The choice of velocity can be adjusted as needed. 
 
I.1.2  EFA test data reduction 
 
The test result consists of the erosion rate dz/dt versus shear stress τ curve (Fig. 1). For 
each flow velocity v, the erosion rate dz/dt (mm/hr) is simply obtained by dividing the 
length of sample eroded by the time required to do so.  
dz/dt = h/t      (1) 
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Fig. 1 - EFA (Erosion Function Apparatus) from Briaud et al. (2001) 
 
 
where h is the length of soil sample eroded in a time t. The length h is 1 mm and the time 
t is the time required for the sample to be eroded flush with the bottom of the pipe (visual 
inspection through a Plexiglas window). After several attempts at measuring the shear 
stress τ in the apparatus it was found that the best way to obtain τ was by using the 
Moody Chart (Moody, 1944) for pipe flows. 
τ = f ρ v2/8      (2) 
Where τ is the shear stress on the wall of the pipe, f is the friction factor obtained from 
Moody Chart (Fig. 2), ρ is the mass density of water (1000 kg/m3), and v is the mean 
flow velocity in the pipe.  The friction factor f is a function of the pipe Reynolds number 
Re and the pipe roughness ε/D.  The Reynolds number is Re = vD/ν where D is the pipe 
diameter and ν is the kinematic viscocity of water (10-6 m2/s at 200C). Since the pipe in 
the EFA has a rectangular cross section, D is taken as the hydraulic diameter D = 4A/P 
(Munson et al., 1990) where A is the cross sectional flow area, P is the wetted perimeter, 
and the factor 4 is used to ensure that the hydraulic diameter is equal to the diameter for a 
circular pipe.  For a rectangular cross section pipe: 
D = 2ab/(a + b)      (3) 
where a and b are the dimensions of the sides of the rectangle.  The relative roughness 
ε/D is the ratio of the average height of the roughness elements on the pipe surface over 
the pipe diameter D.  The average height of the roughness elements ε is taken equal to 
0.5D50 where D50 is the mean grain size for the soil.  The factor 0.5 is used because it is 
assumed that the top half of the particle protrudes into the flow while the bottom half is 
buried into the soil mass. During the test, it is possible for the soil surface to become 
rougher than just 0.5 D50; this occurs when the soil erodes block by block rather than 
particle by particle. In this case the value used for ε is estimated by the operator on the 
basis of inspection through the test window.  
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Fig. 2 - Moody Chart (reprinted with permission from Munson et al. 1990) 
 
 
I.2  SOIL AND WATER SAMPLES USED FOR EROSION TESTS 
 
A total of 11 locations were identified for studying the erosion resistance of the levee 
soils. Emphasis was placed on levees which were very likely overtopped. These locations 
are labeled S1 through S15 for Site 1 through Site 15 on Fig. 3. The samples were taken 
by pushing a Shelby tube when possible or using a shovel to retrieve soil samples into a 
plastic bag. For example at Site S1, the drilling rig was driven on top of the levee, 
stopped at the location of Site 1, a first Shelby tube was pushed with the drilling rig from 
0 to 2 ft depth and then a second Shelby tube was pushed from 2 to 4 ft depth in the same 
hole. These two Shelby tubes belonged to boring B1. The drilling rig advanced a few feet 
and a second location B2 at Site S1 was chosen; then two more Shelby tubes were 
collected in the same way as for B1. This process at Site S1 generated 4 Shelby tube 
samples designated 
• S1-B1-(0-2ft) 
• S1-B1-(2-4ft) 
• S1-B2-(0-2ft) 
• S1-B2-(2-4ft) 
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Fig. 3 – Location of samples 
 
Four such Shelby tubes were collected from sites S1, S2, S3, S7, S8, and S12. In a 
number of cases, Shelby tube samples could not be obtained because access for the 
drilling rig was not possible (e.g.: access by light boat for the MRGO levee) or pushing a 
Shelby tube did not yield any sample (clean sands). In these cases, grab samples were 
collected by using a shovel and filling a plastic bag. The number of bags collected varied 
from 1 to 4. Plastic bag samples were collected from sites S4, S5, S6, S11, and S15. The 
total number of sites sampled for erosion testing was therefore 11. These 11 sites 
generated a total of 23 samples. One of the samples, S8-B1-(2-4ft), exhibited two distinct 
layers during the EFA tests and therefore led to two EFA curves. All in all 24 EFA curves 
were obtained from these 23 samples: 14 performed on Shelby tube samples and 10 on 
bag samples. The reconstitution of the bag samples in the EFA is discussed later. 
 
Water salinity has an effect on erosion. The salinity of the water was determined by using 
the soil samples collected at the sites. Samples S11 and S15 were selected because one 
was on the Lake Pontchartrain side and the other on the Lake Borgne side. The procedure 
consisted of: 
 
1. Dry the soil (about 70 g) in an oven for 12 hr  
2. Weigh a quantity of soil, e.g. 10 g and place it in a PE bottle 
3. Add deionized (DI) water in the ratio of 2 ml water for one sample and 5 ml water 
for another sample to each gram of soil 
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4. Soil: DI water = 10 g: 20 ml or 10g: 50 ml 
5. Shake the bottle to thoroughly mix the soil and water 
6. Allow the soil to settle for 12 hr 
7. Use a pH meter (Orion model 420 A) to measure the pH and a calibrated 
conductivity meter (Corning model 441) to measure the conductivity of the water. 
8. Perform a calibration of the conductivity meter by using known concentrations of 
salt. 
9. Use the conductivity to salinity calibration curve to obtain the salinity of the water 
created in steps 1 to 7. 
 
Then it becomes necessary to correct the salinity of this water because the amount of 
water added to the soil for the salinity determination test does not correspond to the 
amount of water available in the soil pores in its natural state (in the levee). This is done 
by calculating the amount of water available in the pores of the samples in its natural 
state. This requires the use of the void ratio and the degree of saturation of the samples 
calculated using simple phase diagram relationships. The results obtained are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Salinity and pH of water associated with the samples 
 
    pH    Salinity (ppm) 
 
Sample S11   8.61    3287 
Sample S15   8.09    4199 
Typical sea water  7.9    30000 to 35000 
Typical tap water  7.0    500 
 
 
I.3  EROSION FUNCTION APPARATUS (EFA) TEST RESULTS 
 
I.3.1  Sample preparation 
 
No special sample preparation was necessary for the samples which were in Shelby tubes. 
The Shelby tube was simply inserted in the hole on the bottom side of the rectangular 
cross section pipe of the FEA (described previously). 
 
For bag samples obtained by using a shovel to collect the soil, there was a need to 
reconstruct the sample. These samples were prepared by re-compacting the soil in the 
Shelby tube (Fig. 4). The same process as the one used to prepare a sample for a Proctor 
compaction test was used. Since it was not known what the compaction level was in the 
field, two extreme levels of compaction energy were used to recompact the samples. The 
goal was to bracket the erosion response of the intact soil.  
 
For the high compaction effort (100% of Modified Proctor compaction effort), the sample 
was compacted in an 18-inch long Shelby tube as follows: 
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1) The total sample height was 6 inches. The sample was compacted in eight layers. 
2) To form each layer, the soil was poured into the Shelby tube from a height of 1 
inch above the top of the tube.  
3) The soil was compacted using a 10 lb hammer (Modified Proctor hammer) with a 
drop height of 1.5 feet. Each layer was compacted by 8 hammer blows, i.e. 8 
blows/layer. 
4) This process was repeated until a 6 inch sample was obtained. 
5) The corresponding compaction energy was equal to the Standard Modified 
Proctor Compaction energy. 
 
 
Piston ~ 1 inch
~ 17 inches
3-inch diameter 
 Shelby Tube 
1 inch
Soil
Sample Preparation 
(Note: Dimensions Indicative Only) 
 
 
Fig. 4 – Soil preparation by re-compaction for bag samples 
For the low compaction effort (1.63% of Modified Proctor compaction effort), the sample was 
compacted in an 18-inch long Shelby tube as follows. 
 
1. The total sample height was 6 inches. The sample was compacted in eight layers. 
2. To form each layer, the soil was poured into the Shelby tube from a height of 1 
inch above the top of the tube.  
3. The soil was compacted using a 10 lb hammer (Modified Proctor hammer) with a 
drop height of 1 inch. Each layer was compacted by 3 hammer blows, i.e. 3 
blows/layer. 
4. This process was repeated until a 6 inch sample was obtained. 
5. The corresponding compaction energy was 1.63% of the Standard Modified 
Proctor Compaction energy. 
 
Summary test data for all erosion samples are presented in the following section. 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S1-B1-(0-2ft)-TW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S1-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 35.6 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S2-B1-(0-2ft)-TW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S2-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 36.9 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S3-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 35.8 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S3-B2-(0-2ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 36.5 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S3-B3-(0-1ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 36.4 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S4-(0-0.5ft)-LC-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.1 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Low = 1.6% Modified Proctor Compaction  
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S4-(0-0.5ft)-HC-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 35.7 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: High = 100% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S5-(0-0.5ft)-LT-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.2 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Light Tamping 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S6-(0-0.5ft)-LC-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.5 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Low = 1.6% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S7-B1-(0-2ft)-TW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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Erosion Rate vs.Velocity
0.1
1.0
10.0
0.1 1.0 10.0
Velocity (m/s)
Er
os
io
n 
Ra
te
(m
m
/h
r) S7-B1-(0-2ft)-TWDepth(ft):0 - 2 ft
Su = 77kPa
 
 
 
 
 
  New Orleans Systems 
Independent Levee  Hurricane Katrina 
Investigation Team  July 31, 2006 
 
I - 20 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S7-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 36.9 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S8-B1-(0-2ft)-TW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S8-B1-(2-4ft)-L1-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 38.3 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S8-B1-(2-4ft)-L2-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 38.3 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S11-(0-0.5ft)-LC-TW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: Low = 1.6% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S11-(0-0.5ft)-HC-TW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: High = 100% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S12-B1-(0-2ft)-TW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S12-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 36.0 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S15-Canal Side-(0-0.5ft)-LC-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.4 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Low = 1.6% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S15-Canal Side-(0-0.5ft)-HC-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.5 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: High = 100% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S15-Levee Crown-(0-0.5ft)-LT-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.7 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Light Tamping 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S15-Levee Crown-(0.5-1.0ft)-LT-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 35.9 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Light Tamping 
 
Erosion Rate vs.Shear Stress
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S1-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 35.6 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S2-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 36.9 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S3-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 35.8 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S5-(0-0.5ft)-LT-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.2 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Light Tamping 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S6-(0-0.5ft)-LC-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.5 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Low = 1.6% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S7-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 36.9 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S8-B1-(0-2ft)-TW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S11-(0-0.5ft)-LC-TW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: Low = 1.6% Modified Proctor Compaction 
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EFA Test Results for Sample No. S12-B1-(0-2ft)-TW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 0.4 PPT (Tap Water) 
Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S12-B1-(2-4ft)-SW 
 
Sample Type: Shelby Tube 
Water Salinity: 36.0 PPT (Salt Water) 
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Compaction Effort: N/A 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S15-Canal Side-(0-0.5ft)-LC-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.4 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Low = 1.6% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S15-Canal Side-(0-0.5ft)-HC-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.5 PPT (Salt Water) 
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Compaction Effort: High = 100% Modified Proctor Compaction 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S15-Levee Crown-(0-0.5ft)-LT-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 36.7 PPT (Salt Water) 
Compaction Effort: Light Tamping 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EFA Test Results for Sample No. S15-Levee Crown-(0.5-1.0ft)-LT-SW 
 
Sample Type: Bulk Sample 
Water Salinity: 35.9 PPT (Salt Water) 
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Compaction Effort: Light Tamping 
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